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Document 747 lOth October 1977 
AGENDA 
of the Second Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session 
Paris, 28th November • 1st December 1977 
I. Political Questions 
1. European security and African problems 
2. WEU's contribution to the development of 
European union 
3. Application of the final act of the CSCE 
D. Defence Questions 
1. Strategic mobility 
2. Communications and crisis management in 
the Alliance 
DJ. Technical and Scientific Questions 
1. Progress in aerospace 
2. The spread of nuclear energy and defence 
problems 
IV. Budgetary and Administrative Questions 
1. Budget of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1978 
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 
1976- The Auditor's Report and Motion 
to approve the final accounts 
V. Rules of Procedure of the Assembly 
Procedure for electing the President of the 
Assembly when there is only one candidate 
VI. Relations with Parliaments 
Relations with parliaments 
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Report tabled by Mr. MUller cm behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Forni cm behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Segre cm behalf of the General 
Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Tanghe cm behalf of the Com-
mittee cm Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Watlcinscm cm behalf of the 
Committee cm Defence Questions and Armaments 
Report tabled by Mr. Valleix cm behalf of the Com-
mittee cm Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Jessel cm behalf of the Com-
mittee cm Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Dequae cm behalf of the Com-
mittee cm Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
Report tabled by Mr. Dequae cm behalf of the Com-
mittee cm Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
Report tabled by Mr. Jessel cm behalf of the Com-
mittee cm Rules of Procedure and Privileges 
Information report tabled by Mr. Reid cm behalf of 
the Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
Document 748 23rd Novemer 1977 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the Second Part of the Twenty• Third Ordinary Session 
Paris, 28th November•lst December 1977 
MONDAY, 28th NOVEMBER 
Morning 9 a.m. 
Meeting of Chairmen of National Delegations and Political Groups. 
10 a.m. 
Meeting of the Federated Christian Democrat Group and British Conservatives. 
10.30 a.m. 
Meeting of the Socialist Group. 
12 noon 
Meeting of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Afternoon 2.30 p.m. 
Meeting of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
3 p.m. 
1. Opening of the Second Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
4. Adoption of the draft Order of Business of the Second Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session. 
3.30 p.m. 
5. Address by Mrs. Hamm-Briicher, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. 
6. Application of the final act of the CSCE : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Segre on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendaJion. 
7. European security and Mrican problems : 
6 p.m. 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Muller on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendaJion. 
Meeting of the Presidential Committee. 
TUESDAY, 29th NOVEMBER 
Morning 8.30 a.m. 
Meeting of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments. 
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9.30 a.m. 
1. Budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 : 
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. 
2. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1976 - The 
Auditor's Report and Motion to approve the final accounts : 
presentation of the report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration. 
Debate. 
Votes on the draft texts. 
3. Communications and crisis management in the Alliance : 
11 a.m. 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Watkinson on behalf of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
4. Address by General Haig, Supreme Allied Commander Europe. 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
After noon 3 p.m. 
5. WEU's contribution to the development of European union : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Forni on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation 
WEDNESDAY, 30th NOVEMBER 
Revision of 29th November 1977 
Morning 8.30 a.m. 
9 a.m. 
Meetings of the General Affairs Committee and of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privi-
leges. 
1. The spread of nuclear energy and defence problems: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. J essel on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
11.30 a.m. 
2. Address by Mr. Deniau, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the French Republic. 
3. Progress in aerospace : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Valleix on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technolo-
gical and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
4. Strategic mobility : 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Tanghe on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments. · 
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Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
Afternoon 2.30 p.m. 
5. International terrorism: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Muller on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate under urgent procedure. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
6. Relations with Parliaments : 
presentation of the information report tabled by Mr. Reid on behalf of the Committee for Relations 
with Parliaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft order. 
7. Procedure for electing the President of the Assembly when there is only one candidate: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Jessel on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure 
and Privileges. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft text. 
At the close of the sitting 
Meeting of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments. 
CLOSE OF THE TWENTY-THIRD ORDINARY SESSION 
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Acc:oanfs of th• Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly 
for the Financial Year 1976 
THE AUDITOR'S REPORT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
REPORT OF THE EXTERNAL AUDITOR TO THE ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN 
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OF THE ASSEMBLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1976. 
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Financial position as at 31st December 1976. 
Appendix 11 : Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure and unexpended 
credits for the financial year 1976. 
Appendix Ill: Statement of sums due and reoeived from the Seoretary-GeneralofWEU, 
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1976. 
Appendix IV : Provident Fund - Account for the financial year ended 31st Deoember 
1976. 
Report of the external Auditor 
to the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
on the accounfs for the financial year 1976 
General 
1. The following financial statements, together 
with an explanatory memorandum, were sub-
mitted to me by the President : 
(a) Summary of income and expenditure 
for the financial year 1976 and finan-
cial position as at 31st December 1976 
(Appendix I). 
(b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
for the financial year 1976 (showing 
also transfers between sub-heads) 
(Appendix II). 
(c) Statement of sums due and received 
from the Secretary-General of Western 
European Union, London, in respect of 
contributions to the Assembly of 
Western European Union budget for 
1976 (Appendix III). 
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(d) Account of the provident fund for the 
financial year ended 31st December 
1976 (Appendix IV). 
2. My examination of the accounts has been 
carried out in accordance with Article 14 of the 
Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
Summary of Income and Expenditure 
(Appendix I) 
3. The approved original budget provided for 
expenditure of F 6,596,500 of which F 37,500 
was expected to be covered by miscellaneous 
receipts and the balance by contributions. 
4. Actual expenditure in the year amounted to 
F 6,245,893 and income amounted to F 6,664,882 
comprising F 6,559,000 from contributions 
requested and received and F 105,882 from miscel-
laneous receipts. There was thus an excess of 
income over expenditure of F 418,989 arising 
from a budgetary surplus of F 350,607 (as shown 
in Appendix II) and extra miscellaneous receipts 
ofF 68,382. 
Statement of budget authorisations, expenditure 
and unexpended credits 
(Appendix Il) 
(a) Head V, Sub-head 19: Contingencies and 
other expenditure not elsewhere provided for 
5. In 1964 the Cormcil of Western European 
Union authorised the use of 1964 budgetary sur-
pluses to establish a provident fund compensa-
tion account to be maintained by the Secretary-
GeneraL Specific amounts were set aside for cer-
tain staff members as compensation for ending 
the use of guaranteed exchange r8ites for assessing 
withdrawals from the provident fund ; the com-
pensation was to be paid on termination of the 
members' employment in addition to the sums 
due from the provident fund. Interest earned 
on the principal of the compensation account 
was not credited to the account for the benefit of 
the staff members, but has been credited to 
miscellaneous income in the Western European 
Union accounts. 
6. At their 112th meeting in September 1976 
the Western European Union Budget and Organ-
isation Committee agreed that the Office of the 
Secretary-General should submit for approval by 
delegations a proposal that an amount equivalent 
to the interest earned on the principal held in the 
compensation account should be credited to that 
account and distributed, along with the principal, 
to the eligible staff members still serving at 
1st January 1976. The amount required for this 
purpose was to be met from the 1976 budgetary 
surpluses of all the organs of Western European 
Union. The Office of the Secretary-General cal-
culated that interest payments due to eligible 
assembly staff members totalled F 20,945. 
7. During March 1977 the Office of the Secre-
tary-General informed the Clerk of the Assembly 
that all delegations "had agreed the proposal and 
requested him to charge Head V, Sub-head 19, in 
the Assembly's 1976 accounts with the amount 
of F 20,945 and credit a suspense account, delay-
ing payment to the staff members until the Coun-
cil had formally approved the proposal in April 
1977. Article 9 of the Financial Regulations per-
mits credits granted in the budget to remain 
available for use until 31st March in the ensuing 
year, but there is no provision for payments to 
be charged against the budget and the corres-
ponding credits to be placed in suspense for use 
after 31st March. The Clerk of the Assembly 
acted as requested and charged F 20,945 to Sub-
head 19 and included a corresponding credit in 
accounts payable (Appendix 1). However on 15th 
April1977 one delegation informed the Secretary-
General that it had withdrawn its agreement 
to the proposal, and accordingly the formal 
approval of the Council has not yet been given. 
Thus F 20,945 has been charged to Sub-head 19 
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although the actual payments to the staff mem-
bers have not been authorised and made. I under-
stand that the proposal will be reconsidered at 
forthcoming meetings of the Budget and Organi-
sation Committee and the Council. 
(b) Transfers between sub-heads 
8. All the transfers between sub-heads within 
the same head of the budget, as shown in Appen-
dix 11, were duly authorised in accordance with 
Article 6 of the Financial Regulations. 
Provident fund 
(Appendix IV) 
9. The assets of the provident fund of the 
Assembly are amalgamated with the assets of the 
provident funds of the other organs of Western 
European Union in joint deposits held in a 
number of currencies and administered by the 
Office of the Secretary-General. On the advice 
of an Advisory Panel representing all the 
interested parties, the number of currencies held 
was increased during 1976 from three to four. 
10. In accordance with a decision taken in 1974 
by the Office of the Secretary-General the 
balances on the accounts of staff members of the 
Assembly reflect the book value of the Assembly's 
share of the joint deposits and have not been 
adjusted for differences between book and market 
values resulting from fluctuation in exchange 
rates. Withdrawals from the fund in 1976 of 
F 295,558 include F 127,853 repaid to former 
staff members who left in 1975 : the difference of 
F 2,286 between book and market value on these 
members' accounts, referred to in paragraph 8 of 
my report on the 1975 accounts, was offset 
against gains totalling F 3,657 arising in 1976, 
leaving a net gain on valuation of F 1,371, as 
recorded in Appendix IV. At 31st December 1976 
the total book value of the balances was 
F 4,553,882, which includes F 7,056 due for 
repayment in 1977 to a former staff member and 
unapportioned interest of F 88 which will be 
credited to staff members' accounts in 1977. 
11. I have received from the Office of the 
Secretary-General a certificate by the depositary 
showing the amount of the joint deposits held at 
31st December 1976 and a statement confirming 
the share of those deposits standing to the credit 
of the Assembly's provident fund in the Office's 
books at 31st December 1976. A valuation of the 
currencies held in the joint deposits at that date 
showed a loss on book value of some F 807,445 of 
which F 175,962 related to the accounts of the 
staff of the Assembly. 
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12. I wish to record my appreciation of the 
willing co-operation of the officers of the Assem-
bly during my audit. 
Sir Douglas HENLEY, K.C.B. 
(Comptroller and Auditor General, 
United Kingdom) 
External Auditor 
17th June 1977 
Explmlatory Memorandum 
(communicated by the P....,dent to the Auditor of 
the Aaembly in connection with the financial year 
1916) 
1. The statements attached hereto refer to : 
(a) Summary of income and expenditure -
financial position as at 31st December 
1976 (Appendix I) ; 
(b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
(Appendix 11) ; 
(c) Contributions (Appendix Ill) ; 
(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV). 
2. The statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits indicates 
that a sum of F 350,607 remains unexpended, 
whereas the final balance of income over 
expenditure was F 418,989. The difference 
between these two figures, F 68,382, represents : 
F F 
- Bank interest . . . . . . . . 81,385 
- Sundry receipts . . . . . . 3,356 
- Sale of publications . . 21,141 
105,882 
16 
- Less receipts for 1976 
estimated in the bud-
get .............. .. 
Traufers 
37,500 
68,382 
3. Excess expenditure amounting to F 70,844 
has been met by transfer between sub-heads 
within heads. 
Contnoutiom 
4. All contributions were received from the 
Secretary-General WEU London before 31st 
December 1976. 
Provident fund 
5. The Assembly's funds are incorporated with 
those of the other organs of WEU and the 
entire fund is administered by the Secretary-
General in consultation with the Clerk of the 
Assembly. 
6. · The Secretary-General has continued to 
receive advice from the advisory panel set up 
within WEU and from outside bankers on the 
investment of the funds. These are at present 
held in United States dollars, French francs and 
pounds sterling with the International West-
minster Bank Ltd., London. 
7. Interest was distributed to individual 
accounts on 31st December 1976. As shown in 
Appendix IV, the balance of the fund on 31st 
December 1976, including F 88 still to be distri-
buted, was F 4,546,826. 
8. The President would like to take this 
opportunity of expressing the appreciation of 
the Assembly for the help which was extended 
to the Office of the Clerk by the United King-
dom Comptroller and Auditor General. 
18th April1977 
Edmond NESSLER 
President of the Assembly 
APPENDIX 1 DOOlJJIBN'r 749 
APPENDIX I 
Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1976 
(in French francs) 
Per attached statement 
Assessments of member States (see Appendix ID) 
Miscellaneous 
Bank interest .............................................. . 
Sundry receipts .............................................. . 
Sale of publications .......................................... . 
Expenditure under budget authorisation (see Appendix 11) •••.•••• 
Exoess of income over expenditure ............................• 
Finand.al position as at 81d December 1976 
Assets 
Cash at bank 
Sundry advances . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................. . 
Salary advances ............................................. . 
Accounts receivable 
Leas: 
Liabilities 
Supplementary insurance 
Accounts payable ............................................ . 
Excess of income over expenditure ............................ . 
Certified correct : 
6,559,000 
81,380 
3,356 
21,141 
737,047 
62,700 
16,000 
43,706 
12,914 
427,550 
418,989 
Andre DEQUAE 
6,559,000 
105,882 
6,664,882 
6,245,893 
F 418,989 
809,453 
F 859,453 
Edmond NESSLER 
President of the Assembly 
Francis HUMJJLET 
Olerlc of the Assembly Okasrman of the Oommittee on 
Budgeta'1J AOaira and Admsniatrat$on 
I have examined the foregoing Summary of Income and Expenditure and the Statement of Assets 
and Liabilities. I have obtained all the information and explanations that ·I have required, and I 
certify, a.s the result of my audit, that in my opinion these Statements are correct. 
17th June 1977 
Signed: Sir Douglas IIENLEY, K.C.B. 
Comptroller and A utUtor General, 
United Kingdom 
Ea:tm&al AutUtor 
17 
DOOUMBNT 749 
APPEN 
STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATJ:ONS, EXPENDITURE AND 
Total budget for 
DETAILS 1976 1 
HEAD I • EXPENDITURE FOR STAFF 
Sub-Head 1 (a) Salaries of permanent establishment 2,725,000 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades 
Band C), including travelling expenses and French 
social security 9,000 
Sub-Head 2 .Allowances, social charges, etc. 
(.A) .Allowances 
(a) Household allowance 95,000 
(b) Children's allowance 132,000 
(c) Expatriation allowance 234,000 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance 10,000 
(e) Overtime 14,000 
(/) Guarantee against currency devaluation for non-
French staff 
-
(g) Education allowance 38,000 
(h) Allowance for language courses 2,000 
(B) Social charges 
(a) Social security 180,000 
(b) Supplementary insurance 112,000 
(c) Provident fund 368,000 
(d) Retirement pension 
-
(0) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and 
departure of permanent officials 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not 
residing in Paris, who are convened for examinations 
and interviews, and cost of marking examination 
-
papers 1,600 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival 
and departure of staff and dependent persons 1,500 
(c) Removal expenses 3,000 
(d) Installation allowance 4,500 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 7,000 
(/) Medical examination 2,400 
Total of Head I 3,939,000 
I. Document 678. 
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APPJIINDIX II 
DIX 11 
UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1976 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure credits 
+ -
18,452 2,706,548 2,674,884 31,664 
4,695 13,695 13,695 -
95,000 92,900 2,100 
132,000 130,384 1,616 
234,000 223,277 10,723 
10,000 4,974 5,026 
14,000 ll,976 2,024 
I 2,292 40,292 40,292 -
2,000 270 1,730 
ll,465 191,465 191,465 -
II2,000 102,172 9,828 
368,000 360,912 7,088 
1,600 1,192 408 
1,500 
-
1,500 
3,000 - 3,000 
4,500 
-
4,500 
7,000 6,898 102 
2,400 2,186 214 
18,452 18,452 3,939,000 3,857,477 81,523 
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DETAILS 
HBAD ll • EXPENDITUBB RELATING TO THE SESSIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
8ub-Heo4 3 1. Temporary 81aff 
Temporary staff required for the sessions of the 
Assembly 
2. IAnguNiic 81aff 
(A) Interpretation 8enJicea 
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of 
the Assembly 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of 
Committees between sessions 
(B) Tran1ilation Bervicu 
Temporary translators for the sessions of the 
Assembly 
3. lMUrance for lemporary BlG/f 
4. In81allation of equipment and hire of olfice8 
for the BeuionB 
Total of Head ll 
HBAD Ill - EXPENDITUBB ON PRBMISBS AND BQUIPJOINT 
8ub-Heo4 4 Premises 
Bub-HefMl 6 Capital equipment 
Total of Head m 
20 
Total budget for . 
1976 
331,000 
151,000 
130,000 
276,000 
4,500 
147,000 
34,000 
1,073,500 
153,000 
57,000 
210,000 
----------
APPDDIX 11 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure credits 
+ -
331,000 295,726 35,274 
151,000 131,358 19,642 
130,000 113,795 16,205 
276,000 263,435 12,565 
4,500 3,634 866 
3,444 143,556 141,263 2,293 
3,444 37,444 37,444 -
3,444 3,444 1,073,500 986,655 86,845 
3,274 149,726 134,552 15,174 
3,274 60,274 60,274 -
3,274 3,274 210,000 194,826 15,174 
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DETAILS 
HEAD IV • GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-H eaiJ, 6 
Sub-HeaiJ, 7 
Sub-HeaiJ, 8 
Sub-H eaiJ, 9 
Sub-HeaiJ, 10 
Sub-H eaiJ, 11 
Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of 
documents 
Paper, stationery and office supplies 
Printing and publishing of Assembly documents 
Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. 
Official car 
Bank charges 
Total of Head IV 
HEAD V • OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-HeaiJ, 12 
Sub-HeaiJ, 13 
Sub-HeaiJ, 14 
Sub-HeaiJ, 15 
Sub-HeaiJ, 16 
Sub-HeaiJ, 17 
Sub-HeaiJ, 18 
Sub-HeaiJ, 19 
Sub-HeaiJ, 20 
Travel and subsistence allowances and insurance for 
the President of the Assembly, Chairmen of Com-
mittees and Rapporteurs 
Expenses for representation and receptions 
Committee study missions 
Official journeys of members of the Office of the 
Clerk 
Expenses of experts and the auditor 
Expenditure on information 
Expenses for groups of the Assembly 
Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere 
provided for 
Non-recoverable taxes 
Total of Head V 
I TOTAL j ......... . 
Total budget for 
1976 
250,000 
125,000 
620,000 
18,500 
22,000 
500 
1,036,000 
55,000 
80,000 
3,000 
125,000 
20,000 
30,000 
15,000 
3,000 
7,000 
338,000 
6,596,500 
The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1976, and 
Edmond NBsSLJm 
Pruident of the .ABBembly 
22 
Fra.ncis 
Olerlcoflhe 
APPENDIX II 
Transfers Total after Total Unexpended transfers expenditure credits 
+ -
7,902 242,098 183,663 58,435 
125,000 119,600 5,400 
620,000 536,295 83,705 
2,555 21,055 21,055 
-
5,347 27,347 27,347 -
500 87 413 
7,902 7,902 1,036,000 888,047 147;953 
37,772 17,228 11,572 5,656 
14,827 94,827 94,827 
-
3,000 2,025 975 
125,000 117,036 7,964 
20,000 16,445 3,555 
1,000 31,000 31,000 
-
15,000 14,038 962 
18,811 21,811 21,811 -
3,134 10,134 10,134 -
37,772 37,772 338,000 318,888 19,112 
70,844 70,844 6,596,500 6,245,893 350,607 
paid for up to 31st March 1977, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
HUMBLET 
Assembly 
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Andre DEQuA:m 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Boogetary Affairs and Administration 
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APPENDIX ID 
STATEMENT OF SUMS DUE AND RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY 
BUDGET FOR 1916 
Contributions Budget surplus Main budget Net Member States 600ths contributions overpaid in 1975 1975 for 1976 
required 
F F F F 
Belgium 59 (-) 4,730 (-) 54,753 644,968 585,485 
France 120 (-) 9,621 (-) Jl1,363 1,311,800 1,190,816 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 120 (-) 9,621 (-) 111,363 1,311,800 1,190,816 
Italy 120 (-) 9,621 (-) 111,363 1,311,800 1,190,816 
Luxembourg 2 (-) 160 (-) 1,856 21,864 19,847 
Netherlands 59 (-) 4,730 (-) 54,753 644,968 585,485 
United Kingdom 120 (-) 9,621 (-) 111,363 1,311,800 1,190,816 
--
600 (-) 48,104 (-) 556,814 6,559,000 5,954,081 
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PROVIDENT FUND 
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1976 
F F 
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1976 3,960,959 Withdrawals 295,558 
Accounts of former staff members awaiting settlement Loans to staff members 240,000 
at 31st December 1975 130,139 
Contributions of staff members and of the Assembly Balancea carried forward : 
of Western European Union 529,831 
Accounts of a former staff member awaiting settlement 
Repayments of loans by staff members 152,100 at 31st December 1976 
Interest received during year 315,040 Accounts of existing staff 
December 1976 
Gain on valuation by staff who have left the organi-
sation 
Edmond N:mssLER 
Pruidem of the A&Bembly 
1,371 Interest to be distributed 
5,089,440 
Francis HUMBLliiT 
Cleric of lke A&&embly 
7,056 
members as at 31st 4,546,738 
88 
5,089,440 
Andre DJIIQUAlll 
Chairman of lke Committee on 
Budgela11J Affair& and Admini.Btration 
I have examined the toregoing Statement. I have obtamed all the information and explanations that I have required, and I oertify, as the result of 
my audit, t.bat. in my opinion this Statemsnt is oornot. 
17th June 1977 
Sir Douglas H:mNLliiY, K.C.B. 
Comptroller and Auditor General, Uniled Kingdom 
Ezternal Auditor 
Document 749, Addendum 3rd Novemmher 1977 
Accounts of the Administrative Expenditure of the Assembly 
for the Financial Year 1976 
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1976 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 2 
by Lord Selsdon, Acting Chairman and Rapporteur 
The Assembly, 
Having examined the final accounts of the Assembly for the financial year 1976, together with 
the Auditor's Report, in accordance with Article 16 of the Financial Regulations, 
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his 
financial responsibility. 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee : Lord Selsdon (Alternate : 
Ohonnon) (Acting Chairman); Mr. Schmitt (Vice-
Chairman) ; MM. Adriaensens, AZber, Antoni, Bonalumi 
(Alternate : OavaZiere), Del Duca. (Alternate : Borghi), 
Depietri, Evers, Hengel, Ka.uffma.nn (Alternate : Bizet), 
26 
Koopman, Lewis (Alternate: Bagier), McNamara (Alter-
nate: Lord Peddie), Orsini (Alternate: Giuat), Page 
(Alternate: Jusel), Schleiter, Vadepied (Alternate: 
La Oombe), Vohrer, Mrs. van der Werj, MM. Bonnel, 
Schwencke. 
N. B. The namu of those taking pari in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
Document 750 13th July 1977 
DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE 
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1978 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 1 
by Mr. Dequae, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Summary of Estimates for the Fiuaucial Year 1978 
Allocation of Expenditure under Heads and Sub-Heads 
Explanatory Memorandum 
Summary of Estimates for the Financial Year 1978 
Details 
Head I : Expenditure for staff ................................. . 
Head 11 : Expenditure relating to temporary personnel ............ . 
Head I11: Expenditure on premises and equipment ................ . 
Head IV: General administrative costs .......................... .. 
Head V : Other expenditure .................................... . 
Head V I : Pensions ............................................. . 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE •••••••••••••••••••• 
TOTAL BEOEJPTS •••••••••••••••••••••••• 
NET TOTAL ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Estimate for 1978 
F 
5,026,000 
1,302,000 
252,000 
1,153,000 
403,000 
62,000 
8,198,000 
92,000 
8,106,000 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee on Bud-
getary Affairs and Administration and approved unani-
mously by the Presidential Committee. 
Depletri, Evers, Hengel, Ka;u,f!mann, van Kleef, de 
Koster, Lemp, Lewi.s, MoNamara, Orsini, Page, Sohleiter, 
Vadepied, Vohrer. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Dequae (Chair-
man) ; Lord Selsdon, Mr. Schmitt (Vice-Chairman) ; 
MM •. ttlber, Antoni, Bonalumi, de Bruyne, Del Duoa, 
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N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
pri'nted in italics. 
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AUoeation of Expenditure under Beads t111d Sub-Beads 
Head I - EXPENDITURB 11'0R STAD 
Sub-Head 1 : Salaries of permanent establishment ......•........ 
Sub-Head 2 : (A) Allowances ................................ . 
(B) Social charges ............................. . 
(C) Expenses relating to the recruitment, arrival and 
departure of permanent offioi&ls ............. . 
TOTAL OF HEAD I ...................... . 
Head 11 - EXPBNDITURB RELATING TO TH1!I SESSIONS OF TH1!I ASSlDIBLY 
Sub-Head 3: 1. Temporary staff ............................•. 
2. Linguistic staff .............................. . 
3. Insurance for temporary staff ................ . 
4. InstaJia,tion of equipment for sessions ......... . 
5. Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions .....•.• 
Estimate for 1978 
F 
3,500,000 
674,000 
828,000 
24,000 
396,000 
684,000 
5,000 
173,000 
44,000 
5,026,000 
TOTAL OF HEAD II .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . , ____ _ 1,302,000 
Head I11 - BXPENDITURB ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head 4 : Premises •......................•..........•...•. 
Sub-Head 5 : Capital equipment ............•.................. 
TOTAL OF HEAD III ................... . 
Head IV -GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head 6: Postage, telephone, telegraph chargee, transport of 
documents, typewriters, etc. • ................... . 
Sub-Head 7: Paper, stationery and office supplies •............. 
Sub-Head 8 : Printing and publishing of Assembly documents ... . 
Sub-Head 9 : Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. . .... . 
Sub-Head 10 : Official cars .................................... . 
Sub-Head 11 : Bank charges .................................. . 
TOTAL OF HEAD IV .......•............. 
Head V - OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head 12: Travel and subsistence a.llowances and insurance for 
Chairmen of Committees, Ra.pporteurs and Represen-
tatives attending meetings of the Bureau, Presidential 
Committee and joint meetings .................. . 
Sub-Head 13 : Expenses for representation and receptions ....... . 
Sub-Head 14 : Committee study missions ...................... .. 
Sub-Head 15 : Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk 
Sub-Head 16: Expenses of experts and the auditors ............ . 
Sub-Head 17 : Expenditure on information ..................... . 
Sub-Head 18: Expenses for groups of the Assembly ............ . 
Sub-Head 19: Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere 
provided for .................................. .. 
Sub-Head 20 : Non-recoverable taxes ........................... . 
TOTAL OF HEAD~ •••••••••••••••••••••• 
Head V I - PBNSIONS 
Sub-Head 21 : (A) Pensions ................................... . 
(B) Allowances .................................. . 
(C) Severance grant ............................ . 
(D) Payments to member States for validation .... . 
TOTAL OF HEAD TI .................... . 
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182,000 
70,000 
252,000 
260,000 
150,000 
680,000 
22,500 
40,000 
500 
1,153,000 
55,000 
100,000 
3,000 
155,000 
24,000 
36,000 
17,000 
3,000 
10,000 
62,000 
Pro mem. 
Pro mem. 
Pro mem. 
403,000 
62,000 
Head I - Expenditure for Staff 
Sub-Head 1 
SALAB.IES OF PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT 
DOCUMENT 750 
(a) Basic salaries 
.Estimate : F 3,500,000 
.Esti1111Jte : F 3,488,000 
The Clerk ............................................ . 
The Clerk Assistant ................................... . 
Counsellors ............................................. . 
First Secretaries ....................................... . 
Secretary .............................................. . 
Secretaries-Translators /Publications ...................... . 
Administrative Assistant /Assistant Translator 
Chief Accountant ...................................... . 
Personal Assistants ..................................... . 
B~ Sho~nd ~ists ............................. . 
Switchboard Operator .................................. . 
llead ltoneo-Storekeeper ................................ . 
Messengers .•..••................... · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · • · · 
WEU 
Grade 
llors cadre 
llors cadre 
A5 
A4 
A3 
A2 
B6 
B4 
B3 
B3 
06 
C3 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), 
including travelling expenses and French social security 
No. 
1 
1 
5 
2 
1 
3 
1 
4 
6 
1 
1 
2 
28 
Total 
F 
118,000 
209,000 
1,083,000 
368,000 
157,000 
351,000 
124,000 
368,000 
463,000 
80,000 
67,000 
100,000 
3,488,000 
EBtimate : F 12,000 
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Sub-Head 2 
ALLOW ANOES, SOOIA.L OliA.BGES, ETO. 
(A) A.LLOWA.NOES 
(a) Household allowance 
Rank 
Clerk Assistant ......................................... 
Counsellors .•...•....•....•.....•................•......• 
First Secretary ......................................... 
Secretary ............................................... 
Personal Assistants .•..•....•......................•.•••• 
Bilingual Shorthand Typists •..•.•...............•.......• 
Head Roneo-Storekeeper ................................. 
Messengers ••...•.•..•....•................. • · · · · ... · · · • · 
(b) Children's allowance 
E&timalt.: F 674,000 
E&timalt.: F I27,000 
WEU No. Total Grade F 
Hors oadre I I3,000 
A5 4 52,000 
A4: I 11,000 
A3 I 9,000 
B4 3 17,000 
B3 3 I4,000 
C6 I 4,000 
03 2 7,000 
I6 I27,000 
E&timate : F I74,000 
5,800 F per year per child: 5,800 X 30 ........................ F I74,000 
(c) Expatriation allowance E&timate: F 29I,OOO 
Rank WEU No. Total Grade F 
Counsellors .........•..........•..............•..•....... A5 3 I22,000 
First Secretary ......................................... A4 1 37,000 
Secretary ...•.......•••••..•.•....•...•.....•........... A3 I 33,000 
Secretary. Transla.tor I Publications 
Administrative Assistant /Assistant Transla.tor .............. A2 2 39,000 
Personal Assistants .........•.........•..•............... B4 2 34,000 
Bilingual Shorthand ~ists ....••..•.••..•.•............. B3 2 26,000 
11 29I,OOO 
(d) Compensatory rent allowance E&timate: F IO,OOO 
(e) Overtime EBtimate: F I5,000 
(f) 
(g) Education allowance E&timate: F 55,000 
(h) Allowance for language courses E&timate: F 2,000 
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(B) SOCIAL OHA.BGBS 
Estimat~ : F 828,000 
(a) Social Security E&timat~ : F 250,000 
27 officials F 250,000 
(b) Supplementary insurance Estimate: F 141,000 
3.40% of total emoluments X 4,145,000 F F 141,000 
(c) Provident fund E&timate : F 437,000 
14 % of basic salaries X 3,120,000 F F 437,000 
(Q) liiXPENSES RliiLATING TO TB:U: RliiORUITIUINT, ARRIVAL AND DliiPARTURE OF PERMANENT OFI'IOIALS 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing 
in Paris who are convened for examinations and interviews and 
cost of marking examination papers 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure 
of staff and dependent persons 
(c) Removal expenses 
(d) Installation allowance 
(~) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
(f) Medioal examination 
31 
Estimate: F 24,000 
E&limale : F I ,600 
E&timate: F 1,500 
Estimate : F 3,400 
Estimate : F 4,500 
E&limale: F 10,000 
Ellimale : F 3,000 
DOOUJIBBT 750 
Head 11 - Expendtlare relating to the sessions of the Aaembly 
Emmale: F 1,302,000 
8ub-Btad 3 
1. TBJIPOB.&BY STAJ'J' 
Temporary staff required for the lelliona of the Assembly 
Paris : 10 days 
Function Daily Total remuneration No. 
F F 
Head of the sittings office .............................. . 450 la 6,800 
Heads of sections .......................•............... 345 2a 29,000 
460 4b 
Sergeant-at-Arms ....................................... . 390 1 b 4,800 
Secretaries for the Assembly ............................ . 320 2a 15,600 
390 2b 
Precis writers ................•....•.•.....•......•.•••.. 320 4a 31,400 
390 4b 
Verbatim reporters •.•.•....••.......•.......•..••••.••.. 390 14 b 84,400 
500 4c 
Assist;anta •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 255 4b 108,200 
240 23 b 
190 6a 
170 lOa 
Head ushers ........•................................... 120 2a 3,000 
Ushers ................•.•.•.....••..•.........•........ no 16 a 18,900 
Roneo /Assemblers ...................................... . no 18 a 19,400 
n7 321,500 
a. Recruited looally. 
b. Recruited outside Franoe. 
c. Recruited aa free-lance ...._ 
Travelling expenses . .. • .. . • • .. . .. F 74,500 
396,000 
32 
' 
2 
DOOU!riBNT 750 
2. LINGUISTIC ST.AJ'J' 
(A) Interpretation Service8 
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly 
10 days 
Function Total 
No. 
F 
Interpreters ............................................ 12 165,000 
12 
Travelling expenses . • . . . . . . F 13,000 
F 178,000 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions . . • . . . F 160,000 
(B) TraMlation Service8 
Temporary translators for the sessions of the Assembly 
Daily Estimate. 
Function remuneration No. 
F F 
Revisers ................................................ 430 2a 127,000 
668 4b 
Translators .............................................. 333 4a 126,000 
544 4b 
Assistants .•••••.....•..••....•.•......•.......•..•.•...•. 175 4a 83,000 
235 3b 
160 3a 
225 2b 
26 336,000 
1. Based on 32 days for the revisers and translators. 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Reomited outside France. 
Travelling expenses . • . • . . . . • • • • • F 10,000 
F 346,000 
3. INSURANCE JI'OB TEM:POBABY STAFII' 
Eatimate : F 5,000 
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4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR SESSIONS 
- Installa.tion of simultaneous interpretation equipment ................ F 140,000 
- Installa.tion of telephone booths .................................... F 14,000 
- Installation of tape-recorders and a teleprinter "Fra.nce-Presse" for the 
Press Service ................................••.................. F 11,000 
- Technicians necessary for the operation of the simultaneous interpretation 
equipment in the WEU committee rooms • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . F 8,000 
Estimate : F 173,000 
5. MISOliiLLANEOUS EXPENDITURE DURING SESSIONS 
-Removal expenses •....•.......................................... F 5,000 
-Medical Service (Doctor and Nurse) ................................. F 5,500 
- Hire of typewriters and technicians .. . .. . .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. . . . . .. .. . .. F 5,500 
- Servicing of lifts . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 8,000 
- Cleaning ••.....••.•.........•••............•..................... F 8,000 
- Miscellaneous ...............................................•...... F 12,000 
Estimate: F 44,000 
Head Ill - Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Estimate : F 252,000 
Sub-Head 4 
PREMISES 
- Hire of committee rooms outside Paris and installation of simultaneous 
interpretation equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 8,000 
- Technician necessary for the operation of the simultaneous interpretation 
equipment in the WEU committee rooms between sessions . . . . . . . . . . . F 4,000 
- Joint overheads for the premises ................................... F 160,000 
-Minor repairs to equipment and machines and removal of furniture F 10,000 
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O.Al'ITAL EQUIPMENT 
- Purchase of 2 roneo machines (SAM) ..................... F 60,000 
- Replacement of armchairs and typists' chairs .............. F 10,000 
Estimate : F 70,000 
Head IV - General administrative costs 
E&timak: F 1,153,000 
Sub-Head 6 
POSTAGE, TlDLBPHONE, TELEGRAPH CHARGES, TRANSPORT OJ' DOCUMENTS 
- Postage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 150,000 
- Telephone ............................................... F 88,000 
- Telegrams. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 8,000 
- Transport of documents ................................. F 14,000 
E&timak : F 260,000 
Sub-Hearl 7 
P.Al'EB, STATIONlllBY AND OJI'J'IOB SUPPLIES 
- Purchase of roneo paper, stencils, beaded writing paper and other 
office supplies 
E&timate : F 150,000 
Sub-Head 8 
PBINTING AND PUBLISBlNG OJ' ASSEMBLY DOOUMBNTS 
- Printing of Assembly documents (includes the record of debates, 
minutes of the Assembly and Assembly documents) 
- Printing of Reports of the Council 
- Printing of Texts Adopted 
- Miscellaneous - Bulletins, printing of the Agenda 
and Order of Business of the Assembly, voting lists, etc. 
-Reprints 
-Brochures 
E&timate : F 680,000 
Sub-Hearl 9 
PUBOHASE OF DOCUMENTS, BEJ'BBENOE WOBKS, ETC. 
E&timak : F 22,500 
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Sub-Head 10 
OFFIOIA.L CABS 
- Hire of official oars 
Eatimate : F 40,000 
Sub-Head 11 
BANK OHARGES 
Eatimate : F liOO 
Head V - Other expenditure 
Sub-Head. 12 
TRAVEL AND SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOB THE PRESIDENT Oll' THE ASSEMBLY, 
OHAIRMJIN 01' COMMITTli:ES AND BAPPOBTJWBS 
Emmate: F 55,000 
Sub-Head. 13 
EXPENSES li'OB BEPBESENTATION AND RECEPTIONS 
Eatimate : F 100,000 
Sub-Head, 14 
COMMITTEE STUDY MISSION& 
Eatimate : F 3,000 
Sub-Head 15 
OJ'FIOIAL JOUBN11lYS Oll' MEMBERS Oll' THE OJ'FIOE 01' THE OLEBK 
Eatimate : F 155,000 
Sub-Head. 16 
EXPENSES Oll' EXPERTS AND THE AUDITOR 
Eatimate : F 24,000 
Sub-Head. 17 
EXPENDITURE ON INJI'OBMATION 
Eatimate : F 36,000 
Sub-Head. 18 
.lllXPBNSES li'OB GROUPS Oll' TBB ASSEMBLY 
E8timate : F 17,000 
Sub-Head. 19 
OONTIN'GDODDS AND OTBEB EXPENDITURE NOT ELSEWHERE PROVIDED li'OB 
Eatimate : F 3,000 
Sub-Head. 20 
NON-BEOOVJDBABLB TAXBS 
E8timate: F 10,000 
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Bead VI - Pensions 
Sub-Head, 21 
PENSIONS, ALLOW A.NCES, ETC. 
(A) Penaicm8 
EBtimate : F 62,000 
(a) Retirement pension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • EBtimate: F 40,000 
(b) Invalidity pension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EBtimate : pro mem. 
(c) Survivors' pension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EBtimate: F 22,000 
(d) Orphans' pension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EBtimate : pro mem. 
(B) AUowancea 
EBtimate : pro mem. 
(a) Household allowance ................................... EBtimate: pro mem. 
(b) Dependants' allowance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EBtimate: pro mem. 
(c) Education allowance .................................... EBtimate: pro mem. 
(d) Relief allowance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EBtimate : pro mem. 
(C) Severance grant 
EBtimate : pro mem. 
(D) Payments to member States for validation 
EBtimate : pro mem. 
Income 
Estimate : F 92,000 
(A) Sundry receipts 
(a) Sale of publications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
(b) Bank interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 50,000 
(c) Social security reimbursements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
Estimate: F 75,000 
(B) Penaicm8 
(a) Contributions (7 %) Estimate: F 17,000 
(b) Reimbursement of provident fund withdrawals (loans, etc.). EBtimate: pro mem. 
(c) Validation receipts from the provident fund and interest to 
30th June 1974 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . EBtimate: pro mem. 
(d) Provident fund contributions and interest since 1st July 1974 EBtimate: pro mem. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(•ubmltted by Mr. Dequae Chcdrrrum and Rap,POrtear) 
1. The draft budget now before you amounts to F 8,106,000. The budget for 1977 amounted to 
F 7,317,523 1• The difference is therefore F 788,477, i.e. 10.77%. 
2. HeaiJ, I - Expenditure for staff 
The increase (F 571,477) in the estimate for this head takes account of: 
(i) the effect over a full year of increases granted in 1976 in basic salaries and payments to the 
provident fund, expatriation and household allowances and contributions in respect o 
supplementary insurance ; 
(ii) annual increments; 
(iii) an expected increase of 9% in 1978. 
3. HeaiJ, II - Expenditure relating to sessions of the Assembly 
Sub-head 3.1 - Temporary staff 
The estimated increase is F 30,000. 
Salaries for temporary staff follow the scales applied in the Council of Europe and the European 
Parliament. In accordance with the decision of the Budget Committee of the Council, the WEU Assemb1y 
applies automatically, in the course of the year, all increases in salary scales as and when they are applied 
by the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. 
Sub-head 3.2 (A) - Interpretation services 
The increase (F 23,000) in the estimate for this sub-head takes into account probable increases in the 
scales applied by the co-ordinated organisations for salaries and daily allowances payable to interpreters. 
Sub-head 3.2 (B) - Translation services 
The increase (F 25,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the scales applied in th~ 
Council of Europe. 
Sub-head 3.4 - Installation of equipment for sessions 
The increase (F 15,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the expected increase in 
the cost of installing equipment needed for two part-sessions held in Paris. 
Sub-head 3.5 - Miscellaneous expenditure during sessions 
The increase (F 4,000) in the estimate for this sub-head, covering two part-sessions held in Paris, 
is to meet certain expenses affected by the rise in the cost of living. 
4. Heail, Ill - Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Sub-head 4 - Premises 
The increase (F 17,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is to meet the higher cost of maintenance 
for the premises at 43, avenue du President Wilson. 
Sub-head 5 -Capital equipment 
The sum ofF 70,000 is for the replacement of two roneo machines (those now in use having been 
purchased in 1964 and 1969) and of a number of chairs purchased in 1962 which are now worn out. 
5. Head I V - General administrative costs 
Sub-head 6 - Postage, telephone, telegraph charges, transport of documents 
The increase (F 10,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to rising prices. 
Sub-head 7 - Paper, stationery and office supplies 
The increase (F 15,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the higher cost of paper 
and office supplies. 
Sub-head 9 - Purchase of documents, reference works, etc. 
1. The 1977 budget included F 81,523 from Hea<.l I of the 1976 budget for the retroactive payment in 1977 of 
sums due for salary increases. 
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The increase (F 3,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to the higher cost of subscriptions to 
newspapers, periodicals and reference works. 
Sub-head 10 - Official cars 
The increase (F 18,000) in the estimate for this sub-head is due to the higher cost of hiring cars. 
6. Head V - Other expenditure 
Sub-head 13 - Expenses for representation and receptions 
The increase (F 10,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to rising prices. 
Sub-head 15 - Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk 
The increase (F 15,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to an increase in travelling 
expenses and daily allowances expected in 1978. 
Sub-head 16 - Expenses of experts and the auditors 
The increase (F 2,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to increases in fees payable to 
the auditor and experts. 
Sub-head 17 - Expenditure on information 
The increase (F 3,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increase in the cost of 
living. 
Sub-head 18 - Expenses for groups of the Assembly 
A fourth political group was formed in November 1976 and was granted the same subsidy as the 
other groups, thus involving an increase of F 2,000 in the estimate for this sub-head. 
Sub-head 20 - Non-recoverable taxes 
The increase (F 3,000) in the estimate for this sub-head corresponds to the increase in the cost of 
living and the growing number of bills on which tax is not recoverable. 
7. Head VI - Pensions 
In this budget, account has been taken of only two pens1ons to be paid, one retirement and one 
survivor's. 
8. Sundry receipts 
Expected receipts in 1978 include: 
(i) sale of publications; 
(ii) bank interest; 
(iii) social security reimbursements in respect of staff on sick leave; 
(iv) income resulting from the entry into force of the pension scheme in 1978 (pro mem.). 
(a) Basic salaries 
Head I -Expenditure for Staff 
Sub-Head 1 
SALAJWIS OF PBBBUNDT BSTULISBJriBNT 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . • . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • F 3,488,000 
Budget for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . • • F 3,061,664 
Net inoreaae ................ F 426,336 
See the expla.na.tory memorandum, paragraph 2. 
(b) Recruitment of additional temporary staff (grades B and C), including travelling 
expenses and French social security 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . F 12,000 
Budget for 1977 .....................................••.........•••••... F 10,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of increased rates payable to temporary staff. 
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Sub-Heml 2 
.&LLOWANOBS, SOOU.L ~BS, BTO. 
(A) .&LLOWANOBS 
(a) Household allowance 
Estimate for 1978 ..............................••...................•.... F 127,000 
Budget for 1977 .................•........................................ F 107,100 
Net increase .................. F 19,900 
This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff. 
(b) Children's allowance 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 174,000 
Budget for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 146,616 
Net increase. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. F 27,384 
This allowance has been calculated on the basis of the status of staff. 
(c) Expatriation allowance 
Estimate for 1978 ........................................................ F 291,000 
Budget for 1977 .......................................................... F 261,723 
Net increase .................. F 29,277 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of non-French staff entitled to the 
allowance. 
(d) Comperutatory rent allowance 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
Budget for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,026 
Net decrease .................. F 5,026 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the rent allowance now paid and the number of 
officials qualifying for an allowance. 
(e) Overtime 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
Budget for 1977 ................................................ , ......... F 16,024 
Net decrease ................ F 1,024 
(/) 
(g) Education allowance 
Estimate for 1978 ......................................................... F 55,000 
Budget for 1977 .................................................... , . . . . . F 38,000 
Net increase ................. F 17,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance. 
(A) Allowance for language courses 
Estimate for 1978 ........................................................ F 2,000 
Budget for 1977 .......................................................... F 3,730 
Net decrease ................ F 1,730 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the number of officials entitled to this allowance. 
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(B) SOCIAL CHA.BGBS 
(a) Social security 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 250,000 
Budget for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 215,000 
Net increase. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 35,000 
(b) Supplementary insurance 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . F 141,000 
Budget for 1977 .......................................................... F 132,828 
Net increase .................. F 8,172 
This calculation is based on 3.40 % of total emoluments. 
(c) Provident Fund 
Estimate for 1978 ........................................................ F 437,000 
Budget for 1977 .......................................................... F 417,088 
Net increase .. . . .. .. . .. .. . .. . F 19,912 
This calculation is based on 14 % of basic salaries. 
(0) UPBNSBS RBLATING TO THB BBOBUITMBNT, ABBIVAL AND DBPA.BTUBB OF PBBMA.NBNT OJ'FIOIA.LS 
(a) Travelling expenses and per diem for candidates not residing in Paris, who are convened 
for examinations and interviews, and cost of marking examination papers 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 1,600 
Budget for 1977 ...................................•..................•... F 2,008 
Net decrease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 408 
(b) Reimbursement of travelling expenses on arrival and departure of staff and dependent 
persons 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 1,500 
Budget for 1977 ......................................................... F 3,000 
Net decrease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 1,500 
Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff. 
(c) Removal expenses 
Estimalie for 1978 ••...................................................... F 3,400 
Budget for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . • . . . F 6,000 
Net decrease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,600 
Calculated on the basis of estimated departures and replacement of staff. 
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(tl) Installation allowance 
Estimate for 1978 . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 4:,500 
Budget for 1977 .......................................................... F 9,000 
Net decrease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 4:,500 
Calculated on the basis of poesible replacement requirements. 
(e) Biennial home leave for non-French officials 
Estimate for 1978 . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
Budget for 1977 •..................•...................................... F 7,102 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,898 
Based on the number of staif entitled to home leave in 1977. 
(I) Medical examination 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
Budget for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,614: 
Net increase ................. F 386 
Bead 11 - Expenditure relating to the sessions of the Assembly 
Sub-HetMJ 3 
1. TBMPOBABY STAJT 
Temporary staif required for the sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1978 . • . . . . . . • • . . . . . • • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 396,000 
Budget for 1977 ..................••...................................... F 366,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 30,000 
The basis of the calculation is two part-sessions in Paris making a total of 10 sitting days. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
2. LllfG1718TIO STAJT 
(A) lnlerprelalioft. Semcu 
(a) Interpretation services required for the sessions of the Assembly 
Estimate for 1978 • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 178,000 
Budget for 1977 •.............. ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 165,000 
Net increase .................. F 13,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
(b) Interpretation services required for meetings of committees between sessions 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 160,000 
Budget for 1977 . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 150,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
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Estimate for 1978 . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • . F 346,000 
Budget for 1977 •......................................•.•....•...•....... F 321,000 
Net increase. . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • F 25,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
3. IN8tJlUBOB I'OB TlUIPOUBY 8TJ.J'I' 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . F 5,000 
Budget for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . • • . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . F 5,000 
Estimate unchanged 
4. INSTALLATION OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE SESSIONS 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 173,000 
Budget for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • F 158,000 
Net increase ....•............. F 15,000 
This calculation is based on the installations necessary for two part-sessions held in Paris. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
6. Jll80BLLA.NBOU8 BXPBNDITUBB DUBIBG TJUI 8B88ION8 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . F 44,000 
Budget for 1977 • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • . • . • . . . . . . . • . . . . • • . . . • . • . . . • • . . . . . . • . . . . F 40,000 
Net increase ................. F 4,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 3. 
Head Ill - Expenditure on premtaes and equipment 
Sv.b-Bt.all 4 
PRlUil8B8 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . • . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . F 182,000 
Budget for 1977 ••.........................•.......•.•......•.•.....•..••• F 165,000 
Net increase ................. F 17,000 
This estimate has been calculated on the basis of the Assembly's share in maintenance costs and 
hire of committee rooms. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4. 
Sv.b-B t.all 6 
CAPITAL EQUIPJIENT 
Estimate for 1978 F 70,000 
Budget for 1977 .....................•....•.....••...•.......•.••.••.....• F 83,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 4. 
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Head IV -·General administrative costs 
Sub-Head 6 
POSTAG1D, TEL1DPHON1D, TELBGRAPH OHARGES, TRANSPORT OF DOOUM1DNTS 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 260,000 
Budget for 1977 ... · ..•.••..............................................•.. F 250,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
See the explanatory memorandum,. paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 7 
PAPEB, STATIONERY AND OJ'JI'IOE SUPPLIES 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 150,000 
Budget for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 135,000 
Net increase .................. F 15,000 
See the expla.na.tory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 8 
PRINTING AND PUBLISHING OF ASSEMBLY DOOUMBNTS 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 680,000 
Budget for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 680,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Sub-Head 9 
PUROHASlll OF DOOUMBNTS, RBJ'EBENOE WORKS, 1DTO. 
Estimate for 1978 .•...................................................... F 22,500 
Budget for 1977 .••.....•.•................... , .•....... ~ ...•............. F 19,500 
Net increase .................. F 3,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
Sub-Head 10 
OJ'JI'IOIAL OARS 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 40,000 
Budget for 1977 ..............•........................................... F 22,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 18,000 
In the absence of a. ca.r belonging to the Assembly, provision must be made for the hire of chauffeur. 
driven cars for the President of the Assembly a.nd the Clerk. 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 5. 
BANK OHARG1DS 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 500 
Budget for 1977 ••...•. · .... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 500 
Estimate unchanged 
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Head V-. Other expenditure 
Sub-Head 12 
TBA.VBL AND SUBSISTlDNOlll ALLOWANCES AND INSURANCE FOB THE PRESIDENT OF THE ASSEMBLY, (IHAJB.MEN 
OF COMMITTEES AND BA.PPOBTEUBS 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 55,000 
Budget for 1977 ........................• · ......•........... ;.; .•.. : . ..... F 55,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Travel and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly attending committee meetings, 
including meetings of the Presidential Committee, are paid by the govel'Jlllients. 
The Assembly is responsible for travel and subsistence allowances for visits by the President of 
the Assembly, Ra.pporteurs and, on occasion, Committee Chairmen when such visits are connected 
with the preparation of a report or Assembly business. Journeys by Chairmen and Ra.pporteurs are 
subject to the approval of the Presidential Committee. 
Sub-Head 13 
EXPENSES FOB REPRESENTATION AND BEOEPTIONS 
Estimate for 1978 ....................................................... F 100,000 
Budget for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 90,000 
Net increase .... : ........... :. F 10,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Hwl 14 
OOIDII'l"l'EE STUDY MISSIONS 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . • . . . . . . • . . F 3,000 
Budget for 1977 .................. : ...... ; . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
Estimate unchanged · 
Sub-Head 15 
OFFICIAL JOURNEYS OF MEKBEBS OF TBB OFFICE OF THE OLEBK 
Estima~ for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 155,000 
Budget for 1977 ...........................................•••..... _. • . . . .. • F 140,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 15,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub-Bead 16 
EXPENSBS OF EXPERTS AND THE AUDITORS 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 24,000 
Budget for 1977 .........................................•... ·. . • . • . ... • . . . . F· 22,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6: 
Net increase ................. F 2,000 
.. 
Sub-Head 17 
EXPENDITURE ON INFOBliU.TION- · 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . F 36,000 
Budget for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . F 33,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
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Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
D0011JilmT 750 
Sub-Bead 18 
UPDSBS J'OB GBOVPS 01' 1'1111 ASSBIIBLY 
Estimate for 1978 ........•...................................•........... F 17,000 
Budget for 1977 . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • • F 15,000 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 2,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
Sub·Bead 19 
OO:RTJKGDODI8 ABD O'l'JiliB UPDDITUBB NOT BLSBWIIBBB PBOVIDBD J'OB 
Estimate for 1978 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
Budget for 1977 . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 3,000 
Estimate unchanged 
Sub-Bead 20 
NOlf•BBCOVBBABLB TADS 
Estimate for 1978 . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 10,000 
Budget for 1977 .......................................................... F 7,000 
Net increase ................. F 3,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 6. 
(a) Retirement pension 
Estimate for 1978 
Estimate for 1977 
Head VI - Pensions 
Sub-Bead 21 
PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES, ETC. 
(A) Pensions 
F 40,000 
pro mem. 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 40,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7. 
(b) Invalidity pension 
(e) Survivors' pension 
Estimate for 1978 
Estimate for 1977 
pro mem. 
F 22,000 
pro mem. 
Net increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 22,000 
See the explanatory memorandum, paragraph 7. 
(d) Orphans' pension . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pro mem 
pro mem. 
(C) SetJeranee grant 
pro mem. 
(D) Payment8 to member States for validation 
pro mem. 
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Document 750 
Amendment No. 1 
15th November 1977 
Draft budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1978 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Lord Selsdon 
Summary of revised estimates for the financial year 1978 
Initial 
Details 
estimate 
for 1978 
Frs. 
Head I : Expenditure for staff ................................. . 5,026,000 
Head 11: Expenditure relating to temporary personnel ............ . 1,302,000 
HeaiJ, Ill: Expenditure on premises and equipment ............... . 252,000 
Head IV: General administrative costs ........................... . 1,153,000 
Head V : Other expenditure ................................... . 403,000 
Head V I : Pensions ............................................. . 62,000 
TOTAL EXPEND~E ..........•••••••••••..•.•..••••••• 8,198,000 
TOTAL RECEIPTS •.•....••.•.•...••••••••.•.....••.••••• 92,000 
NET TOTAL ••••..••.•..•......•..••..•.•••••••••••••••• 8,106,000 
Changes in the draft budget for the financial year 1978 
Head I -Expenditure for staU 
Sub-Head 2 - (B) Social cha.rges 
(c) Provident fund 2 
instead of: Frs. 437,000 read: Frs. 218,000. 
l'lt.COmt - (B) Pensions s 
(a) Contributions (7 %) 
instead of : Frs. 17,000, read : Frs. 126,000. 
I. See lOth Sitting, 29th November 1977 (Amendment agreed to). 
2. See Document 750, Addendum, paragraph 2. 
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Amended 
estimate 
for 1978 
Frs. 
4,807,000 
1,302,000 
252,000 
1,153,000 
403,000 
62,000 
7,979,000 
201,000 
7,778,000 
Docum81lt 750, Addendum 15~ No~ 1977 
DRAFT BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE 
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1978 
Letter from the Secretariat-General dated 11th November 1911 
and Secretary-General's note 
11th November 1977 
Dear Mr. Humblet, 
I am writing to inform you that the Council have now examined the WEU Assembly budget for 
1978 and, in accordance with the agreed procedure, have expressed a favourable opinion on the budget 
as amended in paragraph 4 of document C-B (77) 8. 
Mr. F. Humblet, 
Clerk of the Assembly of 
Western European Union, 
43, avenue du President Wilson, 
75775 Paris CEDEX 16. 
Secretary-General's note 
WEU Assembly budget for 1918 
Yours sincerely, 
P. B. FB.AsER 
Assistant Secretary-General 
1. The draft budget of the WEU Assembly for 1978 (Assembly document AfWEU [BA (77) 4) was 
circulated under reference B (77) 11 and was examined by the Budget and Organisation Committee at its 
meeting in London on 29th September (BR (77) 1, VII- to be circulated). 
2. Delegates noted that the only new element in the budget stemmed from the introduction of the pen-
sion scheme. They observed, however, that credits in this as well as in the WEU budget for 1978 covering 
the organisation's contributions to the WEU provident fund did not take account of the fact that, in the 
early part of the year, a number of serving staff woul~ join the pension scheme. It was agreed that the budget 
estimates should be modified to assume that at least 50 % of the staff would join the scheme thereby per-
mitting the provident fund estimate to be reduced and pensions contribution income to be correspondingly 
increased. The financial consequences of this decision appear below. 
3. Examining the remainder of the budget, there was general agreement that a positive effort should 
be made to combat the effect of rising prices. D~alegates specifically referred to a number of items of expen-
diture which were increased in 1978 and proposed the reductions· itemised in paragraph 4 below. There was 
support for the view, expressed by one delegate, that future budgets of the organisation should not be per-
mitted to increase at a rate beyond that acceptable to member States in the context of their national budgets. 
4. In accordance with the recommendations of the Budget and Organisation Committee the following 
estimates would be modified as shown : 
Head I - .Ezpenditure for ataff 
Sub-head 2 (B) (c) - Provident fund (see paragraph 2 above) 
Credit reduced by Frs. 219,000 from Frs. 437,000 to Frs. 218,000. 
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Head IV- General administrative costa 
The following credits to be reduced : 
Sub-head 7 - Paper, stationery, etc. by Frs. 3,000 from Frs. 150,000 to Frs. 147,000 ; 
Sub-head 10- Official car by Frs. 3,000 from Frs. 40,000 to Frs. 37,000. 
Head V - Other expenditure 
Sub-head 13- Expenses for representation, etc. by Frs. 2,000 from Frs. 100,000 to Frs. 98,000 ; 
Sub-head 15 - Official journeys of members of the Office of the Clerk by Frs. 2,000 from Frs. 
155,000 to Frs. 153,000. 
Income - (B) Pensions (see paragraph 2 above) 
(a) Contributions (7 %) 
Increased by Frs. 109,000 from Frs. 17,000 to Frs. 126,000. 
The net effect of these changes would be to reduce the total of the budget by Frs. 338,000 from Frs. 
8,106,000 to Frs. 7,768,000. 
5. Under the agreed procedure for the approval of Assembly budgets, given in paragraph 5 of the cover-
note to document B (77) 11, the next stage is for the Council to give its opinion on the budget, indicating 
either preparedness to accept the draft or proposing amendments. That opinion is to be conveyed to the 
Assembly prior to the next session which commences in Paris on 28th November 1977. After the session, 
the budget will be referred back to the Council for final approval. 
6. The Council's opinion will be sought at the meeting to be held on 19th October 1977. 
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Document 751 3rd November 1977 
Procedure for electing the President of the Assembly 
when there is only one candidate 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the Committee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges 1 
by Mr. Jessel, Rapporteur 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Jeael, Rapporteur) 
1. When there is only one candidate for the 
Presidency of the Assembly, it is customary for 
him to be elected by acclamation. However, at 
the last session certain members of the Assembly, 
without nominating another candidate, wished to 
express either abstention or even opposition. In 
the absence of a precedent, the Provisional Pre-
sident, asked how such abstention or opposition 
could be expressed, stated: "Those who wish to 
vote for the candidate should place their ballot 
paper in the envelope, those who do not wish 
to vote for the candidate should strike out his 
name, and those who wish to abstain should 
refrain from placing the ballot paper in the 
envelope." 
2. This procedure exasperated some members 
of the Assembly. The unconstructive opposition 
expressed by striking out the name of the only 
candidate without proposing another appeared 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Co=ittee. 
2. Members of the Committee: Mr. Borghi (Acting 
Chairman) ; Mr. Grieve (Alternate : McGwire) (Vice-
Chairman) ; MM. Brasseur (Alternate: Van der Elst), 
Burckel, Cerneau (Alternate : PMidier), Craigen, Mrs. 
Faccio (Alternate: Treu), MM. Giust, van Hulst 
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to be at the very most a demonstration of bad 
temper. In fact it was tantamount to an absten-
tion ; it did not enhance the dignity of the 
Assembly. 
3. Moreover, election of the only candidate 
should reflect the Assembly's unanimity or near-
unanimity, failing which a contested election 
would definitely be ·preferable. 
4. Were such a situation to reoccur, the Pro-
visional President should inform members of the 
Assembly that with only one candidate absten-
tions may be expressed by means of a blank or 
spoiled paper (by striking out the name of the 
candidate, refraining from placing a ballot paper 
in the envelope or by placing a blank paper 
in the envelope), but that opposition may be 
expressed only by nominating another candi-
date in accordance with the rules and voting 
for him. 
(Alternate: de Koster), Jessel, Konen, du Luart, Mar-
quardt, Dr. Phipps (Alternate: Lewis), MM. Pignion, 
Schiiuble, Schmidhuber, Sgherri (Alternate : Sarti), Van 
Aal, Voogd, Zebisch. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the 11ote arc 
printed in italics. 
Document 752 
Relations with Parliaments 
INFORMATION REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee for Relations with Parliaments 2 
by Mr. Reid, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
3rd Noveuiber 1977 
DRAFT ORDER 
on laws governing elections to the European Parliament and the broadcasting 
of parliamentary debates on radio and television 
INFORMATION REPORT 
submitted by Mr. Reid, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. Activities of the Committee 
Ill. Laws governing elections to the European Parliament 
A. Action by the European Communities 
B. Action by WEU member countries 
C. Impact on the WEU countries 
D. The disfranchised Europeans 
E. Regionalism and direct elections 
F. The dual mandate 
G. Electoral procedures 
H. Conclusions 
IV. The impact of radio and television on parliamentary debates and the public 
A. The current situation 
B. Conclusions 
APPENDICES 
I. Table of action in the parliaments of member countries 
11. Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted 
since December 197 5 
Ill. Visits by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
IV. Questionnaire on the laws governing elections to the European Parliament 
V. Systems for allocating seats in parliamentary assemblies 
VI. Questionnaire on broadcasting parliamentary debates on radio and television 
1. Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 
2. Members of the Committee : Mr. Radius (Alternate 
for Mr. Delorm.e) (Chairman) ; MM. SchZingemann, 
Enders (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Arfe (Alternate: Borghi), 
BonneZ, De Poi (Alternate : Giust), Farr (Alternate : 
Mrs. Knight), Hengel, Jeambrun, Reddemann, Roper 
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(Alternate : Beid), Spautz, Stoffelen, Tanghe (Alternate : 
Dejardin). 
..J.Zso present : Mr. Antoni. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are 
printed in italics. 
DOOUMENT 752 
Draft Order 
on raw. governing elections to the Baropeall Parliament 
and the broadcatlng of parliamentary debate. on radio and televfaion 
The Assembly, 
Having noted the report of the Committee for Relations with Parliaments on the laws governing 
elections to the European Parliament and the impact of radio and television on parliamentary debates 
and the public, 
INSTRUCTS THE COMMITTEE 
To up-date this report as decisions are taken in national legislatures and particularly in respect of : 
(i) voting systems, regional weighting, dual mandate and electoral rules and procedures; 
(ii) laws governing the broadcasting of parliamentary debates on radio and television. 
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DOOUMENT 752 
Information Report 
(submitted by Mr. Reid, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments decided during its meeting in Rome on 
27th June to prepare reports on the broadcast-
ing of parliamentary debates and on the laws 
governing the election of the European Parlia-
ment. Your Rapporteur was appointed on 4th 
July. 
2. The months of August and September are 
not the best time to extract information from 
the parliaments of the WEU countries, and at the 
time of writing (1st October) replies are still 
awaited from three legislatures. In addition 
direct elections are still under active considera-
tion in most parliaments, and in others broadcast-
ing is also being reviewed. What follows therefore 
is purely an interim report which will require to 
be up-dated in due course. 
3. Consideration has been given to the pos-
sibility of rewriting the reports by Mr. Peronnet 
on regional assemblies and the Assembly of WEU. 
Developments in the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Belgium, Italy and the United Kingdom in recent 
years provide much additional material. In 
balance, however, it W88 thought better not to 
tackle this subject until devolutionary bills for 
Scotland and Wales had completed their pas-
sage through the House of Commons, so allow-
ing a pan-WEU review of the situation. 
4. The Committee hopes that the manner in 
which its reports have been written since Nov-
ember 1976 makes for more interesting reading 
and for greater assistance to members of the 
Assembly of WEU. 
U. Activities of the Committee 
5. On 3rd and 4th November 1977, the Com-
mittee visited the Federal German parliament in 
Bonn and also the Landtag, the regional parlia-
mentary assembly of Hesse in Wiesbaden. At the 
same time the government of that Land held 
discussions with the Committee. Texts of state-
ments made will be appended to the next report, 
since there was insufficient time for editing and 
translating them before the session of the 
Assembly. 
6. As can be seen from the table at Appendix I, 
the frequency of these visits varies very much 
from one country to another. Four countries have 
afforded hospitality to the Committee on two 
occasions over the past fourteen years, one 
country on three occasions. Naturally it would 
be quite wrong to deduce from these figures that 
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WEU is more favoured in some member States 
than others, since account should also be taken 
of visits paid by other Committees. An overall 
picture would doubtless show a very balanced 
WEU presence thoughout our member countries. 
7. Nevertheless your Rapporteur feels that 
since the Committee for Relations with Parlia-
ments is the link between WEU and individual 
legislatures, it is proper that the four countries 
which have been visited only twice in the past 
fourteen years should be the next to receive 
visits. Moreover, as a Scot who has been deeply 
involved in proposals at Westminster to set up 
a Scottish sub-parliament, your Rapporteur feels 
that it would be helpful if some of these visits 
could be paid to regional assemblies in WEU 
countries and not just to capital cities. Given the 
importance of "regionalism" in many of the 
countries, this is a matter of general interest to 
the Committee. 
8. Your Rapporteur is also concerned about the 
lack of press and media coverage of WEU affairs, 
and particularly at regional level. He hopes that 
it will be possible for the information directorate 
to issue a brief resume of the Committee's 
business after each meeting and to advise mem-
bers of the channels which exist for the issue 
of press releases to their local newspapers and 
other media. 
9. The Committee has selected two recommenda-
tions for official transmission to the presidents 
of the national parliaments : 
- 298 on the political activities of the 
Council; 
- 299 on the application of the Brussels 
Treaty. 
10. All the texts adopted by the WEU Assembly 
are regularly sent to all members of our national 
parliaments in our small booklet "Texts adopted 
and brief account of session". Around 3,000 
parliamentarians receive copies of this booklet in 
our five languages in the weeks following each 
session. 
11. The summer holidays and various political 
crises have made it difficult for members to 
put questions. As of 15th September the secre-
tariat of the Committee has been able to register 
only 8 Italian, 4 French and 1 German interven-
tion. More activities could probably have been 
recorded, however, if only all members would 
send in accounts of their WEU follow-up actions : 
debates, oral and written questions, visits to 
ministers, etc. 
DOCUMENT 752 
m. Laws governing elections to the European 
Parliament 
12. Your Rapporteur sent a questionnaire on 
this subject to all parliamentary assemblies of 
the seven member countries of Western Euro-
pean Union on 25th July 1977 (Appendix IV). 
To date, replies have been received from France, 
Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and the United Kingdom. While the 
matter has been discussed at committee level in 
Italy, the parliamentary clerks there did not feel 
free to answer the questionnaire until a draft 
bill had been presented. 
13. Your Rapporteur is therefore in the difficult 
position of having to work with incomplete 
information, which he has tried to supplement 
where possible from media sources. He has also 
the problem of having to comment on matters 
which are still under active consideration by 
national legislatures and at a delicate stage of 
discussion in several member countries. At this 
stage, therefore, he has confined himself to pro-
ducing a largely information document and to 
delineating areas of common concern to WEU 
representatives. 
14. He hopes that the Assembly will permit him 
to up-date his material as legislation progresses 
in the parliaments of member countries. 
A. Action by the European Communities 
15. Article 138 of the EEC Treaty of Rome 
commits member States to hold direct elections. 
At the European Communities Heads of Govern-
ment meeting in Paris in December 1974, seven 
of the nine set a target date for elections in 1978, 
the United Kingdom and Denmark reserving 
their position. Following the "yes" vote in the 
June 1975 referendum, a clear British commit-
ment to direct elections was given in December 
1975. 
16. Agreement among all member States was 
reached on 20th September 1976 with the signing 
of the convention "Act concerning election of 
the representatives of the assembly by direct 
universal suffrage" which provides, inter alia, 
for: 
- a European assembly of 410 representa-
tives, elected for a fixed term of five 
years; 
- elections to be held in all member States 
within an agreed Thursday-Monday 
period, designated in the first instance 
by the Council of Ministers. May-June 
1978 to be the chosen period ; 
- membership of national parliaments not 
to constitute incompatibility, and each 
legislature to be free to make its own 
choice about the dual mandate ; 
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- the first directly-elected assembly to 
draw up a proposal for a uniform 
electoral procedure, and meanwhile 
governments can choose their own pro-
posals; 
- the 410 representatives to be divided 
among member States as follows : France, 
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and 
United Kingdom - 81 each ; Nether-
lands - 25 ; Belgium - 24 ; Denmark 
- 16 ; Ireland - 15 ; Luxembourg - 6. 
17. The act does not come into force until all 
the member States have ratified it. In section B 
your Rapporteur gives a brief sketch of his 
understanding of what stage legislation has 
reached in WEU member countries. 
B. Action by WEU member countries 
(i) Belgium (24 seats) 
18. The bill ratifying the Community act of 
September 1976 is under study by the parlia-
ment's Foreign Affairs Committee. So far, no bill 
on electoral law has been published. 
19. All parties in Belgium are agreed on a 
system of proportional representation. There have 
been disagreements, however, on how the coun-
try's 24 seats are to be distributed between the 
French-speaking and Flemish-speaking commun-
ities, with Brussels also asking for separate 
treatment. The Prime Minister, Mr. Tindemans, 
has suggested national lists for the whole country, 
while the former Minister of the Interior, 
Mr. Michel, has proposed a repartitioning of the 
24 seats into three "regions" : 12 for Flanders, 
8 for W allonia and 4 for Brussels. The Egmont 
agreement of May 1977 provided for 13 seats to 
be allocated to the Flemish-speaking and 11 seats 
to the French-speaking list ; residents in the 
Brussels area would be able to designate which 
list they vote upon. 
(ii) Federal Republic of Germany (81 seats) 
20. The Community act was ratified by the 
Bund.estag on 16th June and by the Bundesrat 
on 24th June. 
21. The electoral bill, however, has been facing 
certain difficulties. A bill was tabled by the 
government on 30th March which provided for 
proportional representation through national lists 
with a minimum of 5 % of 'the votes needed for 
election. On 6th May, however, this was rejected 
by the Bundesrat in favour of Land (regional) 
lists. The latter proposal is intended to translate 
the federal nature of West Germany to the Euro-
pean assembly, which the government argues is 
catered for by the 5 % threshold. Broadly the 
government parties - social democrats and free 
democrats - have been in favour of national 
lists ; the opposition parties - christian demo-
crats and christian social union - in favour of 
regional lists. But the Bavarian social democrats, 
for example, have declared for regional lists. The 
debate continues in the autumn. 
22. The Government of the Federal Republic has 
declared that, in view of the special situation of 
Berlin, the House of Deputies there will elect 
representatives to those seats (three) within the 
German quota which fall to Land Berlin. 
(iii) France (81 seats) 
23. At one time it was widely thought that 
France would face considerable difficulties in 
passing the necessary European elections legisla-
tion. In the event, France is the first country to 
complete both ratification and the passage of the 
electoral bill. In the face of possible opposition 
to the elections from both the communists and 
the Gaullists, President Giscard d'Estaing refer-
red the issue in 1976 to the French constitutional 
court. They ruled that no constitutional objections 
existed, since no increase in the European Par-
liament's powers was involved. In the spring, the 
communists declared support in principle for the 
elections. A large body of Gaullists, however, 
continued to have doubts. When the ratification 
bill was presented to the National Assembly on 
16th June, Article 49.3 of the French constitu-
tion was therefore invoked : the opponents of the 
measure declined to table a motion of no con-
fidence, and the act was ratified. On 24th June 
the Senate voted by 220 to 0 with 23 abstentions 
in favour of ratification. 
24. On 25th May an electoral bill was tabled by 
the government providing for proportional repre-
sentation by national lists (as opposed to the 
single-member seat system used for National 
Assembly elections). The plus forte moyenne 
system of proportionality will be used (see 
Appendix V), with seats going to candidates in 
order of presentation on their party's list. This 
bill was passed with minor amendments by the 
Assembly on 21st June (474 votes to 2) and by 
the Senate on 29th June (256 votes to 0). 
25. French citizens resident in other countries 
will be able to vote for a French member if they 
are inscribed in the national election lists. Also 
voting as part of France will be the five French 
overseas departments (Guyane, Guadeloupe, Mar-
tinique, Reunion, St. Pierre and Miquelon) and 
the French overseas territories (Polynesia, New 
Caledonia, Mayotte). 
(iv) Italy (81 seats) 
26. Italy was the first country to ratify the 
Community act. It was approved by the Chamber 
of Deputies on 17th February by 384 votes to 16, 
and by the Senate on 24th March, unanimously. 
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27. There is general agreement on proportional 
representation by the list system, but so far no 
electoral bill has been published. 
28. Discussion in committee and among the 
parties has revealed support for national lists, 
for lists covering all twenty existing regions, and 
for a division of the country into three - north, 
centre, south and islands. The government of the 
autonomous region of Val d'Aosta has tabled its 
own bill in the Italian Senate, seeking its own 
representative in the European assembly. 
( v) Luxembourg ( 6 seats) 
29. The Luxembourg Parliament ratified the 
Community act on 5th July, by 54 votes to 5. A 
draft elections bill is currently being discussed 
between the parties. 
30. The system of election will be proportional 
representation, though it is not yet decided 
whether there will be more than one constituency, 
there being support both for a single one and for 
two : Luxembourg city and the rest of the 
country. Whichever is decided, the outcome is 
not expected to be different. The return of two 
social christians, two socialists and two liberals 
is predicted. 
(vi) Netherlands (25 seats) 
31. The Community act was ratified, by acclama-
tion, in the Tweede Kamer (lower house) on 23rd 
June; and by the Eerste Kamer (upper house) 
on 28th June. The elections bill will provide for 
proportional representation in a single national 
constituency. The elector will be able to vote 
for any given candidate on a list, but if this 
candidate collects less than 380,000 personal votes 
he will not be elected, and his votes will be 
distributed in order of party preference (i.e. list 
order). "Left-over" votes and seats will be 
distributed according to the d'Hondt system 
(see Appendix V). Immigrants from other EEC 
countries who do not have the vote at home will 
probably be able to vote in the Netherlands. 
(vii) United Kingdom (81 seats) 
32. The European assembly elections bill was 
published on 24th June and given a second read-
ing (a favourable vote on the principle) by the 
House of Commons on 7th July by 394 votes to 
147. The Conservative, Liberal and Scottish 
National Parties were in favour, the Labour 
Party split (132 for, 124 against) and the major-
ity of the Ulster Unionists opposed. It will be 
necessary for the government to reintroduce 
the bill in the next session of parliament, begin-
ning in November. 
33. The bill divides the United Kingdom into its 
constituent nations : of the total 81 seats, 
England will get 66, Scotland 8, Wales 4 and 
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Northern Ireland 3. The bill is curious in format 
in that it proposes voting by the regional list 
system for Great Britain, while allowing the 
Commons to replace this with simple majorities 
in single member constituencies ("first past the 
post"). Northern Ireland, regardless, will elect its 
representatives by the single transferable vote 
aystem, as in the Irish Republic. (See Appendix 
V for description of these systems.) 
34. If the regional list system stands, England 
will be divided into nine regional constituencies 
returning from three to fourteen members. If 
the Commons opts for single-member seats, these 
will be based on an amalgam of two or more 
parliamentary constituencies with an electorate 
as near as possible the area's electoral quota (e.g. 
total Scottish electorate divided by eight). 
35. For the proportional representation system, 
the parties would be listed alphabetically in 
vertical order on the ballot paper, with candidates 
Corm try Population 
Belgium 9,883,302 
France 52,655,802 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 61,832,000 
Italy 55,812,000 
Luxembourg 359,000 
Netherlands 14,000,000 
United Kingdom 56,042,000 
38. These figures show a substantial "weighting" 
in representation towards the smaller member 
States (and, in your Rapporteur's opinion, rightly 
so). They also conceal disparities within 
"national" totals. Within the British figures, for 
example, there is a similar "weighting" towards 
Scotland (population per representative 473,000 
compared to 514,000 for England), but Scotland 
is disadvantaged in seats per population in com-
parison to the Benelux countries. This is a subject 
on which your Rapporteur has had representa-
tions from groups in Belgium, France and Italy 
and to which he returns under section D. 
D. The dlafranclalaed Europe,.. 
39. As direct elections to the European Parlia-
ment will take place at the same time throughout 
the whole Community, and as more and more 
nationals from one member country are now 
residing in another without changing their 
nationality, how widely can the EEC franchise 
be extended Y Such persons belong to one of the 
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listed horizontally, again in alphabetical order. 
Seats would be allocated on the d'Hondt principle 
to parties, with the party seat being filled by 
their candidates in order of their personal vote. 
For "first past the post" the candidates would 
be listed alphabetically and "the winner takes 
all", regardless of the percentage size of his vote. 
36. The bill will be keenly contested at West-
minster and progress will be dependent on a 
successful guillotine motion to time-table it there-
after. 
C. Impact on the WEU countries 
37. Before commenting on the detailed provisions 
of national legislation on direct elections, your 
Rapporteur feels that it may be helpful to set 
out a table showing the statistical effect of the 
allocation of seats on the population of member 
countries: 
Population 
Electorate Seats per 
representative 
6,416,662 24 267,000 
33,752,779 81 417,000 
41,600,000 81 514,000 
81 
6 
9,500,000 25 380,000 
40,960,843 81 507,000 
nations which will vote, live in one of the others, 
and have vested interest in the outcome of the 
election and the composition of the parliament. 
40. Your Rapporteur first attempted to establish 
the size of the problem, and requested an estimate 
from each WEU assembly of how many nationals 
are currently living in another EEC country. He 
received the following information on the number 
of expatriates living elsewhere in the EEC : 
Belgium ................ . 
France ................ .. 
Federal Republic of Germany 
Italy ................... . 
Luxembourg ............. . 
Netherlands ............. . 
United Kingdom ......... . 
299,571 
235,000 
1,400,000 
300,000 
270,000 
41. Given the fact that over 2,500,000 Europeans 
fall into this category, he then attempted to 
establish what voting rights they currently have. 
42. In Luxembourg, citizens who reside in 
another Community country have no right to vote 
in home elections. In Belgium, members of the 
public service posted abroad have the right to 
vote by proxy, and their names are entered in 
the electoral roll of the commune where they last 
lived. In the Federal Republic of Germany, 
members of the public service and armed forces 
and their spouses who are posted abroad are 
eligible to vote (Bundeswahlgesetz, Section 12). 
In France, members of the public service posted 
abroad have the right to vote by proxy or by 
post. In the United Kingdom, members of the 
public service and armed forces and employees 
of the British Council, and their spouses, are 
eligible to vote by proxy. Similar provisions have 
recently been adopted in the Netherlands. In 
Italy, citizens living abroad can, if registered on 
the electoral roll there, vote in their home 
commune. 
43. In recent years certain immigrants' councils 
have obtained the right to be consulted at muni-
cipal level in Belgium, the Federal Republic of 
Germany and the Netherlands. There have also 
been proposals in the Belgian and Italian par-
liaments to extend voting rights to immigrants in 
local elections: they have not yet been discussed 
in committee however. 
44. The imminence and special nature of direct 
elections to the European Parliament have led all 
WEU member countries to take a fresh look at 
the problem. Broadly, their response falls into 
two categories : 
- to extend the franchise to nationals living 
in another EEC State by giving them the 
vote in their home country, either by 
returning there to vote, by proxy or 
postal vote, or by voting in the nearest 
embassy or consulate ; 
- to allow such nationals voting rights in 
the host country. 
45. In France, citizens will have the right to 
vote provided they are inscribed on the national 
election lists ; no voting will be possible inside 
France for nationals of other EEC countries. In 
the Federal Republic of Germany, all citizens 
living within the European Communities will be 
enfranchised ; those who live outwith the EEC 
will not, nor will other EEC nationals living 
within the Federal Republic of Germany be 
allowed to vote there. In the United Kingdom, 
the Select Committee on Direct Elections (of 
which your Rapporteur was a member) recom-
mended that the right to. vote at home in Com-
munity elections be extended world-wide to all 
nationals who satisfied the 1971 Immigration Act. 
This was subsequently refused by the government. 
46. In Italy, the permanent committee for 
emigration met on 12th July to consider the 
problem : reciprocity was suggested - if the 
franchise were extended to Italians in a host 
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country, then similar rights might be given to 
citizens of that country in Italy. The matter of 
bilateral agreements, or of writing such a clause 
into the elections bill, will be considered later this 
year. 
47. No final decision has yet been taken in the 
Netherlands. Your Rapporteur is informed, how-
ever, that Dutch nationals resident in other EEC 
countries will probably be entitled to vote at 
home, provided they sign a declaration stating 
that they will not make use of any voting rights 
in their host country. Immigrants to the Nether-
lands from other EEC countries will probably be 
allowed to vote if they have no voting rights in 
their own country. 
48. There are three problems here : the first is 
to ensure that all citizens of EEC member States, 
resident within the Community, have the right to 
vote ; the second is to avoid double voting ; and 
the third is to avoid different practices being 
established in different States. 
49. Since this is a matter which falls within the 
competence of the national legislators of the 
EEC, your Rapporteur trusts that the Council 
of Ministers will take steps to co-ordinate 
proposals for enfranchisement. It is his personal 
view that all the potential 181,000,000 electors in 
the Community from the Shetland Isles to Sicily 
and from Brittany to Berlin should have the 
vote, and that if all member States enabled their 
citizens resident abroad to vote in their home 
country by one means or another, adequate con-
trol of double voting could be exercised. 
E. Regionalism and direct elections 
50. To what extent should the ancient nations, 
regions and provinces of Europe be represented 
through the agency of direct elections 7 As power 
and decision-making are concentrated at the 
centre, to what extent should there be a cor-
responding growth of decision-making at the 
periphery 1 What can direct elections do for 
the cultural, linguistic and economic identities of 
Europe's "regions" 7 When the elections are 
held, will candidates say "I am a Fleming -
and a European", "I am a Scot - and a Euro-
pean", leapfrogging their own "national" 
legislatures ? What links can be established 
between the European Parliament and regional 
assemblies in member States 7 
51. As a Scot, it is inevitable that your 
Rapporteur should be interested in this area. But 
it is worth noting that the regional/national 
approach to direct elections has been part of 
the discussions leading to draft bills in most 
WEU countries. 
52. The question of the separate representation 
of the Flemish-speaking and Francophone com-
munities has dominated proposals in Belgium. 
The United Kingdom bill is openly regionalist 
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in approach, in response to political develop-
ments in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland: 
no matter which voting system is chosen, a 
separate number of seats has been reserved to 
each of them. In the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the differing proposals of the Bundes-
tag and Bundesrat and between government and 
opposition centre on whether a unitary or federal 
approach should be adopted towards the assem-
bly. Is a 5 % threshold sufficient to guarantee 
representation to regional parties, as the German 
Government argues ? (In Scotland it would mean 
the Scottish National Party having to gain 60% 
of the Scottish vote to qualify.) In Italy, pro-
posals to base direct elections on the twenty 
regions or on three super-regions have been 
steadily canvassed. On 20th June 1977 the govern-
ment of the V al d' Aosta region tabled a draft 
bHl in the Italian Senate, seeking one locally-
elected European representative, and your 
Rapporteur understands that a similar proposal 
is under active consideration in the Trentino-
Alto Adige. The problem does not arise to the 
same extent in the Netherlands or in Luxembourg 
(though, in the latter case, there is a vigorous 
debate about separate constituencies for Luxem-
bourg city and the rest of the country). In 
France, the government has steadfastly followed 
a unitary approach to direct elections : Bretons 
and Corsicans for example are to vote on exactly 
the same kind of ballot paper as Alsatians and 
everyone else. 
53. Your Rapporteur is well aware that the 
issues of regional identity and the self-determina-
tion of national minorities is largely a matter 
for the legislatures of individual WEU countries. 
Nonetheless, he believes that these are important 
threads in the direct elections skein (and with 
the return of the Generalitad to Catalonia, they 
are likely to become more important still). He 
asks the Assembly to note the growing importance 
of regionalism, and to commission further work 
in this area. 
F. The dual mandate 
54. With minor modifications (in the United 
Kingdom, for example, peers and certain minis-
ters of religion will be able to stand), qualifica-
tions for candidature in direct elections are the 
same as for national elections. How possible, in 
reality, will it be for someone to be a member 
o~ both ? And what links are envisaged between 
representatives in the European Parliament and 
their national parliaments Y 
55. Article 5 of the Community act stipulates 
that "membership of the European Parliament 
shall be compatible with membership of a parlia-
ment of a member State". Individual members 
may therefore decide whether, in addition to their 
European mandate, they also wish to belong to 
their national legislatures. These legislatures 
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may also lay down conditions and rules governing 
simultaneous membership, for example : 
- members of the European Parliament 
might also be members of national parlia-
ments with or without voting rights ; 
- members of the European Parliament 
might be released from active participa-
tion in national parliaments ; 
- members of the European Parliament 
might delegate their voting rights in their 
national parliament to another member. 
56. At the moment such rules are under active 
consideration in the member countries of WEU. 
From information available to your Rapporteur, 
there seems general agreement that - for a 
transitional period at least - the dual mandate 
must continue for a number of members. This 
argument is advanced on two grounds : the need 
for a personal link between the European Parlia-
ment and national parliaments, and the political 
unacceptability in certain countries of a substan-
tial number of members resigning to contest 
direct elections. In the opinion of your Rap-
porteur, however, the pressures of work, travel, 
voting (and in those countries with single-member 
seats, constituency interest) will in time force 
representatives to choose which mandate they 
hold. The dual mandate will wither away. 
57. It is already clear that a considerable number 
of candidates in direct elections will wish to 
stand for the European Parliament only. If in 
addition, as your Rapporteur suggests, the dual 
mandate in time "withers away", how are links 
to be maintained - and, possibly, institutional-
ised - between European representatives and 
their national legislatures Y It should be obvious 
that reams of documentation and published deci-
sions will not be enough. There will need to be 
face-to-face meetings and discussions. 
58. This is a matter which has provoked some 
discussion in WEU parliamentary circles. In 
most countries it is forbidden to speak in national 
assemblies, let alone vote, if one is a non-member. 
Constitutions and standing orders would have 
to be re-written. 
59. Preliminary talks between the parties in the 
United Kingdom are indicative of the general 
approach being adopted. Some members have 
advocated that European representatives should 
become members of a reformed House of Lords ; 
others have suggested that they should have 
speaking, but not voting rights, in the Commons ; 
another grouping is resolutely opposed to Euro-
pean representatives having any right to sit in 
the national parliament, and propose instead a 
joint standing committee of national and Euro-
pean members. 
60. Since such talks are at a preliminary stage 
throughout WEU, it is too early for your 
Rapporteur to draw any conclusions. He does, 
however, advocate further study of this area. 
G. Electoral procedures 
61. In the absence of published bills in some 
WEU countries, your Rapporteur can only pin-
point subjects on which the subsequent publica-
tion of comparative tables might prove helpful. 
(i) Deposits: Candidates will have to furnish 
a deposit of £500 each in the United Kingdom, 
"sufficient to deter frivolous candidature without 
unreasonably inhibiting candidates", as the 
government put it. In France the sum is 100,000 
French francs per list. In the Netherlands, 
18,000 Dutch guilders per list. In the Federal 
Republic of Germany, no deposits are required. 
The deposit will be forfeited in the Netherlands 
if a list collects less than 75 % of the votes 
corresponding to the electorate per representative, 
i.e. about 285,000 votes. In France, the deposit 
will be returned only to those lists which obtain 
more than 5% of the votes cast. In the United 
Kingdom, the deposit is forfeit from the 
individual candidate who polls less than 25 % 
of the electoral quota or from the group candidate 
where none of the group has been elected and 
the group has polled less than 25 % of the 
electoral quota. 
(ii) Ballot papers: In the majority of WEU 
countries (with the United Kingdom an excep-
tion), these will be familiar in form to the 
elector. The main difference lies between those 
countries where the electorate chooses simply 
between lists drawn up by the parties, where 
the precedence of candidates has already been 
determined, and those countries (e.g. the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands) where the elector-
ate can choose between candidates of the same 
party. If the United Kingdom decides on the 
"first past the post" system, the choice will of 
course be simply between individual candidates. 
In Northern Ireland, the parties will field teams 
of three candidates (but standing as individuals 
rather than as a list) ; electors will number 
their candidates in order of preference (1, 2, 3, 4, 
etc.) and the seats will be allocated according to 
the "droop quota" method of single transferable 
vote. 
(iii) Returning officers : Once all the bills have 
been published, it will be possible to issue a 
comparative table. 
(iv) Decisions yet to be taken: In most countries, 
the power is given to make adaptations to national 
electoral rules by order : registration rules and 
election expenses being mentioned specifically. 
Governments will also have to decide on a 
formula for limiting campaign expenses and on 
the possible use of public funds to assist 
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candidates. Likewise, rules will have to be drawn 
up for the premature resignation of represent-
atives from the European Parliament. 
(v) Cost of elections: Your Rapporteur has 
sought to calculate a total estimated cost for 
direct elections. From financial memoranda 
published by WEU governments, he has obtained 
the following estimates : Federal Republic of 
Germany - 40 million DM; Netherlands -
16 million guilders ; United Kingdom - £10 mil-
lion. If your Rapporteur be permitted to extra-
polate these figures to other WEU countries, 
the following table results: 
Belgium 
France 
Federal Republic 
of Germany (DM 40m) 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands (G 16m) 
United Kingdom (£10m) 
F. frs 
(million) 
31 
85 
86 
85 
1 
32 
85 
405 
for 379 representatives 
62. The estimated cost to national governments, 
per elected member of the European Parliament, 
is therefore of the order of 1,068,600 French 
francs, 497,000 Deutschmarks, 503,500 Dutch 
guilders, £125,720, 194,300,000 Italian lires, and 
7,828,600 Belgian francs. 
B. Conclusions 
(i) This is largely an information document, 
aimed at giving parliamentarians an outline 
view of what progress is being made towards 
the enactment of a direct elections bill in WEU 
member States. Since the matter is still under 
active consideration by national legislatures and 
since no bill has yet been published in several 
countries, your Rapporteur does not feel so far 
able to draw any conclusions apart from the three 
listed below. 
(ii) Given the importance of direct elections in 
WEU member States, your Rapporteur seeks 
permission to update this report as decisions are 
taken in national legislatures, and particularly in 
the area of voting systems, constituencies, 
regional weighting, the dual mandate, and elec-
tion rules and procedures. 
(iii) Your Rapporteur submits that the Council 
of Ministers be urged to take steps to ensure that 
all member States grant the vote in direct elec-
tions to their citizens resident abroad within the 
European Communities. 
(iv) Your Rapporteur asks the Committee to 
endorse his view that there be no restrictions on 
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the dual mandate in the first elections to the 
European Parliament, but that the normal 
pressures of work, travel, and voting will ultim-
ately force representatives to choose between one 
mandate and the other. 
IV. The impact of radio and television 
on parliamentary debates and the public 
63. On this subject your Rapporteur is in the 
difficult situation - as the English phrase has it 
-of being "a poacher turned gamekeeper". For 
ten years before he entered parliament, he was 
a television producer with special responsibility 
for covering politics, and in the mid-1960s he 
was closely involved in preparing evidence on 
the broadcasting of the House of Commons. He 
has to admit immediately that his media object-
ives today, as member of parliament, are some-
what different from what they were then, as a 
television man. 
64. As a broadcaster, your Rapporteur was 
concerned with gaining the maximum audience 
for his political programmes. This involved the 
simplification of often very complex issues, and 
their "humanisation" ior the televiewer by the 
personalisation of argument : two speakers with 
radically opposed points of view, expressed 
briefly, were much more likely to gain exposure 
on television than the conscientious member who 
wished to examine all the shades of grey of an 
issue. Members with a specialist knowledge of 
the finer points of fiscal policy did not appear 
"on the box" with nearly the regularity of those 
who pursued the emotive issues (the killing of 
baby seals, the needs of autistic children, etc.) or 
who had an immediate comment on the hot news 
of the day. Subjects in which the member could 
be intercut with good visual material (baby seals, 
Concorde, North Sea oil) were obviously favoured 
by the television staff. Ministers were much more 
likely to be featured than backbenchers. The "set 
piece" parliamentary occasions - votes of con-
fidence, for example, with their gladiatorial con-
tests - were certain to gain television time : 
run-of-the-mill committee debates (often of much 
more immediate importance to the man in the 
street, and his pocket) were not. 
65. (Your Rapporteur should perhaps at this 
stage remind the reader that there is no television 
coverage as yet of Westminster, apart from the 
pomp and circumstance of the formal opening 
of parliament. The British television producer 
therefore has to recreate the events of the day on 
film or in the adjacent television studios. There 
is no shortage of members wanting to participate : 
"I can reach more electors in five minutes on 
the screen than in a year plodding round my 
constituency", one said in evidence.) 
66. In his television days, your Rapporteur 
wanted access for his cameras to the actual 
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chamber for supplementary coverage. Ministerial 
questions and answers would often be of interest. 
Snatches of debate would provide the "feel" 
and atmosphere of parliament at work. "Wide-
shots" (a general view of the whole chamber) 
would be helpful in "bridging" other sequences. 
The occasional major debate might be covered 
live and in entirety, though it would play hell 
with the programme schedules. From time to 
time there might be the fortuitous gem (Bessie 
Braddock, an extremely large Labour lady, 
dancing a jig on the floor of the house ; or 
Michael Heseltine, a strapping Tory, seizing the 
mace and swinging it high above his head, hence 
confirming his nickname of "Tarzan"). 
67. But is this parliament! Should mediamen 
ever play impresario to their national 
legislators Y Are some things not better kept 
discreetly hidden ? Can television ever present a 
fair and true picture of what our parliamentary 
assemblies do ? Can the media help the demo-
cratic process and strengthen public participa-
tion and understanding 7 
68. After almost four years in the House of 
Commons, your Rapporteur is now, of necessity, 
a gamekeeper. He appreciates that much of what 
parliament does is boring but important : it does 
not translate easily into pictures. He is concerned 
about fairness and overall balance : how to 
capture the flavour of a debate and not just 
the collisions of ministers with their opposite 
numbers ; how to ensure that minority parties 
(admittedly, like his own) are not "squeezed out" ; 
how to remind viewers that the honourable 
member for Blankshire, who has not been seen 
on the screen all day, is attending a WEU plenary 
session in Paris ; how to explain that the gentle-
man with his feet up, who looks ready to drop 
off to sleep any minute, has actually been speak-
ing and voting in committee somewhere else in 
the house all night. 
69. There is also the problem of what coverage 
to give to the member who is not a star, but may 
be rendering indispensable service to his party 
or constituents. Your Rapporteur recalls suggest-
ing on one occasion, somewhat naively, that the 
democratic process in Britain demanded that 
every member should be given the opportunity to 
appear briefly in a series of constituency 
reports : given single member seats, it was right 
and proper that the electorate should see what 
their parliamentarian looked like, and what his 
views were. He was taken aside by a chief whip 
and disabused of the notion very quickly : "Old 
Bloggs might be an absolute sweetie, but put him 
on the box and he will lose us half a million 
votes overnight ... " 
70. At the opposite extreme, there is the 
publicity-seeker and "headline-grabber" : the 
member who very quickly learns to read the cue-
lights of cameras and respond accordingly ("A 
furious face?" Certainly. "A shrug of disdain Y" 
Coming up now. And often conveying more, 
without having to go on the record, than a five-
minute speech would have done.) There is also 
the member who will obtain exposure by hook or 
by crook, and even if it takes half a dozen bogus 
points of order or interventions to do so. 
71. And finally, there is the consideration that 
broadcasting is shaped by the physical lay-out 
of our national legislatures, and by their different 
rules and procedures. A circular chamber poses 
entirely different problems and opportunities 
from a face-to-face chamber such as Westminster. 
Parliaments elected by a list system look very 
different from those elected by the first-past-the-
post method. The very hours when our 
legislatures are in session can be radically dif-
ferent. Assemblies with a highly-developed com-
mittee system might be better served by placing 
the cameras there, and largely ignoring the 
speech "for the record" on the chamber floor. 
72. Nonetheless, your Rapporteur believes that 
there is one question common to the broad-
casting of all WEU assemblies : how to use the 
media as a window on how decisions are taken, 
by whom, and why ; and not simply as a "staged" 
reflection of formal debates. 
73. Your Rapporteur framed a questionnaire 
(Appendix VI) aimed specifically at providing 
answers in this area. Unfortunately only four 
of the WEU parliaments have so far replied, and 
in those which have, the clerks have referred 
him to the national broadcasting organisations 1 
on the questions of audience response, members' 
reaction, and technical equipment. What follows, 
therefore, is purely an interim report, aimed at : 
(a) giving a pen-portrait of current broad-
casting practice in our national assem-
blies, and 
(b) drawing a few tentative conclusions on 
what lessons have been learned in those 
countries where there is radio or 
television coverage of parliament. 
7 4. Your Rapporteur seeks permission to con-
tinue his research, particularly in association 
with the broadcasting organisations. 
A. The current situation 
75. There follows a brief statement, per member 
country of WEU, of your Rapporteur's under-
standing of the rules and procedures governing 
the broadcasting of parliamentary debates. 
1. To date, your Rapporteur has had discussions with 
representatives of the British Broadcasting Corporation 
and the Independent Broadcasting Authority, and with 
Mr. Joseph Puly of the first chain in France. He hopes 
to talk with German broadcasters while in Bonn in Nov-
ember. 
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(i) Belgium 
76. It is only within the last three years that 
the media have been allowed into the legislature 
and then only to cover major debates, though 
recorded extracts are used in news and current 
affairs programmes. Discretionary powers are 
accorded to the President of the Chamber to 
authorise the broadcasting of debates. The 
coverage is complicated by the two-language 
situation, but there is pressure in some quarters 
for a more welcoming attitude to the media. 
(ii) France 
77. Radio and television were not allowed to 
broadcast from the National Assembly until1966, 
but both now carry "live" relays of major min-
isterial announcements and debates while there 
is also extensive use of recorded extracts in 
other programmes, including news bulletins. 
Transmissions are regulated both by the law and 
by parliamentary procedure. 
78. General legislative provisions on broadcast-
ing and television entitle each assembly to super-
vise radio and television broadcasts of parlia-
mentary debates and allocate equal time for 
parliamentary groups of the majority and of 
the opposition. The bureau of the National 
Assembly has issued directives in this sense and 
a delegation from the bureau, elected each year, 
exercises a posteriori control over broadcasts 
of parliamentary debates. This delegation 
intervenes only if the impartiality of broadcasts 
is contested. 
79. Important parts of plenary sittings are also 
broadcast by audio-visual media in France and 
Italy. In the French National Assembly, there 
are elements concerning regularity and organisa-
tion in the "live" or recorded broadcasting of 
important debates which are worthy of mention. 
Debates in which the government's responsibility 
is committed and other important debates are 
televised direct. In debates where the govern-
ment's responsibility is committed, the assembly's 
sitting is organised so as to allow broadcasting 
until 7 p.m., including government statements 
of unlimited duration and a speech lasting not 
more than half an hour by a representative of 
each political group. Televised broadcasts of other 
important debates are organised so as to include 
the first speaker from each political group and 
the government representative. For an important 
debate, there may be a special recorded half-
hour programme after the television news. The 
time is then divided into three equal parts : 
government, majority and opposition. The choice 
of speakers is made by the television authorities 
in liaison with the leaders of political groups, 
while the choice of extracts is left to the 
journalists producing the programme except 
when leaders of political groups have said they 
wished specific parts of the debates to be broad-
cast. 
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(iii) Germany 
80. Apart from a short period when permission 
to cover proceedings was withdrawn, television 
and radio have been allowed into the Bundestag 
since 1953. For regular general coverage film 
cameras are used, with electronic cameras being 
brought in for major occasions and to cover the 
more important committees. There is extensive 
radio coverage - around 80 % - of plenary 
sessions. 
81. Important parliamentary sessions are tele-
vised "live" by NDR3, generally between 9 a.m. 
and 6 p.m. In addition to "live" programmes 
of this kind there is a 30 to 40 minute evening 
summary of the proceedings, including actuality, 
on NDR1, but in North Germany only. Edited 
extracts of debates are also shown in news 
bulletins. On average German viewers see around 
sixty hours of parliament "live" each year, plus 
a far larger amount of recorded and edited 
material. This extensive coverage is significant 
in that, for a time, many members of parliament 
were sensitive about the presence of cameras 
and contemplated taking over the responsibility 
for producing the programmes themselves. These 
doubts, however, were rapidly overcome and 
today the presence of cameras and microphones 
is accepted as a normal part of parliamentary 
life. 
82. A procedure has been established whereby 
the television station puts in a request to the 
press department, which is under the jurisdiction 
of the President of the Bundestag, to be allowed 
to televise certain proceedings. Permission is 
granted by the press department following con-
sultation with party representatives. Once 
permission has been granted, as it normally is, 
the actual televising and editing becomes the 
responsibility of the television station which has 
to conform to certain conditions with regard to 
the placing of cameras. 
(iv) Italy 
83. In Italy there is no regular service on either 
radio or television, but permission is given for 
occasional "live" broadcasts on both media, and 
edited versions are subsequently rebroadcast. 
Votes of confidence are covered in entirety by 
radio. A parliamentary committee has residual 
powers over what is transmitted. 
( v) Luxembourg (see next report) 
(vi) Netherlands 
84. In the Netherlands, television was at first 
restricted to the coverage of a few major debates 
each year, while radio carried a parliamentary 
programme, including recorded actuality, almost 
every day. There are now, however, virtually no 
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restrictions on either medium, although the 
emphasis is still on radio, which carries a daily 
parliamentary programme from Mondays to 
Fridays after 10.30 p.m. containing approxim-
ately ten minutes of extracts from speeches. The 
selection of items for inclusion is at the discretion 
of the broadcasting editor. The broadcasting of 
committees is very infrequent both because of the 
technicality of many of the subjects and because 
committees mostly meet in camera. 
85. The radio and television authorities in the 
Netherlands have standing permission granted by 
parliament to cover the debates of both chambers. 
In practice the proceedings of the upper house 
are seldom broadcast. 
(vii) United Kingdom 
86. The BBC has broadcast since 1945 a daily 
report of proceedings in parliament called "Today 
in parliament", which lasts for fifteen minutes 
and is repeated the following morning as 
"Yesterday in parliament". It is on radio only 
and includes many extracts from individual 
speeches, read as reported speech in the studio. 
In addition, there are many studio-based news 
and current affairs programmes featuring 
members of parliament. 
87. In 1966 a Select Committee on Broadcasting 
recommended the recording of debates for use in 
extract form in subsequent programmes ; it saw 
no objection to the occasional "live" coverage of 
major debates. The committee proposed that the 
Commons take no decision until an experiment in 
closed-circuit television and radio covering both 
houses had been held: this was defeated, how-
ever, by 131 to 130 votes and the idea lapsed. 
88. The House of Lords proved itself much 
more enthusiastic. In 1966 it approved a motion 
for a closed-circuit experiment, and this was 
subsequently held over a three-day period in 
1968. Stung, perhaps, by the Lords' action, the 
Commons authorised a radio experiment - for 
edited summarised programmes - over April-
May 1968. 
89. Subsequent attempts to ensure permanent 
coverage were unsuccessful until the government 
promised a fresh look at the situation in October 
1974. In February the following year the Com-
mons authorised an experiment in public sound 
broadcasting, which took place in extract form 
on the radio networks in June-July 1975. A 
similar motion to allow television coverage was 
defeated. In March 1976 the Commons voted to 
put extract radio coverage on a permanent basis, 
and discussions since then have revolved round 
the technicalities and costs. The chamber has 
now been provided with a commentators' booth, 
accommodation set up for editors in the Palace 
of Westminster, and it is hoped that radio 
coverage will commence within the next four 
months. There is provision for "live" coverage, 
both from the house and committee, but it is 
anticipated that most material will be used in 
extract form, with the BBC providing a "clean 
feed" to other broadcasting organisations. "Today 
in parliament" will be expanded to take account 
of recorded actuality. 
90. Television cameras are allowed into West-
minster for the formal State opening of Parlia-
ment by Her Majesty the Queen. 
( viii) European assemblies 
91. Facilities exist for broadcasting coverage of 
the parliamentary assemblies of Western Euro-
pean Union, the Council of Europe, and the 
European Communities. Indeed, the most up-to-
date technical equipment in any European parlia-
ment probably exists in the Palais de !'Europe 
in Strasbourg. Inevitably, however, coverage falls 
between two stools: the great international event 
(such as the admission of Spain to the Council 
of Europe) and the purely "national" speech 
which comes high on the bulletin order of a 
particular locale (e.g. a speech by your Rap-
porteur on Scottish Gaelic in Strasbourg) but is 
of minimal interest elsewhere. Since the pan-
European events are sporadic, as far as the 
broadcasters are concerned, they tend to be 
covered on film, not electronically ; local speeches 
are much more feasible - they can either be 
relayed by telephone circuit for subsequent re-
broadcast, or posted in tape or cartridge form. 
92. Your Rapporteur believes that it would be 
helpful if the press section of WEU could provide 
a guidance sheet to members on the facilities 
which exist in the Palais d'Iena and the various 
committee centres. 
93. Your Rapporteur also draws the Committee's 
attention to, in his opinion, an interesting intra-
European radio development. The BBC have 
proposed a news and current affairs programme 
in French, German and English to broadcast to 
two-thirds of the population of the EEC countries 
by the end of 1978. There would be direct circuits 
between Paris, Bonn, Brussels and London · and 
the editorial line would be ll faut concritiser 
l'Europe - allowing national attitudes to be 
heard, but within a European framework. The 
concept has the support of the EBU and the EEC 
Commission, and, your Rapporteur trusts of 
WEU. Through this medium, plenary ses;ions 
of WEU and its Committees' meetings might for 
the first time, receive much wider coverage. It is 
hoped that a link to Italy, the Netherlands and 
Luxembourg would follow shortly after the initial 
transmissions of the programme. 
B. Conclusions 
94. What follows are simply a few initial 
thoughts from your Rapporteur. They are by no 
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means his final conclusions, and they are set 
down primarily to initiate discussion into possible 
ways in which this report might develop. 
(i) The aims and objectives of broadcasting 
our asse.mblies are fairly clearly summed up in a 
report Issued by the Canadian parliament in 
1972: 
"Parliament represents the people : its 
business is the nation's business; and one 
of our prime responsibilities is to inform 
the people. The people therefore have a 
right to see their parliament in action and 
through television and radio coverage this 
right could become a reality. Through these 
agencies the public gallery of the House of 
Commons could be extended to the furthest 
limits of the nation. The bond between par-
liament and the electorate would be 
strengthened because the House of Commons 
would be brought into the homes of all who 
wished to tune in to its proceedings." 
95. These are fine sentiments with which few 
parliamentarians would disagree. In this report, 
however, your Rapporteur has hoped to show 
that these ideals face certain practical dif-
ficulties : cost, editorial control, the need to win 
and hold a viewing or listening audience tech-
nical developments, and the dangers of exciuding 
all but "star performers" from the media. 
9?. In the ensuing paragraphs, your Rapporteur 
discusses some of these difficulties. 
(ii) It should be said immediately that radio 
coverage provides few technical problems. In all 
our assemblies, the existing sound systems can be 
readi!y adapted - with the addition of a couple 
of nucrophones for background noise to provide 
"atmosphere". The costs of radio and the number 
of p~r~onnel involved are minimal compared to 
teleVIsion. Your Rapporteur is firmly of the view 
that the major way in which parliament can 
"inform the people" is via the medium of radio. 
97. Television does not present nearly as many 
technical p~oblems as it did a decade ago, though 
these remam considerable. Electronic cameras 
have become considerably smaller in size, and 
can also be automated. It should be perfectly 
possible to televise the Commons, for example 
with two automated cameras slung under th~ 
galleries, one manned camera in the com-
mentators' booth, and two manned cameras in the 
galleries. Fears of disruption on the floor of the 
chamber can therefore be discounted. Cables could 
be run through existing ducting. With new light-
sensitive cameras now available, the problem of 
excessive lighting and consequent heat has largely 
disappeared. The "behind the scenes" crew 
remains large, however (around forty) and a 
control room has to be provided - either 
permanently or through mobile units which have 
to be linked up. 
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98. Permanent television coverage has certain 
attractions. It would provide a record for all 
time of what was said and done in the chamber. 
It would mean that no event was missed, and 
your Rapporteur finds it difficult to believe that 
an evening's news would go by without several 
extracts being included. "Today in parliament" 
type programmes would have fresh material 
daily. There would be no need to rush in crews 
at short notice. Against this, your Rapporteur 
wonders whether the very substantial cost 
involved justifies an operation of this size, 
especially when there are alternative ways of 
achieving the same coverage. 
99. The most obvious alternative is the skilled 
parliamentary correspondent : in a few minutes 
he can deliver the feel and flavour of a debate, 
objectively and in fairness to all sides. To do 
the same using electronic extracts would take 
four or five times as long, if only because the 
parliamentarian's speech patterns are not tailored 
to telecast form. (If any member doubts this, let 
him try making his point in one minute, twenty-
three seconds precisely, which is the specific sort 
of time broadcasters work to.) The second altern-
ative is to use film cameras - as already happens 
in our assemblies for most television coverage -
which require much smaller crewing (around 5 
or six) : these can provide perfectly adequate 
extract material, although naturally there is some 
loss in picture quality and immediate coverage 
is impossible, since the film has to be processed 
and edited. 
(iii) Your Rapporteur notes that, in all countries 
where television has been allowed into the 
chamber, this has rapidly been followed by a 
request for the same facilities to be extended to 
press photographers. As a matter of equity, it is 
extremely difficult to refuse this request. In 
practice it can lead to a plethora of cameramen 
being present, and to great distraction. While 
individual newspapers may object, your Rap-
porteur feels this problem can be overcome only 
by "licensing" a small number of press photo-
graphers on any given day, who will share their 
work on a pooled basis. 
(iv) Who does the "licensing", and who deter-
mines the rules and procedures T Prior to the 
admission of radio and television to our 
legislatures, this has led to much debate and 
heartsearching among members. Is privilege 
extended to such transmissions ? How can object-
ivity be assured T What penalties can be enforced 
on the broadcaster ? Does the absolute freedom 
of the press extend to radio and television ? In 
practice, such problems seem to arise only rarely. 
The broadcasters take great pride in the fact that 
their trade is built on objectivity ("When the 
Labour Party, Conservative Party, Liberal Party 
and all the other parties tell me that my last 
transmission was biased against them, I know it 
was probably spot-on", one producer said.) 
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100. "Controls", such as they are, depend largely 
on existing national parliamentary practice. In 
some countries, they are written into a specific 
law ; in others no such law exists, though broad-
casting may be covered by standing orders, or 
by specific conventions, or in detailed rules issued 
by the broadcasting organisations. Somewhere in 
the legislation covering broadcasting in general 
in our countries there must be a requirement that 
all programmes should be "objective" and 
"balanced". 
101. Who is responsible for the origination of 
programmes also varies widely. In Belgium and 
Germany discretionary powers lie with the 
President of the Chamber to authorise transmis-
sions, though in practice matters are arranged 
between the parties and the broadcasting organ-
isations. In France, similar powers lie with the 
pracsidium ; in Italy with a parliamentary com-
mittee. In the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom there are no such residual powers 
though in the latter a joint committee of the 
Commons and the Lords will hold a "watching 
brief" on the situation. 
102. In general, it appears to your Rapporteur 
that parliamentarians and broadcasters have 
managed to coexist remarkably well. It is 
significant that in no country where broad-
casting facilities have been granted have they 
been permanently withdrawn. The ultimate sanc-
tion lies, of course, with the members of parlia. 
ment themselves who, if dissatisfied, can change 
the rules. 
(v) In the short time available to prepare this 
report, it has not been possible to publish a table 
of comparative costings and hours of parlia-
mentary broadcasting (with a breakdown of the 
type of programme in which extracts are shown, 
and when). Your Rapporteur hopes to be given 
permission to continue his research in this area. 
103. He simply notes that, as a broadcaster, he 
was an advocate of the establishment of a 
"television Hansard", with staff and technical 
facilities coming under the control of the house 
and a "clean feed" being provided on a charge 
basis to the broadcasting organisations. He still 
feels that this is the ideal situation, but having 
reviewed practice among our legislatures - where 
the broadcasters run the entire service themselves 
- he has to admit that it is working perfectly 
adequately. 
(vi) The problem of the "neglected" backbencher 
still remains. There is no obvious solution, apart 
from continuous live transmissions. It could be 
argued, of course, that skill in self-presentation 
on radio and television is an essential part of the 
trade of any politician these days ; a member 
does not need to appear personally to be quoted 
in news bulletins, for example. The onus is there-
fore largely on the individual. Your Rapporteur 
feels, however, that the broadcasting organisa-
tions could do more in initiating the backbencher 
into the mysteries of the media, and in devoting 
more programmes specifically to his interest. 
(vii) In summary, your Rapporteur believes: 
(a) Radio and television can encourage 
intelligent communication between parliament 
and its electorate. It cannot guarantee it. Its use 
depends as much on cost, audience reaction, and 
technical facilities as on the parliamentary 
time-table. 
(b) Until more channels become available, the 
continuous live transmission of parliament is 
hardly feasible ; even then, it would likely be 
counter-productive in terms of audience reaction. 
Continuous radio transmissions, while possible, 
might also produce a hostile or apathetic audience 
response. It would be extremely difficult to 
justify the costs involved. 
(c) The most advantageous use of radio and 
television is in the form of edited reports rather 
than continuous live transmissions. Matters of 
major importance would still be broadcast live, 
but the bulk of coverage would be via parlia-
mentary reports or in news and current affairs 
programmes. The complexities of debate would 
be explained by a commentator, and points of 
order and privilege edited out unless they were 
of public interest. 
(d) Radio has a more important role in explain-
ing parliament to the people than television. It is 
a 
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cheaper, much more flexible, and far easier to 
assemble in edited form. It does not offer the 
same advantages to the publicity seeker. Selected 
extracts used live in newscasts and in parlia-
mentary reports can do much to bring under-
standing of what members of parliament actually 
do. Continuous recording is perfectly feasible. 
With intelligent scheduling at "peak hours", 
a vast audience can be gained. Continuous video-
recording for television is less attractive. Experi-
ence in those WEU legislatures which have tele-
vision coverage indicates that there is a demand 
for extended live coverage only on major 
occasions - formal openings, budgets, votes of 
censure and so on. For such coverage it is desir-
able that jack-points for electronic cameras are 
already available, so that the unit has "drive in" 
facilities. For standard debates, film cameras pro-
vide an adequate alternative facility. 
(e) The potential for conflict between the 
broadcaster and parliamentarian does not appear 
to have been exploited on either side. While 
there have been grumbles, the rules of impartial-
ity and objectivity would appear to have been 
observed. 
(f) A basic skill in the use of radio and tele-
vision is part of the trade of all politicians. The 
onus of appearing is on them. Nonetheless, the 
broadcasting organisations could do more to give 
members of parliament outline knowledge of the 
media ; they could also devote more time to the 
interests of backbenchers. 
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APPENDIX I 
Table of action In the parllamenf.s of member eoantria 
(Totalll fly country for each aeafon) 
Member countries 
:8 
Recommendations u r ~ adopted in J J ] ~ 1 4l .... ] ~ 
'i'a ~ 
lift 
1956 0 0 3 0 0 0 
1957 4: 0 1 0 0 5 
1958 2 0 3 0 0 4: 
1959 0 0 9 0 0 0 
1960 3 12 2 8 0 3 
1961 0 2 0 3 0 6 
1962 2 4: 4: 6 2 3 
1963 0 0 13 22 1 2 
1964 4: 14: 9 11 1 5 
1965 0 11 12 24: 0 5 
1966 2 12 12 4:9 1 4: 
1967 14: 9 22 29 2 6 
1968 6 14: 20 22 1 16 
1969 11 15 17 8 0 4: 
1970 3 15 15 7 2 3 
1971 0 4: 19 9 0 6 
1972 0 6 2 1 0 1 
1973 0 4: 2 6 1 0 
1974: 0 1 3 13 2 0 
1975 10 28 8 19 3 11 
1976 16 4:0 13 10 2 3 
1977 0 7 2 7 0 0 
Total 77 198 191 254: 18 87 
Annual average 3.50 9.00 8.68 11.55 0.82 4:.00 
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~ 
! Total 
1 p 
0 3 
2 12 
3 12 
0 9 
1 29 
0 11 
10 31 
3 4:1 
2 4:6 
28 80 
18 98 
16 98 
4:7 126 
36 91 
10 55 
10 4:8 
0 10 
0 13 
0 19 
3 82 
8 92 
0 16 
197 1,022 
9.00 6.64: 
,, 
' 
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APPENDIX 11 
Table of interventions (debates, questions, replies, etc.) on texts adopted since December 1976 
= 
.s ~ ~ 0 .= ~ ]l ~ ~r ~ ~ ! ~-~ 8 I j g ] ~ l .si ·; ]I ·&, G) ] G) ~ "G! 1~ ~ oS i Ji rl.l ll:l z C) "CO G) &: ~ p 
273 X 2 1 3 6 
274 X 2 2 1 5 
275 4 4 
276 X 2 1 3 
277 
-
278 
-
Dec. 279 
-
1975 280 
-
281 
-
54 
282 
-
283 
-
Res. 55 2 1 3 2 8 
Res. 56 
-
Res. 57 
-
Res. 58 
-
Other action 2 17 4 1 1 2 1 28 
Res. 59 2 4 2 8 
284 -
285 X 2 5 2 2 11 
June 286 
-
1976 287 2 2 1 1 2 8 47 
288 X 
-
289 X 4 5 2 2 13 
290 X 4 2 1 7 
-- --- --- ---
291 
-
292 
-
Nov. 293 X 2 2 1 5 
1976 294 
-
295 X 2 1 2 5 45 
296 2 1 3 
Res. 60 -
Other action 5 15 5 1 6 32 
--
297 
-
298 X 1 1 
299 X 1 1 
300 1 1 
June 301 1 1 
1977 302 1 1 16 
303 
-
304 1 1 
305 1 1 
306 
-
Other action 7 2 9 
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APPENDIX m 
(a) Visits by the Committee for Relations with Parliaments 
22nd February 1963 
lOth October 1963 
11th-12th November 1964 
28th-29th April 1965 
15th-16th December 1965 
Paris 
Rome 
Bonn 
The Hague 
Brussels 
30th October-lst November 1966 London 
23rd-24th November 1967 
2nd-3rd April 1968 
26th-27th March 1969 
27th-28th October 1969 
14th-15th April 1970 
1st-2nd April 1971 
4th-5th November 1971 
24th-25th February 1972 
18th-19th September 1972 
1st-2nd May 1973 
15th-18th October 1973 
8th-10th July 1974 
27th-28th Oatober 1975 
11th-12th !lay 1976 
25th-26th November 1976 
9th-10th May 1977 
3th-4th November 1977 
Berlin (Regional parliament of Land Berlin) 
Luxembourg 
Rome 
Paris 
Bonn 
Rome 
Bonn 
The Hague 
Florence (Regional parliament of Tuscany) 
St. Helier (Regional parliament of the States 
of Jersey) 
Munich (Regional parliament of the Free State 
of Bavaria.) 
Pa.lermo (Regional parliament of Sicily) 
The Hague 
Luxembourg 
Brussels 
Rome 
Bonn - Wiesbaden (Regional parliament of 
Hesse) 1 
1. Statements made in Wiesbaden will be published in the next report. 
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APPENDIX IV 
Questionnaire 
on the laws governing elections to the European Parliament 
1. What position has been reached in your 
national legislation 7 
(If a law has been passed, could you attach 
a copy to the answer to this questionnaire) 
2. Can you give a brief summary of the attitude 
of the major political parties in your country ? 
3. What is the total population and electorate 
of your country ? 
How many seats are allocated to your coun-
try? 
What is the electorate per representative ? 
4. How will you elect your representatives : 
National list Y 
Regional lists 7 
Single-member seats ? 
Other? 
5. If the elections are held by lists, are 
candidates elected in order of party preference 
or may the elector vote for any given candidate Y 
Is there any provision for allocating seats to 
compensate for votes "left over" under the list 
system? 
6. Are the different regions weighted in your 
country? 
If so, how Y 
(e.g. Flanders, Wallonia, etc. in Belgium; 
Scotland, Wales, England in Britain; Brittany, 
Basque area, etc. in France ; Laender in Ger-
many) 
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7. Is it possible for nationals resident in another 
EEC country, and immigrants from other EEC 
countries to vote ? 
8. What is the estimated number of your 
nationals of voting age resident outwith your 
country but within the European Communities ? 
9. What are the qualifications for standing as 
a candidate ? 
What are the conditions for disqualification ? 
10. Must representatives already hold office in 
their national parliament Y Or is this forbidden. 
11. What links are envisaged between your repre-
sentatives in the national and European Parlia-
ments Y (e.g. joint standing committee, speaking 
rights in the national parliament for MPs, com-
pulsory dual membership, etc.) 
12. What expenses are candidates and/ or parties 
allowed Y 
May contributions be made to campaign 
funds from foreign countries, parties or institu-
tions 7 .,"'::ld.M,) 
What is the deposit required for each 
candidate or list Y 
What % of vote must be obtained not to 
forfeit the deposit ? 
13. Has the total estimated cost of the elections 
already been calculated and if so, how much is 
the estimate ? 
How does this figure compare with normal 
general elections in your country Y 
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Systems for allocating seats in parliamentary assemblies 
1. First-past-the-post : This is the system cur-
rently employed in the United Kingdom, and 
the suggested alternative (to regional lists) for 
direct elections. Based on single member 
constituencies, the candidate with the highest 
personal vote is elected, regardless of his percent-
age of the poll. 
2. Single transferable vote (STV) : this is the 
system used in the Irish Republic and which will 
be used for direct elections in Northern Ireland. 
The effect of the single transferable vote 
system is to ensure that the candidates who are 
finally elected represent accurately the prefer-
ences of the whole electorate and in the pro-
portion in which those preferences are held. 
Under this system, the voter indicates on 
his ballot paper his order of preference for as 
many of the candidates as he wishes. 
When the electoral officer comes to count the 
votes, his first step is to work out a "quota" -
the figure which represents the number of votes a 
candidate must receive if he is to be elected. 
For example : if 30,000 votes are cast, this 
total would be divided by the number of vacant 
seats in the constituency (say 5) plus 1. Then, the 
quota would be one more than this figure. Thus, 
30,000:6 = 5,000 plus 1 = 5,001. The effect of 
this is to ensure that there is less than a quota 
for any other candidate after five have been 
elected. Any candidate, therefore, who obtains 
5,001 votes is elected. Any votes which he receives 
over and above the quota are regarded as a 
"surplus". The second preferences shown on these 
surplus votes are then distributed to the other 
candidates. This distribution is mathematically 
worked out to ensure that the second preferences 
of the candidate's surplus are proportional to the 
second preferences shown in the candidate's entire 
vote. 
Possibly, after this, other candidates will 
have reached the quota figure and will therefore 
be elected. If there are still vacancies i.e. if the 
five seats available in this hypothetical situation 
have not been filled, then the second preferences 
of those whose first choice received the smallest 
number of votes are distributed until five 
candidates have reached the quota figure and 
been elected. 
Under the STV system, voters may vote for 
party or personality or sex or on other factors 
or combinations. There are various methods of 
overcoming the by-election problem. There can 
be, as in Eire, another election over the whole 
constituency by what amounts to the alternative 
vote method. The new member will necessarily 
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represent the majority party : if the vacancy 
being filled was that of a minority party, i~ will 
lose its representation. Alternatively, a by-election 
may be held (by STV or by simple majority) 
over part of the constituency ; or the next highest 
candidate of the same party as the missing mem-
ber may be eo-opted. 
3. Party lists : this is the system which is com-
monly used in Europe and which is almost certain 
to be recommended by the European Parliament 
for subsequent direct elections. The list can be 
either national, covering the entire country as 
in France, or regional as in the United Kingdom, 
with a specific number of seats allocated to 
individual areas of the country. Most list systems 
are modified in order to allow electors to express 
individual preferences among each party's 
candidates. 
There follows a brief description of the 
various methods used to allocate seats, by far the 
most common of which is the d'Hondt system : 
(a) The d'Hondt system is the one of the highest 
averages. It works as follows: in a parliament 
with 20 seats for which 7 parties have nominated 
candidates, list A obtains 222,000 votes, list B 
190,000, list C 120,000, list D 66,000, list E 
60,000, list F 50,000 and list G 31,000. When the 
votes have been counted, the results obtained by 
each list are divided by 1, then 2, then 3, then 4, 
and so on. Seats are then allocated according to 
the quotas obtained. 
This gives the following results (seat num-
bers are given in brackets, i.e. seat 1 is allocated 
to list A, seat 2 to list B, seat 3 to list C, seat 4 
to list A, and so on : 
List A ListB 
222 1 = 222 (1) 190 : 1 = 190 (2) 
222 : 2 = 111 (4) 190 : 2 = 95 (5) 
222:3= 74 (6) 190 : 3 = 63.3 (8) 
222 : 4 = 55.5 (11) 190 : 4 = 47.5 (13) 
222 : 5 = 44.4 (14) 190 : 5 = 38 (16) 
222 : 6 = 37 (17) 190 : 6 = 31.6 (20) 
222 : 7 = 31.7 (19) 190 : 7 = 27.1 
ListO ListD 
120 1 = 120 (3) 66 : 1 = 66 (7) 
120 : 2 = 60 (10) 66 : 2 = 33 (18) 
120 : 3 = 40 (15) 66 : 3 = 22 
120 : 4 = 30 
120 5 = 24 
120 : 6 = 20 
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ListE 
60: 1 = 60 (9) 
60:2=30 
60:3=20 
ListF ListG 
50: 1 =50 (12) 31 : 1 = 31 
50 : 2 = 25 31 : 2 = 15.5 
Seats are thus allocated as follows : 7 to A, 
6 to B, 3 to C, 2 to D, 1 to E and F and 0 to G. 
But to obtain a seat A needed 31,700 votes, 
whereas B needed 31,600, C 40,000, D 33,000, 
E 60,000 and F 50,000. Furthermore, G needed 
only 601 more votes to obtain the twentieth seat, 
which was allocated to B with 31,600 votes. 
This syatem thus favours the larger parties. 
From a purely mathematical standpoint, the 
result may seem unfair : lists A and B obtain 7 
and 6 seats for 31,700 and 31,600 votes each 
respectively while list E, with a total of 60,000 
votes, has only one. Politically speaking, the 
result is intentional : although parliament must 
represent the opinions of the electorate it also 
needs a majority and some degree of stability if 
it is to be able to govern. 
(b) The Roget system is slightly simpler : the 
total number of votes cast is divided by the total 
number of seats. In the example given, the total 
of 739,000 votes cast is divided by 20 and the 
quotient is then 36,950, which means that list A 
obtains 6 seats, list B 5, list C 3 and lists D, E 
and F one seat each. This leaves 3 seats, which 
are allocated to those which have the highest 
decimal figure: D, E and F are each given 
another seat. 
(c) The H agenback-Bischoff system starts like 
the Roget system : the quotient of 36,950 gives 
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6 seats to A, 5 to B, 3 to C and 1 each to D, E 
and F. The total number of votes is then divided 
by 6 + 1, 5 + 1, 3 + 1 and 1 + 1 to give the 
highest average for each seat allocated. Lists D, 
A and B are thus each allocated one seat and the 
final result gives 7 seats to A, 6 to B, 3 to C, 2 
to D, 1 toE and 1 to F. 
(d) The reduced quotient system seeks to 
facilitate mathematical calculations after elec-
tions. Instead of using the quotient obtained by 
dividing the total number of votes (739,000) by 
the number of seats (20), i.e. 36,950, which means 
that only 17 seats are attributable immediately 
the quotient is reduced slightly in order to give a 
total of 20 seats. In this example, a figure of 
31,600 might be taken, which would make for list 
A 222 : 31.6 = 7, for B 6, for C 3, for D 2 and 
for E and F 1 each. 
(e) Finally, there is the corrected allocation 
system, invented by Mr. Lisman : to start with, 
the quotient is calculated (36,950) ; any parties 
which do not reach this quotient are discounted, 
which would be the case for list G in the example 
given. Another percentage is then calculated : the 
total number of votes cast for each of the remain-
ing parties is divided by the total of the votes 
cast for lists A to F, which is then multiplied by 
20 (total number of seats to be allocated). Added 
together, these 6 totals come to 20, but of course 
with decimal figures which are then rounded off : 
upwards for 0.5% and over, downwards for less. 
The advantage of this system is that the propor-
tions between the various parties remain intact 
and there are no seats left over for subsequent 
allocation. 
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APPENDIX VI 
Questionnaire 
on broadcasting parliamentary debates on radio and teleuiBion 
1. Are parliamentary debates broadcast in your 
country on the radio Y 
Are parliamentary debates broadcast in your 
country on television Y 
If so, when did it begin 7 
Was the question of allowing debates to be 
broadcast raised in parliament ; if so, when and 
what was the outcome of the debate 7 
If not, why not ? 
2. How are debates broadcast 7 
(a) blanket coverage ? 
(b) formal occasions only Y 
(c) only very important debates, such as 
the debate on the budget, etc. 7 
(d) are committee meetings covered T 
(e) any other form ? 
3. Who is in charge of the broadcasting 
coverage: 
(a) parliamentary staff 7 
(b) radio and television organisations, and 
if so, all of them or only one or two (if 
possible provide names of organisa-
tions) Y 
Further to this question : 
(i) are the producers and technicians paid 
by parliament ; 
(ii) are they responsible to the Speaker, 
President of the Chamber, Clerk, etc. Y 
4. What are the rules covering live and other 
broadcasts, availability and editing of tapes, etc.? 
5. How are the broadcasts financed 7 
(a) by the government 7 
(b) by parliament 7 
(c) by the broadcasting organisations 7 
(d) by two or three of the abovementioned 
(please give breakdown) ? 
(e) in yet another way 7 
6. How much coverage is broadcast (please give 
details in hours and minutes) Y 
(a) live Y 
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(b) in news bulletins 7 
(c) in current affairs programmes 7 
(d) in political debates between MPs 7 
(e) in regional programmes t (i.e. dealing 
with matters of interest to a specific 
locality, featuring local members, and 
perhaps originating from a regional TV 
or radio station) 
(f) in other ways Y 
7. Who is in control t 
(a) who has the final authority 7 
(b) how are the parties "balanced" Y 
(c) what is the balance between ministers 
and MPsY 
(d) what is the balance between leading 
figures and backbenchers Y 
(e) what check is there on a producer 
"dramatising" his broadcast 7 (e.g. spot 
on the MP who plays the "gallery" or is 
sound asleep, etc.) 
8. Who owns the copyrights 7 
(a) on radio and VTR tapes, films, tele-
recordings, pictures Y 
(b) where are they stored Y 
(c) who has access to them Y (free or on 
payment) 
9. Do the broadcasting organisations have an 
automatic right to film and/or record proceed-
ings, or do they apply for it debate by debate 7 
(if the latter, to whom do they have to apply Y) 
10. Technical facilities in parliaments : 
(a) what facilities are permanently instal-
led Y 
(please give numbers) 
- electronic cameras Y video-recording 
machines Y 
- are there permanent control rooms, 
and how much space do they occupy Y 
- are there studios for interviews, and 
if so, how many Y and how are they 
equipped y 
- how many cameras are manned and 
how many are automatic Y 
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(b) how has broadcasting in your parliament 
been affected by the miniaturisation of 
equipment, by newer light-sensitive 
cameras? 
(c) who owns these permanent installations Y 
(d) how many permanent and temporary 
staff are involved and who pays them Y 
11. What is the total cost per annum and what 
costs are recovered by parliament from the 
broadcasting organisations Y 
12. What are the reactions : 
(a) of MPs 7 
13 
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(b) of the public Y 
(c) what is the attitude of MPs to broad-
casters and vice-versa? 
13. Is broadcasting worthwhile Y 
(a) does it help and promote parliamentary 
work? 
(b) does it bring parliaments and MPs 
closer to the population Y 
(c) or the contrary (why) Y 
14. .Any further comments on the subject will 
be appreciated. 
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Opinion of Sir Frederic Bennett on the application of the final act of the CSCE 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the application of the final act of the CSCB 
The Assembly, 
Considering that the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe held in 
Helsinki together with earlier treaties between eastern and western countries opened the way for a process 
which is intended to lead towards international peace, freedom of peoples and the fulfilment of human 
rights; 
Considering that the development of this process will inevitably be by successive steps ; 
Considering that jointly-planned developments must be achieved by all; 
Considering that further steps towards detente at the Belgrade meeting and in other negotiations 
are essential for the pursuit of the process of detente ; 
Considering that such a stage cannot be completed unless all the participants are firmly determined 
to achieve positive results, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Continue to examine the conduct of the Belgrade meeting in parallel with governments and relevant 
European and Atlantic organisations ; 
2. As a priority, endeavour to promote the process of detente with a view to improving understanding 
and co-operation between all the signatory States and affirming human rights and fundamental freedoms ; 
3. Ensure that all signatory countries apply the clauses of the Helsinki final act. 
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Explanatory Memorancfam 
(submitted by Mr. Segre, Rapporteur) 
I 
1. The heat of the ongoing debate preliminary 
to the follow-up conference at Belgrade between 
the countries signatories to the final act of the 
Helsinki conference, and the very fluidity of the 
situation, render difficult, in the Rapporteur's 
view, the presentation at the present juncture of 
any preliminary draft report capable of provid-
ing with a sufficient degree of approximation a 
snapshot of the situation that will arise when 
the WEU Assembly is called upon next June 
to pronounce a substantive opinion. In the words 
of Mr. Kurt W aldheim, Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, we are in fact "in a period of 
transition and uncertainty". There are many 
variable factors on the international scene. 
Among the more important, mention should be 
made of the international running-in of the new 
Carter Administration and developments in the 
SALT 11 negotiations. Other factors play an 
important role such as the strife in Africa, 
the continuing Middle East crisis and the ques-
tion of civil rights. The first meeting between 
the two great powers in Moscow, immediately 
after the American elections, was a failure. How-
ever, both parties hastened to underline that this 
was just a mishap not to be interpreted ,as a 
change of policy and discreet contacts were 
immediately established in order better to pre-
pare the talks to be held by Mr. V ance and 
Mr. Gromyko in Geneva in May. 
"I do not think", said Mr. Waldheim, "that 
this incident can bring d~tente to a halt ... 
Both the Americans and the Russians are 
still just as interested in continuing the 
policy of d~tente." 
2. It is clear that the state of American-Soviet 
relations has and will have far-reaching reper-
cussions on the state of international relations 
and consequently on the preparation and work 
of the Belgrade conference. Hence the present 
uncertainty. It is impossible to foresee the length 
of this "period of transition and uncertainty". 
Rather than go back over the controversies of 
that period and the points of view which have 
been and still are decisive, your Rapporteur 
feels he should try to bring out the basic ten-
dencies and then highlight the other recurring 
variables which must not be overlooked or under-
estimated. The main constant is still the convic-
tion that there is no rational alternative to the 
policy of d~tente and peaceful coexistence, al-
though there may be adjustments and differ-
ences in approach compared with other years. 
Thus it can be seen that there have been pauses 
and difficult periods, but it is not realistic 
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today to expect this universal awareness of a 
common destiny which in so many respects has 
been a feature of recent years to be seriously 
challenged or undermined. Admittedly, each time 
relations between the two superpowers enter a 
difficult stage, the first negative consequence 
is the breach in the barriers which had been 
raised against the Manichean habit, character-
istic of the cold-war period, of considering intcr-
nat;onal questions not on a rational basis but 
primarily in ideological terms and, in extreme 
cases, from a purely propaganda point of view. 
A hint of such a phenomenon, fortunately not 
yet general, has also been ascertained in recent 
weeks. To believe certain newspapers in both East 
and West, we seem to have gone back to the 
fifties. But an immediate denial has been repor-
ted- after the failure of the Moscow talks-
in statements by the leaders of both countries 
who are convinced that, while it is difficult 
to build up confidence, it is easy to restore 
mistrust, with the evident negative consequences 
which this implies. To quote a correct method-
ological viewpoint given recently (March 1977) 
ir. a Soviet review, New Times: 
"The question of confidence is most delicate. 
Decades of hostility and opposition have 
created stereotypes in East and West which 
judge each other primarily through the 
prism of mistrust. At the beginning, d~tente 
was in a sort of vicious circle: mistrust stood 
in the way of constructive talks and the 
absence of results prevented mistrust being 
overcome. The circle has been broken thanks 
to political lucidity and, perhaps, the polit-
ical courage of those who were able to resist 
the inertial force of the cold war and 
progress towards d~tente." 
3. It is now a matter of preventing a return 
to the vicious circle and avoiding a repetition of 
the state of affairs in which mistrust would 
stand in the way of constructive negotiations 
and the absence of results would not aLlow mis-
trust to be overcome. In a "period of transition 
and uncertainty" in international relations, and 
as the Belgrade conference draws near, this 
appears to be the central issue. It obviously 
includes an objective analysis of what Helsinki 
has produced to date, and as realistic an assess-
ment as possible of the process which started 
with the CSCE. 
n 
4. It is a concrete fact, in the current inter-
national situation, especially in Europe, that 
we find ourselves, in this preparatory phase of 
the Belgrade conference, at one of those critical 
moments (exaggerated as it may be in the pre-
sent state of affairs to speak of an actual 
crisis) which recurred on several occasions dur-
ing the years and the months which preceded the 
conclusion of the final act in Helsinki during the 
summer of 1975 and, time and again, called into 
question, more in form than in substance, the 
process of detente which has, for almost the past 
ten years now, been at work throughout our 
continent. For, let it be asseverated right at the 
outset of this report, what is at issue is not some 
casual occurrence but a long-term process, with 
all the typical complexities and contradictions 
which this sometimes implies, including even its 
moments of standstill and backsliding. A process 
which, for all that, seems fated to set its mark 
on the whole of Europe's political, economic and 
social development. While this undoubtedly 
throws up very knotty problems of the relation-
ship between this evolutionary process and that 
of other world regions and other continents, it 
should nevertheless be clear to everyone, even to 
those who now have the profoundest doubts 
about the progress of detente, that the only 
alternative hypothesis would carry with it dra-
matic consequences for the future of the Euro-
pean continent. 
5. Over and above the polemics that have 
marked the past weeks, the belief that this is 
the case still continues to emerge sufficiently 
clearly from the pronouncements of the prin-
cipal statesmen responsible for international 
affairs. 
"I think that detente does exist today", 
said the new United States Secretary of 
State, Mr. Vance, at a press conference 
on 4th March, "and I believe and hope 
that it will continue to exist". 
6. With particular reference to American-
Russian relations, he went on to say : 
"I note a continuing, deep and abiding 
interest in the Soviet Union and among 
Soviet leaders for pursuing with us the 
questions relating to arms control, parti-
cularly in the nuclear area, and in a variety 
of other matters." 
7. On the prospects for detente in United 
States-Soviet Union relations, he addf'd: 
"I think it is in the interest of both of 
our nations to search for common ground, 
and to lessen the tensions which divide the 
nations. In this process, I think it is necess-
ary to try and work out a clear under-
standing of what the meaning of detente 
is as between the two nations. In a sense, 
it is the setting down or arriving at a set 
of ground rules which permit competition 
side-by-side with the resolution of outstand-
ing questions. And it is not, again, a simple 
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task. It is one that has to be worked out 
by discussion and by action ; and I hope 
that as we get into closer dialogue on a 
face-to-face basis, we may develop a clearer 
understanding amongst us of what will be 
acceptable conduct on both sides." 
8. In this manner Mr. Vance seemed to be 
replying to some of the assurances and pledges 
given, in his latest public speech (Tula, 18th 
January), by Leonid Brezhnev: 
"Statements to the effect that the Soviet 
Union is going further than necessary for its 
defence and aiming at arms supremacy so 
as to be able to 'get in the first strike', 
are absurd and absolutely groundless. Our 
policy is not aimed at arms supremacy but 
at reduction of armaments, attenuation of 
warlike confrontation." 
9. Among other things he said that "detente 
is a specific trust, and the ability to take account 
of one another's legitimate interests". 
10. Indeed, the ability to take account of one 
another's legitimate interests is the central and 
trickiest crux of a balanced relationship that is 
undoubtedly never assured once and for all, but 
has to be constantly reaffirmed through a 
dialectic, an antagonism that has certainly never 
vanished from the international scene. 
11. In this connection, the United States 
President's Assistant for National Security 
Affairs, Zbigniew Brzezinski, recently remarked 
that: 
"The ideological as well as political conflict 
between the United States and the Soviet 
Union will go on for a long time but we 
should strive to moderate it gradually. To 
achieve that moderation both co-operation 
as well as vigilance will be necessary. 
Consequently, the maintenance of a strong 
American military deterrent is a necessary 
precondition for a stable and increasingly 
comprehensive as well as reciprocal detente 
- a detente which will remain both com-
petitive as well as co-operative." 
12. Indeed, it is now plain that we have once 
more arrived at a difficult point in time for 
achieving such a balance of relations, not least 
by reason of the fact that the United States and 
its Democrat Administration have announced 
that coneern for civil and human rights through-
out the world "will be threaded through our 
foreign policy" (V ance). The Secretary of State 
was asked: "Do you have a rule in your mind 
at what point does legitimate concern with 
human rights in other countries become un-
warranted interference in the internal affairs 
of another country, either adversary or ally¥", 
and his reply was: "There is no precise black-
and-white rule that I can set down. It is a much 
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more complicated process than that. It is a 
balancing process." The point of equilibrium has 
still to be reached, and most likely never will 
be once and for all, which is precisely one of the 
reasons for the uncertainty that currently looms 
over the international outlook. Yet the proceed-
ings in Geneva of the United Nations Commission 
for Human Rights indicate and confirm how 
seriously the diplomacy of the various countries 
is engaged in this search for an equilibrium. 
m 
13. It is necessary here - because it forms part 
of the ongoing debate between governments and 
political- forces on what the follow-up conference 
in Belgrade should be about - to refer back to 
the final act of Helsinki and what may be termed 
its philosophy. In this context, it is practically 
impossible to review all the elements of the 
debate (and of the controversies) which in recent 
months have mainly been concerned with the 
importance accorded to the campaign for civil 
rights in American foreign policy and also the 
East's reactions to actions and signs which have 
been interpreted as pure and simple interference 
in internal affairs. Consequently, there is a wall 
of misunderstanding and mistrust and a growing 
and bitter confrontation of ideologies and 
internal propaganda around the correct inter-
pretation of the Helsinki final act and its three 
baskets, the provisions of which, on the one hand, 
ban (section I, paragraph VI) "any intervention, 
direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the 
internal or external affairs falling within the 
domestic jurisdiction of another participating 
State, regardless of their mutual relations" and, 
on the other, stipulate (section I, paragraph VII) 
that: 
"The participating States will respect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
including the freedom of thought, conscience, 
religion or belief, for all without distinction 
as to race, sex, language or religion. 
They will promote and encourage the 
effective exercise of civil, political, economic, 
social, cultural and other rights and free-
doms all of which derive from the inherent 
dignity of the human person and are essen-
tial for his free and full development." 
14. Not only since Helsinki but for far longer, 
there have been discussions the world over to 
determine where intervention in the internal 
affairs of another State actually starts. An 
accurate answer has never been found. There is 
a margin of interpretation which always and 
above all depends on the state of relations and 
hence of confidence between the various coun-
tries. This margin of interpretation also applies 
to the Helsinki final act which, as a declaration 
of intention and not a treaty, makes no provision 
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for penalties against defaulting contracting 
parties. It nevertheless sets a precedent in inter-
national law since it is central to matters con-
cerning relations between States and also their 
domestic affairs. ·This makes it difficult to find 
and define an appropriate code of conduct. The 
ensuing discussion included comments on the 
existence of a degree of contradiction noted by 
several commentators in the general principles of 
the Helsinki final act between the said section VI 
establishing the principle of non-interference in 
the internal affairs of the participating States 
and section VII calling for respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms. The con-
tradiction, if it does in fact exist, stems from the 
real state of international political relations on 
which the Helsinki act was erected ; what we 
must realise above all is that the contradiction 
can only be resolved by maintaining and 
fostering the process of detente, and in any case 
only in the longer prospect. Your Rapporteur 
thinks it obvious that violations of such rights 
are committed in both East and West. President 
Carter's comment at his press conference on 23rd 
February is significant in this respect. He said : 
"'Ne have, I think, a responsibility and a 
legal right to express our disapproval of 
violations of human rights. The Helsinki 
agreement, so called basket Ill provisions, 
ensures that some of these human rights 
shall be preserved. We are signatory to the 
Helsinki agreement. We are, ourselves, cul-
pable in some ways for not giving people 
adequate right to move around our country, 
or restricting unnecessarily in my opinion 
visitation to this country by those who 
disagree with us politically." 
15. It is, on the other hand, an incontrovertible 
fact that what has caught the notice of public 
opinion in recent months has been chiefly new 
items emanating from some of the Eastern 
European countries and the Soviet Union, and 
reflecting a great variety of situations and 
behaviours in a context which, while demonstrat-
ing, to say the least, the continuance of "con-
tradictions and limitations which have so far 
prevented those societies from achieving that full 
measure of freedom, democracy and participation 
which is an essential characteristic of the socialist 
ideal" (Enrico Berlinguer, Secretary-General of 
the Italian Communist Party), also indicates, 
with due allowance for exceptions, that things 
are no longer the same as they were in the 1950s. 
With respect to that period there has moreover 
been a growing demand on all sides for demo-
cracy and effective participation in decision-
making. This is as true of the East as it is of 
the West, within the framework of the deep-
seated processes which are everywhere at work. 
16. It is plain to most observers that this has 
also, and largely, depended upon (a) the new 
climate of international relations that has set in 
with the transition from the cold war to detente, 
(b) the new interdependencies that have been 
growing up in the contemporary world, (c) the 
weight and influence of a public opinion that 
lives in an ever-smaller and intercommunicating 
world. These are factual circumstances to which 
every country is, and will increasingly find 
itself, compelled to pay heed, whether it likes it 
or not, given the interconnections which exist in 
effect between its own internal behaviour and 
its external relations, and more generally 
between its own behaviour and the prospects 
ahead for detente. This had led to the growing 
conviction, particularly in Europe, about the 
nature of the process for applying the Helsinki 
agreements and the fact that detente, apart from 
being essential to coexistence in the world, is 
also the necessary framework for gaining major 
sectors of democracy and freedom within each of 
the individual countries. 
17. It is not merely a question of Helsinki. 
International pacts on civil and political rights 
and on economic, social and cultural rights had 
already been approved even before the conference 
on security and co-operation in Europe (and have 
often not yet been ratified by the United States 
and many western countries). The various 
articles of these pacts define a perfect world, a 
sort of radiant city, very remote in any event 
from circumstances in any given country. "The 
right to employment is a human right", said the 
communique of the conference of European 
Social Democrat parties and trade union organi-
sations held in Oslo from 1st to 3rd April1977. 
Nothing would be easier than an exchange of 
accusations and counter-accusations between the 
various States about their respective abuses, for 
instance as regards the application (or non-
ratification) of the two pacts endorsed unani-
mously by the United Nations General Assembly 
at its meeting on 16th December 1966. But such 
a performance would bring us neither civil and 
political rights nor economic, social and cultural 
rights. The only real result - in a world formed 
of countries destined to live together in peace, 
to co-operate and to solve common problems -
would be to unleash a spirit of crusades. 
Mistrust, not confidence, would govern relations 
between States, with all the serious consequences 
that involves. It is therefore evident that the 
discussion in recent months - although it has 
undeniably had its bitter moments - has 
certainly not been useless and will perhaps have 
a positive influence on the preparation and 
conduct of the Belgrade conference. This discus-
sion is indeed an important stage in an overall 
process and of more detailed thinking about all 
the complex interdependent features of the 
world today which the Helsinki final act in fact 
confirmed. As one of the principal representa-
tives of christian-democracy in Italy, Luigi Gra-
nelli, head of the party's international office and 
former Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
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Affairs, recently remarked, it is essential, in 
view of the complexity of this process "to take 
any action which would avoid culpable inaction 
or sterile provocation : ... to do this, and we say 
so quite clearly, we oppose those who, under the 
illusion of better defending their own convic-
tions, may suddenly revert to the logic of the 
Manichean struggle between East and West, 
ultimatums, demonstrations of force, in short, to 
the more or less covert spirit of the cold war ... 
And for the very reason that we must firmly 
uphold the right of the opponents, we must not 
maintain a complacent silence, which would 
amount to complicity, but act", added the repre-
sentative of the christian-democrats, "with 
determination and a sense of measure in calling 
for respect for the principles of human rights 
adopted in Helsinki and upheld by the United 
Nations Charter. At the same time we must avoid 
provocation or pure propaganda which might 
bring a few short-lived results which would soon 
come back like a boomerang". Indeed, "the return 
to inflexible opposition between the two blocs, 
a split between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, the abandonment of dialogue and of the 
search for understanding" would impede any 
possibility of positive developments either in 
international relations or in each country 
progr~vely gaining ever wider areas of 
freedom and democracy. Fairly similar opinions 
were expressed at the meeting of Socialist and 
Social-Democrat Parties in Amsterdam on 16th 
and 17th April 1977 to review implementa.tion 
of the Helsinki final act and consider prospects 
for Belgrade. Inter alia, it is stated in the final 
communique that : 
"Abuses of human rights, wherever in the 
world they occur, should be met by adequate 
action. 
The member parties of the Socialist Inter-
national do not see any contrast between 
these efforts and the policy of detente. 
Therefore they are opposed to conservative 
forces putting into danger in the name of 
human rights what has been initiated in the 
field of humanitarian reliefs by the policy of 
detente." 
18. The need for "the full application, by all 
States, of all the provisions of the final act of 
the Helsinki conference" and for "positive work 
at the Belgrade meeting" was also stressed 
recently by the Secretaries-General of the 
Italian, French and Spanish Communist Parties 
when they met in Madrid on 2nd-3rd March. 
19. In short, in Western Europe, there is now a 
major convergence of political forces of various 
leanings on the fundamental difficulties raised 
by the approach to problems arising since the 
Helsinki conference and prior to the Belgrade 
meeting. This is a political fact whose importance 
must not be underestimated. 
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20. And here we come to the real difficulty : 
on the eve of the Belgrade conference, the 
dialectical relation between (a) the process set 
in train at Helsinki, (b) the satisfactory or 
unsatisfactory state of its progress (and here, to 
be able to give an overall picture, the analysis 
will have to determine how far the contracting 
States have "paid due regard", unilaterally, 
bilaterally and multilaterally, to the provisions 
of the final act), and (c) the best way to be 
taken, at the follow-up conference in Belgrade 
and more generally in intergovernmental rela-
tions in general, to ensure that the process can 
come to full fruition in a climate of trust. Hence, 
it is obvious that an appraisal of the status of 
implementation of the Helsinki act, critical to 
be sure, but historically, indeed historically 
balanced, is one of the factors that can contribute 
effectively to the promotion of co-operation and 
detente. 
IV 
21. In the face of such a factual situation, in 
that part of Europe in which we are chiefly 
interested, i.e. Western Europe, two substantially 
diametrically-opposed attitudes have emerged. 
One, advocated by a minority, starts from the 
postulate that the Soviet Union has now emerged 
upon the international scene not merely as a 
superpower in its global characteristics but as a 
country nurturing more or less overt intentions 
of seeking world dominion. For countries 
endorsing this view the policy of detente would 
therefore be, for the Soviet Union, a mere tactical 
expedient having as its object to lull the western 
democracies into a false sense of security and 
make them drop their guard, thus enabling the 
USSR to achieve the more easily its imperialistic 
ends. The result is a deeply-pessimistic evalua-
tion of the Helsinki act as such and of the initial 
phase of its implementation, an emphasis on the 
latest Soviet policy for nuclear and conventional 
armaments, a refusal to develop East-West 
economic co-operation, a highly polemical denun-
ciation of the non-application by the socialist 
countries of the provisions of the third basket, 
and a substantial opposition to any broadening 
or stabilisation of the policy erected around the 
Helsinki act. In short, the upshot is a unilateral 
appreciation ignoring, to such an extent as to 
turn it completely inside out, the example 
provided by the difficult and laborious process 
at work in Spain, and the responsibility of the 
attitudes taken by the various countries and 
political formations towards it. 
V 
22. The alternative hypothesis starts from the 
premise that Europe is now, and probably will 
for a long time to come remain, in a situation 
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characterised by the existence of two blocs 
(inside which at present the United States and 
the Soviet Union objectively play a dominant 
role, if only by reason of their own specific 
weight) and a great many neutral and non-
aligned countries. Simply taking note of this 
reality means regarding the European situation 
not solely in terms of a bipolarity and recognising 
the greater room for autonomy and initiative 
which, at any rate in the abstract, the progress 
of detente opens up for the various countries. 
Yet nonetheless the two alliances, of the Atlantic 
and Warsaw Pacts, still constitute the principal 
factor in the pattern of post-war Europe. The 
dominant trend in recent years, in a Europe 
organised with sufficient stability to stand up to 
a confrontation not involving any conflicts, has 
been to go beyond the idea, still very obvious 
for reasons we do not propose to go into here, 
that we are all strangers to each other. In short, 
what is proposed is to endeavour, by accepting 
the process begun at Helsinki, to introduce more 
normal relations between Eastern and Western 
Europe, better able to take account of human 
factors in a new spirit of co-operation, to the 
benefit of both sides. This interpretation, which 
of course lays stress on the overriding importance 
of the political aspect, carries as a corollary a 
continuing search to find common. ground for 
co-operation, and as a premise, based on com-
pulsory reciprocity, maximum good faith in 
implementing "measures aimed at increasing 
mutual trust". While the criteria for determining 
the degree of respect and activation of the pro-
visions of the final act may differ and these 
criteria are themselves at present a bone of con-
tention, your Rapporteur believes it is clear that 
this kind of approach is capable not so much of 
"saving Helsinki" (for in fact, and luckily, it has 
not yet come to that), as of allowing the CSCE 
to realise in future, and more and more as time 
goes on, all its great potentialities. Hence the 
fact that: 
"At the meeting of representatives of the 
CSCE participating States to be held in 
mid-June 1977 at Belgrade, it will not be a 
question of fending off accusations, but first 
and foremost of ascertaining what it has 
been possible to put in train on the lines of 
the common resolutions, and secondly, of 
examining what can, more realistically, more 
quickly and more rationally, be attempted." 
(Willy Brandt) 
23. Developing this viewpoint in his opening 
speech at the conference of Socialist and Social-
Democrat Parties in Amsterdam on 16th April, 
Willy Brandt added : 
"The chances of detente must not necessarily 
be considered with pessimism ; on the con-
trary, dangerous errors of appreciation must 
be fought and illusory ideas opposed. 
The policy of detente has never sought to 
eliminate differences between States and 
types of society in East and West. Now as 
before, it is far more a matter of learning to 
live with these differences, abolishing or 
mastering possible tension and at the same 
time developing fields of joint interest. The 
policy of detente and the defence of human 
rights are not contradictory. If we do not 
manage to eliminate tension, thereby making 
peace more stable, it is not worthwhile or 
possible to talk seriously about human 
rights. Reference to human rights is then 
merely a slogan and ineffective if it moves 
too far from reality. Anyone who nurtures 
illusions about the policy of detente does 
not help to ensure peace but encourages an 
atmosphere of insecurity, instability and 
tension." 
24. On the prospects of Belgrade, Willy Brandt 
noted in the same speech that it was necessary 
to: 
"pursue what was started in 1975 through 
European co-operation. The Belgrade con-
ference is certainly not intended to add to 
the already ambitious Helsinki catalogue. 
All participating States must naturally have 
an opportunity of expressing critical 
opinions in the context of this provisional 
review. To this end, a sufficiently clear 
picture must be obtained of the positive 
developments noted since Helsinki, parti-
cularly in the humanitarian field. But in 
Belgrade the representatives of the thirty-
five governments concerned would not get 
very far if they were asked to put each other 
on trial as if they were in court. 
One thing to be attempted must be to define 
two or three concrete tasks under a few 
major headings. These projects, which would 
encourage closer co-operation, might be 
launched in the economic field to solve the 
problems of energy and raw materials sup-
plies, in the field of environmental policy 
and transport." 
VI 
25. To attempt to define more precisely the 
areas in which one or other of the alternative 
hypotheses prevails, it would have to be 
acknowledged (with all the defects always in-
herent in any generalisation, and all the natural 
shifts of emphasis and concept) that the govern-
ments of Western Europe, in general, espouse 
the second hypothesis in the context of an effort, 
whose importance should be underlined, with a 
view to preventing the Helsinki process becoming 
bogged down and seeking the bases and broad 
lines of its subsequent development. In view of 
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the relations between them, particular attention 
should be paid to the EEC countries and the 
neutral and non-aligned countries. 
26. A few examples will suffice to demonstrate 
this orientation. 
27. In the case of France, the declarations by 
the Prime Minister, Mr. Barre (16th March), 
define the principles which guide government 
action: 
"Detente is a lengthy process which will 
inevitably encounter difficulties. But we 
still consider it to be the only means of 
tackling opposition between blocs and 
avoiding a split between countries with dif-
ferent social systems ... As for the long-tenn 
prospects of detente, no country is more 
attached to it than France which, since the 
beginning of the last decade, has made it 
one of the essential bases of its foreign 
policy." . 
28. Referring to the new American leaders, 
Mr. Barre then said: 
"We trust that, without prejudice or 
dogmatism, they will view the world as it 
is. They will see that each country has its 
problems, its interests, its policy, and that 
if each one's independence and dignity is 
respected, there is every chance that the 
international co-operation which the world 
needs will be intensified." 
29. All these views were subsequently developed 
more fully by President Giscard d'Estaing in his 
televised talk on 12th April, during which he 
gave some interesting indications about France's 
general attitude. Inter alia, the French President 
said with regard to political and methodological 
problems: 
"First, what is our concept of the policy of 
detente which is being talked about ! For 
me, the policy of detente is an effort to 
improve relations between countries of East 
and West, accepting their reciprocal 
existence on a basis of equality. Fundamen-
tally, therefore, the policy of detente is an 
attempt to improve relations between the 
countries of East and West. It is not a 
policy for the ideological conquest of the 
West by the East or of the East by the 
West. To this policy of detente, which calls 
for patience since it aims at improving rela-
tions, are to be added certain fundamental 
concerns which for us are human rights and 
application of the Helsinki agreement. 
First, where human rights are concerned, I 
would remind you that France, in all its 
fundamental texts, in its constitution, insists 
on the recognition of human rights, freedom 
in all its forms and the full exercise thereof, 
and when President Carter wishes to intro-
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duce a c1earer and stronger affirmation 
of human rights into world politics, he will 
find an active part being played by France. 
Then there are the Helsinki agreements, in 
which a number of principles are laid down. 
They were laid down by all the countries 
which signed the agreements, including the 
Soviet Union. I brought the Helsinki agree-
ment with me, thinking this question would 
be raised. It reads as follows : 'The parti-
cipating States'- and thus the Soviet Union 
- 'will promote and encourage the effective 
exercise of civil, political, economic, social, 
cultural and other rights and freedoms all 
of which derive from the inherent dignity of 
the human person and are essential for his 
free and full development.' And a little 
further on the agreement reads : 'They con-
firm the right of the individual to know and 
act upon his rights and duties in this field.' 
France therefore considers that application 
of the Helsinki agreements does in fact 
include the exercise of civil rights and 
freedoms and France will express or recall 
this each time there is a question of applying 
the Helsinki agreements. In this connection, 
France disapproves of action which seeks to 
ill-treat or persecute individuals or groups 
of individuals because they are urging their 
countries to apply the agreements. You 
asked whether, in view of this attitude, 
France - and I myself - should receive 
a specific individual, from the Soviet Union 
or another country, who considers he is 
being persecuted. There are relations 
between States and personal relations. 
Where relations between States are con-
cerned, France will continue to stress the 
need to recognise the effective exercise of 
freedoms. If freedoms are not exercised, it 
will pass judgment accordingly. Conversely, 
it will not intervene in particular situations 
within other States. Why not ! First, because 
we would not agree to others taking such 
action towards us. How would the French 
people react if, with regard to a trial or con-
testation, the leaders of another State were 
to express opinions on the position of a 
French citizen Y We would not accept it. 
Second, we will not do so because I am not 
sure that it is the most effective way of 
encouraging respect for human rights and 
freedom. I can tell you that each time we 
have an opportunity, with the principal 
leaders of the eastern countries, we raise 
and solve personal problems, i.e. persons 
wishing to leave their country or families 
wishing to be reunited or situations to which 
our attention has been drawn because they 
are distressing, and we solve a large number 
of problems. 
Conversely, to want to intervene in public 
in particular cases is imagining that by 
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doing so a country such as the Soviet Union 
can be made to go back on its own decisions. 
Those who know the Soviet Union know that 
it would consider this a setback or humilia-
tion and it is not by such methods that the 
problems arising will be solved." 
30. He subsequently made his own thoughts 
clear in the following terms : 
"To revert to what I was saying earlier, 
detente is not a means of conquering each 
other but of improving relations by 
recognising the existence of both sides in 
present circumstances. Of course we stand 
by our ideology and attachment to our 
political and economic system. We know the 
same is true for the Soviet Union. We are 
not trying to make use of this occasion to 
substitute our's for their's, nor the contrary ; 
we are trying to improve our relations in the 
world of today. I believe that, in view of 
the considerable threat to humanity from 
nuclear means - we shall not have time to 
speak about this - because of the volume of 
armaments, detente must continue to be the 
course to be followed in our efforts." 
31. In the case of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Chancellor Schmidt, on 17th February, 
commented on the prospects for Belgrade in the 
following terms : 
"There, a kind of interim balance-sheet will 
be drawn up of what Helsinki has actually 
achieved. On this occasion, the Soviet Union 
is likely to put forward three proposals, for 
international conferences on the environ-
ment, transport and energy. Possibly con-
ferences on other topics will be proposed by 
the West. But Belgrade ought not to become 
an occasion for confrontation, as the CDU 
would like it to be. Such mischievous talk 
can only be indulged in by members of the 
opposition who have no responsibility of 
office." 
32. More recently, in a speech in Amsterdam on 
16th April during the conference of Socialist and 
Social-Democrat Parties, Chancellor Schmidt 
inter alia summed up the position of the Federal 
Government towards the trend of East-West 
relations since the Helsinki conference as fol-
lows: 
"1. The Helsinki agreements represent a tre-
mendous progress compared to the situation 
thirty years ago. While their implementa-
tion has not yet produced satisfactory 
results, there have already been positive 
consequences for Europe, i.e. with regard to 
economic co-operation and the reunification 
of families. 
2. However, governments must recognise 
that there is still a danger of the dialogue 
on detente becoming bogged down. 
Development of the policy of force in other 
parts of the world confronts the process of 
detente with other problems. Africa, the 
Indian Ocean and other regions must not 
remain outside the attempt to eliminate 
tension. It is essential to maintain the 
dialogue on detente and to deepen and 
enlarge it geographically. 
3. The Belgrade follow-up conference could 
be a major intermediary stage. The thirty-
five governments should adopt as their in-
termediary aim support for the joint deci-
sion taken in Helsinki to renounce solving 
disputes by means of arms. The western 
bloc must be careful not to play the role of 
public prosecutor and leave itself open to a 
situation in which it would only react to 
proposals emanating from communist States. 
A joint western position can be discussed 
beforehand with member and non-aligned 
countries. 
4. In the long run, the discussion on human 
rights will play a capital role in the ideo-
logical confrontation between democratic 
and communist societies. The true meaning 
of the policy of detente is to ensure respect 
for human dignity. To this extent, there is 
no contradiction between the policy of 
detente and action in favour of human 
rights. This trend should not therefore be 
compromised by verbal violence ; the discus-
sion should be conducted so as to ensure the 
maximum chance of success for the indi-
viduals concerned. 
5. Detente is a long-term process whose two 
main aims are : 
- progressively to defuse hostilities; 
- to bring together the elements for better 
co-operation, for instance in the economy, 
production and trade, energy policy, raw 
materials supplies or environment 
policy." 
33. Certain statements by the SPD's spokesman 
for foreign affairs, Mr. Horst Ehmke, during the 
debate in the Bundestag on 19th January, are 
also significant: 
"But let everybody be clear that at Helsinki 
far-reaching measures were laid down that 
it will take a great deal of patience to 
implement. The Helsinki resolutions are only 
two years old. The EEC treaties are twenty 
years old, and even these have not yet been 
fully applied. Helsinki is no legal instrument 
whose execution can be enforced. It is the 
starting point of an arduous political process 
in Europe'." 
34. Still more recently (6th April), Mr. Ehmke 
said: 
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"The Federal Republic must now make an 
active contribution to avoiding a return to 
East-West confrontation and allowing the 
two great powers to pursue their policy of 
detente in Europe." 
35. In the case of the United Kingdom, the new 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. 
David Owen, having noted in a speech on 3rd 
March that "the present relationship is essen-
tially unstable. It still carries the risk of miscal-
culation and disaster. We have to reduce this 
risk", underlined "the Jekyll and Hyde nature 
of detente - competition on the one hand, co-
operation on the other" and described the out-
look as follows : 
"Public opinion in the West has tended to 
display an increasing scepticism both 
towards the final act and by extension 
towards the process of detente itself. But it 
is equally true that some of this scepticism 
and disappointment has been misconceived, 
and that expectations have outstripped by 
far the limits of what detente could have 
reasonably delivered. 
For while detente has substantial achieve-
ments to its credit, the process started from 
a low threshold and represents to date only 
a limited, though vitally important, accom-
modation in Europe and between the super-
powers. We are witnessing the early stages 
of this process, not its culmination. Detente 
has solved some of the most urgent and 
obvious problems in East/West relations 
and it has established a basic framework for 
the solution of those which remain. But 
there is still a long way to go. 
The blunt truth is that the first and easier 
stage of detente is over. The issues which 
are today on the agenda of EastjW est 
relations are more complex, more contentious 
and far more intractable. We are beginning 
to encroach on fundamental attitudes on 
human behaviour, and the issues go to the 
heart of each side's perception of itself and 
its interests. Inevitably we cannot expect to 
maintain the momentum of the early 1970s. 
This makes it all the more important that we 
should be realistic. Detente on its own could 
not, and was never, intended to, stop the 
Soviet Union from being a world power, still 
less to convert the Russians and their allies 
from communism. Already in the last 
century it was clear that it was only a 
matter of time before a country of the size, 
population and resources of Russia emerged 
as a global power. Any idea that detente 
could or should have reversed this process 
is absurd. The basic premise from which we 
in the West must start is that the Soviet 
Union is a world power with national 
interests and ambitions to match, which 
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inevitably bring it into competition, and 
sometimes confrontation, with the West. To 
this we must add that communist ideology 
invests the natural rivalry between East and 
West with a dynamic of unceasing struggle. 
Detente is an immensely complex process, 
comprising innumerable strands and rela-
tionships on different levels : political 
dialogue, commercial and technological 
exchange, cultural contacts, ideological 
debate and military vigilance. There is no 
magic formula which will enable us, East or 
West, to strike the right balance in our 
relations at all times. Both sides are still 
feeling their way. All we can say is that 
balance there must be between the elements 
of confrontation and co-operation, whether 
we are talking of the detente process as a 
whole or of its constituent parts. 
These considerations apply with particular 
force to the Helsinki final act. While the 
act marked an important stage in the deve-
lopment of co-operative relations between 
East and West, there is no denying that 
several of its provisions contain the seeds of 
confrontation. 
It is important therefore that we should 
clearly understand its significance. The final 
act is not a treaty which has given the 
sanction of international law to the status 
quo in Europe. It is, on the contrary, a 
declaration of purpose which looks to the 
future, not to the past. It provides specific-
ally for peaceful change. Its value is funda-
mentally long-term : as a charter and code of 
behaviour for what we hope will in time 
become a more normal and open relationship 
between both governments and peoples in 
East and West. It reflects detente's highest 
aspirations. 
Anyone judging the final act in terms of 
quantifiable, concrete results, would con-
clude that progress so far has been 
extremely limited. But the government never 
expected the provisions of the final act to 
be implemented immediately or all at once. 
Those in this country who have already 
dismissed the final act as not worth the 
paper on which it is written are at best 
short-sighted, at worst all too ready to 
substitute short-term political rhetoric for 
long-term. political progress. In pressing for 
the implementation of the final act, we are 
in many areas dealing with entrenched 
attitudes which in the nature of things will 
not change overnight. But recent events in 
Europe have shown that the final act has 
already begun to be an inspiration and a 
point of reference for those who want to see 
their societies evolve peacefully and constitu-
tionally in a more open direction." 
36. The Prime Minister, James Callaghan, in 
turn defined Britain's position in a speech to the 
conference of Socialist and Social-Democrat 
Parties on 17th April : 
"You will see that Britain looks towards 
Belgrade with a determination that it should 
be a further positive development of detente. 
We shall not go there to win propaganda vic-
tories, but to have a businesslike and 
constructive discussion if at all possible. We 
do not nurse expectations which are too 
high- of what can be achieved at Belgrade. 
We are both realistic and patient. European 
security and co-operation is essentially a 
long-term process. Nevertheless we are 
convinced of the political importance of the 
Belgrade meeting for its long-term value in 
continuing the dialogue which has opened 
between East and West, and in emphasising 
the seriousness of the political commitment 
which all the signatory States have assumed. 
It will not be the task of the Belgrade 
meetings to rewrite or prejudice the final 
act. This remains a central and fundamental 
document, and we should satisfy ourselves 
that the final act is working effectively 
before we plan sequels or supplements to 
it. The implementation of the final act is 
a continuing process, and at Belgrade -we 
shall be looking for steady and measured 
progress towards the equal implementation 
of all three baskets, which in our view 
constitute a balanced whole. I must point out 
that public opinion in Britain is concerned 
about the freer movement of peoples and 
ideas, and respect for human rights. We 
will draw attention at Belgrade to short-
comings where there is good evidence that 
they exist. We have never denied that abuses 
of human rights, wherever in the world they 
occur, are a legitimate subject of interna-
tional concern. Concern for human rights -
whether voiced at international fora like 
Belgrade or in private bilateral representa-
tions- is an integral part of British policy, 
and not a diversionary tactic, hastily con-
ceived and as quickly forgotten. The CSCE 
process has already achieved a number of 
gains ; it has opened a dialogue from which 
we work for improvements in many fields ; 
it has enabled us to develop habits of co-
operation ; it is serving as a source of 
encouragement to those who seek to make 
their own societies more open. These gains, 
and the many opportunities which CSCE 
may provide us in the future, are not lightly 
to be abandoned. We in Britain attach real 
importance to the development of the CSCE 
process, and we intend to play an active 
role in the Belgrade meetings." 
37. In the case of Italy, the Minister for Foreign 
Mfairs, Mr. Arnaldo Forlani, in statements in 
Strasbourg (28th January) and London (meeting 
of EEC Foreign Ministers, 1st February), 
emphasised that : 
"The principles of Helsinki cannot be 
implemented by the wave of a magic wand. 
Radically different institutional systems 
stand confronted : yet there is no lack of 
ferments at work and new developments 
indicating a possibility for evolution. These 
ferments will have greater possibility to 
mature the more we advance along the path 
of detente and collaboration, even if only on 
a sector-by-sector basis." 
38. Mr. Forlani remarked in London, of the 
exchange of persons and ideas between East and 
West, albeit in the context of a critical appraisal, 
that: 
"There is, at certain levels in the USSR and 
other Eastern European countries, a new 
ferment at work allowing the tentative 
assertion of personal autonomy. This is 
possible for few people only, and carries 
with it very high risks : it is nevertheless a 
sign and indication that the path of discus-
sions and negotiations may open upon some 
new gleams of hope... We should", the 
Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs went 
on, "take this fact as a reason to go to 
Belgrade with a common attitude : clear, to 
be sure, on the invocation of principles, but 
also realistic and constructive as regards 
further progress on the road of detente, 
within a process of searching that can only 
be gradual and slow." 
Mr. Forlani also said, at that forum, that : 
"The optimism of willpower must prevail 
over causes of pessimism. I think the convic-
tion is steadily gaining ground that any 
hardening of the international situation 
would not only bring with it the grave perils 
that we already knew in the dark years of 
the cold war. It would also stifle, perhaps 
for good, the hopes we cherish of a gradual 
process of liberalisation in Eastern Europe ... 
The way towaros detente is narrow and 
rough, but is in any case the only one we can 
travel. 
If we really want to arrive at a different 
relationship of trust, we must aim at 
achieving a balance of armed forces and 
weaponry at lower levels, and resume the 
nuclear disarmament talks between the 
United States and the USSR. Only if 
tangible results are achieved in this sense 
will the goal of general disarmament appear 
less utopian." 
39. In the case of Finland, the Prime Minister, 
Mr. Martti Miettunen, said: 
"In the implementation of the principles of 
the final act of the European conference at 
Helsinki promising results have already been 
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achieved. To assist towards further progress, 
constant efforts must be exerted in all 
directions. To this end we should like the 
Belgrade follow-up conference to become a 
constructive phase in the same process, so 
vital for the peace and security of the 
nations. Maintenance of the positive spirit 
of collaboration should not be jeopardised 
by choosing to tread the path of exchanges 
of abuse. In my opinion the final act forms 
a single whole and is to be regarded as such 
throughout the implementation of its 
provisions." 
40. In the case of Sweden, the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs said in his report to the Riksdag 
on 30th March 1977 : 
"The question at present arousing the 
greatest interest in international politics is 
that of the immediate prospects of detente. 
Efforts at detente have now been a feature 
of East-West relations for more than half a 
decade. Considering earlier relations, parti-
cularly during the cold war, the results 
achieved are significant. This does not mean 
· that fundamental differences and suspicion 
between the great powers are no longer 
there. But a network of contacts has been 
established, the practice of exchanging views 
has developed and confidence has been 
strengthened and this should gradually lead 
to the realisation that security can be 
obtained by means other than a constant 
increase in armaments." 
41. On the preparation of the Belgrade con-
ference, Sweden's position was defined as 
follows: 
"The government is now carefully preparing 
its participation in the Belgrade meeting 
which, in accordance with a decision taken at 
the Helsinki conference almost two years 
ago, is to verify how the commitments 
entered into in the final act have been 
fulfilled and lay down guidelines for the 
pursuit of co-operation. These preparations 
are being made in close co-operation with 
other participating States, including in 
particular the Nordic countries and the 
group of neutral countries which, apart 
from Sweden, also includes Austria, Finland 
and Switzerland. 
The Helsinki text sets out at length the 
undertakings and recommendations intended 
to promote co-operation in a host of fields 
and facilitate detente in the long term. The 
various parts of the text have an internal 
relationship and together form a balanced 
entity. The achievement of the aims which 
participating States set themselves means 
that they must move clearly and energetic-
ally in the agreed direction but with 
patience and caution. They have no reason 
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to conceal their feelings about the way a 
State, or group of States, fulfils its under-
takings. 
There is nothing to prevent them from 
criti?ising objectively situations which they 
collSlder contrary to these undertakings. 
Such criticism is obviously not contrary to 
the wish to pursue efforts towards detente 
and peaceful co-operation. 
In the light of these considerations, Sweden 
believes that the Belgrade meeting should 
not be transformed into a forum for 
exchanging accusations and charges which 
~ght obscure the ultimate aim, the promo-
tion of peace. 
We shall endeavour to make the work at 
Belgrade look to the future. The Helsinki 
text provides a good basis. We hope that 
understanding will be established on this 
basis with a view to pursuing co-operation. 
Inter alia, we are considering submitting 
proposals to allow participating States to 
draw greater benefits from so-called con-
fidence-building measures. The purpose of 
these measures is to give real information 
about certain troop movements and military 
manoeuvres so as to avoid any unjustified 
suspicion about their aim and direction. 
We shall strive to ensure that the discussions 
in Belgrade on economic and cultural co-
operation lead to real progress. We know 
that in this respect there are particular 
difficulties in the way of co-operation 
stemming from differences between systems 
applied in the various countries. But we feel 
that there will be sufficiently strong joint 
interest to allow agreement to be reached on 
certain worthwhile measures. It might be a 
matter of affording greater facilities for 
economic contacts between the partners 
opening the way for a wider exchange of 
information and more widespread reporting 
by the mass media or allowing countries to 
become better acquainted, in a free manner 
with their reSpective cultures. ' 
~n this connection, it is particularly 
Important to be able to continue work to 
reunite divided families. This work is closely 
connected with the destiny of individuals. 
We shall persevere in finding solutions for 
cases still unsolved and for new cases which 
arise. 
Much attention will be paid at the Belgrade 
meeting to matters affecting the protection 
of human rights. This is both natural and 
necessary. We have great sympathy for 
those who are subjected to humiliation and 
per~ecuti_?~ because they wish to express 
their opnnons on matters concerning the 
community, for instance, because they wish 
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to practise their religion because they wish 
to meet and work together for political 
trade union or other ainls. We admire th~ 
heroism of those who are fighting for these 
fun~ental freedoms in Eastern Europe. 
Pursmt of the process of detente lies in 
governments' respect for and satisfaction of 
individu.al needs and rights. That is why 
we consider that criticism of the violation 
of human rights is beneficial rather than 
harmful to detente. 
The Helsinki final act specifically mentions 
the connection between protecting human 
rights and developing peaceful relations 
between States. When, by statements and 
measures, we endeavour to protect human 
rights, our action is not only beneficial to 
specific individuals ; it also consolidates the 
foundations of peace. 
But although this is our attitude, we must 
also ensure that our words and deeds have 
the desired effect and do not rUll counter to 
the goal sought. Our criticism must be such 
as not to jeopardise the cause we wish to 
defend. This balance is often difficult to 
achieve. 
A~ count;ies a~e very sensitive about any-
thmg which might be considered as inter-
ference in their internal affairs. The fact 
that at international level human rights are 
no longer considered to be the exclusive con-
cern of each separate State is naturally a 
very significant achievement." 
4~. For reasons of space, it is impossible to 
give a complete review of the judgments and 
orientations formulated in the different Western 
Europ?an capitals. One political-geographical 
exc~ptlon must, however, be permitted, in order 
to Illustrate the opinion of the government of 
the host country for the follow-up conference 
Yugoslavia. The Vice-President of the Federai 
Executive Council, Anton Vratusa, wrote 
recently that : 
"Over the past two years there has been 
discernible a favourable development in line 
with the final act of Helsinki. Such changes 
for the better are even more impressive if 
we compare current trends and relations in 
Europe with the situation prevailing in 1967 
when, on the initiative of nine European 
countries, the resolution of the United 
Nations General Assembly was barely 
beginning to encourage regional action 'with 
a. view to improving good-neighbourly rela-
tiOns among European countries having 
different social and political systems'." 
He went on: 
"It is all the more essential that the coming 
Belgrade conference should examine, as well 
as the results of the activities deployed 
following adoption of the final act of the 
CSCE, the essential measures to be taken 
in order to liquidate more speedily any foci 
of crisis and causes of antagonistic division 
in Europe and the world, and ensure the 
progress of the processes initiated, of 
reconciliation among the nations and 
consolidation of peace. This is no time for 
vying with one another, for propaganda 
purposes, in denouncing whatever some 
people have failed to do in implementing 
the final act of Helsinki, but a time for 
conducting an honest and responsible 
analysis of what must be done in order for 
the d-emocratic processes set in motion in 
Europe and the rest of the world by the 
Helsinki conference to be continued with as 
few impediments as possible, and lastingly 
consolidated. The final act of Helsinki forms 
a balanced whole, but is still a compromise. 
Consequently it cannot be implemented 
unless account is taken of the interests of 
all the participants. There can be no 
question of scrutinising the attitude of the 
participating States to any one particular 
basket, but only of surveying political 
security and economic and cultural relations 
as a whole, and the need for firmer reci-
procal commitments guaranteeing continuity 
of effort. It would be no use judging things 
in a spirit of winners and losers. Everyone 
will be a winner if we resolutely address 
ourselves to removing the obstacles impeding 
free contacts between the independent 
peoples of Europe, and everyone will be a 
loser if we obstinately strengthen the 
exclusive attitudes and barriers of separate 
blocs. In that case the real loser is the cause 
of world peace and security, and the real 
winner the forces of violence and passion. 
Undoubtedly, by reducing the issue to one 
of the stance of individual members of the 
intellectual elite of one country or another, 
we distract attention from the big, urgent, 
socio-economic and political problems, a 
settlement of which is a prerequisite for the 
achievement of democratic freedoms for all, 
in the different countries and among nations 
with equal rights." 
VII 
43. Having thus briefly summarised the opinions 
which have emerged, or are emerging in the 
position of the western governments, and which 
are logically founded on a comprehensive and 
complex analysis of the status of implementation 
of the final act of Helsinki, the next problem 
is to identify what steps forward have been 
taken, bilaterally and multilaterally, in applica-
tion of the provisions of Helsinki. The balance-
sheet at the end of the early months of 1977 
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cannot be termed wholly negative. It would have 
been foolish to expect much more progress to 
have been made in such a short time. And it 
would, in any event, be misleading to fail to 
perceive, or ignore, the nature of the implementa-
tion of the final act as an ongoing process. 
However, there are two general aspects that 
deserve to be underlined. The final act looms 
considerably larger now on the international 
scene, compared with the time of signature, and 
more and more references to it are being made, 
albeit for very different reasons. Moreover, and 
this is my second comment, the Central European 
set-up which some may have seen as underlying 
its conception is in rapid transformation : partly 
for negative reasons, such as the macroscopic 
breach of the act constituted by the Cyprus 
question, but also for a number of positive ones, 
such as the Italo-Yugoslav agreement, the 
be~nings of technical collaboration among the 
Balkan countries, and the growing demand for 
extending the system to take in the Mediter-
ranean region. 
VIII 
44. .As regards the concrete achievements con-
nected with the first basket, mention should be 
made of certain bilateral co-operation agreements 
which have assumed fundamental importance for 
the signatory countries : the agreement between 
Italy and Yugoslavia, the one between Poland 
and the Federal Republic of Germany for the 
repatriation o.f families. The conclusion of the 
Osimo treaties between Italy and Yugoslavia 
represented for both countries the final settle-
ment of a dispute dating back to the birth of the 
two States and in fact completed in Europe the 
fundamental process of recognising frontiers 
which started with the Ostpolitik and was 
confirmed by the Helsinki final act. Nor is its 
importance political only, but economic and 
cultural too, given that these agreements, by 
putting paid to a past fraught with hostility (we 
need only recall the boost of aggressivity the 
question of the Adriatic for so long supplied 
to fascism and neo-fascism), open the way to 
a future of co-operation, in some ways highly-
innovating compared with previous international 
experiments carried out in this field. It is 
extremely significant that this agreement should 
be connected with the Helsinki act, and at the 
same time noteworthy that, within the framework 
of this multilateral approach, it should stem 
from a fully-independent decision by both coun-
tries. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Mr. Forlani, specifically drew attention to this 
aspect when winding up the debate in the 
Chamber of Deputies: 
"I note that the Osimo treaties consistently 
conform to the spirit of the letter of the 
conference on security and co-operation in 
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Europe, to which Italy wholeheartedly 
subscribes." 
45. The same could be said of the agreement 
between Poland and the Federal Republic of 
Germany for the repatriation of families, which 
also gratified the wishes of tens of thousands 
of people of German origin, at the same time 
offering them a free choice of going back to 
their homeland or definitely staying on in their 
country of adoption. In this case too, the inde-
pendent decision of the two governments, 
unrelated to any question of blocs, contributed as 
we believe very profoundly to rapprochement 
and friendship between the two countries. It is 
worth remembering, too, the concrete use by the 
Vatican of the Helsinki act for normalising the 
situation of the church in Hungary and, more 
recently, regularising the Berlin bishops' con-
ference, the communique concerning which (27th 
October 1976) explicitly refers to the Helsinki 
act. 
46. On the multilateral plane we have witnessed 
interesting developments like the inauguration 
of technical co-operation between the Balkan 
countries, whether, like Greece and Turkey, 
members of NATO or, like Romania and 
Bulgaria, members of the Warsaw Pact, or again, 
like Yugoslavia, one of the non-aligned. Such 
co-operation gives hope of an expansion within 
the Helsinki framework of detente and agreement 
among the European countries of the Eastern 
Mediterranean basin. Another notable result of 
the Helsinki act has been the co-operation 
established among countries bordering on the 
Mediterranean for collectively combating the 
pollution of its waters, which led in February 
1977 to their signing an agreement at Split. 
In this case too Helsinki seems to have opened 
a way that could be followed by countries belong-
ing to both military blocs as well as neutral and 
non-aligned countries, and bring about tangible 
results beneficial to all the populations 
concerned. 
47. Steps forward of some importance have also 
been taken in the field of confidence-building 
measures (point 2 of the first basket). Important 
manoeuvres have been notified, by one side or the 
other, to the adjacent countries, which have 
generally been able to send observers. There was 
at first some grumbling on the NATO side, but 
things have settled down subsequently in patterns 
apparently satisfactory to all. True, these are 
measures of limited scope, in that the territories 
in which they are compulsory are limited so that 
it is still possible for either side to engage in 
large-scale manoeuvres without giving notice, 
while only a non-aligned country like Yugoslavia 
is, in practice, obliged to notify all the 
manoeuvres carried out on its territory (nor 
has it made any attempt to evade this obligation). 
Whether these are actually measures sufficient 
to the end of strengthening mutual trust is 
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another matter, hence the necessity for genuine 
progress in the MBFR talks in Vienna, but 
within the scope of the Helsinki act provisions, 
it does represent a real achievement. 
48. Some see as the main obstacle to greater 
progress in the reduction of armed forces and 
armaments in Europe the continued existence of 
the two military blocs whose strategies are still 
offensive, even if the political lines accompany-
ing them are defensive. Others instead argue that 
the existence of blocs themselves may in fact 
facilitate, at least in the present stage, a balanced 
and controlled reduction of armaments. 
49. Certainly there are firm, albeit contested, 
statistical grounds for asserting that the Warsaw 
Pact countries have a growing preponderance 
in Central Europe. But we know that in the other 
camp statistics compiled on a different basis point 
to a totally opposite conclusion. According to 
whether forces in the Mediterranean theatre, 
where the West has a marked preponderance, are 
or are not included, radically different conclu-
sions are reached about the balance of forces in 
Europe. Depending on whether numbers of 
divisions or numbers of men are counted, whether 
this or that definition of an armoured vehicle, 
strategic or tactical nuclear weapons is adopted, 
opposite results are reached, with the result that 
either side, considering itself to be in a state 
of inferiority, could think itself threatened and 
seek to restore or alter the balance of forees in its 
own favour. 
50. Plainly, methods like these cannot produce 
any results in the area of detente and disarma-
ment, and are largely responsible for the pro-
tracted dragging out of the MBFR negotiations 
the last round of which terminated unsuccessfully 
on 15th April. 
51. These talks are in turn influenced, positively 
or negatively, by the course of American-Soviet 
strategic negotiations. In addition to this 
obstacle, it should be noted how the question of 
the Vienna talks has been viewed recently, at a 
very important political juncture. In his speech 
to the conference of Socialist and Social-Demo-
crat Parties in Amsterdam on 5th and 6th 
November 1976, Willy Brandt, Chairman of the 
SPD, said in this connection : 
"In 1975, almost $300,000 million were spent 
throughout the world for military purposes, 
of which 80 % by States taking part in the 
CSCE. According to expert estimates, 
tactical nuclear weapons stockpiled in 
Europe alone represent a destructive power 
equivalent to 10,000 times that of the 
Hiroshima bomb. These figures show to what 
extent material, financial, technological and 
human resources are being wasted for 
destructive purposes, whereas if they were 
used for improving the condition of man-
kind, this could relieve considerable 
poverty." 
Mr. Brandt also said : 
"A balanced reduction in these destructive 
forces is of capital importance for the future 
of detente and the establishment of mutual 
confidence in East-West relations, but 
success cannot be achieved by one side 
alone." 
And he added : 
"The aim of the policy of detente in this 
field is to move gradually towards a situation 
in which a surprise attack is impossible. 
This will take time ; it will unfortunately 
be a long time before savings are felt in the 
budgets. However, it is possible, without 
being unrealistic, to agree in the coming 
years on two measures to be implemented, 
one being an initial limitation of armed 
forces in the same context." 
52. More recently (Europa A.rchiv, 25th January 
1977), the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on 
Disarmament and the Control of Armaments of 
the Bundestag Defence Committee, Mr. Alfons 
Pawelczyk (SPD), noted in Vienna that : 
"The process of clarification is making such 
good progress that a first agreement seems 
possible. At this stage of development, it 
might include the following elements : all 
States playing a direct part in the negotia-
tions would undertake to reduce their armed 
forces ; the process of reduction would be 
divided into two stages. To strengthen and 
improve confidence in the policy of detente, 
a first measure might be limited to the 
reduction of American and Soviet forces. 
Ways to reduce the forces of the other direct 
participants would then have to be agreed 
upon. This reduction might cover land and 
air forces and to a certain extent conven-
tional and nuclear weapons. A limited reduc-
tion of the forces of both parties would not 
endanger security but could be an essential 
part of the process of detente. Such an agree-
ment would help to ensure that the policy 
of detente led not only to the establishment 
of confidence but also to an effective reduc-
tion of forces. In this way we should be 
approaching the goal, which is to find a 
means of making it increasingly impossible 
to use military means to impose political 
aims." 
In mid-April, Mr. Pawelczyk again underlined 
that: 
"At the present stage in the Vienna talks, 
it is possible to negotiate a first agreement 
preventing the conventional armaments race 
and allowing a first reduction measure. At 
the present international juncture, what 
really counts for security policy is not the 
size of the first reduction but the very fact 
that there is a reduction." 
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53. The difficulties encountered in the Vienna 
negotiations already show that while the dis-
mantling of the military blocs may possibly be 
a long-term goal, it is quite out of the question 
at present. Now, the disappearance at this time 
of the existing military blocs would, in the 
opinion of many experts, present a number 
of perils (in particular, a multiplication of 
disputes among smaller powers with the con-
sequence of one or more larger ones being moved 
to intervene to settle the dispute and thus bring 
to an end the period of peace, armed peace 
certainly, but still peace, that Europe has known 
since 1945). It would therefore be a very tricky 
path that Europe would have to tread, at least 
initially, once effective action is begun, to open 
up the prospect of dismantling the blocs. Most 
likely, the time is not yet ripe, but already 
it should be possible to imagine a number of 
changes in foreign policy and defence policy by 
one or other side with a view to paving the way 
for such a future development. 
IX 
54. As regards the problems of the second 
basket, considered the easiest sector at Helsinki, 
there are also considerable difficulties, though 
not so serious as those in other sectors. We have 
tabled before us the three Soviet proposals con-
cerning energy, transport and ecology. These are 
long-term projects in areas which have made 
little progress to date, among other reasons 
because the promoters have lately shown little 
sense of urgency, and which are still under study 
in the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe. 
55. With more specific reference to trade, there 
is a series of both· general problems (non-dis-
crimination and most-favoured-nation treatment, 
reciprocity, the abolition of quantitative restric-
tions and administrative obstacles, the indebted-
ness of the eastern countries and their shortage 
of capital), and particular problems concerning 
concrete conditions for business contacts and 
commercial information. Certainly, we find 
ourselves at present in a difficult pass, but the 
fact remains that there is still a steady flow 
of western businessmen towards the socialist 
countries, since the problem of the growing 
interdependence of the capitalist and socialist 
economies, especially in the current international 
economic situation, is clearer to both parties 
than ever before in the past. Long-term co-
operation programmes in various fields including 
energy and exploitation of the sea are now 
prepared in both East and West in different 
economic and government circles, The highly 
favourable fact must also be stressed that this 
year for the first time contacts have been 
established between the EEC and Comecon and 
genuine discussions between the two economic 
DOOUMEl.'(T 753 
areas, Comecon and the Common Market, have 
been opened with the multilateral negotiations 
about fishing. 
56. These programmes provide for co-operation 
agreements in trade (long-term agreements, joint 
companies, compensatory trade and related prob-
lems), agreements on joint production (with the 
possibility of joint ventures and triangular co-
operation), agreements on technological co-
operation including the joint development of 
specific technologies, aimed at supplying 
technical equipment to third countries, and agree-
ments on recourse to the international financial 
system. 
X 
57. The third basket is the section of the final 
act which has roused, and continues to rouse, the 
fiercest controversy, for the reasons stated above. 
The problem is particularly delicate in that it 
involves in fact each country's internal 
legislation and not merely problems of govern-
ments' behaviour. Nor can the question be strictly 
localised in its incidence. It is quite true, as 
already said, that for the last few months public 
opinion has been mainly focused on the USSR 
and the various socialist countries of Eastern 
Europe, in which persons and groups of persons 
have invoked the final act to denounce breaches 
of its provisions and claim wider freedoms. But 
the question arises elsewhere too. We have already 
alluded to what President Carter has said about 
entry visas. Other situations can also be cited 
(the transition phase through which Spain is 
passing ; the controversy about Radikalenerlass 
and telephone monitoring in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany; Cyprus and Northern Ireland). 
Therefore the problem has two aspects : one 
internal to each country and one international, 
in view of the growing importance the question 
of human rights has assumed in international 
relations. The Helsinki act has in this respect 
been certainly innovatory, as the first of its kind 
devoting so much space, albeit with no com-
pulsory force, to economic, social and cultural 
questions of universal impact. 
58. However, a philosophy of conduct has still 
to be formulated. As Mr. Vance says, "It is a 
balancing process". But already one element 
seems to emerge with sufficient clarity, the more 
and more commonly-held conviction - already 
mentioned above - that there is a close connec-
tion between progress in detente and co-operation 
and the creation on all sides of wider and wider 
areas of freedom and democracy. Any pause, or 
worse still backsliding, would certainly not 
encourage a growing and widespread assertion of 
human rights. On the contrary, it is precisely 
progress towards detente that will, in an inter-
communicating world, render more and more 
difficult any transgressions of the major goals 
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which the final act of Helsinki sets for Europe. 
An apt illustration is the remarks by Marshall 
D. Shulman, Director of the Russian Institute of 
Columbia University, and now President Carter's 
adviser on Soviet affairs (Foreign Affairs, 
January 1977, pages 333-334) : 
"It should be clear that the effort to compel 
changes in Soviet institutions and practices 
by frontal demands on the part of other 
governments is likely to be counterproduc-
tive. Yet external pressures may well be 
marginally effective, provided they take into 
account a scale of reasonable feasibility ; for 
example, demands for humane measures in 
reuniting families may be feasible, whereas 
demands for measures which threaten to 
undermine the system's monopoly of political 
authority are not. 
We cannot predict which way the Soviet 
system will evolve in the future. But it seems 
reasonable to believe that easing of repres-
sion is more likely to result from evolution-
ary forces within the society under prolonged 
conditions of reduced international tension 
than from external demands for change and 
the siege mentality they would reinforce." 
He added the basic consideration that : 
"For governments, therefore, the first order 
of business must be to regulate the military 
competition" and that "the objective of the 
United States and other democratic govern-
ments to seek to reduce the danger of nuclear 
war by negotiations with the Soviet leaders 
is a moral obligation." 
59. Still more, the achievement of agreements 
to ensure for the world the possibility of living 
under a system of peaceful coexistence, detente 
and co-operation, is increasingly coming to be 
seen as a path for which there are no rational 
alternatives: the only one that can, at the same 
time, lead the world onwards toward the more 
advanced goals of democracy and freedom. 
XI 
60. Lastly, there are two problems that remained 
marginal at Helsinki but on which the Belgrade 
conference cannot abstain from taking a stand. 
One is that of the Mediterranean. From the fore-
going it is clear that this area with its Middle 
East extension is now one of the world's "hot-
spots" and there is a growing body of opinion, 
even among governments which opposed its inclu-
sion among the topics for discussion at Helsinki, 
that genuine security in Europe cannot be achie-
ved without a solution to Mediterranean problems 
and crises being found. Here too, we must tread 
softly, with a realistic appreciation that the blocs 
and their bases and fleets do exist, and cannot 
be wished away. But there is already during the 
current phase broad scope for action and initia-
tion by way of bilateral and multilateral co-
operation, and extension to the Mediterranean of 
confidence-building measures in the longer pro-
spect of stable security arrangements in that 
area. The other question is that of the follow-up 
of the Belgrade conference. A theme which 
already made heavy weather during the pre-
paratory discussions for the Helsinki conference, 
it lies particularly close to the hearts of the 
smaller and uncommitted countries, which see in 
it a possibility of their making a more effective 
contribution to intra-European relations and 
securing a better safeguard of their own inde-
pendence. At all events, Belgrade can definitely 
not be left without a sequel, and it would not 
suffice merely to decide on a further conference 
once it is over. 
XII 
61. The experience of Helsinki and the follow-up 
actions for the first two years allow us to advance 
certain considerations in connection with the 
coming Belgrade meeting. It is undoubtedly too 
early yet to attempt to convert a declaration of 
intent and informal commitments into legal 
obligations. With the exception of a few precise 
and clearly-defined points, any attempt to do so 
would end up in failure, or in a retreat from the 
results achieved at Helsinki. These are still sub-
stantial. A process has been set in train (both in 
relations between States, and in inducing the 
latter to adapt to this new philosophy of inter-
relations and interdependence), and it is only 
logieal that this process should become increas-
ingly irreversible, unless the way is barred by 
a serious international crisis. It follows that the 
Belgrade meeting must be a success, and every 
effort made to reduce the danger that the pole-
mics now in course be turned into an exchange 
of accusations and insults between the two blocs 
which could seriously compromise the results of 
the conference and diminish, de facto, the import-
ance, function and independence of the neutral 
and non-aligned countries. At the same time we 
cannot but recognise the limitations stemming 
from an attempt to achieve an overall balance of 
concessions and advantages of the sort that was, 
to some extent, striven for or accepted at Hel-
sinki. This sort of tendency will not allow us to 
advance very far, and carries some risk of streng-
thening the bloc mentality, with a consequently 
greater importance and influence of the bigger 
powers over the smaller. The search for realistic 
and balanced solutions to the major problems 
must instead leave more room for the autonomy 
of the individual States, starting from those 
which are not members of the blocs, so as to 
permit the flexible and open-ended solutions 
which alone can secure genuine progress along 
the guidelines laid down at Helsinki. 
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62. As Mr. Luigi Granelli, leader of the Inter-
national Department of the Christian Democrat 
Party and former Under-Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs, recently wrote : 
"There is no sense whatever in taking an 
'all or nothing' attitude, when the subject 
matter of the negotiations is, objectively, 
extensive and complex, and demands, by its 
very nature, a strictly gradualist procedure. 
Helsinki and Belgrade, at different levels of 
course, are not final goals and as such 
subject to definitive criticism as concerns 
their limitations or to empty triumphalism 
as concerns their partial successes. They 
constitute the meaningful stages along a 
laborious road where there would be nothing 
to gain from stoppages occasioned by more 
grandiose ambitions or wishful thinking. A 
breaking off of the dialogue, or a specious 
search for pretexts for not reaching a con-
clusion on questions that can be solved 
through frank and honourable agreement, 
lead in the best of cases to preserving the 
status quo, and in the long run to the inevi-
table erosion of relationships, in a climate 
of growing mistrust. Would not this be the 
opposite of detente ? " 
63. Wisdom and realism dictate that we should 
foresee a slow and uneven progress, depending 
on the different sectors. There is no use wringing 
our hands over this. On the contrary, we must 
allow for it, and not incur the risk of jeopar-
dising this intricate and interdependent growth 
process which, in its underlying guidelines, 
answers the true interests and aspirations of all 
the peoples of our continent and all the countries 
signatory to the Helsinki final act. 
XIII 
64. The Assembly considered this report in 
depth aJt the first part of its twenty-third ses-
sion. During the debate, so many amendments 
were tabled to the draft recommendation that 
the Chairman of the General Affairs Committee 
and your Rapporteur asked for the report to 
be referred back to Committee. Your Rapporteur 
is now submitting a new draft recommendation 
taking fullest account of every aspect of the 
debate and the amendments tabled. At the same 
time, he felt it necessary to prepare an adden-
dum to the explanatory memorandum which he 
submitted in June 1977 to take account of sub-
sequent developments. This addendum mainly 
covers the period up to the end of the first 
ten days in October, when the general debate 
ended in Belgrade and the work of the five ad 
hoc groups began in camera. 
65. As everyone knows, on 15th June 1977 
representatives of the thirty-five member coun-
tries of the CSCE met in Belgrade to prepare 
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the conference proper. The meeting lasted until 
5th August, when a document was adopted 
entitled : "Decisions of the preparatory meeting 
to organise the Belgrade meeting 1977 of repre-
sentatives of the participating States of the 
conference on security and co-operation in 
Europe, held on the basis of the provisions of 
the final act relating to the follow-up to the 
conference., 
66. The work of the preparatory meeting was 
constructive and positive and in conformity with 
the wishes expressed at the opening by Mr. Milos 
Minic, Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Affairs: 
"I must tell you that during our consulta-
tions with all the participating countries -
I repeat, all the participating countries -
we were assured that they would come to 
the meeting in Belgrade firmly determined 
not to allow the conference to become a 
forum for mutual recrimination and con-
frontation., 
Basic agreement was in fact reached on the need 
to consider the two principles described by 
Mr. Minic in his opening speech : 
"The final act and its three baskets, which 
form the basis for work at the Belgrade 
meeting, must be taken as a unique frame-
work for the development of relations, secu-
rity and co-operation in Europe. Every 
aspect of its application must be considered. 
That is why we are opposed to any partial, 
static approach and any attempt to destroy 
the integrity of the document. 
As one stage in the implementation of the 
guidelines adopted at the conference on 
security and co-operation in Europe, the 
Belgrade meeting must not change what was 
agreed in Helsinki. In conformity with the 
final act, however, it can and must adopt 
new measures and recommendations to help 
to strengthen these guidelines., 
67. Nevertheless, in order to work out a satis-
factory definition a number of difficulties had 
to be overcome whose political importance was 
summed up as follows by Mr. Forlani, the Ita-
lian Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the occa-
sion of a cabinet meeting on 4th August : 
"As regards the principal meeting, the posi-
tion of the western, neutral and non-aligned 
countries was to stress the need for an 'open' 
meeting in the sense that the exact closing 
date should have been fixed when it was 
generally considered that appropriate re-
sults had been achieved in the discussions. 
The Soviet Union and other Eastern Euro-
pean countries asked that in any event a 
closing date be fixed without further delay. 
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A compromise was reached by making 15th 
February 1978 the latest possible closing 
date, the work nevertheless having to be 
wound up by the unanimous adoption of a 
final text by the thirty-five delegations. It 
was thus possible to avoid the discussion 
marking time. The final text will also have 
to specify the place and date of the next 
meeting similar to that in Belgrade in order 
to ensure that the process of detente in 
Europe is pursued.'~ 
The day after the conclusion of this agreement, 
n Popolo, the official publication of the Italian 
christian democrats, made the fold.owing com-
ments: 
"This fact is of great importance: it means 
that the thirty-five signatories of the Hel-
sinki final act, despite the deterioration in 
East-West relations which has been noted 
recently, still believe in detente and are 
determined to advance this process., 
68. There is no need to enumerate the details of 
the compromise reached since everyone knows 
them. It will suffice to recall that the agenda 
drawn up provides that after two weeks of plen-
ary meetings five committees will start work 
dealing respectively with : 
- questions relating to security in Europe ; 
- co-operation in the fields of economics, 
science, technology and the environ-
ment; 
- questions relating to security and co-
operation in the Mediterranean ; 
- co-operation in humanitarian and other 
fields; 
- follow-up to the conference. 
69. This means that committees responsible for 
Mediterranean questions and for the follow-up 
to the conference have been added to the three 
committees corresponding to the three baskets of 
the Helsinki final act. It is quite clear that the 
main item on the agenda is the detailed exchange 
of views on the application of the provisions of 
the final act and its impact on the furtherance 
of detente. 
70. It is generally felt that the two weeks of 
plenary debates have brought out a deep-rooted 
sense of responsibility and a constructive 
approach and an initial review may be made of 
the various positions. At the stage reached in the 
debate, it also appears that there has been some 
improvement in East-West relations and in par-
ticular in relations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union, as has been noted recently 
(outline agreement on the strategic arms limita-
tion talks, joint statement issued in Washington 
and Moscow on the Middle East). Your Rappor-
teur's intention is not to recall the full details of 
opinions and views expressed during the general 
debate by representatives of the thirty-five Sta-
tes but rather to note that the application of the 
final act is proving to be (as Mr. Radi, the Ita-
lian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, said in a speech in Belgrade on 7th Octo-
ber) "a long-drawn-out process which will 
become increasingly binding once the initial 
stage has been left behind". The CSCE is there-
fore a "new, original instrument of peace 
designed to strengthen confidence between States 
and provide an ever more definite reply to cer-
tain hopes nourished by nations... These hopes 
grew in the hearts of Europeans when they saw 
a possibility in the lofty principles set out in the 
final act (sovereign equality, non-recourse to 
violence, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect 
for human rights, inter-State co-operation) of 
guaranteeing in the future a more secure, tran-
quil existence, richer in contacts, better res-
pected and freer". (Speech by Bishop Achille 
Silvestrini, Under-Secretary of the Church Coun-
cil for Public Affairs, on 8th October.) 
71. To what extent have these hopes already had 
an echo and response? This basically is the theme 
of the debate. Significantly, there is now a 
tendency to consider together both light and 
shade, to take account of positive results already 
achieved (on religious freedom, the Vatican 
representative stated inter alia : "We note with 
satisfaction that a number of positive points 
have undoubtedly been ascertained in this 
field") and to emphasise what remains to be 
done in the framework of a dynamic and creative 
process. 
72. On 6th October, Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg, 
Head of the United States Delegation, spoke in 
similar terms: "Our task is part of a great and 
ancient enterprise: the search for security, the 
advance of co-operation in Europe. This confe-
rence is one more step toward that high goal, one 
part of the broader process of reducing risks of 
confrontation in Europe and of replacing them 
with opportunities for co-operation." In the 
context of implementation in general, consider-
ation of the more controversial points, which will 
certainly give rise to discussion and dissatisfac-
tion about the time-table and methods of applying 
the final act, is the occasion of a remarkable 
effort to be objective. In this respect, Mr. Gold-
berg made the following revealing statement : 
"The assessment my country has made of the 
overall record of participating States over the 
last twenty-six months shows encouraging evi-
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dence of progress. But the progress displayed is 
not progress enough. It still falls short of the 
goats of the final act and, just as important, of 
the high expectations the final act aroused." He 
also stressed that "human rights encompass eco-
nomic and social rights, as well as political and 
civil liberties" and that in the opinion of the 
United States "one set of values cannot be 
stressed at the expense of the other. Rather, it is 
the combination of these rights and the respect 
in which governments hold them all which offer 
the best promise that all can be attained." He 
underlined that "we will need patience, persever-
ance and perspective. This conference in Bel-
grade is one stage of a dynamic process and a 
continuing dialogue. And that Helsinki process 
is part of an even larger effort to build more 
secure and humane relations among our nations 
and peoples. We are nearer the beginning than 
the end. This conference must give the people of 
the signatory countries and people throughout 
the world a first report of first progress. It must 
demonstrate to them our shared commitment to 
go further. We owe them our best efforts and 
results better than those so far achieved." 
73. This joint determination must of necessity 
concern the whole of the final act and its three 
baskets. New and quicker progre!ifi must be 
accomplished in all fields. Nor should it be for-
gotten, since it is of particular importance, that 
"the Holy See is deeply concerned that no agree-
ment has yet been reached on the reduction of 
armaments, without which there can be no effec-
tive security. Although this question goes beyond 
the undertakings set out in the final act", said 
Bishop Si1vestrini in his speech in Belgrade, "it 
is nevertheless necessary for our meeting to be 
a sign of the will of the European peoples to 
witness the achievement of concrete and specific 
measures for reducing both conventional and 
strategic armaments". 
7 4. Here too patience, perseverence and perspec-
tive will certainly be needed. But in this field as 
in the others there are already signs of the great 
driving force consisting of the expectations, 
hopes and wishes to which the Helsinki final act 
has given birth. It seems destined to carry still 
more weight in both European and international 
life. In any event, it is a sound basis which it 
will be increasingly difficult to ignore, a point 
of reference and a pole of attraction destined to 
exert a growing influence on the conduct of the 
various governments thanks to the active parti-
cipation of public opinion. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Opinion of Sir Frederic Bennett on the 
application of the final act of the CSCE 
1. If the final act of Helsinki is to be regarded 
as an integral feature of detente the same basic 
considerations surely have to apply to the former 
as to the latter. 
2. Detente itself has become increasingly 
regarded with a sense of disillusionment 
throughout the western world, the best that can 
be said of it being that it is preferable to the era 
of cold war that preceded it, the worst that it 
has proved an invaluable opportunity for the 
USSR to advance its own expansionist aims. 
3. Such strong feelings have been aroused in 
the West in this context that both candidates in 
the recent American presidential election decided 
to drop the word detente from their political 
vocabulary. 
4. Yet there never should have been any such 
misunderstanding if there had been an initially 
agreed interpretation of detente, which was not 
the case. 
5. The West, for their part, until events forced 
on them a more realistic appreciation, believed 
that the introduction of detente in place of colU 
war would lead, and was intended to lead, 
through relaxation of East-West tensions, to 
meaningful, peaceful coexistence, entailing 
mutual respect, but without approval of each 
other's differing political, economic and social 
systems. 
6. From the Kremlin's point of view however 
the Marxist-Leninist principle of international 
relations as interpreted and exploited by the 
Krem1in for Soviet nationalist purposes, dictates 
that there can be no real enduring peace, either 
externally or internally, in an inexorable thread 
of contemporary history, between the so-caJ.led 
capitalist world, including social democracies on 
the one hand and a global communist hegemony 
on the other. 
7. Consequently, peaceful coexistence, which is, 
or purports to be, the real basis of detente, is in 
Soviet eyes not really peace, but an indulgence 
in continuing expansionist imperialism, without 
resort to war, leading ultimately to the establis...lt-
ment of such a hegemony, under Soviet domi-
nation. 
8. If the early high hopes of the final act are 
not in their turn to follow detente into disap-
pointment and cynicism, there must be no repeti-
1. In a vote on 9th May 1977, the General Affairs 
Committee by 11 votes to 3 with 2 abstentions decided, 
in application of Rule 42(2) of the Rules of Procedure 
of the Assembly, to append to the report submitted by 
Mr. Segre and adopted by the Committee the text in 
which Sir Frederic Bennett set out a minority opinion. 
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tion of differing interpretations of the stated 
aims of Helsinki, nor a failure to appreciate the 
different motivations of the various signatory 
powers. 
9. For their part, at least until the arrival of 
Mr. Carter on the scene, the Americans never 
attached great importance to the final act, sup-
porting, rather than initiating, positions adopted 
by the European democracies. 
10. These latter mostly felt that the agreements, 
however limited, contained in the act, in all 
three baskets, did open windows in the iron 
curtain, which in the long run could lead only 
to a lessening of totalitarian excesses and dis-
trust and in consequence create greater East-
West tolerance and so lessen tension, not only in 
Europe but anywhere else in the world where 
Soviet ambitions threaten long-established vital 
western interests. 
11. The neutral and the non-aligned signatories 
of Helsinki quite simply felt that any measure 
which made them feel less insecure, however 
flimsy the guarantees offered to them, was 
worthwhile. Most probably the first test of the 
effectiveness or otherwise of such guarantees will 
sooner, rather than later, arise in Yugoslavia. 
12. Finally, the USSR has never concealed its 
dislike of basket Ill on human rights and 
associated matters, or parts of basket I for that 
matter, from the very start of the negotiations ; 
and only reluctantly agreed to the relevant pro-
visions being included in the act as a price that 
had to be paid for their main ambition being 
achieved : the legitimisation of the present 
frontiers of Europe, irrespective of the wishes of 
their various inhabitants. Even so, to obtain the 
inviolability clauses the Kremlin had to accept a 
western reservation that the denial of any future 
changes in these frontiers was limited only to 
the use of force, not to negotiation : but Soviet 
political leaders have never regarded this reser-
vation as a valid one. 
13. Other areas where undoubted different, 
indeed conflicting, interpretations are increas-
ingly becoming apparent are the provisions 
regarding non-interference in the internal affairs 
of another State. These are not seen by the 
Kremlin (the Brezbnev doctrine) as applying to 
subversion of democratic countries inside or out-
side Europe that show possibilities of conversion 
to communist rule, as part of what Soviet leaders 
have described as an inescapabLe progress 
towards a world-wide acceptance of Russian-type 
Marxist-Leninism, as the only enduring form of 
government. Pursuant to the same reasoning of 
course any attempt by the western countries 1A> 
combine to strengthen their defences against 
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communist penetration (and even more so to try 
to reverse trends or situations in favour of 
pluralism in countries a.l.ready regarded by the 
USSR as won over to the cause of Marxism-
Leninism) is decried as aggressive interference 
with a natural inevitable course of events, 
contrary both to Helsinki and, for that matter, 
detente too ! Be that as it may, it was also hotly 
denied in Moscow that Russian intervention in 
Angola came within the purview of Helsinki 
because the latter was not a signatory of the 
final act and therefore did not thereby earn any 
right of protection against external intervention. 
The same claim is being made as each successive 
attempt to increase Soviet influence in Africa is 
undertaken. 
14. Clarification on this latter point is therefore 
or should be a major western objective at 
Belgrade. 
15. With so many separate and often incompa-
tible strains of thought existing among the 
Helsinki signatories about the raison d' et re of 
the final act it is not surprising that different 
estimates should also exist about the progress, if 
any, of steps towards its implementation, in 
regard to all the baskets. 
16. The difficulties of obtaining a consensus 
under such conditions have been compounded by 
the emergence of an increasingly significant and 
articulate element in the original calculation, not 
directly represented in Helsinki, i.e. the dis-
sidents within both the USSR and the satellite 
States that have achieved a prominence and an 
influence never envisaged in August 1975. 
17. Those behind the iron curtain who are philo-
sophically, ideologicalJy or culturally opposed to 
totalitarianism, whatever its colour, have seized 
on Helsinki as a drowning man clutches at a 
straw in order to support and justify their 
aspirations for another way of life ; and with a 
considerable degree of success such dissidents 
have enlisted popular sympathy and support for 
their dissent, within the western democracies, 
which their governements cannot or dare not 
afford to ignore. 
18. Thus an admittedly embarrassing situation 
has arisen for the USSR, and to a differing 
extent for each of the other Warsaw Pact 
governments too. 
19. The more they indulge in repressive 
measures to hold back the new forces of dissent 
in their midst the more they contravene the pro-
visions of Helsinki basket III which they have 
signed, and the more they increase doubts in the 
West about the validity of the whole concept of 
detente. 
20. If on the other hand they adopt a soft line 
with the dissidents these latter accentuate their 
voices of protest and reach an ever-increasing 
audience in the West, proving that criticism of 
Soviet tyranny is not limited to reactionary 
95 
DOOUMENT 753 
capitalist circles abroad but is shared by men 
and women living inside the Warsaw Pact -
and who, after all, should know better than these 
latter the truth Y In the result too the millions 
of those who in the aftermath of the last war 
and during the last thirty years that have 
decided to live in exile, voluntary or enforced, 
in the West - Ukrainians, Armenians, Poles, 
Hungarians, Czechs and East Germans and 
many others deriving from East and Central 
Europe - have found a new public focus for 
their unchanging disapproval of the regimes 
now in power in their homelands. 
21. Under circumstances when there is such 
wide variance about objectives and differing 
interpretations of some of the most important 
provisions of the final act, it is impossible to 
draw up a single balance-sheet of what has been, 
or has not been, attained at the end of the 
treaty's first two years of operation. Selective 
quotations aimed at lowering the political 
temperature, drawn from speeches by political 
leaders from East and West alike wilJ not and 
cannot resolve this dilemma. 
22. For none can alter, even if they manage to 
obscure, the fact that our Rapporteur, despite 
his gallant and sincere efforts, has been asked 
to reconcile the irreconcilable. Once again it has 
been shown that a joint international declaration 
of high principles and laudable aspirations can 
have little validity, if it requires for fulfilment 
an abandonment not just of different forms or 
government, but wholly incompatible outlooks on 
a way of life. To urge the Soviet Union to accept 
our ideals in the West is something we are 
bound to do if we are true to our own faith in 
the basic purposes of Helsinki ; but for the 
Russians to make any substantial concession..-, 
would imperil the whole system and structure of 
their society - unlikely to receive their concur-
rence - and which in this context could even 
turn out to be counterproductive. 
23. Belgrade can therefore be expected to 
achieve little more than a restatement of stand-
points by the various signatories. The USSR will 
claim that active overt western concern about 
human rights in the eastern bloc represents 
interference in the internal affairs of another 
State and is contrary to Helsinki, despite the 
terms of basket Ill. The United States and most, 
if not all, the western nations will deny this 
premise, and also assert that non-interference in 
what form of government the people of a coun-
try freely choose is not a one-way privileged 
process ; and furthermore emphasise that 
restraint should be observed right across the 
global board and not just in Europe. 
24. So by the time the Belgrade conference 
ends, it is reasonable to assume that the ideologi-
cal confLict between Marxist totalitarianism and 
those who will have none of it will continue, as 
heretofore. 
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Amendment No. 1 
Application of the final act of the CSCE 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Roberti 
28th November 1977 
I. Leave out the last paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation. 
2. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph : 
"Considering however that the process of detente depends on guaranteed security for all concerned 
and that WEU is the only European assembly with responsibilities in European defence matters,". 
3. At the end of paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, insert : 
"in order to ensure inter alia that these negotiations in no event affect, directly or indirectly, Western 
European Union's conditions, possibilities and means of defence ;". 
4. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert : 
"3. Ensure that the Eastern European countries apply strictly the clauses of the Helsinki final act 
in the same manner and at the same time as the WEU member countries. ". 
Signed : Roberti 
I. See 9th Sitting, 29th November 1977 (Amendment negatived). 
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Amendment No. 2 
28th November 1977 
4 
Application of the final act of the CSCE 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by MM. Cavaliere and Roberti 
At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following two new paragraphs : 
"Noting with regret that the need to respect the principles of the third basket of the final act of 
the CSCE is incorrectly considered by the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries to be 
unjustified interference in their internal affairs ; 
Concerned at the serious and continuous violation of human rights still occurring in the Eastern 
European countries,". 
Signed : Cavaliere, Roberti 
1. See 9th Sitting, 29th November 1977 (Amendment negatived). 
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Amendment No. 3 
AppUcation of the final act of U.. CSCE 
AMENDMENT No. 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Cook 
28th November 1977 
1. In the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, after "negotiations" insert : 
"particularly in the field of arms control and mutual reduction of forces in Europe". 
2. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "detente" insert : 
"through arms control agreements". 
3. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "clauses" and insert "provisions". 
Signed: Oook 
I. See 9th Sitting, 29th November 1977 (Part 1 amended and agreed to; parts 2 and 3 agreed to). 
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Amendment No. 4 
Applicatum of the final act of the CSCE 
AMENDMENT No. 4 1 
tabled by Mr. BoJUJlu.mi 
At the end of paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper, insert: 
28th Novemhr 1977 
", recognising tha.t a reminder of the need to respect all the provisions of the final act in full does 
not constitute interference in the internal affairs of the signatory States.". 
Signed : Bonalumi 
I. See 9th Sitting, 29th November 1977 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment No. 5 
Application of the final act of the CSCE 
AMENDMENT No. 5 1 
tabled by Sir Frederic Bennett 
28th November 1977 
In the first paragraph of the preamble to the dra.ft recommendation, leave out "is intended to lead" 
a.nd insert "ought to lead". 
Signed : Bennett 
I. See 9th Sitting, 29th November 1977 (Amendment agreed to). 
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~uropean security and African problems 
// 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 1 
by Mr. MiiUer, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 
on European security and African problems 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Miiller, Rapporteur 
I. The African continent's importance for Western Europe 
II. The internal situation 
Ill. External interference 
IV. Southern African problems 
A. The Rhodesian problem 
B. The problem of Namibia. 
C. The South African problem 
V. Equatorial Africa 
VI. North-West Africa. 
VII. North-East Africa 
VIII. Western Europe's policy in Africa 
APPENDIX 
Economic r6le of the South African Republic 
~~O.<f-3 + 'I'IR:I'I(fat) 
-f <f'fi.J(lf){s.l-) 
3rd November 1977 
1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 4 
abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee : Mrs. von Bothmer 
(Chairman) ; Sir John Rodgers (Alternate : Channon), 
Mr. BarH (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Abens, Ariosto, Beith, 
Sir Frederio Bennett, MM. Bizet, Brugnon (Alternate : 
Gessner, Gonella, Grangier (Alternate: B'llh'okel), Hanin, 
Mrs. van den Heuvel-de Blank, MM. Mangelschots, Mende, 
Minnooci, Muller, Peijnenburg, Peridier, Perin (Alter-
nate: Van der Elst), Portheine, Beddemann, Begre, Urwin 
(Alternate : Cook). 
Forni), Cermolaooe, Faulds (Alternate : MoGu.ire), 
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Draft Recommendation 
on European security and African problems 
The Assembly, 
Considering that co-operation between Western Europe and the African countries is essential 
to the security of Europe and the necessary economic development of Africa ; 
Welcoming the determination constantly expressed by the African States to settle problems 
between themselves free from intervention by powers outside the continent of Africa ; 
Noting nevertheless that unrest in the African continent has often provided an opportunity or 
pretext for external intervention ; 
Aware that the economic and social development of the African countries must take priority 
over matters of sovereignty and frontiers ; 
Considering that respect for the sovereignty of African States remains a basic goal of any European 
policy; 
Deploring that the political framework left by decolonisation is ill-adapted to ethnic, linguistic 
and religious realities ; 
Considering that Europe can contribute fully to the economic, social and cultural development 
of Africa only insofar as there is both internal and external peace among the States ; 
Noting that the practice of apartheid in the South African Republic is contrary to all the 
principles on which western civilisation is based and constitutes a permanent threat to peace in 
Africa, imposing on the international community and Europe special responsibilities with particular regard 
to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
REooMMENns THAT THE CoUNCIL 
1. Ensure that its members hold continuing consultations in the most appropriate framework with 
a view to co-ordinating their African policies ; 
2. Co-ordinate the efforts of its members in order to improve the effectiveness of measures to 
compel the South African Republic to terminate apartheid, promote the independence of Namibia 
and establish a just and democratic regime in Rhodesia ; 
3. Examine attentively, in the framework of the mandate given to the SAC, the sale of arms by 
its members in Africa ; 
4. Study means of achieving a concerted limitation of such sales and in particular the embargo on 
arms supplies to the South African Republic ; 
5. Approach other arms suppliers with a view to their participating in this undertaking ; 
6. Foster the development of co-operation between Europe and Africa as defined in the Lome 
Convention ; 
7. Link the assistance Europe extends to the African States with the respect they show for 
human rights; 
8. Promote through co-operation with African States their economic and social development, as 
well as their democratic development, with due respect for human rights, account being taken of 
their specific conditions. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. MiiUer, Rapporteur) 
I. The African continent's importance for 
Western Europe 
1. Since the nineteenth century, the African 
continent has been of considerable importance 
to Europe. In the nineteenth century in parti-
cular, Africa's economic value led to colonial 
expansion by a number of European powers 
which, by the twentieth century, covered almost 
the entire continent. 
2. The end of the colonial empires after the 
Sfi'COnd world war did IliOt stop the flow of trade, 
which has developed still further since Africa 
has proved to be a source of a number of raw 
materials and foodstuffs consumed in large quan-
tities in Europe. There are vast oil reserves, 
p'articuJ.arly in the Algerian and Libyan Sahara 
and in Nigeria. There are uranium reserves in 
Central and Southern Africa which Europe will 
find even more essential in the coming years 
since nuclear energy will be playing a more 
important role in industry. Final,ly, where non-
ferrous metals are concerned, Africa supplies 
particularly large quantities of gold, copper and 
manganese, which are in very short supply in 
Europe. 
3. Conversely, the present low level of indus-
trialisation in Africa makes it a worthwhile 
customer for European industry offering outlets 
which will increase in time insofar as Africa 
manages to overcome its economic and technical 
underdevelopment. Economic association between 
Europe and Africa is not therefore solely the 
result of colonial relationships but something of 
a geographical necessity, particularly as Africa is 
closer to Western Europe than any other conti-
nent. 
4. But it is not only for economic reasons 
that Europe camwt sever its ties with the African 
continent. Indeed, the latter plays an essential 
role in Europe's security now that military 
threats are no longer localised. Africa collltrols 
the whole southern shore of the Mediterranean, 
the eastern shores of the Atlantic and the western 
shores of the Indian Ocean. Its three maritime 
fronts would thus allow any adversary who might 
establish air or naval bases there to control 
shipping in the Atlantic and play an important 
role in the Indian Ocean, an essential launching 
base for American nuclear submarines which 
ensure Europe's security through their deterrent 
effect on the Soviet Union while giving the 
United States 'a second strike possibility in the 
event of the Soviet Union attempting a surprise 
nuclear attack on American territory. 
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5. In short, while the positive role of Africa 
in the West's defence policy remains secondary, 
the negative role it might play if it fell into the 
hands of other powers would be considerable. For 
all these reasons, therefore, Europe should keep 
a close watch on present developments in Africa 
and ensure that the African continent does not 
swing over to the side of a potential enemy. 
Ensuring real independence for the African 
States concords with the political principles 
upheld by the West and the economic, political 
and strategic interests of Europe, oow the colonial 
era is over. 
6. This is the view of the EEC, which has 
constantly sought a policy of assistance to and 
co-operation with any African countries which so 
wish, granting them a major proportion of its 
development aid and concluding preferential 
trade agreements. In defence matters, on the 
other hand, the Western European countries have 
no similar policy since some of them are linked 
with African States by bilateral treaties which 
in effect are alliances ; this applies in particular 
to several former colonial mother countries and 
some of their former colonies, although others 
considered it preferable not to shoulder any per-
manent commitments in Africa. Thus, some Euro-
pean countries maintain armed forces ready to 
intervene at short notice in Africa and which 
are sometimes stationed on African territory, 
whereas their European allies contemplate no 
such intervention whatever may happen. This 
leads to differences between the WEU countries' 
concepts of Europe's ability to promote the free-
dom of peoples and independence of States in 
Africa. For instance, there were differences when 
France supplied aid to Morocco for transporting 
troops and equipment to Zai're in spring 1977. 
The French Government's claims to be acting on 
behalf of Europe were particularly groundless 
since, as far as your Rapporteur is aware, it had 
consulted none of its European partners before 
acting. 
7. In short, although to some extent the Western 
European countries have common views and 
interests which favour political, economic and 
social stability in Africa and real independence 
for the African States, this has produced no 
joint policy, outside the economic field, nor even 
mutual support, apparently due to insufficient 
consultation. On the other hand, in economic 
matters the Lome Convention of 28th February 
1975, which 'associates forty-three States with the 
European Community, thirty-seven of which are 
African t, is a particularly important example of 
co-operation because it recognises and develops 
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reciprocal interests. It mainly concerns poor 
countries largely dependent on agriculture and 
guarantees them markets at sufficiently profit-
able prices. For these weaker States, it is their 
only guarantee against price fluctuations and the 
only way they can protect their economy. 
8. The convention's main provisions covered: 
( i) the granting by the Community of 
duty-free access to all industrial and 
to 96 % of agricultural imports from 
signatory countries ; 
( ii) the creation of an export stabilisation 
scheme guaranteeing the exporting 
countries a certain level of income ; 
( iii) increased development aid ; 
( iv) increased eo-operation ; 
( v) the creation of bodies to provide the 
institutional framework for the agree-
ment. 
9. The agreement is to remain in force until 
28th February 1980, only the provisions on sugar 
being subject to revision at an earlier date. 
10. This agreement meets a number of the Afri-
can States' requirements. It is certainly not in 
the short-term interests of the European States 
but it is in the common interest for the African 
continent to develop rapidly and in a balanced 
manner. 
D. The internal situation 
11. The present-day political geography of 
Africa is strongly marked by the colonial period. 
Before colonisation by Europe there were few 
real States in Africa and the present frontiers 
are a result of the division of African territory 
between the colonial powers. 
12. Very few countries have any ethnic, 
linguistic, cultural or religious unity. Most of 
them group several peoples and inter-State 
frontiers often divide the same people, which has 
been a major source of instabiUty and above all 
a permanent threat to the stability of the States 
concerned. Thus, the military operations opposing 
Zaire and forces from Angola which invaded the 
province of Shaba at the beginning of 1977 took 
place in a region where political frontiers divide 
1. Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory 
Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malagasy Republic, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, 
People's Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, 
Uganda, Upper Volta, Zambia, Zaire. 
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several ethnic groups living in both countries. 
Similarly, many of the difficulties now facing 
Ethiopia stem from the division of the Somali 
people between several States and the fact that 
in certain States several peoples have been 
brought together who have never been on good 
terms. Everywhere this fundamental instability 
makes it difficult to achieve the consensus which 
is needed for the stability of political regimes in 
many African countries and is a source of strong 
temptation to them to intervene in the internal 
affairs of neighbouring States. 
13. Thus, the notion of interference in the 
internal affairs of States does not mean exactly 
the same as in other continents since frontiers 
are often contested, ill-defined and, particularly 
in regions such as the Sahara, where nomadic 
customs persist, barely respected by the popula-
tions themselves. 
14. As soon aa they became independent, the 
African States 'as shaped by the colonial divisions 
agreed to base their relationships on the main-
tenance of States and frontiers inherited from 
colonial days. This was the basic principle of the 
constitutive charter of the Organisation of Afri-
can Unity adopted in Addis Ababa on 25th May 
1963. Until quite recently this principle was 
quite well respected, but it is apparent that it 
is now being called in question in several regions. 
For instance, Libya is now occupying a fringe 
of territory which had been alttributed to Chad. 
Similarly, when Spain withdrew from the 
Western Sahara, Morocco and Mauritania shared 
the territory, which led to disturbances which 
are still far from settled. Many African States 
therefore no longer feel secure because they know 
their neighbours can lay claim to one or another 
portion of their territory and in many cases with 
the support of part of the population. This has 
involved them in an arms race which has been 
most evident in recent years in West Africa, but 
which is also developing in North Africa, where 
Morocco and Algeria have acqui,red considerable 
military strength. 
15. The Organisation of African Unity has 
constantly tried to impose the principle that the 
fate of Africa should, whatever the circumstances, 
remain in African hands. However, the conflicts 
and mistrust which have developed between 
African States mean that the OAU no longer 
affords the African States sufficient guarantees 
and they have formed other groups within the 
continent, turning increasingly to non-African 
powers in order to increase their influence or 
ensure their security. 
ID. External interference 
16. This takes very many forms, some being 
an aftermath of the colonial era in that the 
former colonial powers endeavoured and in many 
eases managed to maintain privileged relations 
with the territories of their former empires. The 
desire of certain African States to escape from 
what they considered to be the excessive influence 
of the former colonial powers led them to seek 
support elsewhere. Thus, the United States played 
an important role in the fighting which followed 
the decolonisation of the Congo. But the Soviet 
Union in turn has intervened to strengthen the 
positions of those African States which sought 
to break away more completely from the domina-
tion of the former colonial powers and this has 
resulted in the rivalry between the two great 
powers being extended to the African continent. 
Finally, the rapid increase in wealth in certain 
Arab countries and Iran since 1973 and the 
parallel development of their military strength 
give them an increasingly important role in the 
East African balance. In particular, they seem 
to have strongly encouraged Somalia's action 
against Ethiopia in 1977. 
17. So far, the influence of the Soviet Union 
has not resulted in any permanent foothold, and 
its diplomatic activity in Africa may be con-
sidered above all as an attempt to weaken western 
positions, thus harming world capitalism, rather 
than an attempt to set up communist regimes. 
However, the considerable development of the 
Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean in recent years 
gives reason to fear that the Soviet Union may 
endeavour to set up bases in the area and extend 
its economic, ideological, political and military 
influence. 
18. In 1977, there was some development in 
American policy inasmuch as President Carter 
clearly showed that he did not intend the United 
States to intervene directly in Africa. Thus, he 
allowed a government to be set up in Angola 
which received aid and arms from outside and 
did nothing to ensure the defence of Za1re when 
it was invaded by forces from Angola. 
19. The Angolan affair was considered very 
important by many African governments because 
they felt it was a challenge to the West's deter-
mination to keep Mrica free of Russian or 
Chinese intervention. China too pursues an active 
policy on the shores of the Indian Ocean. It eo-
operates closely, particularly with Tanzania, most 
of whose arms it supplied, although it is not pos-
sible to speak of direct military intervention by 
China, any more than in the case of the Soviet 
Union which, even in Angola, seems to have relied 
on Cuban forces to ensure that its side won. 
20. Future relations between Europe and Africa 
may therefore be in doubt because of external 
intervention on the Mrican continent ·and this 
can but have major repercussions on both the 
economy and the security of Europe. 
21. However, attempts by certain Mrican coun-
tries such as Tanzania, Algeria, Tunisia and 
Mozambique to organise their economies along 
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"socialist" lines adapted to the characteristics of 
African society must not be considered as the 
result of external interference. On the contrary, 
greater economic strength and some balance in 
the division of wealth are elements of stability 
and independence worthy of encouragement. 
IV. Southern African problems 
22. The most serious problem in present-day 
Mrica arises from the presence and policy of the 
white-dominated South African Republic at the 
southernmost tip of Africa. For a long time, it 
had the support of most western powers, which 
looked upon it as a major economic partner, a 
bastion of western civilisation standing in the 
way of the threats now hanging over the African 
continent and occupying an essential strategic 
position between the Indian Ocean and the 
Atlantic, particularly at a time when oil from 
the Arabian-Persian Gulf had to be routed via 
the Cape because of the closing of the Suez Canal. 
23. However, the policy of racial discrimination 
has had effects which jeopardise the very objec-
tives of western policy in Mrica. The majority 
of African States find such a policy intolerable 
because they view it as the prolongation and 
aggravation of the colonial regime in forms most 
inacceptable to the African peoples leading to 
permanent opposition between black and white 
with world-wide repercussions. 
24. There are now two things at stake in the 
unrest in Southern Africa. First, there is the 
question whether the future of the white inhabi-
tants who settled in that part of the world is 
in remaining in the territories they have been 
developing for several centuries. But the question 
also arises as to what extent the black and white 
populations can cohabit on an equal footing after 
the minority element has dominated the majority 
for so long. It is thus a major problem which 
is raised on the basis of a number of seemingly 
minor matters. In fact, the fate of the govern-
ment of Rhodesia and Namibia depends to a very 
large extent on the strength and will of the 
South. Mrican Republic. 
25. It is evident that while all the Western 
European countries condemn the very principle 
of apartheid it would be easier to fight it effect-
ively if the governments in power in other parts 
of Africa showed greater determination to ensure 
respect for human rights within their frontiers. 
Recent massacres in Burundi, persecutions and 
massacres of Christians in the Southern Sudan, 
torture in Equatorial Guinea and despotism in 
Uganda considerably diminish the strength of any 
complaints these countries may make about South 
Mrica and to some extent explain why the white 
population of South Africa is against any move 
to bring them under the domination of the black 
majority. 
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A. The Rhodesian problem 
26. This problem began twelve years ago. Rho-
desia has a population of more than six million, 
only 270,000 of whom are white. It was the white 
population that terminated British colonisation 
and seized power in a country where they formed 
only a very small minority. The Rhodesian 
Government succeeded in recruiting among the 
black population certain units for its army which 
for several years has been fighting the rebellion 
of the Patriotic Front, which aims to set up a 
new African-dominated State on the territory of 
what is now Rhodesia : Zimbabwe. 
27. Without delving into the history of the 
difficult relations between the Rhodesian Govern-
ment and its African neighbours and the United 
Kingdom, your Rapporteur merely wishes to 
recall that during summer 1977 the United States 
and the United Kingdom informed Mr. Ian 
Smith's government of a plan to re-establish peace 
in Rhodesia. This plan has not been published, 
but from information issued it may be deduced 
that Mr. Smith's government would be withdrawn 
and replaced for six months by a British 
administrator in Salisbury. The government 
armed forces and those of the Patriotic Front 
would be disbanded and replaced by an inde-
pendent peacekeeping force in which Nigeria, 
Canada and India might participate. The British 
administrator would arrange free elections based 
on the principle of equal voting rights for all 
persons and the government resulting from these 
elections would organise a new Rhodesian army. 
Finally, a fund of $500 million would be set up 
to guarantee the property of the white popula-
tion while the black population's adhesion to the 
new regime would be facilitated by a $1,000 mil-
lion development fund which would be granted 
in exchange for a guarantee of constitutional 
order ensuring freedom for all. 
28. Information obtained to date suggests that 
the Rhodesian Government will not agree in full 
to such a plan, mainly because it would mean 
disbanding the government army, because it 
would have no confidence in the international 
force which might be deployed by the United 
Nations and finally because equal voting rights 
would ensure that the black majority triumphed 
over the white minority. Mr. Smith is therefore 
insisting on special representation for white resi-
dents and that justice, administration, the police 
and the army be independent of "politics", i.e. 
that they remain in the hands of the white 
minority. Finally, he is calling for the applica-
tion of restrictive clauses in respect of voting 
rights which would take account inter alia of the 
cultural level of potential electors. He has at 
least agreed to a programme leading to the 
introduction of universal suffrage within two 
years. 
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29. Moreover, Rhodesia's neighbours, particu-
larly Tanzania, which is the headquarters of the 
Patriotic Front forces, are opposed to the dis-
bandment of these forces and claim that they 
form the framework of the future army of 
Zimbabwe. 
30. In fact, Rhodesia's fate seems to depend 
essentially on the external support its govern-
ment receives from outside. Although it was 
difficult to achieve a united western front to 
ensure respect for a trade embargo intended to 
bring pressure to bear on the Rhodesian Govern-
ment, it seems that Mr. Smith's government can 
no longer expect direct assistance from any EU:ro-
pean government, particularly if it rejects the 
Anglo-American plan. 
31. No great results are to be expected however 
from the boyoott measures since they are applied 
very unevenly by both eastern and western coun-
tries. There have even been cases of "socialist" 
countries serving as intermediaries between 
western countries and Rhodesia. For instance, it 
has been claimed that Yugoslavia sold, at world 
rates, butter purchased at cut price from the 
EEC, the Soviet Union is said to have sold to the 
United States chromium imported from Rhodesia, 
and China to have sold Rhodesian tobacco. 
32. The government's survival therefore depends 
mainly on South African assistance. But South 
Africa seems to have two ways of looking at the 
problems. On the one hand, Rhodesia is seen as 
the forward bastion of the white cause in 
Southern Africa, which would induce South 
Africa to give the Rhodesian Government uncon-
ditional support. On the other hand is the acknow-
ledged fact that Rhodesia is at present facing 
problems which are unknown in South Africa 
and an understanding with the wootern powers 
or a certain number of African States which 
might involve abandoning Rhodesia might streng-
then South African positions. 
33. There is thus some ambiguity in South 
Africa's attitude towards the Rhodesian problem 
and it is anxious to demonstrate that there is 
absolutely no connection with the problems 
peculiar to the South African Republic. The 
South African Government's reception of the 
proposals made by Mr. Owen and Mr. Young 
will now reveal its true intentions. 
B. The problem of Namibia 
34. South-West Africa, a former German colony, 
was entru.sted by League of Nations mandate to 
the then South African Union after the first 
world war. When the United Nations decided to 
terminate this mandate and make South-West 
Africa independent, South Africa unilaterally 
annexed the territory, thus placing considerable 
strain on relations between many African coun-
tries and South Africa and also between those 
countries and the western powers, which were 
accused of being accomplices in the South 
African action. 
35. The result was to further justify the reta-
liatory measures against South Africa and the 
boycott recommended by the United Nations 
General Assembly. Although such recommenda-
tions are not binding, they have been respected 
by certain countries. The fact that several Euro-
pean governments have not respected them, 
however, has been partly responsible for the 
deterioration of their relations with many African 
countries. During his visit to Southern Africa 
in August 1977, Mr. de Guiringaud, French 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, ascertained that 
France's policy towards South Africa, to which 
it has sold arms and where it is to build several 
nuclear power stations, has aroused strong 
hostility among the black States in the region. 
C. The South African problem 
36. In South Africa itself the numerical balance 
between the various elements of the population 
swings lea<J against the white population than in 
Rhodesia, there being 4.3 million whites compared 
with 22 million blacks, Indians or coloured. The 
latter large minorities further complicate the 
confrontation between black and white popula-
tions. 
37. Despite a regime which radically separates 
the various elements of the population, height-
ening the considerable economic disparities 
between them, the South African Government 
has for many years managed to maintain peace 
within its frontiers. But it is pursuing an increas-
ingly repressive policy which can but lead to 
increaaed tension. To meet demands for indepen-
dence, the government has set up autonomous 
black States (Bantustans), which are generally 
located in the poorer regions where few whites 
had settled. However, for the last few years 
South Africa has been having internal difficul-
ties, particuJarly in the suburbs of large cities, 
and disturbances are increasingly frequent. In 
August 1977, a large number of black secondary 
schools and universities had to be closed by the 
government. 
38. South Africa has such economic and military 
strength that even with the support of neigh-
bouring black countries the native populations 
have little hope of achieving even their most 
rightful claims without the co-operation of the 
whole international community. 
39. The South African Government's present 
threat to acquire nuclear weapons would appear 
to demonstrate its determination to resist any 
intervention from without and at all costs main-
tain a regime of white domination over the black 
element. For the first time, however, this threat 
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appears to have given rise to a unanimous reac-
tion among the western powers, which are 
showing their radical opposition to the use of 
this means of intimidation. But there is little 
doubt that South Africa would use every means 
available to ensure its security if it found itself 
completely abandoned by the West. But there are 
signs that South Africa's aim is now economic 
autarky which would shelter it from external 
pressure and the white population, thus hemmed 
in, would feel itself less influenced by views from 
outside. 
40. Southern Africa is therefore the most 
important area of tension on the African con-
tinent and there is every reaBOn to foresee a 
considerable increase in tension in the coming 
months and years to the point that, although 
South Africa does not seem seriously threatened 
at present, no guarantee can be given of its 
longer-term survival. 
41. This situation raises a number of problems 
for all the western powers, particularly as to the 
steps they can and should take with regard to 
the South African Republic, which is a major 
economic partner for many of them and with 
which some, such as the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands, maintain a relationship based on 
common languages. 
42. The "front-line" African States, i.e. those 
which have frontiers with South Africa, Rhodesia 
or Namibia, wish the investment and trade 
boycott of South Africa to be applied in 
full, very probably not only in order to impose 
their solution to the Rhodesian problem, obtain 
independence for Namibia and terminate racial 
discrimination in the South African Republic, 
but also to put an end to the domination of 
whites throughout Southern Africa. They have 
received a certain amount of outside support, 
particularly from the Soviet Union and 
China, which have supplied arms to several of 
them (Tanzania and Zambia, for instance), and 
they have a strong majority in the United 
Nations. Moreover, all African countries have 
affirmed the principle of solidarity with the 
cause of the black population of Southern Africa, 
although some are afraid that new communist 
regimes may be set up in Southern Africa and 
stop well short of unconditional opposition to the 
South African Republic. 
43. The western countries certainly agree that 
a solution should be found in Rhodesia and 
Namibia which meets the claims of the African 
countries. They are not so unanimous when they 
envisage the consequences of a possible overthrow 
of the present regime in South Africa. Admitted-
ly, they all feel that the policy of racial discri-
mination practised by the South African Govern-
ment is morally unacceptable and endangers 
relations between Europe and Africa. But none 
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of them has dared to consider openly the con-
sequences of the black population assuming power 
in South Africa which might mean strongly anti-
western forces being moved into this vital area. 
Thus, on 25th August 1977, Mr. Young, United 
States representative at the Lagos anti-apartheid 
conference, did not hesitate to warn the African 
countries against a policy of over-radical sanc-
tions against South Africa, which he said might 
kill rather than cure the patient. 
44. So the principal aim of western pressure on 
South Africa is to induce it to halt its policy of 
annexation in Namibia, stop supporting the 
Rhodesian regime and transform its internal 
regime by giving equal treatment to blacks and 
whites. But if this pressure were to lead to total 
isolation of South Africa and endanger the con-
tinued presence of the white element there, it 
may be wondered what policy the western powers 
should adopt. 
45. In short, it is most important for all members 
of the Atlantic Alliance, particularly the EEC 
countries which are endeavouring to work out a 
common policy for their relations with Africa, 
to hold close and frequent consultations on the 
action to be taken and also on the very aims of 
their policy so as to avoid hasty action which 
might compromise the permanent interests of 
Europe and the W em and lead to a situation in 
Africa liable to harden positions or encourage 
intervention from without. 
V. Equatorial Africa 
46. Equatorial Africa is dominated by the 
former Belgian Congo, now Zaire, which occupies 
a central position, covers a large area and has a 
population of 26 million. The West, and particu-
larly the United States, made considerable efforts 
following the decolonisation of the Congo to 
maintain its territorial unity, which was threat-
ened by a large number of internal and external 
forces working to break it up. 
47. But when Portugal granted independence 
to Angola, several political organisations fought 
for power until the MPLA won with the help of 
the Soviet Union. The regime set up in this region 
traversed by most of Southern Zaire's lines of 
communication with the Atlantic thus received 
considerable military assistance from the Soviet 
Union, particularly through the intermeddary of 
Cuba which sent several thousand "volunteers" 
to Angola (more than 20,000 according to reliable 
sources). Nor does it seem, despite the presence 
of these Cuban forces, that the MPLA is able to 
exercise effective control over the whole country. 
48. The regime which has been established in 
Mozambique moreover does not seem content, as 
is the case in many African countries, with 
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developing the alliance with Moscow or Peking 
and purchasing arms from them. Recent informa-
tion indicates that the aim is to impose a real 
economic and political dictatorship by authori-
tarian means. 
49. Moreover, since relations between Southern 
Zaire and the Indian Ocean are controlled either 
by Tanzania, where there is a considerable 
Chinese presence, or by Mozambique, the former 
Katanga, the province with the largest copper 
and uranium reserves, was in danger of being 
asphyxiated, which explains why Zaire assisted 
the opponents of the MPLA during the Angolan 
war of independence. 
50. At the beginning of 1977, when President 
Mobuto's government in Zaire appeared weakened 
by the effects of the world economic crisis, this 
province, now known as Shaba, was invaded by 
forces from Angola which threatened to cause 
a further split in Zaire or to overthrow the 
regime. Finally, the Katanga "police force" seems 
to have returned to Angola. Zaire received 
no direct assistance from the western powers 
apart from France's help in transporting Moroc-
can forces to Zaire. During the crisis the United 
States did not wish to intervene on the side of 
the Zaire regime as it had done fifteen years 
before. 
51. It may be quite a reasonable policy to leave 
the Africans full responsibility for organising 
their security. In any event, the West should not 
act in disarray and through one country's uni-
lateral action find itself involved in a political 
and military venture about which there had been 
no consultation or real consensus. Conversely, 
Europe cannot allow powers outside Africa to 
exploit internal African conflicts in order to 
establish an economic, political and military 
presence. In short, consultations with a view to 
joint action by the Western European countries 
should be essential in such circumstances. 
VI. North- West Africa 
52. Frontiers between North-West African 
States are particularly precarious and question-
able because they mainly cut across desert areas 
inhabited by nomadic tribes over which the 
governments have little control. Since the end 
of French control in Algeria, the latter has had 
clashes with Morocco over the position of its 
western frontiers, and this dispute flared up 
again in 1976 after Spain granted independence 
to the Western Sahara. 
53. This region was shared between its two 
neighbours, Morocco and Mauritania, although at 
least part of the population (the Sahrawis) wished 
to remain independent. They formed the Polisa-
rio, which is waging guerrilla warfare against 
both Morocco and Mauritania. The latter, mainly 
desert, has very few armed forces and appears 
to be having great trouble resisting Polisario 
raids. Algeria supplies the Polisario with military 
assistance and also provides a base for the fighting 
or non-fighting elements responsible for the raids 
on Morocco and Mauritania. The seriousness of 
this affair stems inter alia from the fact that 
when Morocco and Mauritania shared the 
Western Sahara they took no account of the 
principle that frontiers established in Africa 
during the colonial period should be maintained. 
Their action would have been justifiable only if 
there had been very wide agreement from the 
inhabitants of the Western Sahara, which does 
not appear to have been the case. 
54. The covert war being waged in this region 
is one reason for the serious tension between 
Algeria and its western neighbours, and the 
European countries interested in the exploitation 
of Mauritania's mineral resources may find 
themselves involved in this problem one way or 
another. This is particularly true of France, 
several of whose nationals have been kidnapped 
or killed during Polisario raids. 
55. There is a similar problem in the frontier 
area between Libya and Chad. The Government 
of Chad has never had any real control over an 
immense territory consisting mainly of very 
sparsely populaJted desert. Northern Chad (the 
Tibesti area) and particularly the Toubou tribe 
have been in constant rebellion since Chad became 
independent. They are supported by Libya, which 
has territorial claims to the northern part of 
Chad of which it occupies a part. For several 
years France gave Chad military support in 
puting down the rebellion. It has now withdrawn 
its armed forces from Chad but continues to sup-
ply it with military equipment and is thus in-
directly involved in the conflict. 
56. It is extremely difficult to assess how 
representative the Chad rebellion is compared 
with the N'Djamene government and to obtain 
an accurate picture of the positions occupied by 
the forces on either side. So far, action by non-
African powers in the Western Sahara and in 
Chad has been very limited, and it would prob-
ably be wiser for Western Europe to adopt a 
cautious wait-and-see attitude in both areas. 
VD. North-Et.rst Africa 
57. Ethiopia, which is in the centre of this 
region, is its largest and most heavily-populated 
country. It might have been thought that its 
long history and the existence of a State reconsti-
tuted after the collapse of a brief Italian rule 
would have allowed it to evade the kind of chal-
lenges arising in States of colonial origin. This 
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is not so. Ethiopia annexed the former Italian 
colony of Eritrea, where a major rebellion has 
progressively developed. As long as there was 
still a sufficiently strong regime in Addis Ababa, 
external powers refrained from intervening in 
Ethiopia. However, there was a growing number 
of revolts and Haile Selassie's regime proved · 
increasingly incapable of maintaining internal 
order. When this regime collapsed and was repla-
ced by a military directorate, the situation dete-
riorated still further. The rebellions spread to a 
very large part of the territory and in the Soma-
li-populated south-east, support is received from 
Somalia, which in turn seems to be receiving con-
siderable military and financial assistance from 
Saudi Arabia after previously having received 
support from the Soviet Union. In the early 
months of 1977, the insurgent Somalis and the 
regular forces of the Somali army occupied a 
large section of Ethiopian territory, including 
the Ogaden Plateau, which is now completely 
out of the control of the Ethiopian Government. 
58. The former Eritrea is in full revolt and the 
French withdrawal from Djibouti in spring 1977 
may give further extension to a conflict which 
stemmed partly from the wish of the Somali 
people to reconstitute a vast Somali empire cover-
ing present-day Somalia, Djibouti and a large 
part of Ethiopia. The Somali Government denies 
such expansionist aims but it is hard to see how 
it can avoid becoming involved in the revolt 
of the Somali people in Ethiopia. On the con-
trary, all press reports indicate that it is co-oper-
ating closely with them. The West is not at the 
moment directly involved in the North-East 
African conflicts but the maintenance of a French 
force in Djibouti raises the question of how 
much longer involvement can be avoided. 
59. Following the fal1 of Haile Selassie, Ethiopia 
turned to the Soviet Union for technical and 
military assistance. But until quite recently 
Somalia was also supported by the Soviet Union 
which provided it with weapons too. In the cir-
cumstances, it is therefore the Soviet Union 
which is making the greatest effort to re-establish 
peace between its allies, but it is not at all sure 
that it will succeed. Although it announced in 
September 1977 that it would no longer supply 
arms to Somalia, there may be a strong tempta-
tion to intervene more directly in order to make 
its view prevail if fighting continues and the 
situation becomes worse. 
60. Furthermore, in the next few years, all 
the problems connected with East Africa may 
feel the repercussions of the considerable develop-
ment of the wealth and power of certain Middle 
Eastern countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. The reputation of the Arab countries which 
for a long time practised slave trading, probably 
leaves much to be desired in black Africa. But 
the vast sums they have accumulated from the 
sale of oil now allow them to provide large-scale 
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development assistance to countries which are 
still very poor as Saudi Arabia has done in the 
Sudan and Kenya. They can also supply arms 
either to States or to insurgents and have very 
probably done so in Eritrea and Somalia. Finally, 
Iran is in the process of building up a powerful 
navy which will probably play a decisive role in 
the Indian Ocean in future years. 
61. Such interventions at present favour conser-
vative forces, particularly in Oman, where Ira-
nian assistance has enabled the sultan to over-
come the Dhofar revo1t and in the Sudan, where 
Mr. Nemery's government seems to have aban-
doned its former radical positions. 
62. But the indications are that African prob-
lems will slip increasingly away from the con-
trol of those who envisaged a continental order 
in Africa and will gradually find a point of 
balance controlled from outside Africa. The eco-
nomic progress of certain Middle Eastern coun-
tries is already making them a pole of attraction 
for immigrant workers from Pakistan and Soma-
lia. The control they can exercise over Red Sea 
and Arab-Persian Gulf issues is thereby becoming 
ever more real and they will probably soon be 
able to extend this control along the western 
shores of the Indian Ocean. 
63. The Ethiopian affair is particularly serious 
because it might be the start of a challenge to 
everything that seemed stable in Africa, par-
ticularly the principle of the intangibility of 
States and frontiers inherited from colonial times. 
Indeed, the situation in Ethiopia where different 
tribes, languages and religions are grouped to-
gether is to be found throughout the whole of 
Africa and has already led to disturbances and 
fighting as in Zaire and Nigeria. But the case 
of Ethiopia is even more complicated by outside 
intervention and particularly by the flow of Arab 
money to Somalia. 
VIII. Western Europe's policy in Africa 
64. A rapid review of developments on the Mri-
can continent in recent years and the problems 
now facing it demonstrates the extreme complex-
ity of the situation that has developed there. 
Over-simplified or over-hasty judgments SU(lh as 
the classification of the African countries into 
supporters or opponents of the West, the Soviet 
Union or China are very misleading since the 
courses followed by those countries are always 
liable to change at very short notice as has often 
occurred in the past. 
65. There is probably one permanent factor, 
i.e. the Africans' desire to settle African prob-
lems themselves. But even this principle, to 
which they all claim to be attached, is often 
infringed by the African States themselves and 
no 
even more so by revolutionary movements 
endeavouring to change the status quo. 
66. Faced with this extremely complex situation, 
Europe has the utmost difficulty in defining a 
meaningful policy. Several European States ad-
mittedly have an African policy but rare are those 
whose policy covers all African problems. Most 
have special relationships with a specific State 
or group of States and consider their action in 
Africa as a development of these connections. 
67. In this respect, the EEC was perhaps for 
too long guided by the fact that, prior to the 
accession of the United Kingdom, France and 
Belgium played a major role in working out 
the Community's African policy. The Commun-
ity was more concerned with Northern, Western 
and Central Africa than with Eastern and South-
ern Mrica. Western Europe's policy towards 
Africa should probably now be reviewed because 
the links between ex-colonial powers and some 
of their former colonies are more relaxed and 
greater interest is being taken in African prob-
lems, precisely because of the close relations be-
tween the EEC and Africa, by countries which 
had not played a major role in Africa in the 
earLy post-war years. Furthermore, the fact that 
Europe is seeking political unity means it should 
try to unify the policies of the separate European 
countries. Encouragement is to be found in the 
fact that Africa is essential to Europe and will 
be increasingly so insofar as the latter seeks a 
place in the economic, political and military 
balance of the world. The limited area covered 
by Western Europe, sadly lacking in raw mate-
rials, means that industrial and trade activities 
can be developed only in close association with a 
larger continent with greater resources but less 
geared to such activities. 
68. Moreover, Europe's African policy cannot be 
seen in isolation from its general policy be it 
in economic matters or external policy and 
defence. A cursory review of Mrica's present 
problems shows that all the forces now playing 
a role in the world have one or more points 
of contact on the African continent. It therefore 
seems increasingly difficult to uphold certain 
principles, in East-West relations in Europe, for 
instance, and at the same time act in a manner 
which is contrary to these principles in Africa. 
This is certainly true of the Soviet-Union's inter-
vention in Angola when it ignored the principles 
of non-intervention and respect for frontiers 
which it upholds in Europe in the framework of 
the CSCE. 
69. But it also applies to the Western European 
countries which, in Southern Mrica, for instance, 
can hardly ignore breaches of human rights no 
less serious than those they denounce in the 
Soviet Union's application of the Helsinki third 
basket. Finally, it is quite evident that a Euro-
pean defence policy requires security of access 
to raw materials and lines of communication, 
which cannot be guaranteed if external powers 
install themselves on the African continent. 
70. Again, Europe must fully realise the Afri-
cans' need for close co-operation. For the African 
countries, only such co-operation can compensate 
the disadvantages of very sharp fluctuations in 
the price of raw materials, exports of which 
are an essential pari of their economy. They 
also know that their development, including their 
agriculture, cannot be satisfactorily pursued 
without continuing technical co-operation or even 
financial assistance from Europe, whose invest-
ments are often essential. 
71. Thus, the idea sometimes expressed in the 
term "Eurafrica" must be retained. There must 
be no question of resuscitating an obsolete colo-
nial system or again making Africa dependent on 
or subordinate to Europe. But underlying this 
notion is the idea of deep solidarity which neither 
side can avoid. The colonial past certainly still 
plays a major role, both positive and negative, 
in relations between Europeans and Africans, but 
it must not veil the fac;t that there are even 
earlier, and so to speak permanent, links between 
the two continents. 
72. Nevertheless, while it is possible to define 
a few principles which should govern relations 
between Europe and Africa such as respect for 
human rights or non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of States, it is very difficult to translate 
these principles into a common policy. 
73. Thus Europe is bound to take account of 
the special agreements associating certain Com-
munity members with certain African States. 
But because of these agreements it might find 
itself involved, as France was inter alia in the 
Chad conflict, on the side of established regimes 
which are also contested regimes and consequently 
have to take part in defending a political and 
territorial status quo which the African p~ple 
find increasingly inacceptable and which would 
conform neither to the principles it claims to 
defend nor to its own true interests. 
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74. Nor, clearly, can it support or allow to 
develop revolutionary forces which sometimes 
have considerable ambitions but which may not 
necessarily be representative of the country as a 
whole. Naturally, the principle that it is for 
the Africans to settle problems concerning their 
continent fully conforms to the interests of 
Europe, which would have nothing to gain from a 
military undertaking whose principal result 
would be to turn the Africans unanimously or 
almost unanimously against it. But full applica-
tion of the principle of non-intervention would 
also involve dangers which would be the greater 
since external powers such as the Soviet Union 
and China have no compunction about interven-
ing directly or indirectly according to the case. 
75. Moreover, Europe is still the principal sup-
plier of arms to Africa. Generally speaking, 
European arms are sold to States and not to 
insurgents and they should help to maintain a 
certain degree of stability. But in the event of 
civil war in those States or hostilities with their 
neighbours these sales of arms involve Europe 
in spite of itself in sometimes dubious and 
morally ill-founded complications. 
76. At first sight therefore it seems impossible 
to define a policy which the European countries 
should follow in Africa. They must exercise great 
discernment and above all exchange information 
on a continuing basis about their respective 
interests and aims in order to avoid their legitim-
ate interests bringing them into conflict or involv-
ing them in differences over which there has 
been no prior agreement. 
77. SUJCh consultations are held in the framework 
of the EEC where trade and economic and tech-
nical assistance are concerned. Views are not 
sufficiently concerted on politicaL and military 
matters, as has been cLearly demonstrated by 
events in recent months and the mistrust they 
have aroused between Western European coun-
tries. Now that African problems seem to be 
taking a more serious turn, it is primordial to 
call upon our governments to intensify such 
consultations. 
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APPENDIX 
Economic r6le of the South African RepubUc 
1. Share of South Africa in world mineral production and reserves 
Known reserves 
%of 
Tons world 
reserves 
Gold I5,000 49% 
Platinum and 
related metals 30,000 86% 
Vanadium I4,000,000 64% 
Antimony 200,000 4% 
Chromium 3,000,000,000 83% 
Manganese 3,000,000,000 48% 
Diamonds IO 7% 
Uranium 250,000 I7% 
Asbestos 9,000,000 IO% 
Nickel 5,000,000 IO% 
Fluorine 200,000,000 46% 
Zinc I2,000,000 9% 
2. South Africa's customers (%) 
I. Western Europe 55.2% 
) 
Federal Republic 
of of Germany 
which United Kingdom 
I8.2% 
I6.6% 
2. Japan 
3. United States 
4. Africa 
5. Canada 
I9.6% 
I0,6% 
7.4% 
4.I% 
World 
rank 
I 
I 
I 
5 
I 
I 
2 
4 
5 
3 
I 
4 
ll2 
Production 
% of World %of Tons world 
rank Mrican production production 
--
7I3 59% I 94% 
I25 55% I IOO% 
8,5IO 46% I 92% 
I5,I73 2I% I 87% 
2,607,000 30% 2 74% 
5,900,000 24% 2 73% 
1.5 I7% 3 20% 
2,900 I3% 3 60% 
354,500 IO% 3 56% 
20,750 3% 7 62% 
202,580 5% 8 62% 
6I,260 I% I8 23% 
3. Oil trfJIIBported via the cape route 
596 million tons 
65 % of Middle East oil exports 
58 % of the oil tankers in commission 
42 % of all oil transported by sea 
65 % of the oil consumed in Western Europe 
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Amendment No. 1 
European security and African problems 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Roper 
28th November 1977 
In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "measures" in line 1 insert "(i)"; after 
"apartheid" in line 2 insert "(ii) to", and after "and" in line 3 insert "(iii) to". 
Signed : Roper 
1. See lOth Sitting, 29th November 1977 (Amendment withdrawn). 
113 
Document 754 
Amendment No. 2 
European security and African problemt~ 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Whitehead and others 
28th November 1977 
1. Leave out the fourth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation. 
2. In the sixth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "left by decoloni-
sation" and insert "inherited from the colonial period". 
3. In the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "can" and insert 
"should" and leave out all the words after "Mrica". 
4. Mter the seventh paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new 
paragraph: 
"Reaffirming our condemnation of the systematic violation of human rights in certain despotic 
post-colonial regimes in Africa;". 
5. In the eighth paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "practice" and 
insert "policy" and after "principles" insert "of democracy and human rights". 
6. At the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert the following new paragraph: 
"Condemning the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the suppression of civil 
liberties by the white minority government of South Africa,". 
7. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after "members" insert "to establish peace and 
security in Southern Africa"; leave out "improve the effectiveness of measures to" and leave out "regime" 
and insert "transition to majority rule". 
8. Leave out paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation proper and insert : 
"Initiate steps to reduce the present deplorable level of arms sales from external countries to Africa ;". 
9. In paragraph 4 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "concerted" and insert "strict" and 
after "particular" insert "enforcing". 
10. In paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out all the words after "rights". 
Signed: Whitehead, Stoffelen, Roper, Hardy, Urwin, Watkin.ton 
I. See lOth Sitting, 29th November 1977 (Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 agreed to; part 7 amended and agreed to). 
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Amendment No. 3 
European security and African problems 
AMENDMENT No. 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Boucheny 
28th November 1977 
I. At the end of paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert ", ensuring the departure of 
Mr. Ian Smith's illegal government;". 
2. After paragraph 5 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph: 
"Reconsider policies of investment and technology transfer in South Africa and Rhodesia. which 
might inter alia render ineffective the embargo on supplies of military equipment by strengthening 
the economies of these countries ; ". 
3. At the end of paragraph 6 of the draft recommendation proper, insert : "so as to foster the economic 
progresfi of the African countries and not the interests of multinational firms attracted by low wages and 
the absence of social guarantees". 
4. After paragraph 8 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph 9: 
"Afford its support to the liberation movements in Namibia., South Africa and Rhodesia which are 
recognised by the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, i.e. the ANC, the SWAPO 
and the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front;". 
5. Insert the following new paragraph 10 : 
"Condemn the repeated attacks by the South African and Rhodesian regimes on neighbouring States 
and particularly the military operation against Mozambique on 27th November.". 
Signed : Bmuill,eny 
1. See lOth Sitting, 29th November 1977 (Parts 1 and 3 negatived; parts 2 and li agreed to; part 4: amended 
and agreed to). 
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Amendment No. 4 
Europema security and African problems 
AMENDMENT No. 4 1 
tabled by Mr. &mks -and others 
28th Novemmber-1977 
I. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "improve the effectiveness of mea-
sures to compel" and insert ''convince" ; and aft(er "Republic" insert "of the need". 
2. In paragraph 4 of the draft recouunendation proper, leave out all the words after "sales". 
Signed : Bank8, Page, Hawkina 
1. See lOth Sitting, 29th November 1977 (Amendment negatived). 
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Amendment No. 5 
European security and African problems 
AMENDMENT No. 5 1 
tabled by Mr. Page··and others 
29th November 1977 
Leave out the eighth paragraph of the preamble to· the draft recommendation and insert : 
"Condemning the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms and the suppression of civil 
liberties by African governments ;". 
Signed : Page, Banks, Hawkins 
1. See lOth Sitting, 29th November 1977 (Amendment negatived), 
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REPORT 1 
aubmitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions1 
by Mr ... Valleix, Rapporteur 
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Requirements for new aircraft 
1. Adopted in Committee by 13 votes to 0 with 
2 abstentions. 
2. Members of the Comm,ttee: Mr. Warr• (Chair· 
man) ; MM. Ya'lleio:, Leuer (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM • 
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Draft Recommendation 
on progress in aerospace 
The Assembly, 
Considering its original aim of promoting a European aircraft industry to be ambitious in present 
circumstances but essential if the industry is to survive ; 
Believing that the present national concentrations and na.tiona.lisations in Europe's airfra.me industries 
have not strengthened Europe's position vis-a-vis the United States aircraft manufacturing industries; 
Aware of the vast differences between the airframe industries in the various countries of the Common 
Market and considering that in the military field only those of the United Kingdom and France are econo-
mically, commercially and politically comparable since both countries have : 
(a) a large military production; 
(b) a. wide military export market ; 
(c) a. comparable approach on several matters relating to defence policy; 
(d) well-established helicopter and aero-engine industries; 
but aware also of the will of all member countries to widen their share of the civil market for medium-range 
aircraft at world level ; 
Noting with regret that apart from some common research, development and finance activities the 
governments of member countries will not: 
(a) agree on a common aeronautical policy; 
(b) promote a unified civil and military aircraft manufacturing and user market; 
(c) set up a European military aircraft procurement agency; 
(d) form a. European aeronautical council; 
Convinced however of the need to sustain a European aircraft industry, but recognising that this 
calls for solidarity between participating industries and governments which are now omnipresent in elabo-
rating aeronautical policy ; 
Underlining that output for military purposes, which partly offsets a low level of civil production, 
involves a permanent risk since military orders depend largely on political factors, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNciL 
Urge all member governments : 
L To establish a long-term relationship between their national airframe industries- alternating design 
leadership - in order to promote families of aircraft based on the Airbus and aircraft equipped with CFM-56 
engines; 
2. To agree on a form of specialisation and rationalisation based on these types of medium-range aircraft ; 
3. To open discussions on a permanent relationship for the construction of military aircraft and heli-
copters; 
4. To examine the advisability or otherwise and the possibility of a concerted military aircraft export 
policy to countries considered acceptable by WEU member countries and to seek this concertation in the 
framework of the Standing Armaments Committee ; 
5. To seek a co-ordinated approach with a view to collaboration with American aircraft manufacturers 
on long-range civil aircraft. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Valleix, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. Co-opera.tion in advanced technology such as 
aircraft production is still extremely complex. 
Whether the end-product is for civil or military 
purposes, it comprises a multitude of components 
which have to work independently and simulta-
neousLy. International co-operation is even more 
difficult as it requires a very high degree of 
management. Since co-operation on Concorde 
was started in 1961, many different forms of 
international co-operation have been practised 
and it may rightfully be claimed that good 
management methods have since been established 
and adopted as in the case of the Airbus and the 
MRCA. 
2. For international co-operation on military 
aircraft, a difficulty is that the various govern-
ments have evaluated their own requirements 
separately and differently in terms of both time-
scale and methods. The average Life of an air-
craft is twenty years, but when one government 
needs to renew certain types of aircraft the time 
is not necessarily ripe for other governments to 
do likewise - they may not need to renew their 
aircraft for another five or ten years. Some 
governments, for example the German Govern-
ment, require short-range aircraft whereas others, 
the British Government for instance, prefer 
long-range aircraft. Furthermore, for countries 
such as France and the United Kingdom arma-
ment exports are an important factor in their 
industrial policy, international trade and balance 
of payments. The requirements of a country such 
as Germany, which has no share in international 
arms trade, are not therefore comparable with 
those of France and the United Kingdom. 
3. Since the Committee reported on European 
aeronautical poliicy in May 1976, there have been 
major changes in the European aeronautical 
industry. 
4. First, there was the decision to buy the F-16 
from the United States. Your Rapporteur has 
always regretted that most member countries are 
inclined to make the greater part of their pur-
chases in the United States, which does not help 
to strengthen the industrial capacity of Western 
Europe. For instance, one side effect of the so-
called "deal of the century" will be the develop-
ment of new engine production facilities in 
Europe. Europe already has an over-capacity in 
this fiebd and if Belgian factories are now to 
manufacture F-16 engines under licence this will 
result in facilities which are unbalanced as they 
will have no design teams and will therefore he 
unable to prepare future projects once produc-
tion of the F-16 engine terminates. In the near 
future the United Kingdom Government will 
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have to inject another £ 20 million of taxpayers' 
money into Rolls-Royce to allow it to continue 
work on the RB-211 engine ; Rolls-Royce's own 
profits have not been high enough to produce a 
capital reserve for the further development of 
the RB-211 series. Like situations will lead to 
economic weakness in Western Europe mainly 
due to an inability to produce at competitive 
prices. 
5. Second, the three major aircraft constructing 
countries have opted for national concentrations 
of their industries. In Britain aircraft construc-
tion activities have been concentrated through 
the nationalisation of Hawker Siddeley, British 
Aircraft Corporation and Scottish Aviation 
which have now become British Aerospace. In 
France a co-ordinator has been appointed 
between Aerospatiale and Dessault. His task will 
be to avoid competition between the two com-
panies which, in the past, often tended to com-
pete in the same type of programmes. In the 
Federal Republiic there is discussion between 
VFW-Fokker and MBB with a view to concen-
trating the North and South German aircraft 
industries in one consortium. It is not quite clear 
whether the Netherlands part of VFW-Fokker is 
also to be included in this concentration. Both 
the German and Netherlands Governments are 
negotiating with the companies concerned, but a 
decision cannot be reached until the new Nether-
]ands Government has been able to examine the 
situation. A decision is becoming increasingly 
urgent as Fokker in the Netherlands is intro-
ducing shorter work shifts due to present pro-
duction difficulties with their F-27 and F-28 air-
craft. When production of the F-16 starts the 
Netherlands factory will again have a sufficient 
workload. In Bremen the situation is even worse 
as it has been impossible to sell the VFW-614, 
only thirteen of which have been built. 
6. National concentrations are therefore now 
taking place in the airframe industry. The Com-
mission of the Communities has often pleaded 
for international consortia at European level. 
The general idea was that Hawker Siddeley, 
Dassau1Jt and MBB should form one European 
consortium and British Aircraft Corporation, 
Aerospatiale and VFW-Fokker the other Euro-
pean consortium. Now, with the concentration of 
national groupings, the question is whether this 
will promote a "European" aircraft industry 
which, according to the governments and indll&-
trialists, is the goal to be reached. Individually 
the national groupings will be unable to meet the 
civil and military requirements of Western 
Europe, nor will they be able to compete with the 
American aircraft industry. This will be possible 
only if they collaborate and if the European 
work force attains the same p.roductivity rate as 
that of the United States. Moreover, European 
products cannot pierce the world market without 
gaining a foothold in the United States. With the 
present national concentrations and nationalisa-
tions in Europe it is doubtful whether Europe's 
position has been strengthened in competition 
with the United States. Governments which 
already have great influence on their national 
aircraft companies are unlikely to agree to reduc-
tions in the numbers employed when they are 
over strength. It is also to be wondered whether 
they would support new programmes more on a 
national than on a European basis. 
7. On the other hand, however, as the older 
generation of industrial leaders gives way to 
new managers in the European aircraft indus-
tries there will be a move towards greater co-
operation and specialdsation which are vital in 
order to survive. All are now convinced that col-
laboration with the Americans on medium-range 
civil transport aircraft means in fact that they 
would become risk-sharing subcontractors ; they 
would have neither the advantages of a risk-
sharing partnership nor those of independent 
subcontractors. The major European manufac-
turers realise that they need one another if they 
are to attain their ambitious targets. 
8. In the aircraft engine industry the situation 
is very different as Europe has too small a civil 
market in this field. Thus, collaboration with the 
Americans is essential in order to attain satisfac-
tory production runs. Only four major firms are 
left: two in the United States- General Elec-
tric and Pratt and Whitney ; and two in Europe 
- Rolls-Royce and SNECMA. German engine 
manufacturers are linked with the German car 
industry, of which they form only a very small 
part. 
9. In the Commission of the European Commu-
nities' publication of 2nd August 1977, "The 
European aerospace industry - Trading posi-
tion and figures", a breakdown by country is 
given on the importance of the European a.ero-
engine industry. These figures show that France 
and the United Kingdom together account for 
91,263 of the total EEC work force of 104,225, 
and the United Kingdom aircraft engine indus-
try employs three times as many people as the 
French industry. 
10. The French firm, SNECMA, has direct 
relations with General Electric for building its 
CFM-56 engine, and Rolls-Royce has similar 
relations with Pratt and Whitney. 
11. This is a general outline of the facts and the 
present-day situation, but the question is what 
progress is possible in aeronautical matters at 
the present juncture. 
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I. Developmenu in the European 
aircraft industry 
12. The following figures underline the histo-
rical importance of the European aircraft indus-
try. During the first world war aircraft produc-
tion figures were as follows: United Kingdom, 
55,000 aircraft; France, 51,000; Germany, 
48,000 ; Itaily, 12,000 ; United States, 14,000. 
13. For 1944, at the end of the second world 
war, military aircraft production figures were: 
United Kingdom, 27,000; Germany, 36,000; 
United States, 95,000; Japan, 33,600. In 1944 
production in France had been reduced to the 
manufacturing of spare parts for the German 
industry. No figures are available for Italy, but 
its aircraft industry then employed 600,000. The 
aircraft industries of Germany, Italy and Japan 
were dismantled at the end of the second world 
war and remained inactive until 1955, 1956 and 
1952 respectively. 
14. After the second world war the United 
States industry started to produce mai111ly civil 
aircraft and, in 1946 alone, turned out 35,000 
aircraft. The conversion to civil production was 
so fast that the civil market was unable to 
absorb the annual output. Only the larger firms 
therefore managed to survive and by 1948 pro-
duction had dropped to some 7,500 aircraft a 
year. By 1971 there remained only twelve main 
companies in the United States and factories are 
still being merged. The aircraft industry is 
America's major exporter and this has a direct 
influence on the European aircraft industry. 
15. The Communities' publication of 2nd August 
1977 indicates that in 1975 aerospace revenues 
for the nine Common Market countries amounted 
to $ 9.8 billion compared to $ 35.6 billion for the 
western world as a whole. Within the overall 
results, performance varied from sector to sector. 
The study notes that in the Community's 
millitary fleet the proportion of European-
designed aircraft is as high as 67 % in some 
member countries but the percentage varies 
widely from one nation to another. 
16. The work of the aeronautical industries 
within the EEC increased by 27 % between 1970 
and 1975 while the gross domestic product for 
the nine nations as a whole increased by only 
13 % during the same period. The revenues of 
the French industry now slightly exceed those of 
the British industry. The main export markets 
for military aircraft from these two countries 
are the Middle East and North Africa. 
17. The market for civil transport aircraft con-
tinues to be a problem area for the European 
industry whose share of the free world market 
dropped from 9.5 % in 1970 to 7.8 % in 1976. 
According to Common Market figures the Euro-
pean industry now has only 2.4 % of the western 
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market for long-range aircraft and 13 % of that 
market for short- and medium-range aircraft. kJ 
a result, military sales represent 72 % of overall 
EEC aerospace revenues. The study forecasts a 
slow but steady upward trend in the proportion 
of short- and medium-range aircraft in future 
years : 55 % of the total world market will be 
for shorrt- ·and medium-range aircraft during the 
period 1976 to 1985 and this trend might be 
accentuated after 1985. 
18. Your Rapporteur feels that the position o:f 
Airbus-Industrie has recentl'Y improved. It is on 
the brink of penetrating the American market 
and Congressional attempts to legislate against 
European aircraft have been rejected by the 
Federal Government in Washington. 
19. In the field of general aviation and business 
aircraft the United States aircraft industry is 
increasing its share of the market whereas the 
European industry is losing ground. The esti-
mated numbers of light and executive aircraft 
produced by companies in the EEC in the period 
1973-75 are: 
1978 1974 1976 
Light aircraft 1,500 1,200 800 
Executive aircraft 100 70 70 
1,600 1,270 870 
Nearly half the light aircraft produced within 
the EEC are manufactured under United States 
C€ssna licence by Reims Aviation in France. In 
the United States the recent trend in the number 
of aircraft produced is as follows : 
1978 1974 1976 
Total number 13,645 14,165 14,057 
- of which single-
engined aircraft 10,633 11,000 11,798 
If these figures are compared, it can be seen that 
Community production decreased from 12 % of 
United States production in 1973 to 6.2 % in 
1975. In the helicopter sector, on the other hand, 
Western Europe has steadily increased its share 
of the free world market. 
20. The overall productivity level of the Euro-
pean industry is still lower than that of the 
United States industry. 1n Europe production 
runs are shorter and the structure of its industry 
is not so well balanced as in the United States. 
21. The EEC publication also stated that air-
craft sales were rather disappointing in 1976 : 
only three Airbuses and six F-28s compared with 
sixteen Airbuses a.nd twenty-six F-28s in 1975. 
In 1976 Boeing sold 113 B-727s and thirty-six 
B-737s. 
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D. The situation in the United Kingdom 
22. During the past year the most important 
topic has been the nationalisation of the aero-
space industry as set out by the government in 
its Aircraft and Shipbuiiliding Industries Bill. 
The resulting single company is British Aero-
space. During the nationalisation process the 
British aerospace industry could not take any 
initiatives but it has since contacted American 
and European industries in order to sound out 
possibilities for European or Anglo-Ameriean co-
operation. The British Airways' decision to buy 
six long-range Lockheed TriStars emphasises the 
lack of a cohesive European aircraft industry in 
the face of continuing United States domination. 
23. The action programme proposed by the 
Communities for the European aeronautical 
sector has given rise to much discussion in the 
United Kingdom. This programme favours more 
Community control and financing of the aircraft 
industry and a concerted air transport policy. 
The Commission of the Communities is of the 
opinion that the European aircraft industry may 
disappear if drastic measures are not taken in 
order to ensure Community-wide co-operation 
which wi11 require common financing as well as 
common research, development and production. 
The British Government however does not agree 
to its independent aircraft industry being con-
trolled by an international body such as the 
Commission, or to it being submerged in the type 
of multinational organisation proposed in the 
Commission's action programme. In a world 
dominated by the American market and the 
American industry, the British consider it un-
wise to set up an exclusive European air manu-
facturing industry and establish a European 
market and have so far nearly always opted for 
transat1Jantic co-operation. 
24. kJ an advanced industrial country, the 
United Kingdom wishes to maintain its own 
independent capabilities in this field and is not 
willing to share responsibility for it. Moreover 
in the field of aero-engine manufacturing a 
European aero-engine policy would not make 
much sense in view of the need to collaborate with 
United States aero-engine manufacturers. RoiJs-
Royce is predominant in Europe and has an 
international reputation since it meets an inter-
national, and in particular an American, require-
ment. The United Kingdom Government feels 
that it has the ability to produce both military 
and civil aircraft and wants to continue produ-
cing them. Just as it does not wish to be a simple 
warship-manufacturing nation, not making 
merchant ships, so it does not wish to be only a 
military aircraft-manufacturing nation. 
25. It is convinced that any new transport air-
craft project must be viable and competitive in 
the world market. This means that the Euro-
peans have to become more efficient if they are 
to increase their production rates and thus 
reduce costs. A special effort is needed in 
research and development. In this field Europe 
is falling behind the United States and there 
might thus be serious repercussions in future 
years. 
26. Neither the Europeans nor the Americans 
have appropriate engines for a small aircraft of 
about 120 seats but the European industry 
should try to meet this requirement as there is a 
wide market for such an aircraft. 
m. The situation in France 
27. In his speech on 11th June 1977 at the close 
of the 32nd Paris air show, the French Prime 
Minister, Mr. Barre, said that the Airbus pro-
gramme was the basis of the French aeronautical 
policy. This programme shouhl be developed to 
arrive at a family of aircraft derived from the 
present Airbus. He thus enlarged upon views 
already par~ly defined by Mr. Chirac, his pre-
decessor, which demonstrates definite continuity 
in French aircraft policy : 
"The government has agreed to the develop-
ment of two alternative versions of the Air-
bus, one equipped with new engines and 
the other allowing an increase in the air-
craft's take-off weight and radius of action. 
The government is also in favour of a 
detailed technical and commercial studv 
being made of a lower-capacity version. • 
This study should of course be set in the 
context of co-operation covering all medium-
haul aircraft. 
We should in fact intensify our efforts in 
respect of smaller-capacity aircraft since 
commercia.il requirements will compel con-
structors to offer equipment superior to 
present aircraft in this category. 
In order to launch such a programme, there 
will have to be action in three fields: deve-
lopment of engines especially adapted to 
these requirements, organisation of interna-
tional co-operation and search for a wide 
market. 
Where engines are concerned, I will merely 
mention the CFM-56 programme, whose 
performances are well known. 
At international level, two years ago France· 
took the initiative of proposing co-operation 
with our European partners in a medium-
haul aircraft programme. 
Some felt our action to be premature. 
French or European firms then thought of 
starting talks with their American counter-
parts. The public authorities were not 
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against this insofar as these firms preserved 
Europe's future prospects. 
The government has just drawn conclusions 
from these talks. First, it notes that there is 
a more definite need for a medium-haul air-
craft than two years ago. It also considers 
that equitable co-operation with American 
firms depends on European means first 
being strengthened. 
France therefore proposes that the govern-
ments MSOciated in the Airbus project and 
any other European governments so wishing 
study the joint construction of a new 
medium-haul aircraft equipped with CFM-
56 engines. 
At the right time and when the principal 
options have been made, this co-operation 
might be opened to include American firms. 
Since the Airbus-Industrie structure has 
proved its worth, we propose that it be used 
for this new aircraft too. 
The Societe Aerospatiale, France's leading 
firm in this programme, will therefore con-
tinue the necessary work with its European 
partners. 
The airlines wiLl of course have to be asso-
ciated with defining the specifications of the 
aircraft. 
The final decision to launch the programme 
will be subject to three conditions : 
a fair division of responsibilities and 
risks j 
solidarity between participaJting govern-
ments; 
adequate commercial and financial pros-
pects accompanied by suitable assu-
rances from the airlines of the countries 
participaJting in the programme. 
The government's course is thus now clear: 
to implement a poHcy of civil programmes 
based on the Airbus family and on a new 
medium-haul aircraft. 
But however ambitious our programme 
policy may be and however coherent our 
equipment policy, what would be the point 
of these efforts if our industrial structures 
are not strengthened T 
More than in any other sector, the State 
plays an omnipresent role in aeronautical 
policy, and this is so in France as in other 
countries. It gives its views on all program-
mes and finances their development before, 
in many cases, becoming the principal cus-
tomer. This situation has no equivalent. The 
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State must therefore provide itselrf with all 
the means necessary for ensuring the cohe-
sion of concepts and control of the results 
of the policy it defines in this field." 
28. The Prime Minister then announced the 
creation of a new company, chaired by Mr. Jean 
Blancard, which would act as overlord for both 
Aerospatiale and Dassault-Breguet. 
29. Although French policy on European pro-
jects has not yet evoked a positive response from 
the other European Ministers concerned, it is 
still hoped that there wiN. be a favourable reac-
tion. The prospects of the market for a medium-
and short-haul programme seem more promising 
than in 1975. 
30. During a meeting on 17th June 1977 
between the French President and the Federal 
Chancellor it was agreed that, if possible, future 
aeronautical co-opemtion would be based on the 
development of a family of Airbus aircraft. 
31. The French proposals are now being studied 
by British Aerospace, MBB and VFW-Fokker, 
especially the proposal for a twin-CFM-56 (140-
160 seat) jet liner. 
32. Although implicitly confirming that no final 
decision would be taken on starting work on a 
twin-CFM-56 aircraft before the middle of next 
year, Mr. Cavaille, Secretary of State for Trans-
port, pointed out that Frs. 75 million for the 
programme authorisation for this project were 
earmarked in the budget of his secretariat of 
State. Airbus developments were allocated Frs. 
227 million in programme authorisations and 
Frs. 10 million for the further study of super-
sonic commercial transport aircraft. 
33. The Prime Minister, who, since his speech 
at Le Bourget in June, had given no further 
details about the government's intentions in aero-
nautical matters, reverted to these questions 
during a visit to Toulouse in August 1977. 
34. Mr. Barre added two new elements to the 
measures announced in June : the examination 
of the resumption of work on the Nord 262 and 
the government's determination to promote the 
twin-CFM-56 medium-haul aircraft with or with-
out British participation. 
35. Resumed production of the Nord 262 would 
require initial financial support from the State 
and orders from the navy and civil defence and 
other authorities. On the other hand, the opera-
tion would very soon be able to provide a worth-
while workload, about half of which would go to 
the aircraft division of Aerospatiale. 
36. The French Government is further prepared 
to reopen the Transall production line if there 
is sufficient demand for this aircraft. The 
French defence authorities would order twenty-
five if other European countries, especially Ger-
many, ordered another twenty-five, fifty orders 
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being the minimum requirement for starting up 
again. 
37. Finally, your Rapporteur wishes to mention 
that plans to build a Mercure 200 with McDon-
nell: Douglas have been abandoned. It was fore-
seen that design leadership would go to Dassault 
and thrut the marketing would be done by Mc-
Donnell Douglas. However, in June 1977, the 
French Minister of Equipment decided that this 
type of collaboration did not offer sufficient 
economic advantages for the French company. 
IV. The situation in Germany 
38. In 1976, at the request of the Federal 
Government the Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs in charge of the co-ordination of the 
German aerospace industry, Mr. Martin Griiner, 
submitted a report on developments in aerospace 
in the Federal Republic in which he concluded 
that existing aerospace projects should be conti-
nued. This means, on the civil side, continuing 
production of the Airbus and the VFW-614 and, 
on the military side, the Tornado (MRCA) and 
the Alpha-Jet, as well as helicopters and missiles. 
German industry and the Federa1 Government 
believed that for both technological and economic 
reasons the Federal Republic should keep an 
aerospace industry. The ratio between the Fede-
ral German, French and British aircraft indus-
tries is 1 : 2 : 4, the numbers employed being 
50,000, 100,000 and 200,000 respectively. 
39. Federal aid will be necessary in order to 
continue the abovementioned programmes. At 
the end of September 1977, Mr. Griiner announ-
ced that the Federal Government would give 
short-term financial aid to VFW-Fokker, the 
exact amount not being mentioned. The condi-
tions of this aid will be discussed by the Minis-
ters of Economic Mfairs and Defence and will 
depend on the development of the discussions on 
co-operation between VFW-Fokker and MBB in 
order to rationalise the German aerospace 
industry. 
40. The marketing positions of MBB and VFW-
Fokker are rather different - the first being 
in a much better position than the second. Co1-
laboration between these two firms might be 
possible; this would come under the responsibi-
lity of the governing boards and the shareholders. 
The Federal Government will not participate in 
the future organisation or force MBB and VFW 
to adopt a specific structure. It will however try 
to alleviate certain burdens which at present 
weigh heavily on VFW. It hopes that Fokker 
Amsterdam will eventually participate in the 
German group since Dutch-German oommercial 
interests are complementary in this field. More-
over, a concentration of German, Netherlands 
and Belgian aircraft industries (Societe Ano-
nyme Be)Jge de Constructions Aeronautiques -
SABCA- belongs to Fokker) would make for 
a better balance between this group and the 
French and British groups. 
41. It is still extremely difficult to gain a foot-
hold in the world market because of American 
competition and in the internal European mar-
ket airlines are sti11l reluctant to convert to a 
policy of buying national or European products. 
German participation is essential bec·ause of the 
Airbus, Tornado and Alpha-Jet production and 
the possible reopening of the Transall production 
line. However, in the near future the market is 
expected to expand, thereby offering greater 
opportunities for this industry. Recent orders 
placed by Lufthansa for the Airbus and by KLM 
for Fokker aircraft seem to indicate that the out-
look is brighter. 
42. Of major importance is the recently-signed 
memorandum of understanding concerning 
Euromissile which covers the period up to 1985. 
This general agreement covers all types of mis-
siles : those used by aircraft as well as by tanks 
and other vehicles. 
V. Prospects of the European market 
43. In September 1977 the OECD published an 
important study on the future Of European air 
transport in which it noted that between 1970 
and the year 2000 the European airline fleets 
wouM increase from 600 to more than 1,100 air-
craft, 75 % of which would seat 100-150, some 
11 % 150-225, some 10 % would be small air-
craft seating 50-100, and the rest would be taken 
up by very large aircraft with a 300-450 capa-
city. The OECD came to the conclusion that the 
aircraft industry would have to expand con-
siderably in order to meet the airlines' demands. 
44. The present situation remains uncertain as 
the major American manufacturers are also 
fighting for this market. Boeing is offering the 
British a plan for the joint construction of a 
further development of the B-737, and is also 
offering co-operation on projoots such as the 
B-7N7 and the B-7X7 ; it is already co-operating 
with the Italians on the la.tter. However, a deci-
sion had not yet been taken and this underlines 
the great difficulty and risks involved in start-
ing a new programme. This is aJ.so illustrated 
by the fact that McDonnell Douglas is not 
launching a new aircraft but developing a new 
version of its DC-9 - the DC-9 Super 80. This 
decision by McDonnell DouglaB should hasten 
the British-French-German discussions as speed 
is now extremely important. 
45. At W eybridge in the United Kingdom 
fifteen representatives of the European aircraft 
industry (five from the United Kingdom, five 
from France and five from Germany) are 
discussing which aircraft could best conquer the 
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new market 1• Your Rapporteur is convinced that 
if Europe promotes several national projects at 
the same time it will lose to American competi-
tion. He hopes therefore that as a result of the 
discussions the European airframe manufact-
urers will promote one prototype to be developed 
into a joint series or family of aircraft. Although 
the BAC X-11 and the Airbus 200 and their 
modifications and derivations- 130-170 seats-
are not being discussed directly since the 
representatives are to define the future short-
and medium-haul aircraft, these aircraft are 
foremost in the minds of the manufacturers con-
cerned : British Aerospace, Aerospatiale, MBB 
and VFW-Fokker. 
46. On the other hand, if co-operation with the 
United States seems necessary on another type 
of aireraft then the question arises whether the 
American manufacturer - Booing or McDonnell 
Douglas - will collaborate with several Euro-
pean countries or just one European manu-
facturer. The SNECMA-General Electric pre-
cedent might allow consideration to be given also 
to transatlantic co-operation under European 
leadership. 
47. There is no doubt whatsoever that collabora-
tion with the United States would be essential 
if a super Concorde were to be developed. 
VI. Developments in space 
48. The Committee's last report dealing with 
European space activities 2 was submitted by 
Mr. Lenzer who discussed, in Chapter 11, the 
first meeting of the Ministerial Council of the 
European Space Agency which was held at the 
new seat of the agency in Paris on 14th and 
15th February 1977. At this meeting the Council 
adopted a decLaration on an overall programme 
in the field of communications sa.tellites, a decla-
ration on the Ariane l,auncher programme pro-
duction phase and resolutions on the Earthnet 
programme, a European remote sensing satellite 
programme, the agency and operational systems 
and, finally, the agency amd its external rela-
tions. Your Rapporteur will not delve into the 
details of the decision.s of this first Ministerial 
Council meeting of the agency since they have 
already been described in the main by Mr. 
Lenzer. There are, however, a number of points 
relevant to the present state of European space 
activities which are worthy of mention. 
49. Visiting the 32nd Paris Air Show in June 
1977, it became evident to the Committee that 
the United States aerospace industry wishes to 
retain its place in the world market and 
especially where satellites and space platforms 
1. See Appendix. 
2. Document 736. 
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are concerned. NASA's participation in the air 
show centred on the space shuttle, but it also 
emphasised economical space vehicles, full-scale 
models of which were displayed. An experi-
mental ocean survey spacecraft called Seasat was 
exhibited as we11 as a mock-up of a solar power 
satellite. Such a satellite could capture energy 
from the sun and convert it into direct electrical 
energy, this subsequently being transmitted to 
earth by microwaves. It is estimated that such 
a satellite could be in orbit as early as 1995. 
50. On the European side the European Space 
Agency as well as individual countries were 
exhibiting full-scale models of spacelab, the 
European Ariane launcher and of the many 
types of satellites now under construction either 
in European or in national frameworks. It has 
become quite clear that the sale of satellites 
might become an interesting financial operation. 
51. The space shuttle wiLl be the first major 
step towards giving mankind access to new 
previously untapped resources which will be 
available not only for research but also for 
manufacturing and meeting the needs of man-
kind. The space shuttle wiLl provide a continuous 
view of the earth and its total environment. It 
will be possible to conduct research and services 
in meteorology, oceanography, goology and 
environment and also broadscale exploration of 
new terrestrial .resources. Solar power stations, 
such as that shown by NASA at the air show, 
might become feasible alternatives to fossil fuels. 
52. Of immediate importance are communica-
tions satellites which have aroused the interest 
of several countries such as Brazil, India, Pakis-
tan, etc. 
53. In December 1976, twenty Arab States 
established the Arab satellite telecommunicationR 
organisation with its headquarters in Riyadh, 
Saudi Arabia. Participating States have already 
pledged $ 100 million to the Arab satellite pro-
ject. They are now seeking a consultant organisa-
tion to help define specifications for the tele-
communications system of the participating 
countries. The consultant organisation will also 
participate in the choice of contractors to imple-
ment the system and oversee its implementation 
and the training of personnel needed to operate 
the system. The selection of the management 
consultant will be made not later than 1978. A 
hardware manufacturer cannot compete for the 
management oonsultancy contract. 
54. The main participating countries are Saudi 
Arabia with 26.5 %, and Libya with 18 %. The 
Chairman of the seven member board of directors 
will be a Saudi Arabian minister. 
55. The Arabs are not the only ones to be 
actively interested in setting up a satellite com-
munication system ; a Chinese Delegation has 
also visited the European Space Agency. All 
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aspects of Western European communications 
sateHite activities, including the ESA orbital test 
satellite, the Marots system, the European com-
munication B~Rtellites programme and the Franco-
German Symphonic satellite programme have 
been studied. The Chinese Delegation was also 
very interested in the European earth stations 
mobile or fixed. ' 
56. However, no European hardware will be 
sold if it has not been proved beforehand. The 
European launcher Ariane not yet being opera-
tional the European Space Agency had to ask 
the Americans to put the European satellites 
into orbit. As is known, this was not successful 
and your Rapporteur put the foLlowing questions 
to the Council of Ministers : 
"1. On 14th September 1977, the American 
Thor-Delta rocket carrying the European 
Space Agency's OTS B~Rte1lite was destroyed 
a few seconds after launching, thus leading 
to the loss of the first European satellite 
of this type. Was this type of rocket also 
used for launching the European scientific 
satell!ite Geos on 20th April 1977 which 
failed to achieve the expected results ? 
2. Why did the American authorities use a 
type of rocket which had not yet proved its 
reliability for this launching ? Why did the 
European authorities concerned agree to this 
choice T 
3. What is the Council's assessment of the 
financial, technical and commercial con-
sequences of the failure on 14th September 1 
In particular, does it consider that the 
Marots programme can be carried out in the 
conditions planned f Is it not urgent to 
review the terms of the contract with NASA, 
under which all the risks and costs are borne 
by the customer alone, i.e. ESA 1 
4. Does the Council consider that co-
operation between Europe and the United 
States in space matters has proved to be 
satisfactory enough to justify its being 
pursued?" 
57. When the Ariane launcher is ready for 
launching in 1981 it might well meet with com-
petition from outside the United States through 
a privately-financed German-built heavy launch 
vehicle. The engineers of the German firm, 
Orbital Transport- und Raketen-Aktiengesell-
schaft (OTRAG), believe that from a basic two-
tank, two-engine model they can produce effec-
tire inexpensive launchers. 
58. Your Rapporteur has been informed that 
such a launcher would cost at least as much 
as the Ariane. The ESA CounciL should now lOfle 
no time in taking a decision on the production 
of the operational series of Ariane launchers. 
59. The future orientation of ESA should be as 
follows. The scientific programme should be 
strengthened since, as a result of European col-
laboration, budgets for national activities have 
now been greatly reduced. 
60. ESA shouLd foresee the possibility of provid-
ing launching services in order to ensure the 
success of the spacelab programme and the 
future use of the Ariane launcher. ESA should 
contact possible clients to ensure correct use of 
the application satellites. 
61. The European space industry should become 
independent and cater directly for clients wish-
ing to use irts space systems. Your Rapporteur 
hopes that the European telecommunication 
authorities, the national post office authorities, 
will overcome their reluctance to use satellite 
systems being developed within the framework 
of ESA. 
62. Finally, when your Rapporteur compares 
the situation in the aeronautical and space 
industries he notes that in both fields it is 
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essential for the Europeans to become strong 
enough to compete successfully with American, 
and maybe in the future Japanese, aerospace 
industries. In neither field are the European 
industries yet capable of competing in the world 
market and concentration and specialisation are 
necessary to overcome this handicap. Your Rap-
porteur feels that the only present possibility 
for permanent structural relations in Europe lies 
in the successive launching of individually-
studied co-operative projects intended for the 
world market. The success of such projects 
would aLready be an important step towards 
strengthening the European industry. 
63. If the various European firms made an 
effort to become as efficient as American firms, 
which would necessarily involve staff cuts, then 
it would become possible to consider structural 
changes aimed at bringing Europe's industries 
closer together. 
64. It would be dangerous to leave decisions 
in abeyance for too long. 
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APPENDIX 
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Draft Recommendation 
on WEU's contribution to the development of European union 
The Assembly, 
Considering that Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty contains a binding commitment to 
automatic military assistance ; 
Convinced that application of this provision, as of Article VIII, calls for close and continuing 
consultations between its signatories on external policy and defence questions ; 
Further convinced that only full application of the treaty can maintain mutual confidence, which 
gives full deterrent value to Article V ; 
Considering that neither the North Atlantic Council nor, in present circumstances, the political 
consultations organised between members of the EEC are able to replace entirely the consultations provided 
for in the modified Brussels Treaty, particularly under Article VIII; 
Considering that the modified Brussels Treaty has introduced a new ethical dimension into relations 
between signatory States ; 
Considering that the mandate given to the Standing Armaments Committee by the Council on 31st 
May 1976 should make a. substantial contribution to: · 
(a) paving the way towards a harmonisation of armaments with a view to protecting the production 
capability of industries which are essential for maintaining employment and safeguarding the 
independence of member countries ; 
(b) preparing a joint policy for member countries in respect of sales of arms, which might lead to 
disarmament ; 
Deploring the fact that in practice the Council takes no account of these considerations ; 
Convinced that a future European union can be based only on treaties and institutions associating 
member countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Examine to what extent the modified Brussels Treaty is really applied by organisations other than 
WEU; 
2. Implement Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty whenever the international situation so 
requires, i.e. consult with regard to any situation which may constitute a threat to peace or to economic 
stability ; 
3. Examine the implications of Article V for all member States, with the aim inter alia of harmonising 
strategic concepts and strengthening procedure for consultation ; 
4. In the context of the search for universal, progressive and controlled disarmament, consider how 
WEU can contribute to the establishment of lasting peace ; 
5. Ensure that the task given to the Standing Armaments Committee is pursued promptly and 
efficiently and is extended to cover the sale of arms with a view to making meaningful progress towards 
general and complete disarmament; 
6. Meet the wish regularly expressed by the Assembly to hold a true dialogue on the various aspects 
of the application of the modified Brussels Treaty ; 
7. Give favourable consideration to the possibility of revising Article IX of the treaty so as to allow 
better participation by members of parliament in the work of the Assembly. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Forni, Rapporteur) 
I. European union and defence 
1. While it might have seemed possible ten 
years ago to project the shape of Europe in the 
near or more distant future on the basis of earlier 
concepts and extrapolations starting from the 
Rome Treaty and its preamble, any such attempt 
today would be difficult and hazardous. The 
nine EEC countries have admittedly agreed to call 
the goal of their joint undertaking "European 
union", but both the substance and the shape 
of this European union are increasingly un-
certain. 
2. Spain and Greece wish to join the Economic 
Community without delay. Others such as Turkey 
wish to strengthen their links with the Com-
munity with a view to future membership. Yet 
others are prepared to co-operate closely with 
their neighbours in economic matters but do not 
wish to engage in political or military under-
takings. 
3. Community Europe will probably have to be 
enlarged in the next ten years and this will bring 
with it wide-ranging changes in the present Euro-
pean system, particularly in agriculture. But 
many other aspects of the European undertaking 
may need revision, perhaps because of enlarge-
ment or because of internal developments in 
member States or because of changes in inter-
national society and the balance of political, 
economic or military forces, not to mention fore-
seeable or unforeseeable developments in the 
crisis with which the capitalist world has been at 
grips since 1973 and which shows every sign of 
becoming worse rather than better in years to 
come. The EEC, which was set up at a time when 
steady, rapid economic progress was an accepted 
fact, seems to be having greater difficulty than 
member States in adjusting its economic and 
trade policy to the demands of the crisis. 
4. The last attempt to explore if not to define 
the substance of the future European union was 
the Tindemans report. This provided a basis for 
a number of discussions in the European Council, 
but it very soon became apparent that it was 
destined to fall into oblivion. 
5. For instance, the proposal to include defence 
among the responsibilities and activities of the 
European union met with a host of objections. 
The thought of extending the responsibilities of 
the European Parliament at the expense of the 
WEU .Assembly seems to have been endorsed by 
none of the governments. The only point on 
which the nine governments managed to agree 
was that the European Parliament should' be 
elected by direct universal suffrage before sum-
mer 1978. But now it is not at all clear that the 
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nine countries will be able to agree on electoral 
procedure or on a date. Some are wondering 
whether it will be possible to hold elections within 
the prescribed time limits. 
6. While the era of high-flung speculation about 
the future of Europe now seems over, it is clearer 
than ever that the future European union, if it 
is ever to see the day, can be based only on what 
already exists where treaties and institutions are 
concerned. But one way or another the modified 
Brussels Treaty is the only sound basis for a 
common defence policy. 
7. On 5th August 1977, the WEU Council 
answered written question 176 put by a British 
member of parliament in the following terms : 
"There can be no doubt about the binding 
character of the automatic mutual assistance 
clause in Article V of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, which constitutes a commitment in 
international law." 
This means that the seven governments agree to 
interpret Article V of the modified Brussels 
Treaty as an "automatic" commitment clause 
leaving no margin of interpretation of what may 
be covered by the word "attack". Without any-
thing else, this statement determines the role of 
WEU and particularly of its Council, since there 
can be no such commitment if policies are not 
closely concerted: it is impossible for States to 
envisage "automatic" military commitment with-
out first agreeing on the main aspects of their 
defence policies and on the direction of their 
foreign policies. Failing this, all the signatories 
of the pact would be committed by each other's 
actions and might find themselves having to 
condone policies of which they might not approve. 
8. However this may be, Western Europe 
stands as one in face of the vital need to avoid 
at any cost a war which, whatever arms may be 
used, conventional or nuclear, would bring total 
ruin. Therefore, while there may be wide diver-
gences between the defence policies of the 
Western European countries, they draw close 
together in their recognition of the need for a 
deterrent. It is no secret that today only nuclear 
weapons can provide a deterrent capable of 
making a possible enemy renounce the use of 
force because of the risk of incurring intolerable 
destruction on his own territory. It also implies 
a desire to defend oneself by every means in the 
event of an attack and also a strategy, i.e. a 
doctrine for the use of nuclear weapons to make 
them the instrument of a policy of deterrence 
rather than of war. 
9. Thus, fk facto solidarity, the need for a 
deterrent defence policy and divergences between 
DOCUMENT 756 
the defence policies of European States determine 
the framework of WEU. It must continually con· 
sider how passive solidarity can be transformed 
into active solidarity by deterrent action in the 
general interest but for which defence policies 
based on different assessments of the situation 
must be harmonised. Thus France, which is no 
longer a member of NATO and will very probably 
continue to pursue an independent defence policy, 
is essential to the security of W estem Europe 
because of its geographical position and the exis-
tence of its nuclear force, just as Western Europe 
- and in particular the Federal Republic of 
Germany - is essential to the security of France. 
10. The French Socialist Party, for its part, has 
clearly and on several occasions given its views 
on associating the national nuclear foree with 
this solidarity and most recently in an interview 
with Robert PontHlon in Le Point of lOth October 
1977: 
" ... The claim to wish to defend national ter-
ritory aLone means refusing to take account 
of undertakings stemming from France's 
adhesion to the Brussels or Paris Treaties, 
and I intentionalJy refrain from mention-
ing the North Atlantic Treaty which does 
not make the commitment of forces auto-
matic. 
But for us there is no sense in France with-
drawing behind its frontiers. The 'threat', 
as the military say, can be in two forms : 
direct pressure on our frontiers or on the 
frontiers of countries of the Alliance to 
which we belong. By leaving the Alliance, 
we would accept that our neighbours may be 
attacked without a move on our part and 
that we should defend ourselves alone in 
the event of a direct threat to our frontiers. 
This is unthinkable. 
When Mitterrand says that he does not 
believe in a national deterrent, it is because 
he believes in the alliances and for him 
national deterrence means nothing if it is 
not included in a system of alliances and 
solidarity. 
What Mitterrand says is that even with a 
national strike force France cannot argue 
its case in isolation from its alliances ... " 
11. .A. union of countries pursuing very different 
defence policies would be meaningless without a 
political expression of their solidarity and so far 
there is no other than the modified Brussels 
Treaty. This, and hence WEU itself, is thus the 
common element serving the security of all in a 
deterrent which each one exercises with the means 
available to it: integration of conventional forces 
in NATO for some, an independent policy with 
132 
the support of a nuclear force in the case of 
France. 
U. Defence policy 
12. From the very beginning, the exercise of 
most of the WEU Council's military tasks was 
handed over to NATO. It lost many of its econ-
omic activities when the United Kingdom joined 
the European Communities and much of its 
political work when ·nine-power political con-
sultations began. The Council of Ministers has 
spaced out its meetings and now considers only 
fairly secondary matters. Nor is there any great 
political activity at meetings of the Permanent 
Council. However, the WEU Council has not 
thereby lost any of the responsibilities assigned 
to it under the modified Brussels Treaty which 
is still essential in view of present uncertainty 
about the future of Europe. 
13. Even in the near future, it is not out of the 
question that internal developments in certain 
member countries might make their relatio~ 
with the .American partners in the North .Atlantic 
Treaty far more difficult, either because the 
United States would not be prepared to accept 
the participation of communists in these countries' 
governments or because the course adopted by 
a new majority in their economic, social, trade 
or even defence policy would not be appreciated 
across the .Atlantic. Moreover, the achievement 
of an economic and social policy in conformity 
with the interests of the peoples of these coun-
tries might make them stand apart from Com-
munity Europe, dominated by the ideology of 
free enterprise, for there could be no question 
of a democratically-chosen government subordi-
nating its economic and social polticy to foreign 
policy considerations. 
14. In any event, a French majority, whatever 
it may be, will have to take account of the de 
facto solidarity between France and its partners 
and will consequently have to maintain and 
develop, in the framework of the modified Brus-
sels Treaty, consultations and co-operation with 
the European members of NATO, which will 
have to be intensified as France moves further 
away from NATO. In such a case, the WEU 
Council may have to resume its role as a 
link between one country of W estem Europe 
and the principal European members of the 
.Atlantic .Alliance as it did in the days when the 
United Kingdom was outside the EEC. WEU's 
intergovernmental character can but encourage 
action in this field which would be out of the 
question for a supposedly supranational organisa-
tion. · 
15. Consequently, this does not mean major 
changes in the immediate future, but rather the 
maintenance of what exists, it being particularly 
essential to be able to resort to the Council since 
it provides the basis for all the a,ctivities~f WEU. 
But the Council must continue to fulfil effect-
ively the role incumbent on it under the modified 
Brussels Treaty. 
16. Yet, the WEU Council as it now operates 
does not appear to be taking its tasks seriously. 
It is just as if the seven governments have agreed 
not to touch the modified Brussels Ti-eaty or to 
apply it only in a most restricted manner to a 
point that one may wonder whether they really 
apply it. In fact, the Council's annual report to 
the Assembly shows quite clearly that the Council 
is doing practically nothing to keep itself infor-
med of matters which are within its terms of 
reference but are supposed to be exercised else-
where. It .hardly wonders to _what extent its 
responsibilities are in fact being exercised by 
other bodies. For instance, it is evident that 
France's non-participation in certain NATO 
activities makes it impossible for the latter to 
exercise in full the responsibilities assigned to 
the WEU Council by the Brussels Treaty. Has 
the Council ever done anything to make up for 
this lacuna Y 
~7. The question therefore arises as to why the 
Council systematically adopts a restrictive view 
of its commitments ·and thus does not really 
respect the treaty it is responsible for applying, 
nor the promises it has itself made to the 
Assembly concerning inter alia the information 
it must furnish, nor even certain decisions it 
has taken such as that of 31st May 1976 confer-
ring a mandate on the Standing Armaments 
Committee. 
is.- Admittedly, it is realised that all the govern-
ments agree that NATO, the Nine and the inde-
pendent European programme group allow them 
to consider together in wider forums than that 
of the WEU Council matters which concern the 
application of the modified Brussels Treaty and 
that they are anxious to avoid duplication and 
n:take rational use of the multilateral .consultative 
bodies at their. .disposal. . However, this is ;not 
enough to explain the deliberately P8fldve atti-
tude adopted by the Council and its steadfast 
wi,sh not to implement any of its treaty responsi-
bilities other than those which concern its rela-
tions with the Assembly. Even this shows evidence 
of iJJ.-will in the brevity of its replies to recom-
mendations and written questions, the growing 
poverty of its annual report and its reluctance 
whenever there is question of implementing the 
procedU're for a dialogue with the Assembly. In 
short, everything indicates that the -seven govern-
ments are aiming at progressively killing off a 
treaty which they still claim to respect but which 
they are in fact emptying of substance. There 
is, for instance, every reason to suspect that they 
discouraged any attempt by Greece and Turkey 
to acwde to the modified Brussels Treaty. It may 
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therefore be wondered whether there are other 
reasons for the Council's attitude. Three possible 
types of motivation may be considered, although 
it is not pOBSible to determine just how decisive 
each one may be for each member country, for 
it is not sure that they all have the same motives, 
even if the resulting inertia is the same. 
19. (i) The fact that certain member countries 
rely mainly on American strength to ensure their 
security encourages them to give priority to 
NATO rather than any collective security organ-
isation to which the United States does not 
belong. They even seem afraid that the United 
States may take offence at the smooth operation 
of any truly European defence organisation, 
which explains the cold reception given to Mr. 
Tinde.mans' proposals on defence matters and 
the mediocre results of attempts made on the 
fringes of NATO, such as Eurogroup and the 
independent European programme group, to 
work out a European armaments policy ·or the 
hardly-vetled wish in some quarters to reduce 
WEU's activities as far as possible. When it 
visited Norway and Denmark, the General 
Affairs Committee was able to see how wary 
these countries were of any European initiative 
in defence matters. It is not certain that the 
attitude of all the members of WEU is very 
different to that of the Norwegians and the 
Danes. 
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20. (ii) The modified Brussels Treaty involves 
different obligations for the various member 
countries, which has given some of them to believe 
that it was discriminatory at their expense. For 
instance, the United Kingdom is not allowed to 
withdraw forces from Germany without the agree-
ment of its allies. There are ceilings on certain 
armaments that the Federal Republic may manu-
facture or JKl8Se8S. It is not difficult to under-
stand why such countries find commitments or 
bans of this kind hard to bear and deplore the 
fact that their association with Western Europe 
in defence matters is linked to such discrimina-
tion, since the United Kingdom has to ask its 
allies for authorisation before moving any troops 
from the mainland of Europe to Ireland, and 
the Federal Republic has to face lengthy pro-
cedure every time it wishes to build certain types 
of ship. 
21. The reason for such unequal treatment prob-
abiy resides in the special position of each Euro-
pean country at the time of the negotiations 
which led to the modification of the BruBSeis 
Treaty in 1954. However, some overall balance 
is to be found since, although the United King-
dom agreed to special commitments, its territory 
is not subject to the limits and controls imposed 
on the countries on the mainland of Europe, 
while the Federal Republic which, because of 
its situation, is Europe's most sensitive point, is 
subject to particular constraints. In short, the 
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discrimination found in the modified Brussels 
Treaty is less evident if all its provisions are 
considered than if the parts applying to one or 
other signatory are considered. 
22. (iii) The existence of an assembly, where the 
parliaments of member countries are represented 
relatively fairly, obviously disturbs the govern-
ments, which are anxious to keep their external 
policy at a discreet distance beyond the reach 
of demonstrations of public opinion. All relations 
between the Council and the Assembly are 
branded by this taste for diplomatic secrecy, a 
long-standing tradition, admittedly, but also 
essential for camouflaging action abroad which 
is often a long shot from principles voiced at 
home. The new factor brought into international 
relations by the modified Brussels Treaty was 
precisely the element of parliamentary super-
vision in the day-to-day life of a defensive 
alliance, the aim being to ensure democracy in 
Europe, whose institutional foundations were 
just being laid. But in practice the Council seems 
to be intent on depriving the organisation of 
subst81nce and the governments seem to prefer 
organisations which are more discreet than WEU. 
23. Whatever their reasons, it is clear that the 
governments are deliberately keeping the Council 
in a state of semi-lethargy and that the latter 
is doing nothing it could and should do to apply 
the modified Brussels Treaty effectively, i.e. : 
(a) 
(b) 
keep itself informed about how matters 
within its competence are being dealt 
with or not in other bodies and take 
upon itself to do what others are not 
doing satisfactorily in the foreign policy 
and defence fields ; 
keep the Assembly suitably informed 
about what is being done elsewhere and 
to this end reach agreement with the 
organisations concerned for the com-
munication of information that may be 
transmitted to the Assembly ; 
(c) implement the protocols on armed forces 
and the control of armaments, not only 
in the routine, bureaucratic and super-
ficial manner which is now the rule but 
bearing in mind their implications for 
a European defence policy ; 
(d) establish a European armaments policy, 
taking account of the requirements of 
joint defence and the economic and 
social possibilities and requirements of 
each member country ; 
(e) prepare measures for applying Article 
VII, paragraph 3, of the treaty which 
makes it incumbent on the Council : 
"... to consult with regard to any 
situation which may constitute a 
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threat to peace, in whatever area 
this threat should arise, or a danger 
to economic stability" ; 
(f) endorse the Assembly's efforts to study 
and reflect upon all the problems raised 
by Europe's security and to prepare for 
the rationalisation of European bodies 
active in defence matters in anti~ipation 
of the time when it will be possible to 
include these questions in the framework 
of a European tmion. 
m. Level of forces, Umitation and control of 
armaments 
24. It is evident that the situation which 
induced the signatories of the Brussels Treaty 
to prescribe procedure for limiting the level of 
member countries' armed forces and to create the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments in 1954 
is not at all the same today. Other factors now 
advocate maintaining multilateral control of 
armaments. 
25. First, the limits and control contribute to 
the level of confidence in the Alliance. For 
instance, the fact that it is incumbent on the 
United Kingdom under the treaty not to reduce 
the level of its forces stationed on the mainland 
of Europe without the agreement of all its 
partners is an essential token of confidence in 
European solidarity and a major factor of 
deterrence since it is evident to any possible 
aggressor that it links the United Kingdom to 
the defence of the continent. 
26. Second, the control system, which seems to 
be applied satisfactorily, might if necessary form 
a useful brake on an undue increase in arma-
ments by one or other signatory country. It 
guarantees that none of these countries can be 
suspected of wishing to follow a course of aggres-
sion inside or outside Europe. 
27. The existence of armaments control, includ-
ing inter alia the treaty provisions concerning 
the Federal Republic of Germany, makes a 
valuable contribution to detente because it 
protects the members of WEU against slander 
campaigns which might provide a pretext for 
accelerating the armaments policy of their 
eastern neighbours and demonstrates that the 
defence of Western Europe is indivisible. 
28. The fact that Western Europe's armaments 
are subject to a controlled agreement allows the 
WEU countries to tackle problems of security 
and co-operation in Europe and disarmament 
problems in the best conditions. It may be hoped 
that these matters will be considered in a more 
positive manner in the coming years in the 
context of more general and complete disarma-
ment than hitherto. Then the Agency might 
constitute a model for a wider and more ambi-
tious organisation, for the degree of perfection 
to which it has raised its methods of controlling 
armaments is probably unequalled. In short, the 
maintenance and pursuit of the Agency's activi-
ties may, in the future, be a very useful con-
tribution to a policy of detente and peace. 
29. However, the Agency will not be able to 
play its full role unless all the signatories of the 
modified Brwflels Treaty are prepared to fulfil 
all their coonmitments. 
30. At present, Article Ill of Protocol No. III 
on the control of armaments is not applied by 
one of the signatory countries, i.e. France, which 
has moreover apparently never been asked to do 
so by its partners. This article reads as follows : 
"When the development of atomic, biological 
and chemical weapons in the territory on 
the mainland of Europe of the High Con-
tracting Parties who have not given up the 
right to produce them has passed the 
experimental stage and effective production 
of them has started there, the level of stocks 
that the High Contracting Parties concerned 
will be allowed to hold on the mainland of 
Europe shall be decided by a majority vote 
of the Council of Western European 
Union." 
31. It is clear that French nuclear armaments 
have now "passed the experimental stage", but 
France is subject to neither authorisation for 
nor control over these weapons. Very probably, 
if its partners have not asked it to apply the 
protocol, it is because they are fully aware of 
the reasons why France could not comply. These 
reasons are clear enough. On the one hand, they 
stem from the f~Ret that nuclear weapons have a 
deterrent effect only if they are in the hands 
of a purely national authority, alone capable of 
taking decisions on the use of such weapons ; 
on the other hand, there is the disagreement 
between France and its partners over NATO. In 
other words, France does not wish to risk being 
deprived of its nuclear weapons or restricted in 
their possible use by a decision of its partners. 
But, rightly or wrongly, it suspects some of its 
partners of subordinating their decisions on the 
defence of Europe to their concern to give the 
United States every satisfaction it might wish 
in return for its military protection of Western 
Europe. For a long time, there has been no doubt 
about the United States' hostility towards 
France's nuclear weapons and it could rightly be 
feared that it might use the means available to 
it to encourage France's partners in WEU to 
put a brake on France's nuclear weapons since 
it has never approved of another member of the 
Atlantic Alliance having an independent 
decision-taking ability in respect of the use of 
the deterrent. 
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32. Today, some of France's partners are cer-
tainly less hostile than in the past to French 
nuclear weapons. At its meeting in Ottawa on 
19th June 1974, the North Atlantic Council even 
said that: 
" ... The European members who provide 
three-quarters of the conventional strength 
of the Alliance in Europe, and two of whom 
posse'SS nuclear forces capable of playing a 
deterrent role of their own contributing to 
the overall strengthening of the deterrence 
of the Alliance, undertake to make the 
necessary contribution to maintain the com-
mon defence at a level capable of deterring 
and if necessary repelling all actions 
directed against the independence and ter-
ritorial integrity of the members of the 
Alliance." 
33. However, it may still be wondered whether 
all the governments participating in NATO were 
sincere in Ottawa. In particular, it is known 
that the Netherlands Government implied that 
this part of the Ottawa declaration hardly con-
corded with its views. 
34. Indeed, replying to a question put by Mr. 
Wattmans on 23rd December 1975, Mr. van der 
Stoel, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the 
Netherlands, said : 
"Every one of us has had to put up with a 
phrase here or there which he might not 
have written if this declaration had been a 
unilateral one. One of the most difficult 
paragraphs for my government has been the 
one dealing with the nuclear forces of cer-
tain European allies. I have finally accepted 
the present formula as a statement of fact 
and in order not to stand in the way of a 
consensus, but in doing so I must stress, 
once again, that in my opinion nothing in 
the declaration can be construed as support 
by my government for the idea of a Euro-
pean nuclear force, an idea which is to the 
Netherlands, now as before, unacceptable." 
35. Nuclear weapons are a sufficiently serious 
matter for a country which has chosen to develop 
them and for many years made the necessary 
effort to have a full and sophisticated range not 
to be able to leave it to an international forum 
to decide on their possible limitation or abandon-
ment. The French socialists and communists, 
who were for a long time against the development 
of French nuclear weapons, can no longer 
disregard their existence. They have turned their 
thoughts to the search for means of using these 
weapons as a factor of security, peace and 
disarmament. As matters now stand, they too 
could not leave it to a majority of the members 
of WEU to take decisions which are essential for 
France's defence policy. 
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36. Conversely, if it were seen that France's 
partners were really applying the spirit and the 
letter of the modified Brussels Treaty and of the 
Ottawa declaration, i.e. if they were prepared to 
consider, with France, and without being in-
fluenced :from outside all the problems relating 
to the defence and security of Europe, in other 
words to make the WEU Council's activities 
correspond to its responsibilities, a French 
Government representing the true ambitions of 
the people and aware of the de fapto solidarity 
linking the defence of France with that of 
Europe might then consider applying Article Ill 
of Protocol No. Ill. But there can be no question 
of solidarity being one-way: if France's partners 
are convinced that French nuclear weapons con-
tribute to Europe's security, as they declared in 
Ottawa, they too must come to grips with the 
consequences and demonstrate that they too take 
seriously the prospect of a real policy for the 
defence of Europe by EuropeanS. 
37. It might moreover be added that such a 
choice would also put an end to the mistrust 
which is constantly re-emerging among Euro-
pean countries, and in particular, between the 
Federal Republic and its partners. For instance, 
in recent months there have been accusations in 
the French press (L'Express, 22nd-28th August 
1977) that the Federal Republic had evaded the 
provisions of the modified Bru!lrels Treaty by 
producing missiles in Zaire which might be used 
for military as well as for civil purposes 'and 
which thus escaped the WEU limits and con-
trols. On the building of two tankers needed by 
the federal navy, the German press (W ehrtech-
nik, September 1977) complained, inter alia 
about the slowness of WEU procedure used by 
the Federal &public's partners to force it to 
purchase these tankers abroad. How valid are 
these accusations Y Your Rapporteur cannot say, 
but they reveal mistrust which would be perfectly 
unjustified if the de facto solidarity uniting 
the Western European countries became active 
solidarity. 
38. It is not by turning down the tone of 
reciprocal accusations or by trying to satisfy the 
complaints of the other side one by one that 
France and Federal Germany will manage to 
overcome the differences voiced by public 
opinion in the two countries in recent months 
but by re-establishing confidence based on a 
shared conviction that the two countries are 
pursuing a common aim. 
39. Finally - and your Rapporteur considers 
this essential - while the first aim of a defence 
policy is to be effective, i.e. deterrent, it must 
also meet certain ethical standards and not 
merely the requirements of total pragmatism. 
Armaments are only a means and care must be 
taken to avoid this means becoming an end for 
States with all the dangers that involves for 
world peace. In this respect, the modified Brus-
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sels Treaty was an innovation by "moralising" 
so to say the necessary armaments policy. This 
is one of the reasons why the task of limiting 
and controlling levels of forces and armaments, 
of which it was the first step, must be main-
tained, pursued and strengthened, for peace and 
disarmament are the primary interests of all. 
IV. Armament$ production 
40. During the 1954 negotiations which led to 
the modification of the Brussels Treaty, France 
was the one to propose that WEU's responsibili-
ties be extended to cover matters relating to 
armaments production. France's partners appear 
to have greeted Mr. Mendes..France's proposals 
in this sense with some scepticism, traces of 
whi~h are to be found in the pages of Lord 
Avon:S memoirs on this matter. However, they 
agreed to the creation of the Standing Arma-
ments Committee to promote the joint produc-
tion of armaments by the WEU member coun-
tries. 
41. Their scepticism now appears only too justi-
fied in view of the work accomplished by the 
SAC, but this is due largely to the total absence 
of determination to succeed shown by the. seven 
governments in this connection. However, on 31st 
May 1976, the Council, following initiatives 
taken in the Assembly by Mr. Jobert and Mr. 
V an Elslande, decided to confer a new task on 
the SAC. 
42. The decision taken in 1976 to reactivate the 
Standing Armaments Committee led the Assem-
bly to put frequent questions to the Council on 
its intentions in taking this decision. It is now 
clear that while the independent European pro-
gramme group is still closely linked with an 
Atlantic view of defence requirements, although 
administratively it is independent of NATO, the 
role of the SAC can be defined in relation to 
the European armaments industries rather than 
to a defence policy. 
43. Until the enquiries conducted by the SAC 
have led to a published report, it is difficult to 
say what this role will be. But it can already be 
foreseen that one of its aims will be to remove 
the obstacles to dividing work between European 
industries rationally enough to allow worthwhile 
reductions in .the cost price of armaments by 
lowering operational and marketing expenses as 
well as investments, without Europe's defence 
potential suffering. Secondly, a remedy will have 
to be found for the difficulties to which the 
European industries are subjected because the 
crisis in the capitalist world favours large non-
European manufacturers. 
44. Including sub-contracting, the WEU coun-
tries' armaments industries employ almost a mil-
lion persons. If a determined effort to cut 
expenditure on armaments is not accompanied 
by an organisation of production, a large pro-
portion of these workers would become un-
employed and Europe's armaments research 
capability would gradually dry up. 
45. Finally, several European countries have 
had to try to compensate the smallness of their 
national markets and the difficulty of penetrat-
ing the markets of their partners by selling arms 
to African, Asian or &uth American countries, 
thus accelerating the arms race in those areas. 
The fast increase in the price of oil since 1973 
has added to the arms-producing countries' 
determination to sell and improve the purchasing 
capacity of their customers. This matter needs 
sorting out, as President Carter recently under-
lined, but this is hardly possible unless a code 
of good behaviour is drawn up between arms-
producing countries. 
46. Here too the SAC might play an important 
role if it does not limit its ambitions to purely 
industrial organisation but considers the overall 
problem of arms sales with a view to reaching a 
common definition of principles seeking to 
reduce the scale of arms sales and prevent them 
from upsetting the balance and fanning the 
flames of conflicts outside Europe. 
47. On lOth September 1977, the important 
Hamburg newspaper Die Welt gave a parti-
cularly remarkable e:Jeample of the effects of 
joint production on the currently prevailing 
anarchy in the sale of European armaments to 
the developing countries. According to Die Welt, 
a number of Middle Eastern countries were be-
lieved to have signed a contract with the French 
manufacturer of the Alpha-Jet, Marcel Dassault, 
for 200 aircraft of this type. This aircraft is a 
eo-production of Dassault in France and Dornier 
in the Federal Republic, but the French Govern-
ment was prepared to sell aircraft to these coun-
tries to which the Government of the Federal 
Republic considered it undesi:rtable to supply 
military equipment of this kind. But the Federal 
Government could not prevent Dornier from 
delivering German-manufactured parts for the 
aircraft to its French associate, which allowed 
the Dornier-Dassault consortium to circumvent 
the decisions of the Federal Government, just 
as it could if necessary circumvent decisions of 
the French Government. 
48. This example shows that in the absence of 
adequate intergovernmental consultations eo-
production can be a way for industri~lists to 
evade control by governments, already not very 
inclined to restrict sales of arms to under-
developed countries. An essential aspect of the 
SAC's mandate might thus be to work out pro-
cedure to prevent industrialists from acting in 
this way by creating a European office for the 
armaments trade to harmonise principles and 
practice in selling countries with a view to 
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preventing unrestrained competition leading to 
the over-arming of countries whose only real 
priority should be economic development. This 
would be a major contribution to general and 
complete disarmament. 
49. Generally speaking, the SAC's mandate, 
which is economic rather than military, the latter 
field being left to the independent European 
programme group, should eventually place it in 
the framework of the future European union 
rather than NATO, making it something of an 
extension of the Community institutions to the 
armaments field. 
50. But this is only one course. The effectiveness 
of the SAC's work will depend solely on the 
determination of governments, to organise the 
European armaments industry in order to rescue 
it from its present crisis and to lay down 
industrial, social and commercial standards with 
which they would be prepared to comply. As 
long as this determination is not manifest, the 
charter of the Standing Armaments Committee, 
like the decision of 31st May 1976, will remain a 
dead letter. 
51. One of the prospects offered by Mr. Mendet!-
France in 1954 when he proposed creating the 
SAC was in fact to limit competition, organise 
production and prevent the development of anar-
chy in the sale of arms. Twenty-three years later, 
it is time for the seven governments to abandon 
the ambiguous positions behind which they have 
been constantly hiding to paralyse the SAC and 
say whether they really have the political will 
to inject life into this body. 
V. The parliamentary dimension 
52. The WEU Assembly will continue to be 
distinct from other European parliamentary 
assemblies not only because of its :responsibilities 
but also because of its membership. Whereas the 
North Atlantic Assembly represents only very 
partially the parliaments of the member coun-
tries of the Atlantic Alliance, since inter alia 
there is no communist representation, which is 
possible because of its rather vague statutes, the 
European Parliament will no longer ensure a 
permanent link with the parliaments of member 
countries when it is elected by direct suffrage. 
53. On the other hand, the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe and co~ 
quently the WEU Assembly are composed of 
delegations which are fairly representative of 
national parliaments. This is an essential aspect 
because no co-ordination of independent defence 
policies can be achieved other than through the 
national parliaments. Moreover, the Assembly 
has received its responsibilities from the modified 
Brussels Treaty itself. Since it receives a 
DOOUMENT 756 
report from the Council, it is empowered to deal 
with all matters relating to European security. 
54. The remarks of Mr. von Hassel, as reported 
in Die Welt of 1st August 1977, should thus be 
borne in mind. He warned against "the danger 
of the establishment of a nine-power European 
Parliament in the framework of the EEC leading 
to the other institutions created in Europe being 
shelved". 
55. It is not therefore its membership which 
hinders the work of the WEU Assembly but firSt 
and foremost the fact that its partner, the 
Council, is constantly evading its responsibilities, 
carefully providing only a strict minimum of 
information and avoiding any dialogue or 
debate, while at the same time pouring out a 
wealth of fine words to attenuate the Asaembly's 
discontent. 
56. It is obvious that a clash is inevitable if 
the Assembly is generally anxious to apply the 
modified Brussels Treaty correctly whereas the 
Council's main concern is to apply it in the most 
restrictive manner possible. The Assembly's 
principal duty is therefore to inform public 
opinion by every means available to it of the 
Council's demise. 
57. But in order to widen its audience, the 
Assembly should follow in the wake of its Pre-
sident's encouragement and, throwing linguistic 
and diplomatic habits to the winds, tackle the 
essential fundamental problems of Europe's 
defence policy. Only too often has it confined 
itself to matters more technical than political, or 
skirted round the substance of debates by using 
procedural devices or by concealing deep-seated 
divergences behind unanimous votes. By endea-
vouring to reach the core of the subject, your 
Rapporteur does not expect to achieve unanimity 
on his report but hopes to open a debate in which 
fundamental problems will be tackled in full 
view of European public opinion. The danger 
threatening European parliamentarism. is not 
differences of views but the camouflaging of such 
differences with fine words likely to obtain false 
majorities but which in the long run lead only 
to indifference and scepticism among public 
opinion. 
58. The WEU Assembly's responsibility is the 
defence of Western Europe in all its aspects : 
political, military, strategic, scientific and 
technical. Its means of action, faced with a 
defaulting Council, is to draw on public opinion 
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and to this end it must be clear in what it says, 
firm in its attitude and steadfast in its require-
ments vis-a-vis the Couneil. 
VI. Conclusions 
59. At a time of such uncertainty regarding 
the future of Western Europe, as envisaged so 
far, and of NATO, the modified Brussels Treaty 
provides relatively firm ground because of the 
"automatic" nature of its Article V. WEU, 
having little support from advocates of a Euro-
pean defence community as of an Atlantic com-
munity, constitutes the minimum on which the 
member countries can agree in defence matters. 
It is there to ensure a permanent link between 
countries which cannot consider their security 
in isolation but yet do not share the same 
political, economic and social concepts and do 
not have the same concept of a defence policy 
based on deterrence. 
60. Furthermore, WEU offers a number of 
instruments which might prove most useful in a 
policy for "moralising" international relations 
in the manufacture and sale of arms and in the 
limitation of forces and control of armaments. 
At present, the use it makes of these instruments 
is too limited but the Assembly's efforts should 
be directed towards urging governments to meet 
their mutual undertakings in full in order to 
achieve greater security no longer based solely 
on the accumulation of armaments but on 
mutual confidence, controlled disarmament and 
international co-operation. 
61. The institutional framework is not the only 
means offered by WEU for helping to prepare 
the future European union in fields within its 
competence. Of greater importance is its 
experience and fundamental work at the level 
of the Council and its technical bodies and of 
the Assembly. An attempt has been made in this 
report to define a number of lines of action 
which your Rapporteur proposes for WEU 
because he feels they are appropriate for a 
European union based on democracy and seeking 
to promote a little more peace and justice in 
Europe and throughout the world. Should the 
future European union come into being, it will 
not make its presence felt by breaking in new 
ground. On the contrary, it is by pursuing and 
organising work which can be started here and 
now in the framework of existing institutions 
that we can lay the foundations for tomorrow's 
Europe. 
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Amendment No. 1 
29th November 1977 
WEU's contribution to the development of European union 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Roper 
In the penultimate paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "takes no" 
and insert "fails to take adequate". 
Signed : Roper 
1. See lOth Sitting, 29th November 1977 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Communications and erlsis management in the Alliance 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 1 
by Mr. Watkinson, Rapporteur 
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prm'Ced m ttaZios. 
Introductory Note 
In preparing this report, the Rapporteur had interviews as follows : 
Brussels, 16th Februn,ry 1977 
United Kingdom Delegation to NATO 
Sir John Killick, KCMG, Permanent Representative; 
Mr. John Peters, Counsellor, Defence; 
Mr. J. M. Legge, First Secretary, Defence Planning; 
Mr. E. W. L. Hedley ; 
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Commander Da.vid J. Lean, RN, United Kingdom Military Representative Support Staff. 
London, 11th July 1977 
Ministry of Defence 
Mr. Kevin Tebbit (DS 12); 
Wmg Commander Hutchinson (Cabinet Office); 
Mr. John Horley (Crisis Management, DS 12). 
London, 13th October 1977 
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Peter Hill-Nortcn, GCB (retd.), former Chairman of the NATO Military 
Committee. 
The Committee as a whole met in NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 16th February 1977, where it 
was briefed by : 
Lt.- General Bckmiickle, Director, International Military Staff, on "Crisis Management in NATO" ; 
and by: 
Major-General Sir John Anderson, Director General, NATO Integrated Communications System 
Management Agency, on "The NATO communications system". 
The Committee next met in Paris on 19th and 20th September 1977 when it discussed a. first draft 
of this report and held a. meeting with the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly. The 
Committee was briefed by : 
Admiral Tutenuit, Head of the Transmissions-Electrcmique-lnformatique Division of the French 
Combined Chiefs of Staff, on communications infrastructure- the RITTER; RA-70 and navy systems; 
and by: 
Lt.-Oolonel Lemereier of the Direction Oentrale des Transmissions, on the French army RITA com-
munications system, and the Committee saw a. film concerning it. 
The Committee then visited the French 8th Division Headquarters and 58th Command and Com-
munications Regiment in Compiegne, where it was received by General Orouzillae, General Officer commanding 
8th Division, and was briefed on the divisional communications system by Colonel Petorin, commanding 
communications of 8th Division. Conducted by General Crouzilla.c and Colonel Petorin, the Committee 
then visited a. display of communications equipment of the 58th Command and Communications Regiment. 
The Committee met at Headquarters Allied Forces Central Europe in Brunssum on 3rd November 
1977, where it was briefed by the Commander-in-Chief, General F.-J. Bchtdze, German army, and members 
of his staff. The Committee met finally in Bonn on 4th November, where it was addressed by Mr. Andreas 
von Biilow, German Parliamentary Secretary of State for Defence. At that meeting it discussed and 
adopted a revised draft of the present report. 
The Committee and the Rapporteur express their thanks to the Ministers, officials and senior 
officers who addressed it and replied to questions. The views expressed in the report, unless expressly 
otherwise attributed, are those of the Committee. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on communications and crisis management 
in the Alliance 
Stressing that the Alliance's first purpose of preventing and deterring war, without prejudice to its 
vital interests, requires a system of crisis management to ensure that the Alliance and its members, acting 
in concert, ,take timely measures to prevent a crisis developing or to defend its interests ; 
Calling for measures of crisis prevention to be strengthened and increased ; 
Welcoming the development of the crisis management system centred on NATO headquarters and 
believing the loyal participation of all countries of the Alliance to be essential ; 
Calling on the member governments never to shirk the burden of responsibility for the timely 
mplementation of readiness measures whenever warning time is available, 
RECOMMENDS TO THE CoUNCIL 
That it urge member governments : 
1. To promote crisis prevention measures designed to improve stability and increase warning time of 
any real threat: 
(a) in the CSCE negotiations by calling for the confidence-building measures agreed at Helsinki to 
be strengthened and augmented ; 
(b) in the MBFR negotiations, by calling for progress to be made on NATO proposals for the reduction 
of forces and for associated measures ; 
2. To seek to improve arrangements for NATO crisis management : 
(a) by calling on all NATO countries to participate fully : 
(i) in the early completion of the NATO Integrated Communications System; 
(ii) at an appropriate high official and, from time to time, at political level, with all relevant 
government departments, in crisis management exercises based on likely and realistic 
scenarios; 
(iii) in the provision and evaluation of information, and in consultation, on a world-wide immediate 
and continuous basis, covering any events that may involve allied interests with a view to 
developing a collectively agreed assessment of a crisis situation ; 
(iv) in subsequent crisis management decisions as often as may be necessary, including the 
implementation of diplomatic and economic measures; 
(v) in the augmentation of the NATO mobile, standing and on-call forces to provide a greater 
range of deterrent options in periods of tension ; 
(vi) in ensuring that full use is made of military warning time by making timely preparation 
through the implementation of the agreed alert measures ; 
(b) by calling on the North Atlantic Council to establish an ad hoc group to review and make 
recommendations for the improvement of the existing NATO crisis management machinery and 
procedures ; 
(c) by calling on the North Atlantic Council to study the possibility of establishing a permanent 
teleprinter link between NATO headquarters and the Government of the Soviet Union and of 
designating an authorised NATO spokesman to use the link on appropriate occasions. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Watldnson, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. NATO is a defensive organisation. If the 
Alliance is to be preserved it is vital that NATO 
should have the machinery and wiU to respond 
adequately to crises which may confront the 
Alliance. No two crises are the same ; therefore 
NATO must have crisis management techniques 
that are adaptable, and a crisis machinery that 
can function swiftly and purposefully. The 
complexity of crisis management stems from the 
fact that it is in this area that the politicians 
and the military must combine to reach swift 
decisions acceptable to and binding on the 
Alliance. It is this interface that this report 
attempts to probe. 
2. The Committee asked your Rapporteur to 
examine the arrangements for top-level political 
consultations in the Alliance in a period of ten-
sion ; to outline the communications systems that 
are presently available in NATO; to stress the 
need for early political decisions on preventive 
and readiness measures in any period of ten-
sion ; and for immediate decisions should 
hostilities break out. 
3. The term crisis does not lend itself to easy 
definition. Your Rapporteur agrees with Admiral 
Sir Peter Hill-Norton in his article on crisis 
management in the NATO Review and General 
Schmiickle in his briefing of the Committee, 
that the most appropriate definition is that of 
Lipson who has stated : 
"A crisis is a controversy between single 
governments, or groups of governments, 
over an issue which is deemed fundamental 
to the basic interests of one side or both. 
An unusual intensity of feeling is gen-
erated, and there is a possibility that force 
may erupt. A crisis is managed if a solu-
tion acceptable to both sides is reached 
without resort to force. It is successfully 
managed if the underlying sources of con-
flict are removed for the future." 
4. With the exception of the Berlin crises 
from 1958-63, NATO itself has not had to face 
a crisis in these terms, though there have been 
several such crises since World War II. 
Nevertheless the Committee believes that in 
public debate there has been insufficient atten-
tion paid to the problem of crisis management. 
A pre-emptive strike at nuclear level of itself 
rules out crisis management but conventional 
wisdom for well over a decade has had it that 
no such pre-emptive strike could be made from 
the East at a conventional level. It was thought 
that a strike would take months to prepare. 
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Thus the Alliance would have lengthy warning 
time. This wisdom now appears to be dated. 
There has been a build-up of such quantity and 
quality of armaments on the central front, and 
the readiness of Warsaw Pact forces is at such 
a level that previous estimates of warning time 
should be drastically reduced. Hence the Com-
mittee believes that it is vital that there be a 
crisis management system in NATO to cope with 
this new reality. Any new development demands 
an equal updating in crisis management pro-
cedures. 
5. Your Rapporteur stresses that the nature 
of NATO itself makes the business of crisis 
management within the Alliance complex and 
difficult. In a crisis fifteen different nations 
have to adjust their individual responses rapidly 
and decisively into a collective response. No 
such problem faces a crisis manager in the 
Warsaw Pact. Hence the relevance and import-
ance of the subject. 
6. The report itself is divided thus : 
- an account of crises past ; 
- the lessons that can be learnt from those 
crises; 
- possible destabilising factors that could 
provoke a crisis ; 
- a brief account of crisis prevention 
measures; 
- an analysis of crisis management 
techniques and machinery ; 
- summary of possible improvements. 
U. Crises past 
7. It is worthwhile studying, and in part 
analysing, a series of crises which have arisen 
since the end of the second world war ; certain 
lessons can be learnt - not least the poverty 
of historicism. 
(i) The Berlin bloc,ade, June 1948 to May 1949 
8. In an attempt to integrate West Berlin 
into the Soviet zone, the Soviet Union began to 
impose restrictions on road, rail and water com-
munications between the western zones and West 
Berlin on lOth March 1948. A total blockade 
began in June and on 21st June special air 
transport arrangements were inaugurated by 
Britain and the United States which became a 
fuR-scale air lift by 28th June. 
9. Decisions by the western powers on the 
specific handling of the Berlin crisis appear at 
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that time to have been handled in trilateral 
consultations between France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States as the powers 
responsible for the western sectors of Berlin. 
Although the Brussels Treaty had been signed 
by the original five countries on 17th March 
1948, and the military structure known later 
as the Western Union Defence Organisation was 
being established during the rest of 1948, com-
muniques of the Consultative Council and 
Defence Ministers meeting under the Brussels 
Treaty do not appear to have made specific 
reference to Berlin. 
10. The blockade of Berlin was terminated by 
the Soviet Union on 12th May 1949, a month 
after the signature of the North Atlantic Treaty 
on 4th April. 
11. In retrospect it may be asked whether the 
air lift was an appropriate response to the 
blockade of Berlin. On the one hand by avoiding 
entirely any confrontation on the blockaded 
routes, it placed the onus on the Soviet Union 
of escalating the conflict if it had sought to 
interfere with the free use of the air corridors. 
On the other hand it can be argued that a bad 
precedent was set in accepting the denial of 
land access, especially at a time when the United 
States had a monopoly of nuclear weapons. The 
despatch of an armed military convoy to take 
supplies to West Berlin could still have placed 
the onus of using force to resist it on the Soviet 
Union. 
(ii) East Berlin uprising, 17th June 1963 
12. The serious workers' uprising in East 
Berlin in 1953 was quelled by the use of force 
and led to a declaration of a state of emergency 
throughout East Germany. The integrity of 
West Berlin was not immediately threatened, 
but the incident is chronicled because of the 
danger of conflict that could have arisen 
through the in:£1ux of large numbers of refugees 
to the western zone. · 
13. Security in West Berlin was and is the 
responsibility of the three western powers, 
France, the United Kingdom and the United 
States ; the Federal Republic at that time was 
not a member of NATO. Very delicate situations 
could arise in the future in the event of serious 
civilian disturbances in Eastern Germany, 
particularly if they resulted in the flight of 
refugees to the Federal Republic. 
(iii) Hungary and Suez, 1966 
14. A civil insurrection in Hungary on 22nd 
and 23rd October 1956 resulted in Mr. Nagy 
coming to power as Prime Minister. On 25th 
October Mr. Nagy announced in a broadcast 
that the government would open negotiations 
with the Soviet Union to secure the withdrawal 
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of Soviet forces from the country. A Soviet 
Government statement issued on 30th October 
stated in part "bearing in mind that the further 
stationing of Soviet military units in Hungary 
may provide a pretext for· making the situa-
tion more tense, the Soviet Government has 
instructed its military command to withdraw 
Soviet military units from Budapest as soon as 
the Hungarian Government finds it necessary. 
At the same time the Soviet Government is 
ready to enter into talks with the Hungarian 
People's Republic and the other parties to the 
Warsaw Treaty on the question of the stationing 
of Soviet forces in Hungary". On 31st October 
Mr. Nagy protested to the Soviet Government at 
the continuing reinforcement of Soviet troops 
within Hungary, and announced that Hungary 
would withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. In a 
message to the United Nations Secretary-General, 
the Hungarian Government appealed to the 
United Nations and the great powers to 
guarantee Hungary's permanent neutrality. 
15. On 4th November Mr. Nagy in a broad-
cast at 6 a.m. announced that Soviet troops had 
launched an attack upon Budapest ; the radio 
called on the United Nations to come to Hun-
gary's assistance. Fighting between the Soviet 
and Hungarian armed forces, the latter sup-
ported by the civilian population, lasted until 
lOth November when resistance was finally 
crushed and the Government of Mr. Kadar was 
imposed by the Soviet Union. The Soviet attack 
was said to have occupied 10,000 troops with 
1,000 tanks ; contemporary Hungarian estimates 
of casualties were 25,000 Hungarians killed in 
Budapest itself. 
16. Any possible consultation within the 
NATO framework at the time of this crisis must 
have been rendered impossible by internal dis-
sention following the Anglo-French invasion of 
Egypt. Following an Israeli attack into the 
Sinai desert, in coLlusion with Britain and 
France as has subsequently been revealed, Egypt 
rejected an Anglo-French ultimatum calling for 
the withdrawal of Egyptian and Israeli forces 
from the Suez Canal zone. Britain and France 
bombed military targets in the area from 31st 
October to 4th November. and landed troops in 
Egypt on 5th and 6th November. Whereas a 
resolution sponsored by the western powers in 
the United Nations Security Council calling for 
·the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary 
had been vetoed by the Soviet Union, now 
Britain and France were vetoing a resolution 
sponsored by the United States and another by 
the Soviet Union. 
17. The communique issued after the min-
isterial meeting of the North Atlantic Council 
from 11th to 14th December 1956 stated that 
the Council had adopted recommendations on 
closer co-operation including advance consul-
tation on policies or major pronouncements 
significantly affecting the Alliance or any of 
its members, and the adoption of a procedure for 
the internal settlement of disputes and differ-
ences between member countries within NATO. 
The communique specifically stated that "the 
Council discussed the threat which Soviet pene-
tration in the Middle East would present for 
NATO. In view of the fact that the security, 
stability and weLl-being of the area are essential 
to world peace the Council agreed to keep 
developments in this area under close and con-
tinuing observation... the Council have followed 
the course of events in Hungary with shock 
and revulsion... the Council reaffirmed the 
conviction of its member governments that the 
United Nations should continue its efforts 
through the pressure of wol"ld opinion to induce 
the Soviets to withdraw their forces from Hun-
gary and to right the wrongs done to the Hun-
garian people. The peoples of Eastern Europe 
should have the right to choose their own 
governments freely, unaffected by external pres-
sure and the use or threat of force, and to decide 
for themselves the political and social order 
they prefer. The Ministers examined the impli-
cations for NATO of Soviet policy and actions 
in Europe and elsewhere. In the light of their 
assessment of Soviet policy they were in full 
agreement on the need to face up to any threat 
which would endanger the security and free-
dom of the Atlantic community". 
18. The North Atlantic Council had shown 
itself ready to consult on matters affecting 
peace when they arose outside the NATO area. 
Hungary is a country with no common frontier 
with any NATO country, but the appeals of the 
Nagy government to the United Nations and to 
the great powers for support during the Soviet 
invasion of Hungary would obviously have 
placed NATO in a great dilemma had not con-
sultation at the time become virtually impos-
sible because of internal disagreement over 
Anglo-French involvement in Egypt. 
(iv) The Berlin crises, 1958, 1961 and 1968 
19. In a speech on lOth November 1958 Mr. 
Khrushchev said in part "the time has evidently 
come for the powers which signed the Potsdam 
Agreement to abandon the remnants of the occu-
pation regime in Berlin ... the Soviet Union for 
its part, will hand over to the sovereign German 
Democratic Republic those fun~tions in Berlin 
which are still wielded by Soviet organs. Let the 
United States, France and Britain form their 
own relations with the German Democratic 
Republic and come to an agreement with it if 
they are interested in certain questions relating 
to Berlin. As for the Soviet Union we shall 
observe as sacred our obligations which stemmed 
from the Warsaw Treaty... should any aggres-
sive forces attack the German Democratic 
Republic... we will consider it as an attack on 
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the Soviet Union and on all the parties to the 
Warsaw Treaty. We shall rise to the defence 
of the German Democratic Republic ... ". 
20. Soviet notes were communicated to France, 
the United Kingdom and the United States and 
the Federal Republic of Germany on 27th 
November 1958 saying in part "the Soviet 
Government can no longer consider itself bound 
by that part of the allied agreements on 
Germany which has assumed an unequal 
character and is being used for the maintenance 
of the occupation regime in West Berlin and 
for interference in the internal affairs of the 
German Democratic Republic. In view of this 
the Government of the USSR notifies the 
Government of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . that the Soviet 
Union regards as null and void [the agreements 
on Berlin]". 
21. The Soviet proposal was for West Berlin 
to become a demilitarised free city, arrange-
ments for access to be negotiated with the East 
German regime. The note concluded that if by 
the end of six months no agreement had been 
reached the Soviet Union would implement its 
own plans in agreement with Eastern Germany. 
The note concluded "any violation of the fron-
tiers of the German Democratic Republic, 
Poland or Czechoslovakia or any aggressive 
action against any member State of the Warsaw 
Pact Treaty will be regarded by all its parti-
cipants as an act of aggression against them all 
and will immediately cause appropriate reta-
liation ... ". 
22. The Soviet notes were interpreted in the 
West as an ultimatum and led immediately to 
close consultation between France, Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, as well 
as consultation in the North Atlantic Council. 
The Soviet proposals were firmly rejected in 
identical notes from the .three occupying. powers 
in Berlin which said in part " ... the government 
will not and does not in any way accept a 
unilateral denunciation of the agreements... nor 
is it prepared to relieve the Soviet Union of the 
obligation which it assumed... the government 
will accordingly continue to hold the Soviet 
Government directly responsible under existing 
agreements for the discharge of its obligations 
with respect to Berlin. The continued protection 
of the freedom of more than two million people 
of West Berlin is a right and responsibHity 
solemnly accepted by the three western powers 
... unhindered communications by land and air 
between that city and the Federal Republic of 
Germany are ... essential to the discharge of that 
right and responsibility ... ". 
23. The three western notes were strongly sup-
ported in a statement on Berlin issued after the 
ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Coun-
ciL on 16th December 1958 which said in part 
"The Council fully· associates itself with the 
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views· expressed [on Berlin by the four govern-
ments'] the demands expressed by the Soviet 
Governtnent have created a serious situation 
which must be faced with determination... the 
member States of NATO could not approve a 
solution of the Berlin question which jeopard-
ised the right of the three western powers to 
remain in Berlin as long as their responsibilities 
require it and did not assure freedom of com-
munication between that city and the free world. 
The Soviet Union would be responsible for any 
~etion which had the effect of hampering this 
fJ:1le communication or endan~ring this free-
dom ... ". 
24. The situation remained tense into 1959, 
Mr. Khrushchev in a speech on 17th February 
saying typically "efforts llol'e being made to 
intimidate us by saying that they will start 
shooting if we stand in ·their way. It is clear 
however that if anyone did start shooting that 
would tnean war ... ". President Eisenhower the 
following day at a press conference pointed out 
that the western powers h8.d never said that they 
were going to "shoot their way into Berlin" 
but that they would carry out their respons-
ibilities to the people of West Berlin. If an 
attempt was made to stop them ••it will be 
somebody else using force". 
25. While the exchange of notes and proposals 
on Berlin continued fruitlessly through 1959, 
nothing more was heard of the Soviet proposal 
~o hand over its Berlin responsibilities to the 
German Democratic Republic. This crisis had 
l>een -h&ndled by a clear statement by the whole 
.t\.tlantic Alliance of its resolve to stand by the 
w~tern powers' responsibilities in Berlin, while 
avoiding the use of threatening 1a.nguage. The 
onus of using force would have been placed on 
the Soviet Union if an attempt had been made 
to interfere with free access to Berlin while 
NATO clearly demonstrated that it had the 
resources to counter such· use of force if neces-
sary. 
26. The .1958 Berlin crisii; was probably the 
~ast in which the United States defence posture 
placed primary emphasis on nuclear retaliation. 
Mr .. Khrushchev revived the crisis in his sp~eeh 
of 15th· June 1961 in which he said ''the conclu-
sion of the peace treaty with Germany cannot 
be postponed any longer. A peaceful settlement 
in Europe must be attained this year". The East 
German authorities announced that after 1st 
August all ai,r traffic to and from Berlin would 
have to be registered with them. On 13th August 
the Berlin wall was built, while Soviet and 
United States tanks were in confrontation on 
the demarcation line, but no shots were fired. 
27. The western response on this oceasi,on was 
equally firm, but the military options available 
to -Pi'esident Kennedy and his Defence Secretary, 
Mr. 1\IcNamara, were wider\ ·40,000 American 
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troops were moved to Europe and replaced in 
the United States by 46,000 reservists called to 
the colours. In November a United States 
armoured cavalry regiment was also moved to 
support the 7th Army in Europe. While the 
British, French and United States garrisons in 
Berlin are not considered part of the forces 
assigned to NATO, complete co-ordination of 
military planning was assured through the 
establishment of a tripartite contin~ncy plan-
ning staff eo-located with the NATO military 
headquarters concerned - SHAPE - then 
located at Rocquencourt outside Paris, now 
moved with SHAPE to Casteau in Belgium. 
28. The western reaction was backed at all 
times by offers to continue negotiations with the 
Soviet Union, and while the availability of force 
was made evident, no threat to use force was 
openly made by the western powers. 
29. Typically by October Mr. Khrushchev had 
altered tack : "If the western powers show 
readiness to settle the German problem, the 
question of a deadline for signing a German 
peace treaty will not be of such importance. We 
shall not insist on the signing of the peace treaty 
before 31st December 1961." 
30. The Foreign Ministers of France, Ger-
many, the United Kingdom aud the United 
States met in Paris prior to the ministerial 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council held from 
13th to 15th December, which made the follow-
ing strong reference to Berlin : 
"The Ministers ... reaffirmed their deter-
mination to protect and defend the 
libemes of West Berlin ... the three western 
powers who bear special responsibilities 
for Berlin stand by their clear obligation 
to protect those who have put their trust 
in them. Acting in close consultation with 
their NATO allies, they have taken the 
necessary measures to maintain their rights 
and fulfil their obligations. Confirming 
their agreement on this policy, the mem-
bers of the Alliance reaffirmed the res-
ponsibilities which each member State has 
assumed in regard to the security and 
welfare of Berlin and the maintenance of 
the position of the three powers in that 
city ... The Council agreed that the Alliance 
must continue on itS resolute course com-
bining strength and firmness of purpose 
with a readiness to seek solutions by peace-
ful means." 
31. Berlin continued to be a source of tension 
however - in October-November 1963 British 
and United States military convoys to Berlin 
were temporarily blocked by Soviet forces -
until the signing of the quadripartite (France, 
Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States) 
agreement on Berlin on 3rd September 1971, 
completed by inter-German agreements and a 
final quadripartite protocol on 3rd JUII.e 1972, 
whereby the Soviet Union itself formally recog-
nised th.e existing rights of the three western 
powers in West Berlin, the right of free access 
between West Berlin and the territory., of the 
Federal Republic, and certain rights .of the 
Federal Republic to represent the interests of 
West Berlin abroad. At the same time the 
German Democratic Republic secured recogni-
tion and details of arrangements were con,cluded 
between that government, the Federal Republic 
and the Berlin Senate. '· · 
32. Thus after more · than twenty · years 
unrelenting western firmness and the manifest 
readiness of NATO collectively to defend the 
western position, coupled with a readiness to 
negotiate at all times, finally secured from the 
Soviet Union a more permanent formal agree-
ment providing for a more stable and peaceful 
situation in Berlin. 
(v) The Cuban missile crisis, October 1962 
33. Technically Cuba lies outside the NATO 
geographical area, being some ten nautical miles 
south of its southern border - the Tropic of 
Cancer. But as the possibility of a naval 
blockade was involved it could very well have 
led to incidents involving United States vessels 
in areas north of the Tropic of Cancer, and such 
incidents would clearly have come within the 
terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. 
34. Refugees from Cuba had been reporting 
various forms of Soviet military assistance for 
the communist Castro regime in Cuba but it was 
not until the United States high-level recon-
naissance flight of 14th October 1961 that 
evidence was discovered of nuclear missile 
installations that could threaten the United 
States. Eventually a total of 24 MRBM laun-
chers and fixed facilities for 16 IRBMs were 
observed. In addition some 42 Ilyushin-28 
bombers with a combat radius of about 700 
nautical miles were shipped to . Cuba.. For 
Mr. McNamara this action was directly linked 
to Soviet designs on Berlin : 
"Their stationing of nuclear and armed 
ballistic missiles in Cuba was directly 
related to [the Berlin] agenda. The psy-
chological if not the military threat that 
these missiles would have posed to our 
own homeland was apparently the trump 
card which Mr. Khrushchev intended to 
play in the next round of negotiations on 
the status of Berlin." 1 
35. President Kennedy in a broadcast on 22nd 
October 1962 made the issue a direct confron-
tation with the Soviet Union, saying in part '•it 
shall be the policy of this nation to regard any 
I. Testimony to Congress, 30th June '1963-. 
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nuclear missile launchOO from Cuba against any 
nation in the western hemisphere as a.n attack by 
the Soviet Union on the United States requiring 
a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet 
Union~'. This is probably the most explicit 
threat to use nuclear weapons that has ever. been 
made by a NATO country. 
36. In his broadcast President Kennedy an-
nounced the following measures : · 
"A strict quarantine on all offensive 
military equipment under shipment to 
Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any 
kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation 
or port will if found to contain cargoes 
of offensive weapons be turned back. This 
quarantine will be eJct;ended if needed to 
other types of cargo and carriers. We are 
not at this time however denying the 
necessities of life as the Soviets attempte<l 
to do in their Berlin blockade of 1948. 
Second, I have directed the contiimed a.nd 
increased close surveillance of · Cuba aiid 
its military build-up ... should these offen-
sive military preparations continue... fur-
ther action will be justified. I have directed 
the armed forces to prepare for any even-
tualities... · 
Seventh and finally, I call upon Chai'-'man 
Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this 
clandestine, reckless a.nd provocative threat 
to world peace and to stable relations 
between our two nations.· I call upon hhU 
further to abandon this course of woi-ld 
domination a.nd to join in an histOric 
effort to end the perilous arms raee- and 
transform the history of man." 
37. While President Kennedy called -immedi~ 
ate consultations within· the Organisation of 
American States a.nd in the United Nations 
Security Council the crisis does not appear from 
the public record to have been formally referred 
to the North Atlantic Council at that time. 
There were statements of ~;~upport for tpe United 
States position from the allied governrilents, but 
apparently no crisis meeting _within t~e frame. 
work of NATO. The communique followi_ng the 
routine ministerial meeting on 13th to 15th 
December 1962. took note of the sit-.;mtion : · · · 
"The recent attempt by the Soviet Union 
to tHt the balance of force against ·the 
West by secretly stationing nuclear. mis-
siles in Cuba brought the world to ·the 
verge of war. The peril was averted by the 
firmness a.nd restraint of the United 
States, supported by the Alliance · and 
other free nations." 
Mr. Khrushchev had of course already baek!')d 
down ; his letter of 28th October to ·President 
Kennedy communicated· to the press said : 
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"I regard with great understanding your 
concern and the concern of the peoples of 
the United States of America in connection 
with the fact that the weapons you describe 
as offensive are formidable weapons 
indeed. Both you and we understand what 
kind of weapons these are. In order to 
eliminate as rapiill:y as possible the con-
flict which endangers the cause of peace ... 
the Soviet Government, in addition to 
earlier instructions on the discontinuation 
of further work on weapons construction 
sites, has given a new order to dismantle 
the weapons, which you describe as 
offensive, and to return them to the Soviet 
Union." 
38. The handling of the Cuban missile crisis 
was a triumph for United States leadership : 
the crisis was managed and averted by skilful 
use of the overt threat of force ; the United 
States was careful to give the Soviet Union time 
and opportunity to withdraw. The methods used 
in the Cuban crisis could be regarded as a 
paradigm of crisis management. 
(vi) The Middle Eat UJGr, 1961 
39. In the latter half of 1966 and in early 1967 
tension between Israel and its Arab neighbours 
had steadily increased, initially because of the 
Syrian-supported Arab terrorist campaign and 
Israeli reprisal raids. On 16th and 17th May 
1967 the armed forces of Egypt (then known as 
the UAR), Syria and Jordan were mobilised 
and on 18th May the United Nations Secretary-
General, U Thant, acceded to an Egyptian 
request that he order the withdrawal of the 
United Nations emergency force in Sinai and 
the Ghaza Strip on the grounds that it was 
present only by Egyptian invitation in the first 
place, and was based solely on Egyptian terri-
tories. 
40. On 23rd May Egypt announced the closure 
of the Tiran Straits thus denying passage 
through the Gulf of Aqaba to the Israeli port 
of Eilat. Egyptian troops occupied positions 
controlling the Straits of Sharm el Sheikh from 
which the United Nations emergency force had 
withdrawn. In a speech that day President 
Nasser claimed that Israel was supported and 
supplied by the United States, although not by 
the United Kingdom and France as in 1956, and 
that Egypt was faced with a western alliance 
led chiefly by the United States, the United 
Kingdom and Canada which wished to use the 
United Nations force for imperialist purposes. 
Egyptian forces, he said, would have disarmed 
the force had it not been withdrawn. 
41. The United States and the United King-
dom both recognised the Gulf of Aqaba as 
international waters which would remain open ; 
the United States termed the blockade illegal 
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and potential-ly dangerous to peace while the 
United Kingdom said it would support inter-
national action through the United Nations to 
secure free passage. The Soviet Union blamed 
Israel for a dangerous worsening of tension. 
There were bilateral consultations between 
ministers of the United States, the Soviet Union, 
the United Kingdom, Israel and United Nations 
officials. 
42. On the early morning of 5th June Israeli 
forces attacked Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian 
forces and within three days had seized the 
whole Sinai Peninsula and all Jordanian terri-
tory west of the river. By lOth June the Golan 
Heights in Syria had been seized and by 11th 
June Israeli shipping was again passing through 
the Straits of Tiran. It was later disclosed that 
the "hot line" had been used on that day for 
personal discussion between President J ohnson 
and Mr. Kosygin and it was also announced 
that the NATO Permanent Council had held an 
extraordinary meeting to discuss the situation. 
43. On 6th June Cairo radio claimed that 
British and American carrier-based aircraft 
were aiding the Israeli forces. The claims were 
repeated by Egyptian and Syrian sources and 
totally denied by the United Kingdom and the 
United States whose aircraft carriers were not 
in range of the scene. On 8th June Israel 
released a recording of an intercepted radio con-
versation between President Nasser and King 
Hussein in which President Nasser had arranged 
joint announcements to the effect that American 
and British carrier-borne aircraft were attacking 
their forces. On the same day the United States 
communications ship "Liberty" was sunk by 
Israeli aircraft and torpedo boats fifteen miles 
north of the Sinai coast. Israel admitted respon-
sibility, apologised and offered compensation. 
44. The routine ministerial meeting of the 
North Atlantic Council on 14th June made only 
passing reference to the Middle East in its 
communique : 
"In accordance with their practice of con-
sulting together, ministers held an 
exchange of views on the Middle East 
situation following the hostilities ... they 
noted with satisfaction that a cease-fire 
has now taken place... member govern-
ments expressed their determination to 
support all efforts to establish a lasting 
peace in this area ... in accordance with the 
legitimate interest of all concerned." 
45. While the risk of direct confrontation 
between NATO countries and the Soviet Union 
may have been less in 1967 than in either of the 
other two Middle East conflicts in 1956 and 
1973, there were nevertheless considerable 
dangers. The Soviet Union did not support the 
western view that the Gulf of Aqaba was an 
international waterway; the United Kingdom 
and the United States asserted the right of their 
own vessels to free passage. The Soviet Union 
was a primary supplier of armaments to the 
Arab countries engaged in the hostilities, 
whereas the United States and to a lesser extent 
France and the United Kingdom were suppliers 
of Israel. The picture was however more com-
plicated in that Jordan had also received arma-
ments from NATO countries. Technically the 
Israeli attack on the USS "Liberty" was grounds 
for the United States to invoke Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty ; had a· similar mistaken 
attack been made by Egyptian forces, the situa-
tion could have been more serious. The 
emergency meeting of the NATO Permanent 
Council on 5th June is perhaps the first time 
that such a meeting has been held to consider 
a conflict in the Middle East. 
(uii) Warsaw Pact inuasion of Czechoslovakia, 
AugUBt 1968 
46. The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the 
Soviet Union and four of its Warsaw Pact allies 
late on 20th August 1968 was undoubtedly the 
most serious crisis to confront NATO. The large 
concentraJtion of Warsaw Pact forces along the 
northern frontiers of Czechoslovakia would have 
posed a direct threat to NATO had they been 
directed westwards. There was however no 
shortage of political and military warning of 
developments as a brief chronology will recall. 
47. Following the liberalisation measures of 
the Dubcek government early in 1968, concern 
in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries other than Romania soon became apparent. 
On 8th May political leaders of Bulgaria, East 
Germany, Hungary amd Poland met the Soviet 
leaders in Moscow - a meeting reported only 
in a very short Tass communique. From lOth 
to 11th May the western press reported Soviet 
troop movements in southern Poland, the 
Czechoslovak press agency stated that Czechoslo-
vakia had been informed in advance of Warsaw 
Pact country manoeuvres in southern Poland, 
adding that reports that they were directed 
against Czechoslovakia were considered to be 
political provocation. From 17th to 22nd May 
the Soviet Defence Minister Marshal Grechko 
accompanied by General Yepishev visited Prague, 
a communique stating that "concrete steps have 
been outlined for the further development of the 
friendship between the Soviet army and the 
Czechoslovak People's Army and the strength-
ening of their co-operation within the frame-
work of the Warsaw Treaty". 
48. At that time the deployment of Soviet 
army divisions in the Warsaw Pact countries 
was as follows : 
East Germany 20 (including 10 tank divi-
sions) ; 
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Poland 2 (including 1 tank division) ; 
Hungary 4 (including 2 tank divisions) ; 
None in Czechoslovakia or Romania. 
On 24th May the Czechoslovak press agency 
announced that Warsaw Pact manoeuvres would 
be held in Czechoslovakia and Poland in June 
under the command of the Soviet General 
Y akubovsky. These manoeuvres were held from 
20th June onwards, their end being announced 
in a statement from Moscow on 12th July. 
Soviet units remained in Czechoslovakia however 
for reasons attributed to "abnormal traffic con-
ditions" - their slow withdrawal was given 
full coverage in the Czechoslovak media. · 
49. From 14th to 15th July another limited 
meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders was held in 
Warsaw - a meeting again not attended by 
representatives from Czechoslovakia or Roma-
nia. A joint letter from the meeting to the 
Czechoslovak Central Committee stated in part 
that: "The frontiers of the socialist world, 
since World War II, have been pushed to the 
centre of Europe, the Elbe and the Forest of 
Bohemia ... " the signatories would "never agree 
to these historic gains being placed in jeopardy". 
50. On 19th July a NATO spokesman denied 
Soviet allegations that NATO had been involved 
m any way in political developments in Czecho-
slovakia, as alleged by the Soviet Union. From 
29th July to 1st August an extraordinary 
meeting was held at Cierna in Czechoslovakia, 
close to the Soviet frontier, of the entire Soviet 
Politburo and the entire Praesidium of the 
Czechoslovak Communist Party. This was fol-
lowed by a meeting in Bratislava on 3rd August 
of Communist Party leaders from Czechoslovakia, 
the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria 
and Eastern Germany - a meeting from which 
Romania was again absent. 
51. On 3rd August the Czechoslovak Ministry 
of Defence announced the departure from Cze-
choslovak territory of the last Soviet army unit 
from the June manoeuvres. On 4th August the 
Soviet General Shtemenko was appointed Chief 
of Staff of the Warsaw Pact forces. 
52. Finally on 19th and 20th August an extra-
ordinary meeting of the Central Committee of 
the Soviet Communist Party was held in 
Moscow - a meeting reported only by the 
western media - and at 23.00 hrs. on 20th 
August Warsaw Pact forces finally invaded and 
occupied Czechoslovakia. Again Romania took 
no part in the invasion and was reported to 
have denied passage across its territory to the 
token Bulgarian battalion that participated. 
53. At 01.00 hrs. on 21st August Prague Radio 
broadcast a statement by the Praesidium of the 
Czechoslovak Communist Party to the effect that 
forces of the foregoing countries had crossed 
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into Czechoslovak territory without the know-
ledge of the government, and that the Czecho-
slovak army had not received the command to 
defend its territory. 
54. On 23rd August a NATO spokesman said 
that the North Atlantic Council had met in 
permanent session to discuss the _situation con-
cerning early warning and that it would be 
neees8ary to halt the withdrawal of United States 
tl'()()ps from Europe. On 4th September the 
NATO Defence Planning Committee met in 
permanent session and issued a communique : 
"The Defence Planning Committee of 
·NATO, recognising that developments in 
. ' Czechoslovakia cannot fail ·to be of grave 
concern, has initiated a thorough BBSess-
ment of their implications for allied 
defence policy, particularly for force pos-
tures... [They] have accordingly affirmed 
the necessity of maintaining NATO's mili-
tary capability and of taking into account 
the implications of recent developments 
in. Eastern Europe in the planning of their 
. national forces." 
:western reports said that the initial invasion 
forces totalled some 250,000 to 300,000, and that 
by the .end of August there were over 600,000 
foreign troops - chiefly Soviet forces - in 
·Czechoslovakia. On 16th October a Soviet-
CzechoSlovak treaty on the stationing of troops in 
Czechosl9:vakia was duly signed. · 
,55, The regular ministerial meeting of the 
N()rth Atlantic Council on 15th to 16th November 
referred to the situation in Czechoslovakia in 
the strongest terms, saying in part : 
"The contention of the Soviet leadership 
. that there exists a right of intervention in 
the affairs' of other States deemed to. be 
within a so-called socialist commonwealth 
runs counter to the basic principles of the 
UN Charter, is dangerous to European 
. .security, and has inevitably aroused grave 
anxieties. It gives rise to fears of a further 
use of force in other cases. The use. of 
force and the stationing in Czechoslovakia 
of Soviet forces not hitherto deployed there 
have aroused grave uncertainty about the 
situation and about the calculations and 
intentions of the USSR. This uncertainty 
demands great vigilence on the part of the 
!l-Ilies." . 
56. It was the invasion of Czechoslovakia that 
led directly to to the establishment 9f a proper 
crisis management procedure and machinery 
within· NATO, as described ~elow. The Com-
mittee understands that the NATO military 
assessment of developments was accurate and 
rapid. The concentration of forces was known 
to be along the northern frontiers of Czecho-
slovakia ; the movement of troops had in fact left 
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gaps in .the Warsaw Pact forces deployed along 
other p~rts of NATO's ea~tern boundary. The 
assessment concluded that the Warsaw Pact was 
militarily prepared for the immediate occupa-
tion of Czechoslovakia, but the political assess-
ment in'NATO at the same time was that the 
Soviet Union would not risk the deterioration 
in Easi-West relations that would inevitably 
ensue i:(- its overt threats to the integrity of 
CzechoStovakia were carried out. It has to be 
remembered that in May 1968 the Reykjavik 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council had made 
its "signal" to the Warsaw Pact countries and 
proposed: • talks on mutual and balanced force 
reductions ; the Soviet Union was anxious to 
secure a .conference on security and co-operation 
in Europ~; the non-proliferation treaty was open 
for signature ; and SALT was in prospect. 
57. In the event the military assessment of 
capabilities was entirely correct ; the political 
assessmel)t was wrong. Finally late on 20th 
August the movement of Soviet transport air-
craft towttrds Prague airport was observed on 
NATO rti.dars . 
(vifi) Middle East conflict, October 1913 
58. Following President Sadat's secret visit 
to · Saudi Arabia, Syria and Qatar on 26th 
August 1973 (which was only announced after 
the event)· the summit meeting of three Arab 
leaders - President Assad of Syria, King Hus-
sein of Jordan and President Sadat- was held 
in Cairo from lOth to 11th September, being 
described· in the Egyptian press as having been 
to arrange the co-ordination of front-line Arab 
States in direct confrontation with Israel and 
the creation of a common Arab plan of action 
on the Middle East to ensure the realisation 
of Arab.aims. 
59. Fighting broke out on 6th October with 
an Egyptian attack across the Suez Canal and 
a Syrian attack on the Golan Heights. While 
there WeJ.!I no hostilities on the Jordanian fron-
tier, forces from Jordan, Iraq, Morocco and 
Saudi Arabia had been sent to Syria and parti-
cipated in the fighting. Libyan aircraft were 
also reported to have operated from Egypt. 
These hostilities resulted in far larger losses of 
tanks and aircraft than any previous Middle 
East conflict and demonstrated the effectiveness 
of the Soviet surface-to-air missiles in Egyptian 
hands and of the anti-tank guided missiles, 
chiefly those in Israeli hands. A cease-fire was 
finally obtained only on 24th October after 
Israeli fo~ces in a counter-attack across the 
Canal had encircled Port Said and the Egyptian 
Third Army. 
60. The oonflict led to a remarkable mixture 
of co-operation and confrontation between the 
United States and the Soviet Union, and public 
disagreement among the NATO countries. On 
lOth October the United States claimed that the 
Soviet Union had started a large air lift of 
military equipment to Syria and Egypt which 
was deemed "substantial" by 12th October. By 
13th October the United States had started its 
own "appreciable" air lift because the Soviet 
air lift was deemed "massive". By 15th October 
the United States claimed that the Soviet 
Union had delivered 4,000 tons of supplies in 
280 flights to Syria and Egypt, which used a 
route overflying Hungary, Yugoslavia, the 
Adriatic and the Eastern Mediterranean. Bel-
grade confirmed publicly on 18th October that 
it had authorised such overflights. 
61. The United States air lift ran into con-
siderable difficulties from its allies, only Por-
tugal allowing the Azores airfield to be used 
for the purpose. There were objections from 
Spain when it was reported that United States 
tanker aircraft based in Spain had been used 
for in-flight refueHing. On 16th October the 
United Kingdom Foreign Minister Sir Alec 
Douglas-Rome stated that the United Kingdom 
had imposed an embargo on arms supplies to both 
sides in the Middle East conflict, claiming that 
unlike the situation in 1967 it was an even-
handed embargo because both sides possessed 
British equipment. He added that "British 
military facilities overseas have not been and 
are not being used for the transit of military 
supplies to the battlefield". On 24th October 
two Israeli ships were reported loading arms 
supplies in Bremerhaven, and on 25th a German 
spokesman said that the United States had been 
asked to halt all arms shipments to Israel from 
Germany, and that weapons deliveries via Ger-
man territory or from United States depots in 
Germany could not be permitted. A United 
States spokesman on 26th October criticised 
United States allies for dissociating themselves 
from the United States in what was an effort 
in the common interest. 
62. Consultation between the United States 
and the Soviet Union apparently began with 
Dr. Kissinger's talks with Mr. Dobrynin, the 
Soviet Ambassador in Washington, from 16th 
October. Mr. Kosygin visited Cairo from 16th 
to 19th October and was said to have conveyed 
some of Dr. Kissinger's proposals to President 
Sadat. On 20th October, at Mr. Brezhnev's invi-
tation, Dr. Kissinger arrived in Moscow accom-
panied by Mr. Dobrynin. The United Nations 
Security Council was then able to agree on 
cease-fire resolutions on 22nd October and again 
on 24th October, only the latter being successful 
in halting the fighting. 
63. Confrontation was reflected in the increase 
in the Soviet Eastern Mediterranean fleet from 
its normal level of forty vessels to more than 
eighty - the highest ever - and the reinforce-
ment of the United States Sixth Fleet to a total 
of three aircraft carrier groups. After President 
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Sadat had called for the despatch of Soviet and 
United States forces to the Middle East to ensure 
observance of the cease-fire, the United States 
at 03.00 hrs. on 25th October ordered its forces 
world-wide to "Defence Condition 3"- an early 
stage of alert. Explaining the move later on 
25th October Dr. Kissinger said that the United 
States rejected proposals for a joint United 
States-Soviet force in the Middle East and was 
"even more opposed to the unilateral introduc-
tion by any great power, especially a nuclear 
power, of military forces into the Middle East 
in whatsoever guise these forces should be 
introduced" ; ambiguity in some actions and 
communications and some readiness measures had 
led to the calling of the alert. The ambiguities 
were later listed as the alerting of 50,000 .Soviet 
paratroops in Eastern Europe ; the reinforce-
ment of the Soviet Mediterranean fleet ; ~d the 
movement of Soviet transport aircraft to the 
Crimea. The United States alert was cancelled 
on 31st October when the Soviet paratroops 
were also reported to have been stood down. 
64. Although public statements do. not appear 
to have been made the press reported criticism 
by other NATO governments of the United 
States actions, and consultations with the Soviet 
Union, which had been made without prior 
consultation of other NATO countries. There 
appears to have been closer consultation among 
the nine countries of the European Community, 
which issued a first statement on 13th October 
calling for a cease-fire in line with the resolutions 
of the United Nations Security Council,. and a 
second statement on 6th November calling, fpr 
a return of forces to the lines occupied. on 
22nd October - the date of the first Security 
Council resolution, prior to the completion of 
the Israelis' encircling of Port Said. The first 
statement from NATO appears to have been in 
the communique after the routine meeting of the 
Nuclear Planning Group on 7th November 
reporting "a constructive discussion of -some of 
the implications for the Alliance of the recent 
crisis.,.". The communique issued after the 
ministerial meeting of the NATO Defence Plan-
ning Committee (i.e. excluding France) on 7th 
December said in part : "Ministers · discussed 
recent events in the Middle East and their 
implications for the security of the Alliance. 
Ministers took note of preliminary assessments 
of the lessons which NATO might learn from 
the conduct and outcome of this conflict... they 
noted with approval the steps which are being 
taken to ensure the sufficiency of military oil 
stocks essential for the defence of the· Alliance". 
The communique issued after the :ministeriai 
meeting of the full North Atlantic Council on 
11th December merely noted the Ministers' sup-
port for "relevant resolutions" of the United 
Nations Security Council. -
65. While a study of this conflict shows the 
failure of NATO to consult or produce an agreed 
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plan of action, in part because European mem-
bers were faced with an oil embargo, it also 
holds lessons concerning the ignoring of warning 
by the Israeli leaders who did not order mobili-
sation during the Yom Kippur holiday. Egyptian 
military preparations were evident, but they 
had been seen before just as President Sadat's 
warlike declarations had been heard. The con-
certation of so many Arab countries was perhaps 
a new event. Most significant perhaps was the 
departure of the Soviet navy from Egyptian 
ports and the departure of Russian families 
from Egypt some three days before the attack. 
But Israel had ordered mobilisation, at con-
siderable economic cost, on some three occasions 
since the previous hostilities, and the Cabinet, 
preoccupied with the kidnapping of a party of 
Jews in Austria, did not order mobilisation 
until early on 6th October when 100,000 soldiers 
were mobilised following Israeli intelligence 
reports that an attack had been decided on for 
sunset that day. 
(ix) The Cyprus crisis, 16th July 1974 
66. In an earlier report 1 the Committee had 
chronicled the evolution of the 1974 Cyprus 
crisis, triggered by the coup d'etat in Cyprus 
on 15th July engineered by the Colonels' regime 
in Athens, which overthrew President Makarios 
and led to landings by the Turkish armed forces 
on 20th July. This crisis did not hold a direct 
threat of Soviet military intervention. Soviet 
comment was moderate in tone initially ; it sought 
to discredit the Greek leadership and NATO 
which it held jointly responsible for the plot, 
and adopted an understanding attitude to Tur-
kish intervention ; after the fall of the Colonels' 
regime, however, the Soviet Union sought a 
rapprochement with the new Greek Government. 
The main thrust of Soviet actions was to seek 
to remove a political settlement from the frame-
work of the three-power Geneva talks to the 
United Nations Security Council where the 
Soviet Union would itself be directly involved. 
Following the visit by the Soviet Deputy Foreign 
Minister Mr. Tiyichev to Ankara, Athens and 
Nicosia from 11th to 18th September, the Soviet 
proposal was supported by the Greek Foreign 
Minister and by Mr. Clerides for the Greek 
Cypriot community but was rejected by 
Turkey. 
67. The Cyprus criSIS is referred to here 
because of the considerable strains it placed on 
NATO - the North Atlantic Council at per-
manent level held twenty-five meetings dui.ing 
the crisis, five of them in six days at its height. 
The Secretary-General of NATO deserves credit 
for his personal interventions which contributed 
1. Document 651, 14th November 1974. 
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to preventing an outbreak of war between Greece 
and Turkey in Thrace, where both countries 
had moved units of their armed forces. But 
1NATO consultations did not prevent the Turkish 
landings of 20th July, nor the subsequent with-
drawal of Turkey from the Geneva talks and 
its further military exploitation of the position 
of its forces in Cyprus on 14th August, despite 
the fall of the Colonels' regime in Greece. Later 
that day Mr. Karamanlis issued the following 
statement : "After the Atlantic Alliance demon-
strated its inability to prevent Turkey from 
creating a state of conflict between two allies, 
the Prime Minister ordered that the Greek 
armed forces should be withdrawn from NATO." 
Greece has not in fact withdrawn from the mili-
tary structure of NATO - Greek officers for 
example remain at their posts in the integrated 
NATO headquarters except that in Izmir in 
Turkey- and negotiations between NATO and 
Greece on the detailed implementation of the 
decision of 14th August 197 4 are still in pro-
gress as the Committee has elsewhere reported 
from time to time. 
68. On 29th July during the three-power talks 
in Geneva between Britain, Greece and Turkey, 
Mr. Mavros, the Greek Foreign Minister, called 
for an immediate meeting of the North Atlantic 
Council at ministerial level. His failure to secure 
such a meeting contributed considerably to Greek 
bitterness at what was seen as the impotence 
of NATO. Various reasons have been given 
in NATO circles for such a ministerial meeting 
not having been convened : there is said to 
be no difference in the powers of the Council 
whether it meets at the level of permanent 
representatives or ministers, and that no 
government in any case can dictate at what 
level (minister or ambassador) other countries 
should be represented at any meeting ; in 
any case it would have been virtually impos-
sible to expect fifteen foreign ministers to 
meet at twenty-four hours' notice. It has 
to be recognised however that there is in 
practice a considerable political difference 
between a Council meeting at ministerial and 
one at ambassadorial level ; no doubt many 
countries doubted very much whether in practice 
a ministerial meeting could have been any more 
helpful in producing a solution to the dispute 
involving two communities in Cyprus and two 
members of the Alliance - a dispute which is 
as far from settlement today. 
(x) Angola, 1976-76 
69. The Committee reports elsewhere 1 the 
chronology of Soviet (and Cuban) intervention 
in Angola. The crisis is recorded here as an 
1. Strategic mobility, Rapporteur Mr. Tanghe, Doou· 
ment '758, paragraphs 61 el Bell· 
example of the especial difficulty of reaching 
a common assessment in NATO concerning 
events outside the NATO area. It subsequently 
emerged that the United States had been giving 
limited clandestine support to the opponents 
of Mr. Agostinho Neto's MPLA since 1975, but 
the United States Administration was unable 
to persuade Congres9 to authorise material sup-
port, and not all NATO countries were agreed 
that the interests of the Alliance required the 
MPLA to be opposed merely because the Soviet 
Union was supporting it - the Portuguese air 
base in the Azores remained available to the 
Cuban air lift until 19th January 1976. 
70. With open hostilities in the Horn of Africa 
and the Soviet Union changing alliances in the 
area, there is an urgent need for a commonly 
agreed assessment of the situation and the inter-
ests of the Alliance in the whole African con-
tinent, where crises may well arise in the future, 
even as the Middle East moves very slowly 
to a settlement. 
Ill. Lessons of crises past 
71. The following observations can be made 
about crises past : 
(i) the perception of a crisis is subjec-
tive ; the interpretation of events, 
which may well be ambiguous, is 
crucial; 
(ii) the political assessment of intentions 
may well be wrong ; it was in the 
case of the Soviet invasion of 
Czechoslovakia in 1968 ; 
(iii) too frequently the political leadership 
fails to convert warning time into 
preparation time - military readiness 
measures are not ordered. Again in 
the case of Czechoslovakia in 1968, 
when some 300,000 Warsaw Pact 
troops were at instant readiness to 
move, no military readiness ..measures 
were ordered in NATO, although the 
. lowest - "military vigilaRce" - can 
be ordered by major NATO com-
manders on their own authority. It 
amounts to manning headquarters 
twenty-four hours a day and recalling 
staff from leave ; it could not have 
been held to be provocative. It must 
be remembered that at higher levels 
of readiness reinforcements have to 
be moved to Germany - 30,000 from 
the United Kingdom, more from the 
United States - and these moves 
take time. Warning time must not be 
wasted; 
(iv) internal political conflicts within the 
. Alliance can endanger the determina,.. 
153 
DOCUMENT 757 
tion of NATO to respond and act 
decisively. The coincidence of the 
Suez and Hungary crises in 1956 is 
one case. Cyprus in 1973 was a 
dangerous internal crisis. The NATO 
crisis management machinery itself is 
not relevant to such internal crises, 
. but political and diplomatic means 
within the Alliance are vital for their 
solution j 
(v) crises outside the NATO area can 
spill over and affect NATO itself-
cf. the Middle East crises ; 
(vi) the solidarity of the Alliance, swiftly 
demonstrated, is vital and can be 
very effective - cf. the Berlin crises; 
. crises; 
(vii) disturbances in the Warsaw Pact 
countries can spill over into the 
NATO area through the arrival of 
refugees ; or conceivably of retreat-
ing forces engaged in combat - the 
danger is acute where a common 
frontier with a NATO country 
exists : East Germany ; Czechoslova-
kia; 
(viii) the monolithic and closed nature of 
the Warsaw Pact tends to make its 
actions unpredictable for the open 
democratic societies of NATO. Con-
versely and paradoxically Warsaw 
Pact analysts may find the public 
. exp~ion of divergent views in 
NATO countries confusing to their 
regimented minds, and fail to per-
. ceive that NATO can reach consensus 
· and take firm action when a crisis 
occurs; · 
(ix) the response to a crisis should be 
firm and a commitment should be 
stated clearly - but room should be 
Jeft for . an adversary to withdraw 
wlierever possible -:- cf. Cuba ; 
(x) the study of past crises can provide 
valuable particular lessons for 
NATO. This is true of the Middle 
East wars of 1967 (need for aircraft 
shelters) aJ1d 1973 ~need for larger 
stocks of anti-tank and anti-aircraft 
missiles ; need for new tactics in the 
case of these missiles). 
IV. Desiabiliaing factors that could provoke 
ci Crisis . 
72. . It is impossible to compile an eXhaustive 
list of eircumStanees that oould provoke a crisis j 
history has an annoying habit of not repeating 
itself, and no one can adequately prepare against 
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an ·irrational decision. Nevertheless your Rap-
porteur does think it important to draw atten-
tion to certain possible destabilising factors : of 
these he considers that in the context of this 
report the most important is warning time and 
the changing military balance. 
(a) Wqrnlng time and the changing military balance 
73. Various reports have draw attention to the 
increase in numbers and capabilities of Warsaw 
Pact forces on the central front over the last 
eight to ten years. Oompared with the situation 
before the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet 
armed forces in Eastern Europe have increased 
from ·400,000 to 500,000 men, the number of 
divisions increasing from 26 to 31 - chiefly 
because of the reintroduction of Soviet forces 
into . Czechoslovakia, in positions very much 
closer to NATO's eastern border than hitherto. 
Over approximately the same time the number of 
Warsaw Pact main battle tanks in Northern 
and Central Europe is reported to have increased 
from 11,500 (including 6,000 with Soviet divi-
sions) to 19,000 (including 11,000 with Soviet 
divjsions). The numbers of tanks in each Soviet 
motorised rifle division has been increased by 
about sixty to eighty tanks. 
74. More significant perhaps than the increase 
in numbers in the ground forces has been the 
improvement in the quality of Soviet equipment 
with the introduction of the T-72 and T-62 main 
battle tanks, and the transformation of the 
tactical air forces from relatively short-ran~ 
interceptor and ground support aircraft to the 
riew MiG-21 J, K and L, the MiG-23 and the 
SU-17 and 19. Some of these aircraft have ranges 
more comparable to NATO strike aircraft such 
as the F-104, and this factor coupled with the 
1~ to NATO since 1967 of its airfields in 
France means that all remaining NATO tactical 
airfields in Germany and the Benelux countries 
must he considered within range of a first strike 
by. Wa~w Pact tactical air forces. The 
devastating effect of such a surprise attack was 
demonstrated by the Israeli forces in the 1967 
six-day war in the Middle East. 
75. Since the Cuban missile crisis the Soviet 
navy has been enlarged and transformed from a 
coastal force to an ocean-going fleet with a 
world-wide capability. There could be war at sea 
with relatively little warning time. 
76. The possible consequences of the new 
Warsaw Pact capabilities in Central Europe 
have been reported in partic.ular by Senators 
Nunn a:nd Bartlett in their report "NATO and 
the new Soviet threat" to the Senate Armed 
Services Committee in January 1977 - a report 
based largely on a study by Lt.-General J ames 
Hollingsworth, a former United States army 
commander. That report states in,ter alia: 
"Soyiet forces deployed in Eastern Europe 
now possess the ability to launch a paten-
US4 
tiaRy devastating conventional attack in 
Central Europe with little warning." 
Major-General Close, a Belgian divisional com-
mander, has attracted much attention with a 
recent study in which he claimed that Warsaw 
Pact forces could reach the Rhine in fol"ty-eight 
hours. Such alarmist conclusions have however 
been refuted by more reliable authorities includ-
ing the previous Chairman of the Military Com-
mittee, Admiral Sir Peter Hill-Norton, and, 
most recently, the Supreme Allied Commander, 
General Haig. An objective article by Mr. Les 
Aspin, a member of the United States House 
Armed Services Committee and a former systems 
analyst with the Pentagon 1, does not support 
them. The Institute for Strategic Studies' "Mi-
litary Balance" shows a reduction in the number 
of Warsaw Pact tactical aircraft on the central 
front from some 5,400 to about 4,100 over the 
last nine years, a decrease which has coincided 
with the introduction of the more modern air-
craft. NATO still retains superiority in the 
capability of its tactical aircraft and, it is widely 
believed, in the training of its crews and pro-
bably in the quality of its anti-tank weapons. 
77. Moreover the behaviour of the Warsaw 
Pact high command in the past when organising 
operations such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
has displayed slow deliberation rather than 
lightning improvisation ; that particular opera-
tion was after all preceded by exercises which 
amounted to a dress rehea.raal. 
78. The conclusion nevertheless remains that 
although a no-warning massive attack by Warsaw 
Pact forces across the central front to the Rhine 
or beyond remains a very unlikely if not impos-
sible contingency, Warsaw Pact forces do now 
possess the capability of taking more limited 
milita,ry action by way of air strikes at NATO 
airfields or armoured incursions into the North 
German plain with no warning at all. 
. . (b) Emergence of new nuclear powers 
79. There is little risk that within the two 
alliances there would be a proliferation of States 
obtaining nuclear weapons. However there are 
well-known risks of proliferation of nuclear 
weapons in other nations outside the Alliance. 
.As has been pointed out previously, world 
politics are so interlocked that major shifts in 
power in other parts of the world can have a 
spill-over effect into NATO. 
(c) Technical progress to a aucceaful nuclear first-
strike capability 
80. No such advantage presently exists. Even 
if such a capability emerged it would not pre-
I. NATO Review No. 4, August 1977, "A surprise 
attack on NATO - Refocusing the debate". 
dicate aggressions, but it would mean that one 
side would have the power to "lean" on the other 
and influence its policies. This p~ known as 
"Finlandisation" could produce results mare 
successful than outright war. 
(d) Disagreements within the AIUance 
81. The nature of the alliance of fifteen sove-
reign States voluntarily acting together always 
has within itself the seeds of disagreement 
and breakdown. The Soviet Union has shown its 
ruthless determination to stamp out all opposi-
tion within the eastern bloc in its actio~ against 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The West cannot 
and would not respond in this way. Indeed the 
West handled the most serious disturbance 
within the Alliance- the withdrawal of France 
- with considerable determination. But serious 
breakdowns in the Alliance could produce doubts 
as to the capacity to respond in the face of 
pressure. 
(e) Failure to respond in the early stage of a crisis 
82. NATO has never been seriously tested, 
but it is clear that failure to meet a provocative 
act decisively in the earliest stages would produce 
a serious crisis. This means that politicians must 
be clear about decisions to mobilise and deploy 
troops if circumstances dictate such action. If a 
serious crisis were to develop it could involve 
major troop movements and the ealling up of 
reservists. The Alliance must be ready to meet 
this eventuality. 
(f) Development of ciuil emergency plan~~ 
83. The balance of terror rests on the horren-
dous assumption that the end result of war is 
the destruction of whole cities and millions of 
persons. The development of civil emergency 
plans that would enable a State to evacuate 
cities or protect their population could have 
serious destabilising consequences. Paradoxically 
the exposure of populations serves to prevent 
the contemplation of nuclear attack. The Soviet 
Union has resumed civil emergency preparations. 
(g) Failure in international negotiation~~ 
84. The success of SALT II is vital. At the 
present time the negotiations are in a delicate 
stage. Indications point to success. It ·is clearly 
in the interest of world peace that such negotia-
tions should succeed. 
(h) Power straggle outside the NATO area 
85. It is no longer possible for NATO to isolate 
itself from the rest of the world: In particular 
the Middle East has been and is a dangerous 
flash-point which could drag in the superpowers. 
Angola too had wider significance than its Afri-
can location. In no . way would one wish to 
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encourage the involvement of NATO powers, but 
world developments can no longer be ignored. 
. (i) Military mistakes 
86. Action by either side produced by mistaken 
judgments could clearly be interpreted as 
pro~ocative acts, particularly if military ·forces 
ar.e involved. 
V. Crisis prevention 
87. The Committee has reported elsewhere 1 in 
some detail on the confidence-building measures 
included in the CSCE final act. By increasing 
warning time available in the event of any mili-
tary moves by an adversary, such measures can 
reduce the risk of mistaken interpretation of 
non-hostile activities by Warsaw Pact countries: 
The Belgrade conference should be used bY the 
western· countries to secure an improvement in 
the confidence-building measures already agree4· 
at Helsinki. Thus the threshold for the man~ 
datory prior notification of major military 
manoeuwes should be lowered from 25,000 to 
say 10,000, and other measures now optional or 
voluntary should be made mandatory __,... the. 
prior notification of other manoeuvres ; the i.1lvi-
tation of observers to m!J.noeuvres, under · con-
ditions which should be defined to ensure the 
measure is effective ; the prior notification . of 
major military movements. The record of imple-
mentation in respect of the existing agreement& 
is not good, as the Committee has reported 1.-
88. Your Rapporteur draws attention in this 
context to a recent report of the United Kingdom 
House of Commons Expenditure Committee 2 
which recommends that consideration be given, 
for the purposes of the final act, to defining and 
establishing an order of priority for the notifi-
cation of manoeuvres, movements, and mobilhm-
tion exerciseS, because of the impact these dif-
ferent military activities have on warning time. 
That report also recommends thart the obligation 
of notification be extended to naval and air .. 
exercises. 
89. In the .framework of the MBFR negotia-
tions the participating NATO countries have 
proposed certain "associated measures" which 
would need to be linked to any agreement on the 
reduction ·of forces ---: "verification measures" 
to permit the monitoring both of force with-
drawals and of residual forces; "non-cilrcum. 
1. European security and East-West relations, D<icu-
ment 744, 1st June 1977, paragraph 11; Document 726,. 
29th November 1976, paragraphs 45-53. 
2. Fifth report from the Expenditure Committee, 
Session 1976-77, Progress in implementing the final act 
of the CSCE, 19th May 1977. 
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vention" measures to specify e.g. the destination 
of forces withdrawn from the guidelines area ; 
and "stabilising measures" similar in general to 
oonfidence-building measures of the CSCE, but 
applicable especially to the conditions of the 
guidelines area, and including e.g. limitations 
on the size of troop movements and limitations 
on the size of manoeuvres. No response at all has 
been forthcoming from the Warsaw Pact nego-
tiators to the "associated measures" proposals, 
and the Committee hopes that the proposals will 
continue to be pressed by the NATO countries 
concerned. 
90. The Committee draws attention at the same 
time to proposals made by Mr. Aspin in his 
article quoted in paragraph 76 above that in 
view of the failure to progress on force reduc-
tions in the MBFR talks, they should be used to 
negotiate instead on measures like the foregoing, 
designed to add warning time and preclude the 
possibility of surprise attack : e.g. to require 
the presence of international observers at 
Warsaw Pact and NATO installations in Central 
Europe ; to restrict the number of people that 
can be involved in, manoeuvres and to limit their 
frequency ; lastly to limit the number of troops 
that can be rotated into Europe at any given 
time and to require prior announcement of such 
movements. 
91. The Committee recognises that any agree-
ment reached on MBFRs will in itself increase 
stability if appropriate "associated measures" 
are included. Certain of the latter measures on 
thek own might also serve to improve warning 
time. The former Chairman of the Committee, 
~r. J~lian Critchley, in his article on "Warnings 
and response" 1 concludes that "if we cannot rely 
upon. a warnmg then our defences must be 
adequate without it. If we accept the fact that 
warning is bound to be ambiguous then we must 
be capable of reacting repeatedly to fahJe alarms 
without commitment to war". 
VI. Crisis management 
(a) The atracture of NATO 
92. Before discussing the specific NATO 
machinery for crisis management, your Rappor-
teur wishes to recall first the political and 
military structure of NATO. The North Atlantic 
Council, established under Article 9 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, is the highest decision-making 
body in NATO, composed of representatives of 
the fifteen member countries. It meets under 
the chairmanship of the Secretary-General, and 
countries may be represented at ministerial level 
by foreign ministers or also by defence ministers ; 
it occasionally meets at the level of heads of 
1. NATO Review No. 4, August 1977. 
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State or of government. It is organised to meet 
permanently in Brussels at the level of ambas-
sadors - permanent representatives of the 
member States who head the national delegations 
at the NATO headquarters in Brussels. 
93. Since France withdrew from the integrated 
military structure of NATO, the French Repre-
sentative has withdrawn from the Council when 
m81tters affecting the defence structure are 
discussed, on which occasion the Council is 
referred to as the Defence Planning Committee 
(DPC), but apart from the absence of the 
French Representative this Committee is the 
same body as the North Atlantic Council. 
94. Under the Council are a number of com-
mittees and working groups on which all member 
governments are represented through members 
of their delegations· in the NATO headquarters; 
these committees deal with specific subjects such 
as political affairs, defence review, etc. Speci-
fically there is a committee on Council operations 
and exercises which is directly concerned with 
the organisation of crisis management pro-
cedures. 
95. On the military side, immediately under 
the Council, comes the Military Committee which 
is the link between the Council and the three 
major NATO commanders. It is composed of the 
chiefs of staff of all member countries except 
Iceland (which has no military forces). Like the 
Council, it is organised to meet in permanent 
sessi9n in the NATO headquarters, at which 
level member countries are represented by a 
permanent military representative who is a 
senior officer representing his chief of staff. 
France has not been represented at meetings of 
the Military Committee since it withdrew from 
the integrated military structure, but France is 
still represented at NATO headquarters at 
military level by the chief of the French military 
mission to the :Military Committee. 
96. The Chairman of the Military Committee 
is a· ·senior officer elected for a two- or three-
year_ period by the committee, and he heads an 
international military sllaff composed of service 
officers seconded from their national countries. 
The Chairman of the Military Commitree repre-
sents it on the North Atlantic Council. 
97. The North Atlantic Council and its com-
mittees are served by a civilian international 
staff under the authority of the Secretary-
General who is simultaneously Chairman of the 
North Atlantic Council. National delegations to 
the Council and its committees, national military 
delegations to the Military Committee, the 
civilian international staff and the international 
military staff are all housed in the same NATO 
headquarters building at Evere in which all 
meetings of the Council and Military Committee 
and their subordinate bodies are held. Admiral 
Sir Peter Hill-Norton has summarised the scope 
of the North Atlantic Council as follows: 
"The North Atlantic Council (or, for 
defence matters, the Defence Planning 
Committee) is the highest authority of the 
Alliance. · 
... all decisions taken in the Council or 
Defence Planning Committee (DPC) are 
expressions of the collective will of member 
governments. It is in the Council, or the 
DPC, that the views of governments are 
exchanged and, one would hope, harmon-
ised on all major issues. Consultation covers 
political, military, economic and a wide 
range of other subjects. It is interesting to 
note that to produce these same results 
through normal diplomatic channels, with 
each country independently consulting the 
. other fourteen, would require no less than 
105 bilateral exchanges on every separate 
issue or development. 
... under the Lisbon Agreement of 1952, 
member countries have delegated to their 
permanent representatives on the Council 
the responsibility of representing all ele-
ments of their governments." 
98. The NATO commands - Three major 
NATO commanders come directly under the Mili-
tary Committee and exercise command over the 
Atlantic Ocean, the European mainland includ-
ing the Mediterranean and the Ohannel respec-
tively. These are the Supreme Allied Comman-
der, Europe (SACEUR) with his headquarters 
at Casteau, Belgium ; the Supreme Allied Com-
mander Atlantic (SACLANT) with his head-
quarters at Norfolk, Virginia ; and Commander-
in-Chief Channel with headquarters at North-
wood, United Kingdom. 
99. These headquarters and those of a number 
0-f subordinate commands established under them 
are staffed by officers seconded from the 
national armed forces of the various countries 
assigning or earmarking forces for the commands 
.concerned. 
100. Apart from air defence forces, NATO com-
manders do not exercise command over forces in 
peacetime. They are respollsible for preparing 
defence plans, determining force requirements, 
determining in consultation· with the countries 
concerned the peacetime deployment of national 
forces assigned to the command, and conducting 
exercises of the assigned forces. Other forces 
"earmarked" for NATO command are those 
which will be made available to the command at 
a later stage of alert than the assigned forces ; 
the deployment of earmarked forces in peacetime 
is not determined by the NATO commands but 
they must be able to reach their assigned posi-
tions within a specified time of M-day. · 
(b) Crisis management 
101. Since the move of NATO headquarters to 
Brussels, and in partichla'r. since the invasion of 
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Czechoslovakia, NATO has acquired much of the 
material installations needed for crisis manage-
ment by the Alliance as a whole, and is pro-
gressively acquiring the experience and expertise 
needed for continuous on-going decision-making 
among fifteen countries. There is now a set of 
agreed procedures for crisis management. The 
NATO headquarters in Brussels has a situation 
centre permanently manned by inte:rnational 
military and civilian staff where the fifteen 
permanent representatives and their staff can 
be continuously informed of developments any-
where in the world and themselves provide in-
formation from their own capitals. The centre 
is backed up with improving communications 1 
by satellite and other means with the national 
capitals as well as with the NATO commands . 
Expertise is being acquired through the medium 
of the Hilex and Wintex exercises held in 
alternate years. The high-level exercise (Hilex) is 
essentially a free-play exercise at the lower end 
of the criSis spectrum - possible moves by 
potential adversaries are studied and appropriaJte 
responses improvised among the fifteen partici-
pants. The winter exercise (Wintex) series are 
designed primarily to test all NATO procedures 
through a pre-planned scenario. 
102. Crisis management can be considered to 
have three phases, which will be considered in 
turn: (i) crisis information ; (ii) crisis consulta-
tion; (iii) crisis management proper. 
(i) Crisis information 
103. Under the terms of· Article 6 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, the geographical area. to which 
the mutual defence obligation ertends is : 
- the territory of any of the parties in 
Europe or North America, the territory 
of Turkey, or the islands under the 
jurisdiction of any of the parties in the 
North Atlantic area north of the Tropic 
of Cancer; 
- the forces, vessels or aircraft of any of 
the parties when in or over these ter-
ritories or any area in Europe in which 
occupation forces of any of the parties 
were stationed on the date when the 
treaty entered into force, or the Medi-
terranean Sea or the North Atlantic 
area north of the Tropic of Cancer. 
104. While the mutual defence obligation of 
parties under the treaty is limited to the fore-
going area, it is clear from the analysis of past 
crises that information available collectively to 
the Alliance must cover a much larger area. 
NATO itself possesses no sort of intelligence-
gaJthering machine apart from the type of 
· I. The communications involved are described in 
Section VII below. 
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electronic information obtained from surveillance 
radar. National governments are the sole sources 
of information: It is essential therefore for all 
countries through their permanent delegations 
and military representatives to keep NATO 
headquarters fully informed at all times of 
developments anywhere in the world which could 
conceivably lead to a threat tO allied interests. 
While the provision of information to NATO is 
said to be better than in the past there is stiill 
need · for improvement, particularly the con-
tinued provision of information by a.ll countries 
throughout the developing phases of a crisis, 
even when their own interests may at times be 
felt to· be diverging from those of the Alliance. 
It is understood that there has been a tendency 
for information sources to "dry up" at certain 
crucial times. 
105. The provision of information to NATO 
must be a continuous daily p.rocess in normal 
times as well as in times of tension. NATO is 
now well organised to provide analysis by the 
major NATO commanders of intelligence received 
from national sources, and to disseminate 
intelligence and its analysis throughout the 
NATO commands and national capitals. 
(i'). Crisis consultation 
106. When the daily flow of information points 
to any possible threat to allied interest, there 
must be an immediate, continuous and world-
wide joint assessment of incoming information, 
even before the need to consider possible couTBeS 
of action arises. This is the problem of "crisis 
recognition" which is alwa'ys easier in retrospect 
than prbspect. 
107. A recent constructive development in 
NATO was the establishment of the "crisis 
assessment group" drawn from senior members 
of the international civilian and military staffs 
of delegations ; the Co:mm:ittee recommends that 
it be made permanent, to be activated during 
exercises and any period of tension. A common 
assessment of a situation based on a common 
analysis' of intelligence available to an govern-
ments and NATO staffs and commandent is the 
precondition for consultation and decision-
making in crisis management. Consultation 
between member countries is necessary not only 
in respect of possible collective action to be 
taken by NATO countries or by NATO-assigned 
forces but also in respect of actions to be taken 
individually by NATO countries when these are 
bouhd to have a direct bearing on the interests 
of the Alliance as a whole or any of its other 
members. Only in this way is it possible to main-
tain the solidarity of the A1Jliance, and for that 
solidarity to be clearly manifest. The analysis 
of historical crises reveals only too many 
examples where this consultation has been 
lacking. 
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(iii) Crisis· management proper 
108. When an impending crisis has been iden-
tified through the crisis assessment procedure 
more intenSe consultation becomes necessary on 
the range of p01i18ible courses of action to be 
considered.: The aim of crisis management is to 
prevent esealation to hostilities without sacri-
ficing the·. ·interests of the Alliance. Measures 
have to M designed to signwl clearly to an 
adversary the resolve of the Alliance to protect 
its interests; without the measures themselves 
leading irreversibly or uncontrollably to hosti-
lities. The tange of options available to NATO 
and individually to its member countries during 
a dev~loping crisis include political measures 
which can be world-wide and effectively co-
ordinated su,ch as the reca.ll of ambassadors ; con-
certed demarches by several or all NATO coun-
tries; the activities of NATO countries' military 
attacll.es ; they include economic measures such 
as possible· ·!rade sanctions ; they include a range 
of military .:ineasures short of actual preparation 
for hostilities such as the holding of military 
exeroises; or the deployment of the NATO im-
mediate reaction forces (ACE Mobi[e Force, or 
the Standing Naval Forces Atlantic or Channel) 
or the activation of the On-Call Naval Force in 
the. Mediterranean. The Committee recommends 
that the NATO immediate reaction forces be 
augmented, particularly through the duplication 
of ACE Mobile Force to permit the simultaneous 
deployment of a foroe to the northern and 
southern flanks. 
109. The three NATO countries possessing 
nuclear forces- France, the United Kingdom 
and the United States- all now have "hot lines" 
to the Kremlin. The use of these facilities has 
been reported on certain occasions. If the soli-
darity of the Alliance is to be maintained it is 
important for all member countries to be kept 
informed of any bilateral exchanges of any 
member country with the Soviet Union or other 
parties involved in crisis situations, whether 
through diplomatic channels or more directly. 
While the concept of a "hot line" between NATO 
headquarters and the Kremlin may not be 
thought desirable by the nuclear powers, other 
NATO countries may feel that such a develop-
ment could contribute to allied solidarity 
provided that an authorised spokesman for 
NATO be designated; he could only be the 
Secretary-General. The Committee recommends 
that the possibility be studied. 
110. If military measures become necessary 
because crisis prevention has failed, NATO has 
a system of alerts to ensure that assigned and 
earmarked ·:mroes are ready for any eventuality. 
The lowest level - military vigilance - can be 
ordered by any of the three major NATO com-
manders on: their own initiative ; this ensures 
that NATO· headquarters are manned twenty-
four hours a day and that the staff is at full 
strength. Political authority from the Defence 
Planning Committee transmitted through the 
Military Committee is required for any of the 
three degrees of formal alert up to general alert 
which would involve large-scale movement of 
assigned and reserve forces to their wartime 
:p<JSitions and the -call-up of reserves. Deploy-
ment of immediate reaetion forces is mentioned 
in paragraph 108 above. 
111. In peacetime NATO commanders exercise 
control of their air defence forces and have the 
authority to order interception by fighter air-
craft of any unidentified aircraft for purposes 
of identification only. If an intruder opens fire, 
fire may be returned by the interceptor. The 
Committee understands that the powers of 
NATO commanders, especially of maritime and 
air forces, is currently in the process of being 
clarified through negotiations in NATO. The 
present situation is not entirely clear and varies 
in different areas of NATO and in different 
countries. 
112. Land force commanders automatically have 
authority to protect forces under their command. 
Hostilities would be deemed to have broken out 
if forces of an adversary crossed a frontier, 
and national commanders would have the auto-
matic right to take defensive protective action. 
But apart from the air forces, a political deci-
sion must intervene before other forces are placed 
under the authority of NATO commanders. Cer-
. tainly political decisions will have to be taken 
before defensive strikes could be conducted 
beyond the territory of NATO countries. Apart 
from the release of nuclear weapons, which it is 
envisaged would be under close political control 
at all times, the authority of NATO commanders 
to conduct military operations would be an auto-
matjc function of the forces progressively placed 
under their command at the various stages of 
alert as ordered through the NATO political 
and military channels. 
113. Guidelines for the possible initial use of 
tactical nuclear weapons were originally discus-
sed at the Athens ministerial meeting in 1962, 
and have been updated since then. The Commit-
tee understands that if time and circumstances 
permit it there would be full consultation in 
the North Atlantic Council (or DPC) prior to 
any initial use. In the absence of unanimity 
in the Council/DPC concerning any request 
from a major NATO commander or national 
authority for the use of nuC'lear weapons, the 
consensus view, with a note of dissentients, 
would be presented to the nuclear power owner 
of the warheads concerned. In any circumstances 
there would be an obligation on the nuclear 
power owner of the warhead to consult at least 
the country owning the delivery system and any 
NATO country on which the weapon is based 
or would fall. 
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(c) llostillties 
114. As has been said the object of cr'lSJS 
management is to prevent hostilities from break;-
ing out. But if that objective fails, either becaUse 
of a military intervention by an adversary, or 
because NATO forces are compelled to u8e force 
to protect themselves or allied interests, it will 
be important for the management concept to 
continue after hostilities have started in order 
that appropriate political guidance and. strategic 
direction can be provided to the major NATO 
commanders and to ensure thalt defence arran-
gements themselves are designed at first. to 
compel an aggressor to break off an attack, ari-4 
to reduce the risk of hostilities spreading to all-
out conflict. If control is io be conserved, 
measures both before and after the outbreak of 
hostilities must remain reversible. · · 
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(d) Participation 
115. The .Committee stresses the importance ·of 
adequate participation by member countries in 
crisis management procedures whether in the 
annual exercises or in crisis situations proper. 
It is not only the manning of the NATO situa-
tion centre or the participation of national 
delegations that exercises the machine, it js the 
full participation of the machinery of govern-
ment in the national capitals that ensures real-
ism in exercises or effectiveness in real crises. 
It is understood that not all countries possess 
adequate communication and liaison between the 
various government departments concerned in 
the national capitals. It is a platitude to say 
that war is too important to be left to the mili-
tary authorities ; it is a fact that the closest liai-
son between civilian and military staffs in a 
large range of ministries is essential to crisis 
management. These would include obviously the 
Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, but 
also the. Ministry of the Interior, Ministries 
controlling air, sea and land transport awl' the 
Ministry of Health where hospital accommoda~ 
tion has to be considered. 
116. The level of political participation in an 
exercise is also important, and the practice of 
member countries is understood to vary widely. 
Some participate in exercises at the level of 
senior officials only. Others are said to involve 
senior ministers including at times the Prime 
Minister, in a national W8il' headquarters. The 
Committee stresses that crisis management plan-
ning cannot be realistic unless there is p:roper 
political participation at certain times. Only 
wilth that participation · can officials and the 
military authorities learn the type . of options 
which political ministers may be prepared to 
approve, and only in this way can ministers 
themselves be made familiar with the type of 
decision they may be called upon to take in a 
real crisis. 
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117. The Committee understands that the spe-
cial position of France is that it remains a 
member of the Alliance, bound by the North 
Atlantic Treaty, but that its military forces 
are not "integrated" into the NATO military 
structure in peacetime, and would not particip-
ate in any agreed NATO measures except on the 
sovereign decision of the French Government to 
be taken in the light of prevailing circumstances. 
In this latter respect the position of France 
hardly differs from that of the other NATO 
countries. It appears to the ·Committee that it 
will not be possible for France to take any 
timely military decisions to co-operate effoo-
tively with the Alliance in an emergency, unless 
it is in immediate and continuous possession 
of the information and agreed assessments avail-
able to the rest of the Alliance and on which 
NATO crisis management and defence decisions 
will be based. The Committee therefore urges the 
full participation of France in crisis management 
arrangements, without thereby implying any inte-
gration of French forces in peacetime, on the 
advisability of which the Committee would not be 
unanimous. 
VB. The infrastructure of crisis management 
(a) NATO communications 
118. NATO has developed its communications 
system progressively since the first military 
command headquarters were established in the 
1950s. Starting with leased civilian telephone 
and telegraph links, commonly funded infra-
structure programmes were used to improve 
these links in the later 1950s, and in the 1960s 
for the first time a commonly funded and owned 
radio system linking NATO subordinate com-
mands was introduced in Europe - ACE High 
- a. microwave tropospheric scatter system. 
119. · At the same time the early radar systems 
were brought into the NATO air defence ground 
environment (NADGE) providing air defence 
control and early warning through a chain of 
seven major radar stations linked to the air 
defence command posts and major headquarters. 
The radar chain itself intermeshes with the 
Canadian-United States distant early warning, 
(Dewline), so that together the two systems pro-
vide an unbroken radar screen from North Cape 
in Norway to Eastem Turkey and . across the 
northern land mass of the North American con-
tinent as far as the Pacific Ocean. 
120. All these communications and early wam-
ing projects were "hierarchieal" military systems 
linking the NATO military headquarters down-
wards to their subordinate cODliilinds ; they were 
designed for the command and control of forces 
assigned to NATO commands. When a crisis 
management system was first discussed in NATO 
following the move to Brussels in 1967, a first 
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politicall'!l oriented communications system was 
established known as the NATO-wide commu-
nications system (NWCS) using various existing 
and planned communications links to provide a 
teletype network linking the NATO headquarters 
in Evere, Brussels, to the national governments 
of the Alliance (excluding France) as well as 
providing links to major NATO commanders and 
a parallel system to national ministries of 
defence. The decision to establish the system was 
taken at a special meeting of defence ministers 
in December 1967. 
121. At the same time a decision was taken 
to supplement the existing physical communica-
tions links provided by ACE High and leased 
land lines with a modern satellite communica-
tions sygtem which now has twelve ground sta-
tions located in or near the capitals of all NATO 
countries (except France, Iceland and Luxem-
bourg) using the Satcom series of geostationary 
satellites. This system again is jointly funded 
and owned by the NATO countries. 
122. In 1970 at a meeting of the NATO defence 
ministers it was decided to integrate all NATO 
communications systems into a single new sys-
tem to be known as the NATO Integrated Com-
mrinications System (NIOS) to be jointly funded 
and owned by the NATO countries. New equip-
ment required for the system would be "produc-
tion shared" - manufacturers of communica-
tions equipment in all participating countries 
would receive production orders representing 
)Vithin narrow limits the countries' contribution 
to the NICS budget. 
123. The new system would provide an inte-
grated grid network of communications serving 
all users- military headquarters, NATO head-
quarters, national governments, and national 
ministries of defence -throughout the NATO 
·area. All existing transmission systems will be 
incorporruted into NIOS whether land lines, sub-
marine cables, tropospheric scatter or satellite. 
But at the terminal points on the grid there 
will.be automated switches for telephone traffic 
and automatic roulting for telegraphic traffic. 
By substituting a grid system of communications 
for the traditional hierarchical system where 
circuits radiate downwards from headquarters to 
subordinate headquarters, redundant routes will 
.be provided ensuring that· communications can 
be maintained even when certain links are out 
of action. · 
124. In particular the satellite communications 
system will be relied on to provide ·long-distance 
Jinks ; access for isolated users such as naval 
fqrce commanders ; broadcast nets for high-level 
NATO commanders. 
125. Because of the h.igh cost the implementa-
tion of the NICS project has been divided into 
two Stages, stage one io be completed by 1981. 
This stage will provide improvements to the 
satellite communications links ; telegraph auto-
matic relay equipment, which will become opera-
tional from 1978 to 1981 ; a pilot secure voice 
projoot --- to permit the use of voice communica-
tion without risk of interception ; an initial voice 
switched network will become operational by the 
summer of 1978 to completion in September 1980. 
SiXteen modern telephone exchanges in this ~ 
teni will provide secure voice communication for 
users.: 
126. T.he satellite communications system will 
be ~proved with further ground terminals and 
increase in capacity. Phase three NATO satellites 
were launc4ed in .April1976 a.ri.d January 1977, 
and new ground terminals in addition to the 
existing twelve will be delivered from the end 
of 1979 onwards. 
127. Figures published by NATO up to 1976 
show the following total expenditures on com-
munications and early warning systems: 
.Amounl m millions 
Item of intema~ional 
accoUnling uniU 
(I.AU) 
I. Land lines, submarine 
cables, radio links and 
NICS projects ........ 326 
. 2. ·:&aar· warning instal:-
lations · ...... : .••. : . .. 67 
3. Air defence ground en-
vironment ............ 115 
128, ·Phase- two of the NICS will be imple-
mented from 1981 onwards, and decisions are 
now urgent on detailed plans for that phase. 
The Committee understands t}lat improv~ qua-
lity and capability will require a change from 
two-'\\fire to four-wire ~ircuits throughout NICS. 
In view ·of . the introduction of digital rather 
than rot:isting analogue systems in- many national 
strategic and tactical communications systems it 
will be essential for NICS to adopt. the ~e 
digital technology in Phase two. The Committee 
has been mfortned ·that digital techniques p~ 
vide grea~r capacity-on existing circuits, greater 
security of communication through automatic 
encryption of all transmissions, greater capability 
for computer data transmission, and the ;main-
tenance of voice quality and indeed the quality 
of all transmissiOn' independently- of the numbe~ 
of terminals through whlch a message may be 
traruunitted and relayed. The difficulty will be 
deciding on standardised digital systems com-
patible with various pre-existing national systems 
both military ·and ciyil wh~h are not now always 
sta$rdised _even with41 individual countries 
of the Alliance. 
11 
DOCUMENT 757 
129, For the reasons stated in pa,rwaph 117 
th~ Conup_ittee stresses the desirability of full 
French participation in NIOS. The installation 
of a major NICS terminal in the Paris area, to 
include· a sawllite ground station, would doubt-
less· improve the security of the whole system 
through the increase in redundancy. ; more 
important,. it w.ould prevent the isolation of the 
FJ;'eneh Government from emergency consulta-
tioJJS between its allies. It would have the added 
~dvantage of offe,ing *e possibility of leased 
circuit$ in the NATO sateUite system for French 
nationa.l communications.· The United -Kingdom 
already uses certain NATO circuits ~or purely 
natio;nal purposes on a repayment basis. 
(b) National systems 
France 
130. F~~ce has a number of separate strategic 
communication systems for the . three . services. 
The army relies on the Reseau inter-arm.ies de 
transmissions (RITTER) which, like all modern 
coinmunications systems, is based on a main 
network ·compriSing a quadrilateral with corners 
at Paris, Tours, Dijon and La Courtine. These 
four points are linked by 1 kW tropospheric scat-
ter transmitters which have-a range which covers 
the sides of the quadrilateral of about 500 to 600 
kilometres. Links from the main stations to user 
subscribers are by line of sight microwave cover-
ing distances of 40 to 60 kilometres with lower 
power transmitters. · With computer-controlled 
automatic switching telegraphic traffic can be 
handled, with a maximum capacity of 40,000 
baud, equivalent to some five messages per 
second. This capacity is understood to be the 
Sa.me -order as that of the NATO Integrated 
Communications System, "in which France is not 
participating. RITTER is linked at the peri-
phery of the liystem by line of sight microwave 
relay with French forces in Germany at Baden-
Baden and Treves. 
131. The French air force uses a separate grid 
network comm:uni~tions system known as the 
Reseau hertzien air 70 {RA-70). This communi-
cations·. network provides links with the new 
NATO· air headquarters' on the central front, 
AA.FCE .(Allied Air Forces Central Europe), 
to be l9Cated at Boerfink in its war headquarters 
co~located with headquarters AFCENT. The air 
force sy8tem transmits radar control and warn-
ing information - France remains integrated 
~n tl:~e NATO air defence ground environment 
system for control and reporting only - and 
links up With additional radar coverage in South-
:f}ast France, ·oriented towards the Mediterra-
nean, which is outside the NATO system proper. 
The air force · sy~~m includes communication 
with the strategic nuclear fprces Mirage IV and 
the strategic missiles of the_ Plateau d'Albion. 
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132. The French navy has a number of com-
munications systems. In France there is the 
Reseau telegraphe marine for telegraphic traffic 
using civilian post office cables between the 
main centres. The navy also has a data trans-
mission network (Reseau transmissions donnees 
marine - RTDN) concerned with store-keeping 
data in naval depots. The world-wide Organisa-
tion maritime de transmissions (OMAR) provides 
links with the French navy at sea and has sta-
tions at Fort de France, Paris, Papeete, Noum.OO., 
Reunion Island, Dakar and Djibouti. The Orga-
nisation mondiale inter-armee de transmissions 
(OMIT) is still a radio-based communications 
system which relies on some channels through 
the civilian satellite communications system 
Intelsat as a supplement to the national channels. 
It has stations at Noum&!., Papeete, Pointe-8.-
Pitre, Paris, Djibouti and Dakar and when neces-
sary in the Kerguelen Islands. It was pointed 
out to the Committee that other countries such 
as the United States and the United Kingdom 
are already using military satellite systems for 
world-wide military communications. 
133. From 1971 to 1976 studies were carried 
out to see whether it was possible to integrate 
the systems of the three services, but integration 
has been abandoned because the requirements of 
the services and the locations of their main user 
headquarters are too different. In view of the 
amount of traffic handled on the military sys.. 
tems they are considered cost effective - the air 
force system RA-70 is said to have cost F 600 mil-
lion, and to be no more expensive than using 
civilian post office circuits. 
134. In the future interoperability between 
existing systems will have to be sought. It was 
noted that the navy data transmission system 
used for stock-keeping is not compatible with 
the French civilian post office data transmis-
sion system. The French air force is to introduce 
a data transmission system for stock-keeping and 
will have to choose between the two existing 
systems. 
135. There appears to be an overall problem 
of widely-differing communications standards 
both between the civilian and military systems 
and between military systems within the Alli-
ance. It was pointed out to the Committee that 
FINABEL, EUROCOM, NATO and the United 
States armed forces had all adopted different 
standards covering characteristi«B of communi-
cations systems. 
136. France will aim at a communications sys-
tem interoperable with the NATO Integrated 
Communications System and expects to moder-
nise existing circuits and to introduce digitalisa-
tion for all circuits - speech, telegraph, data 
transmission and facsimile - which will make 
for easier handling of all types of traffic and 
easier encyphering. 
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Other countries 
137. The Committee has not had the opportunity 
of studying other national communications sys.. 
tems in so much detail. It understands that the 
United Kingdom has a policy of using leased 
civilian post office circuits for military purposes 
within the United Kingdom, believing that this 
arrangement offers greater military security, 
because of greater redundancy in the civilian 
communications network, at lower cost than a 
military system. Special military communica-
tions have been provided to the strategic sub-
marine fleet, and there is one tropospheric scat-
ter link to British forces in Germany. 
138. United Kingdom experience with its geo-
stationary satellite communications system Sky-
net has not been satisfactory, and the require-
ment for it has now fallen with the concentra-
tion of forces and defence commitments in the 
NATO area. The policy now is to rely in'Creas-
ingly for purely national military purposes on 
leased cireuits in NATO, United States and civi-
lian (Intelsat) satellite systems which have pro-
ved more reliable and offer greater security 
through redundancy at much lower cost. 
VID. Conclusions 
139. The Committee's principal conclusions are 
set forth in the draft recommendation. 
Preamble, last paragraph 
140. The need for political courage in convert-
ing warning time into preparation time is stres-
sed in paragraphs 71(iii) and 82 of this explana-
tory memorandum. 
Operative text, paragraphs 1(a) and (b) 
141. The improvements in confidence-building 
measures and in associated measures here envi-
saged are described in paragraphs 87 to 91. 
Paragraph 2(a) 
142. The need for French participation in crisis 
management arrangements is stressed in para-
graph 117. 
Paragraph 2{a) (i) 
143. The NICS is described in Section VII, 
paragraphs 118 to 129. 
Paragraph 2(a) (ii) 
144. The need for full participation in Cr1818 
management exercises is stressed in paragraphs 
115 and 116. 
Paragraph 2(a) (iii) 
145. The need for the provision and evaluation 
of information and for joint assessment is dealt 
with in paragraphs 106 anci 107. 
Paragraph 2(a) (iv) 
146. Possible crisis management decisions and 
options designed to avoid hostilities are described 
in paragraphs 108 and 109. 
Paragraph 2(a) (v) 
147. The NATO immediate reaction forces are 
mentioned in paragraph 108. 
Paragraph 2(a) (vi) 
148. Military alert measures are described in 
paragraphs 110 to 113. 
Paragraph 2(b) 
149. In recommending that the North Atlantic 
Council establish •an ad hoc group the Com-
mittee has in mind a mixed team of not more 
than six persons, civilian and military, of the 
level of counsellor or colonel, drawn from the 
international staffs and certain delegations, who 
163 
DOCUMENT 757 
would be instructed to review, and make recom-
mendations for the improvement of, all existing 
machinery and procedures for crisis management 
in the light of experience both from Willltex 
and Hilex exercises and from actual crises of 
the recent past, whether or not the NATO machi-
nery was activated for their management. 
Paragraph 2(c) 
150. The proposal for a NATO "hot line" to 
the Kremlin is contained in paragraph 109. 
IX. Opinion of the minority 
151. In the draft recommendation one member 
of the Committee would have deleted all refe-
rence to NATO. In paragraph 1 (b) a minority 
of the Committee would have deleted the word 
"NATO" on the grounds that some proposals 
of the Warsaw Pact countries should be taken 
into account ; two members suggested that the 
Council of WEU should formulate proposals 
for MBFRs. In paragraph 2 (c) a minority would 
have substituted the words "the headquarters 
of the Warsaw Pact" for the words "the Govern-
ment of the Soviet Union" ; one member would 
have deleted the sub-paragraph. 
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Amendment No. 1 
28th Novelllber 1977 
Communications and crisis management tn the Atuance 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Pawek%yk 
At the end of paragraph 1 ofthe draft recommendation proper, insert the following new sub-paragraph : 
"(c) by ensuring that the arms control negotiations in which members of WEU are participating 
cover all categories of weapons (including the so-called grey-area weapons) which have an 
immediate impact on European security;". 
Bi(fiWl : Pawelczylc 
1. See lOth Sitting, 29th November 1977 (Amendment amended and agreed to). 
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Amendment No. 2 
29th November 1977 
Communications and crisis management in the Alliance 
AMENDMENT No. 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Stoffelen 
In sub-paragraph 2(a) (v) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "in the augmentation of" 
and insert "in assigning more elements of existing national forces to". 
Signed : Stoffelen 
1. See lOth Sitting, 29th November 1977 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Amendment No. 3 
29th November 1977 
Commanieations and crisis management in the Alliance 
AMENDMENT No. 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Banlrs 
In sub-paragraph 2(a) (iii) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "the provision and evalua-
tion of information, and in consultation, on a world-wide immediate and continuous basis, covering any 
events that may involve allied interests with a view to". 
Signed : Banlc8 
1. See lOth Sitting, 29th November 1977 (Amendment withdrawn). 
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Amendment No. 4 
29th Nove~ 1977 
Communications and crisis management in the Alliance 
AMENDMENT No. 4 1 
tabled by MM. Rfufius and RivUre 
I. Leave out paragraph 3 of the preamble to the draft recommendation and insert : 
''Noting the existence of procedures for exchanges of information and consultation between the 
member States of the Atlantic Alliance in the event of international crises but regretting the absence 
of comparable procedures in the European framework and deploring the fact that the governments 
of the WEU member countries do not make use of the poBSibilities offered in this respect by the 
Brussels Treaty ;". 
2. At the beginning of the draft recommendation proper, leave out "That it urge member governments". 
3. Leave out paragraph l(b) of the draft recommendation proper and insert: 
"(b) by taking steps towards general, complete and controlled disarmament in the framework of all 
negotiations which respect the real equality of participating States ; , . 
4. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (a) and insert: 
"(a) by calling on all member countries to participate fully in the most appropriate European frame-
work (WEU or the European Community) : 
(i) at an appropriate high official and, from time to time, at political level, with all relevant 
government departments, in crisis management exercises based on likely and realistic 
scenarios; 
(ii) in the provision and evaluation of information and in consultation covering any events 
that may involve European interests with a view to developing a collectively-agreed assess-
ment of a crisis situation ; 
(iii) in subsequent crisis management decisions as often as may be necessary, including the 
implementation of diplomatic and economic measures ;". 
Signed : Radi'U8, Riviere 
I. See lOth Sitting, 29th November 1977 (Amendment negatived). 
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Strategic mobility 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
CommfttU on Defence Qwtstions tmd Armaments 1 
by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur 
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1. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to 0 with 
2 abstentions. 
2. Mem'ber8 of the Committee : Mr. Boper (Chairman) ; . 
MM. de Koster, Pawelcsy'k (Vice-Chairmen) ; MM. Ahrens, 
Beauguitte, ter Beek, Boldrini, Bonnel, Boucheny, Critch-
ley (Alternate : Banks), Dejaram, FoBBOn, lkant, Hand-
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Ios, Hardy, Konen (Alternate: Bpavt.), Lemmrich, Mag-
giMH, M6nard, Nessler, Peccl&ioli, Biviere, Boberli, 
Schmidt Hermann, Scholten (Alternate : 11an H ulri), 
Tanghe, Whitehead (Alternate: Wat'kin&on). 
N.B. The MfMB of tko1e tamg part m: the wte are 
priRted m itaUcB. 
The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on strategic mobility 
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Noting the great increase in the strategic mobility of the armed forces of the Soviet Union in the 
last decade ; · 
Stressing the need for the armed forces of the Atlantic Alliance on routine NATO missions to .1>8 
able to move freely throughout the area of the Alliance, but noting that as yet not all members o~er 
sufficiently convenient arrangements ; 
Welcoming President Carter's initiative in calling for the demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean, but 
stressing further the need for the armed forces of certain allied countries to have ready access to areas, of 
the world where those countries exercise responsibilities ; · 
Noting the significance for strategic mobility of decisions to be taken at the Conference on the Law 
of the Sea, 
RBCOliDfENDS TO THE COUNOIL 
That it urge member governments : 
1. Through their representatives on the North Atlantic Council to call on all countries of the Atlantic 
Alliance: 
(a) to offer mutual overflight and staging rights for military transport and combat aircraft, on 
routine NATO missions or agreed exercises, subject only to normal notice through air traffic 
control or military channels ; 
(b) to permit routine port visits by warships of countries of the Alliance on normal NATO tasks at 
not more than two weeks' notice through military channels, and to waive charges on an agreed 
uniform basis, or consider multilateral funding ; 
2. Through their representatives at the Conference on the Law of the Sea to call for : 
(a) the high seas status, or a status no more restrictive for the operation of warships and military 
aircraft, of all waters beyond the territorial sea of a maximum breadth of twelve miles to be 
maintained ; 
(b) the right of transit passage, as now defined in the informal composite negotiating text, through 
all straits linking two parts of the high seas as defined in paragraph 2 (a) above, to permit ·the 
overflight of aircraft and passage of warships, including the submerged passage of submarines, 
in normal operational mode. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Tanghe, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. On 26th May 1976 the Committee appointed 
Mr. Etienne Duvieusart to be Rapporteur on the 
present subject, instructing him to report on the 
material and political difficulties of securing 
strategic mobility, including refuelling facilities 
and overflying rights for air forces and bun-
kering facilities and rights of passage for war-
ships, both within the NATO area and world-
wide. Mr. Duvieusart's preliminary examination 
of the subject revealed no collected body of infor-
mation on which the report could have been 
drawn. Accordingly, as the Committee stated in 
its preliminary report adopted on 19th May 1976 
(Document 709), the Rapporteur prepared a 
questionnaire for circulation to MiDJistries of 
Defence of the countries of NATO and of the 
European Community. 
2. On the Committee's preliminary report, the 
Assembly adopted Order 46 on 16th June 1976 
requesting the Committee "to continue its studv 
of the problems of strategic mobility and report 
at an earLy date". 
3. A first draft of the present report was pre-
pared by Mr. Duvieusart and discussed by the 
Committee at its meetings in Rome on lOth May 
and in London on 1st June 1977. The first draft 
report was then referred back to the Rapporteur 
for reVTision, chiefly because certain countries 
had not replied to the questionnaire, and the 
Committee felt that information on which the 
report was based was incomplete. The item was 
accordingly removed from the agenda of the 
first part of the twenty-third session of the 
Assembly by the Presidential Committee, but has 
been placed on the agenda of the second part. 
4. Following changes in the Belgian Delegation 
Mr. Duvieusart ceased to be a member of the 
Assembly. The Committee accordingly appointed 
your present Rapporteur to succeed him on 20th 
September 1977. The present revised draft 
report remains very much the first draft of 
Mr. Duvieusart, but has been thoroughly revised 
by your Rapporteur to take account of views 
expressed during earlier discussion in the Com-
mittee, and also of the replies and comments 
since received from governments. 
U. The questionnaire on strategic mobility 
5. The text of the questionnaire is reproduced 
at Appendix I. Under covering letter from the 
Clerk, this questionnaire was sent in October 
1976 to the countries of NATO and of the Euro-
pean Communilty. Copies were completed and 
returned by Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, 
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the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey and 
the United Kingdom before the first draft of 
this report was prepared. Ireland and the United 
States sent letters in repLy containing more 
general information relevant to the subject. A 
copy of the questionnaire was communicated for 
info!l?-ation to the a"';lthol"ities of Iran, prior to 
a VlSlt by Mr. DuVIeusart. Other information 
releVIant both to the NATO area and to the rest 
of the world was secured at interviews. 
6. · On the Rapporteur's instructions following 
the first discussion in Committee, the' Clerk sent 
further letters to the Ministries of Defence of 
countries not having replied to the questionnaire 
and also communicated copies of the first draft 
report for comment to all Ministries of Defence 
to whom the questionnaire had been addressed. 
Replies to the questionnaire have now been 
received from France, Germany and Italy and 
comments on the first draft report have 'been 
received from Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
France, Norway, the United Kingdom and the 
United States. 
7. Replies to the questionnaire vary in the 
a!flount of de~ they contain, but together pro-
vide a considerable amount of information 
through cross reference, because the question-
naire asks each country both about the facilities 
it exte~ds to military aircraft and ships of other 
countnes, and about the facilities which that 
country's aircraft and ships receive from other 
c?untries. ~ross-che:cking in this way has pro-
vided considerable mformation about the situa-
tion within the NATO area, with which this 
r~port is primarily concerned, yet at the same 
time, probably due to differences of interpreta-
tion by offieialB in different countries has also 
yielded some contradictory informatio~. 
8. Beyond the NATO area less precise informa-
ti~n has been obtained from the questionnaire, 
chi(lfly because fewer countries are concerned 
with military movements there. Two countries 
felt unable to discLose specific bilateral pro-
cedures affecting other countries ; one provided 
a general statement of policy. 
9. Because of the more forthcoming attitude of 
some countries and the cautious reticence of 
others, your Rapporteur has concluded that it 
wou1rl be invidious to publish the texts of coun-
try replies. They are on file in the Office of the 
Clerk and may be inspected by members of the 
Committee. Your Rapporteur is grateful to all 
the officials of the many countries who were at 
pains to supply the information on which this 
report draws. 
10. It will be convenient to deal with air and 
naval movements in the NATO area first as 
' 
unsurprisingly, replies reveal a very different 
pattern of arrangements for military movements 
outside that area, although in the case of naval 
movements, the differences are less marked than 
for the movements of aircraft. 
m. The NATO area 
(a) Air mouements 
11. Movements of military aircraft of NATO 
countries, whether combat or transport aircraft, 
whether for overflights or staging, when within 
the areas of major subordinate commands on 
routine NATO missions (support missions, liaison 
and postal flights, training missions are cited) 
have reasonable facilities in the Central and 
Northern European areas, aircraft being 
required simply to file a flight plan with air 
traffic control, advance notice varying from half 
an hour to one hour through established tele-
communications, but these facilities may be 
granted subject to ICAO regulations being 
observed. Diplomatic or other official written 
appLication is not involved; However, the precise 
situation varies somewhat being general1y 
governed by bilateral arrangements between 
individual NATO countries. 
12. It emerges from some of the more detailed 
replies that a fairly liberal core of countries in 
this area requiring ATC notice only comprises 
Belgium-Luxembourg, Denmark, Germany and 
the Nether1ands. Germany states that reciprocity 
is a condition of granting such facilities to 
NATO countries in general, air forces stationed 
in Germany have additional rights under the 
NATO status of forces agreement and supple-
ments. Flight plans or ATC notification are not 
required of aircraft operating within the NATO 
air defence system. France offers special 
"occasional" authorisation for overflights to 
NATO countries requiring only three days' 
notice through military channels ; it is under-
stood that such requests can be granted on an 
annual quota basis; only ATC notice need then 
be given when a flight is made. France author-
ises low-level flight training over its territory 
for aircraft of Belgium, Canada, Germany and 
the United Kingdom and enjoys the same 
privileges for its own aircraft in Germany, Italy 
and the United Kingdom. Individual countries 
may enjoy similar facilities (air traffic control 
notice on11y) in a wider range of countries 
including Canada, Iceland, Norway, United 
Kingdom and the United States, to which again 
Italy should be added for overflight (not stag-
ing, which requires at least forty-eight hours' 
notice), if annual quota arrangements are taken 
into account, although one country has more 
permanent arrangements for overflight. Italy 
reports that it requires ten days' diplomatic 
clearance for flights requiring reservation of a 
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large amount of airspace involving the issue of 
a notice to airmen (NOT AM) ; it requires twenty-
four to forty-eight hours' notice through mili~ry 
channels for low- and very-low-level flights. 
Other Southern European NATO countries gen-
erally appear to require diplomatic clearance, 
involving written appLication, with notice rang-
ing from three to seven days, but here also a 
small number of NATO countries have bilateral 
agreements allowing air movements to be 
arranged after ATC notice only. Canada requires 
diplomatic clearance, with fourteen days' not~ce, 
except for countries with which it has specific 
bilateral. arrangements. 
13. More formal arrangements may, however, be 
required for certain categories of flight. 
Belgium, for example, states that it requires 
forty-eight hours' notice through military chan-
nels where special supplies may be required on 
landing, or where staging facilities for VIPs, 
flights by formation of more than nine aircraft, 
photographic missions other than those included 
in NATO exercises are involved. Full diplomatic 
clearance of from three to fourteen days may 
be required for aircraft carrying nuclear 
weapons or bulk ammunition, employing special 
photographic equipment or electronic counter-
measures (ECM), or, naturalily, where important 
passengers are expecting special arrangements to 
receive them. 
14. Minor departures from general rules may 
still be encountered ; one country apparently 
requires forty-eight hours' warning for use of 
its naval airfields, but only the routine one-hour 
warning where other millitary airfields ar(' 
involved. 
15. Aircraft from non-NATO countries, when 
overflying or staging in NATO countries, ·are 
uniformly required to seek diplomatic clearance, 
the notice required varying, according to coun-
tries' replies, from two working days to one 
month or more. But most NATO coun~ries 
require the same of other NATO countries where 
bilateral agreements do not exist. Italy permits 
military aircraft from non-NATO countrieS to 
land only at those military airfields that are 
open to civil traffic, never at NATO airfields; 
services are available only from civil commercial 
companies. 
16. Information required by countries perJTiit-
ting overflight or staging appears to vary, 
normally aircraft type, purpose of flights, air-
port of origin and immediate destination I are 
required. DetailB of aircraft load and airport 
of final destination are stated to be required by 
some countries, but not all. 
17. The most important single factor affecting 
overflight or staging facilities is, of course, the 
purpose of a flight. The facilities described above 
are usually available to aircraft on routine 
NATO missions including agreed NATO exer-
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cises, and it is with these purposes that this 
section of the report is concerned. Italy normally 
treats military aircraft from NATO countries 
engaged on non-NATO missions in the same way 
as aircraft from non-NATO countries (para-
graph 15 in fine). It will be recalled, for exam-
ple, that the United States, which has generally 
satisfactory arrangements for aircraft mowments 
for NATO purposes in most NATO countries, 
was able to rely only on the Azores for .staging 
military resupply flights to Israel during the 
1973 homilities. 
18. An attempt has been made to reach agree-
ment, so far without success, on a NATO 
ST ANAG to cover overflight and staging for 
tactical movements in the NATO area. Belgium 
unilaterally offers on and over its territory the 
facilities proposed in the draft of this STANAG, 
which correspond with those described in para-
graphs 12 and 14 above. 
(b) Movements of warships - the territorial BeG 
19. It is widely expected that if and when 
general agreement is reached in the third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 1, the 
maximum permitted territorial sea will be twelve 
nautical miles. At the time replies to th~ 
questionnaire were prepared six NATO countri~ 
and Ireland claimed a territorial sea of three 
nautical miles onLy. The other eight claims were 
Canada (12 n.m.), France (12 n.m.), Greece 
(6 n.m.), Iceland (4 n.m.), Italy (12 n.m.), Nor-
way (4 n.m.), Portugal (6 n.m.), Turkey (6 n.m.). 
Denmark and the United Kingdom state that 
they have no plans to claim twelve nautical miles 
at the present time. 
20. Replies to the questionnaire are incomplete 
as far as the extent of territorial sea of other 
countries recognised by the various NATO coun-
tries is concerned. Germany and the United 
Kingdom never recognise more than three 
nautical miles ; but Germany is reviewing the 
question. Belgium recognises three nautical miles 
except in the case of Norway for which it recog-
nises four nautical miles, but advises ships' 
captains never deliberately to ignore larger 
claims. Canada, Denmark, France, Italy and the 
Netherlands recognise claims up to twelve nau-
tical miles only. Portugal states that it has no 
rules on this question. 
21. All countries replying recognise the right of 
innocent passage for warships through their ter-
ritorial: waters, in accordance with Article 14 of 
the 1958 Geneva Convention which requires sub-
1. The next session is scheduled to open in Geneva on 
28th March 1978 and to continue to about mid-May. 
2. Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, United States. 
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marines navigating in the territorial waters of 
another State to do so on the surface and to 
show their flag. Countries claim the same right 
for their own warships in the territorial waters 
of other States, but Italy reports that in practice 
it exercises this right only occasionally and never 
in the Albanian territorial sea - Albania claims 
twelve nautical mUes (but see paragraph 28). 
22. Article 17 of the Geneva Convention permits 
States to enact regulations governing navigation 
in their territorial waters, and requires foreign 
ships exercising the right of mnocent passage 
to comply with them. Among the countries reply-
ing, Belgium states that it has no regulations 
but draws attention to ministerial orders of 1923 
and 1936 1 • Denmark has issued a special "Ordi-
nance governing the admission of foreign war-
ships and mi1dtary aircraft to Danish territory in 
time of peace" t, dated 27th February 1976, to 
which attention is drawn by other countries as 
well as Denmark. Italy has special regulations in 
the Maddalena archipelago (North-East Sardi-
nia) (RD of 24th February 1938) ; and in the 
territorial waters of the Islands of Augusta 
(East Sicily) and Pantellaria (Sieilian channel) 
(RD of 16th September 1939). The Netherla.nds 
reports a royal decree. Norway requires that 
''generally not more than~ warships, as a 
maximum, belonging to the same foreign State 
ought to be given permission to stay simultane-
ously within each of the following two sections 
of the coast... [which are the sections north and 
south respectively of latitude N 65°10'] Foreign 
warships having left a Norwegian port or an-
chorage ought, generally, not to be allowed to 
re-enter Norwegian interior waters within a 
shorter period·than thirty days. This also applies 
to warships which are used for fishery inspection 
duties". The United Kingdom has traffic separa-
tion regulations in certain waters. No country 
reports its warships having been required to 
leave foreign territorial waters for failing to 
comply with regulations, and no country reports 
having required a foreign warship to leave its 
own territorial waters for such failure, except 
Norway which reports "only when disobeying 
the rules" [quoted above]. 
23. As far as prior authorisation or notification 
for warships to navigate in the territorial waters 
of another State is concerned, there is some 
conflict between the replies of the NATO coun-
tries received. Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal and the United Kingdom have 
no requirement for prior notification by foreign 
warships navigating in their territorial waters 
and the United Kingdom states that there u; 
no such requirement in international law. 
Belgium requires foreign warships navigating in 
the Escaut to obtain prior authorisation; 
I. The Belgian and Danish texts oited are reproduced 
at Appendix II. 
elsewhere in its territorial waters Belgium 
requires, if possible, seven days' advance noti-
fication for the navigation of foreign warships. 
Denmark, under the terms of the ordinance cited 
in paragraph 22, requires three days' advance 
notice of the passage of a foreign warship 
through its ter.ritorial waters other than the 
Straits (see paragraph 28 below) and requires 
its permission to be obtained with eight days' 
notice when more than three warships of the 
same nationality are involved. 
24. Most countries replying say that they seek 
authorisation or give notice before their warships 
navigate ih the territorial waters of other coun-
tries, where this authorisation or notification is 
required. Belgium so notifies NATO countries 
but seeks authorisation of others. French war-
ships avoid entering territorial waters of States 
demanding prior authorisation, otherwise France 
gives prior courtesy notification whether 
required or not. Italy says that notification or 
request for permission is not necessary ; Portu-
gal says it does not give notification ; and the 
United Kingdom repeats that there is no require-
ment to do so in international law. No country 
reports suspending the rights of foreign war-
ships to navigate in its territorial waters "in 
recent memory"\ and no country reports that its 
warships have had that right suspended by other 
countries. 
25. AB noted above, Article 14 of the 1958 
Geneva Convention requires submarines to navi-
gate on the surface when in the territorial 
waters of other States. Norway alone specifies 
that submarines of foreign States shaJll navigate 
on the surface "so that the whole conning tower 
and the deck with ordinary freeboard is above 
the surface", and that foreign submarines 
navigating submerged may be forced to the 
surface. All countries replying say that they 
respect the requirement to navigate on the 
surface except when specific permission to do 
otherwise has been giwn. 
(c) International straits 
26. While under the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the Territorial Sea States may suspend 
temporari1y the right of innocent passage in 
parts of their territorial sea, if essential to the 
protection of their security, there is no right to 
suspend navigation through straits which are 
used for international navigation between one 
part of the high seas and another. Within the 
NATO area there are several such international 
straits, lying wholly within the territorial sea 
claimed by the riparian States, that are of 
1. Italy reports temporary suspension of navigation 
rights, published in notices to mariners, for naval firing 
practice or exercises, etc. 
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importance to the movements of warships, of 
NATO countries. 
27. The Danish territorial sea and internal 
waters embrace the three entrances to the Baltic 
- the Sound, the Great Be1t and the Little Belt. 
The French and Italian territorial seas enclose 
the straits between Corsica and Sardinia. Italian 
territorial sea encloses the Messina Straits be-
tween Sicily and the mainland. Turkish ten;ito-
rial sea encloses the entrance to the Bliack Sea. 
Most of the straits round the coast of Britain are 
wide enough for there to be a high sea passage 
through the middle (the United Kingdom claims 
only three nautical miles territorial sea). The 
Straits of Gibraltar lie wholly within the terri-
torial seas claimed by Spain (6 n.m.) and 
Morocco (12 n.m.). 
28. None of the riparian States replying claim 
any right to limit innocent passage through such 
international straits within their territoriaJl irea, 
although Denmark requires three days' prior 
notification for passage of warships through' the 
Litt1e Belt, and that part of the sound within 
its internal waters (Drogden and Hollaender-
dybet) ; and for the simultaneous passage of 
more than three warships of the same nation!l-litY 
through the Great Belt, Samsoe Belt or Sound. 
Ail countries replying exercise their rights of 
passage through such international straits. 
Germany does so .through the Great BelJt, Samsoe 
Belt and Sound. The Netherlands and Noriway 
do so chiefly through the Sound, Portugal 
chiefly through the Straits of Gibraltar, France 
and the United Kingdom through many such 
straits, the former giving by courtesy adv~nce 
notice in some cases (e.g. Indonesian Straits) ; 
Italy mentions Gibraltar and Corfu. 
29. No State reports having its right of pas-
sage limited, although attention is drawn by' two 
countries to the Danish requirement for author-
isation and notification under its ordinance of 
1976 referred to in paragraph 22 above. Den-
mark claims the historical right to regulate 
1
pas-
sage through the "old" Danish straits ; the 
Copenhagen Treaty of 14th March 1857 between 
Denmark on the one hand and Belgium, France, 
the United Kingdom and the Baltic riparian 
powers on the other, provides for the redemption 
by these other parties of the dues previously 
levied by Denmark on specified merchandise 
passing through the straits ; the treaty is cited 
by Danish authorities as evidence of histopcal 
Danish rights in the straits, which were not 
modified by the 1958 Geneva Convention on the 
Territorial Sea. Passage through the Turkish 
Straits is governed by the International Mon-
treux Convention of 1936 to which France, Italy 1, 
Turkey and the United Kingdom among the 
1. Italy aooeded on 2nd May 1938. 
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NATO countries are parties, as are the riparian 
Black Sea powers. The convention limits the pas-
sage of warships through these straits and pro-
hibits the passage of submarines (except for 
purposes of repair) and of aircraft carriers; 
the Committee has previously reported on the 
Montreux Convention, and taken exception to 
the illegal passage of the Soviet aircraft carrier 
Kiev 1 • An Anglo-French convention of 1904, 
recognised\ by Spain, provides for the non-
fortification of the Straits of Gibraltar. 
(d) Port uiafts 
30. Three categories of visit by warships are 
generally recognised - formal visits involving 
specia!l honours and ceremonies ; informal visits 
invo1ving local ceremonies and customary salutes 
only ; and routine visits carried out solely for 
logistic exercise or operational purposes. As far 
as the visits by NATO warships to the ports of 
NATO countries are concerned, this report is 
concerned solely with routine visits and the fol-
lowing remarks refer to these, unless other types 
are specifically mentioned. Countries in their 
rep1ies draw attention to the NATO Standardisa-
tion Agreement (STANAG) 1100, but procedures 
and periods of notice required for arranging 
port visits among NATO countries are clearly 
much more cumbersome and lengthy than those 
for staging or overflight for aircraft which have 
been analysed above. · 
(e) Clearance and notification for port uiafts lJy 
NATO wanrhfpa 
31. Country replies show considerable discre-
pancies between length of notice a country 
l'equires for a visit by a warship of another 
NATO country, and the period of notice which 
other countries claim they give on visiting that 
country. At one extreme Norway reports that 
it requires seven days' notice, although prefer-
ring more, through diplomatic channels for visits · 
to its ports and itself normally gives a minimum 
of one month's (never less than one week's) 
notice through diplomatic and military channels 
to NATO and other countries that its warships 
wish to visit. Italy applies STANAG 1100. At 
the other extreme, the Netherlands requires and 
gives six weeks' notice through diplomatic chan-
nels for routine NATO visits, except for visits to 
Belgium and the United Kingdom which can be 
cleared with between two and six weeks' notice 
through military channels, the United Kingdom 
noting that such visits can at times be arranged 
at forty-eight hours' notice, but that more than 
two weeks' notice is usually necessary for practi-
cal reasons such. as. finding berths. The average 
1. See Document 651 (paragraph 36), 14th November 
1974; Assembly Recommendation 256, 4th November 
1974 and Document 673 (paragraph 22), 29th April 1975. 
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period of notice reported by Belgium, Canada 
and the United Kingdom appears to be four 
weeks, through military channels. Denmark 
reports giving and requiring thirty days' notice, 
through diplomatic channels, except in the case 
of Germany and Norway to which it gives two 
weeks' notice of a visit and of the United King-
dom to which it gives four weeks' notice. Portu-
gal reports special arrangements for visits by 
French ships under the bilateral treaty of 1974. 
France requires a month's notice through naval 
attache channels (or direct through naval com-
mand channels in the ca:se of British ships 
visiting Atlantic and Channel ports) for visits 
by NATO ships, and reports that some other 
countries require longer notice (six weeks to two 
months). Germany requires only fourteen days' 
notice of a visit (five months for nuclear-
powered vessels) and requires military channel 
notification only for visits by the NATO stand-
ing naval forces. Germany itself gives a mini-
mum of three weeks' notice. 
(f) Non-NATO uiafm to NATO ports - clearance 
and notiflcatfon 
32. On the whole the periods of notice required 
by NATO countries for visits by warships from 
non-NATO countries are the same as those 
required for visits by NATO vessels, and range 
from one to four weeks for routine visits. Some 
countries require longer notice for "informal" 
visits (Belgium eight weeks instead of four for 
a routine visit, Portugal four instead of two, 
United Kingdom six to eight instead of four). 
The Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
specifically require longer notice from Warsaw 
Pact countries (Netherlands twelve weeks' notice 
instead of six ; United Kingdom three months 
or more instead of six to eight weeks for 
informal visits which are usual[y involved in this 
case). France extends the same treatment to 
Spanish ships as to NATO ships. 
33. It is concluded that the extent to which 
inter-NATO ship visits receive favourable treat-
ment depends on the type of visit-routine -
which is less likely to be involved in the case 
of visits by ships of non-NATO countries. 
(g) Port ufsff8- lJy NATO shlpa to NATO countries-
facilities prouided 
34. The United Kingdom points out that the 
range of facilities provided free or on repayment 
varies with the type of visit (routine or informal) 
and the port visited (naval or non-naval). The 
following remarks refer to visits to naval ports. 
Attention is also drawn by countries replying to 
the existence of the NATO STANAG 1062. 
Germany also mentions ALP-1 (B) (Navy) 
"Handbook on supply arrangements in NATO 
navies" and other classified texts. Unsurpris-
ingly, faciUties which countries replying report 
offering to visiting warships of other NATO 
countries are similar to those they report receiv-
ing when their own warships visit NATO coun-
tries. 
35. Special arrangements are in force for ves-
sels of the various permanent naval forces when 
visiting ports of participating countries. These 
forces are Standing Naval Force Atlantic 
(STANAVFORLANT) in which participate 
Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, United 
States ; Standing Naval Force Ch111nnel 
(STANAVFORCHAN) in which participate 
Bellgium, Denmark, Germany, Nethel"lands, 
United Kingdom; and the Naval On-Call Force 
Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED) in which 
participate Italy, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States. When visiting United Kingdom 
naval ports vessels of these permanent forces are 
not charged for navigational aids, pilotage, tugs, 
mooring and making fast, use of piers, etc., 
cranes, refuse disposal, locall supplies of water, 
steam, electricity, telephone and certain other 
services, including operationaL training such as 
surface and air target towing, etc. It is not clear 
from replies whether charges are similarly 
waived in ports of other participating countries. 
36. Belgium, Canada (in the absence of other 
bilateral agreements), Germany and Norway 
quote ST ANAG 1062 ; Canada and Portugal 
STANAG 1100, as the basis for facilities pro-
vided and charges made or waived in connection 
with visits by NATO vessels or visits to NATO 
ports. Denmark waives charges only in respect 
of moorings and berths for NATO vessels. Italy 
has a bilateral agreement with Germany for the 
reciprocal waiver in military ports of charges 
for tugs, berths, food, fresh water and fuel. The 
Netherlands has bilateral agreements with 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom 
under which charges are waived in respect of 
tugs, pilotage, berths and moorings and the sup-
ply of services such as fresh water, steam, elec-
tricity, telephone and refuse disposal. The Uni-
ted Kingdom reports that in the case of "infor-
ma~" visits by warships of any nation to naval 
ports, charges for port dues, pilotage, moorings, 
berths, water, refuse disposal, water transport 
and recreational motor transport, are waived, 
but in the case of "routine" Visits only are port 
dues, water transport and duty motor transport, 
waived. The United Kingdom has bilateral agree-
ments with France, the Netherli8Jlds, and the 
United States to waive charges in the case of 
routine visits as if they were informal visits. 
France however offers the same facilities under 
the same conditions for all foreign warships, 
irrespective of nationality : tugs (free in naval 
ports) ; berths and moorings (free) ; food, fresh 
water, fuel, repairs (at current charges). 
37. Shore leave for crews is universally offered 
and received. 
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(h) Vt.ifs to ports of NATO countries by vesaer. of 
non-NATO countriea -facilities provided, 
38. Denmark, Italy1 and Norway report no dif-
ference between facilities provided and charges 
waived for visits by vessels of NATO countries 
and by those of non-NATO countries. Belgium 
reports that it waives charges for moorings and 
fresh water; Denmark that it waives charges 
for berths and moorings; Netherlands reports 
no waiver of charges even to NATO countries, 
except to France, fl-rermany and the United King-
dom covered by the bilateral agreement men-
tioned above. Norway reports no waiver of char-
ges for any country ; Portugal waives charges 
for berths onl(y for official visits by ~els of 
allied countries; the United Kingdom, in the 
case of informal visits, waiv€8 charges for servi-
ces as reported above. 
(i) Fleet auxiliary vesaela 
39. Germany and the United Kingdom do not 
consider fleet auxiliary vessels (e.g. fleet oi~ers, 
supply and repair vessels) to be "warships" 
under the terms of the 1958 Geneva Convention 
on the High Seas, but consider them tq be 
"government ships operated for non-commercial 
purposes" and thus entitled, in general, to 
facilities which are available to merchant ships. 
The questionnaire accordingly examines · the 
attitude of countries to this issue. 
40. Be~um, Denmark, Frence, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Portugal d€Signate their fleet 
auxiliaries as warships, they are generally 
armed 2 or the right to arm them is reserved. 
Oanada (normaldy) Belgium, Germany and 
France consider fleet auxiliaries of other 
countries to have the designation given to them 
by their flag country ; the Last three say they do 
not consider that designation to be changed if 
the auxiliary is armed ; they treat fleet auxi-
liari€8 in accordance with their designation. !Den-
mark and Italy deem all :flJeet auxiliaries of other 
countries to be warships and treat them as such. 
The Netherlands reports that it applies the rules 
of the Geneva Convention whether or not a fleet 
auxi~iary is armed. Portugal reports that the 
designation "depends upon the circumstanc~", it 
extends the treatment appropriate to the desig-
nation. 
41. Canada expects its fleet auxiliaries will be 
accorded the same status as other Canadian gov-
ernment vessels. While German fleet auxiliaries 
are not classed as warships, they are not armed, 
and would be classed as warships if they were. 
The United Kingdom states that its fleet auxili-
aries are not warships under the terms of the 
1. Exoept for German warships (see paragraph 36). 
2. e.g. Hydrographic vessels may be an exception. 
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definition of warships in the 1958 Gilneva Con-
vention on the High Seas ; it reserves the right 
to arm its fLeet auxiliaries without prejudice to 
their status, and "in general terms" finds that its 
fleet auxiliaries receive treatment from other 
couniries in accordance with the status claimed 
for them. In respect of the fleet auxiliaries of 
other countries, the United Kingdom states that 
it applies the designation and the rules of inter-
national law and affords them appropriate treat-
ment. 
IV. Outside the NATO area 
42. Strategic mobility outside the NATO area 
can be provided first and· foremost by routes 
over the high seas - being all sea and ocean 
beyond the limit of the tt>rritorial sea. Most 
countries, as has been seen above, still recognise 
only the historical limit of the territorial sea -
three nautical miles - which 'leaves a high-sea 
passage through any strait exceeding six nautical 
miles in width - such straits include Dover and 
Gibraltar in the NATO area. 
43. On the high seas there is unrestricted pas-
sage for warships and overflying rights for air-
craft without reference to any country, so that 
the limit on mobility over the high sea is the 
refuelling range of a ship or aircraft. Ships can, 
of course, be refueNed at sea by fleet oilers, 
although in-flight refuelling for aircraft is an 
economic proposition only if a base for the 
tanker is reasonably near the refuelling point. 
44. Warships, as has been stated above, further 
enjoy the right of "innocent passage" through 
international straits - i.e. straits which link one 
part of the high sea to another, or to the ter-
ritorial sea of another State, and which, at some 
point, are entirely closed by the territorial 
waters of the riparian States. "Innocent passage" 
permits warships to transit only, they may not 
engage in exercise or operational activity such 
as aiming armaments, laying sonar buoys, etc. 
There is no right of overflight of international 
straits six miles or less wide without permission 
of a riparian power. 
45. For aircraft with their relatively short 
refuelling range, staging facilities are obviously 
important for long-range deployment, and over-
flying rights are necessary in practice if a suf · 
ficiently short route is to be found to areas such 
as the Indian Ocean. 
46. Although of the NATO. countries it appears 
that France, the United Kingdom and the United 
States are chiefly concerned in longer-range 
deployment to areas such as the Indian Ocean, 
other countries stHl retain overseas commitments 
(Netherlands), or sovereignty over distant lands 
(Denmark), and Belgium, within recent memory, 
has briefly deployed military forces in Africa. 
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4 7. Your Rapporteur has not sought to assemble 
detailed information concerning overflying and 
staging routes available to member countries -
most woU'ld be reticent about disclosing bilateral 
arrangements which may not have been pub-
lished elsewhere. Information concerning one 
member country shows, however, the existence of 
facilities for overflight or staging in thirty-two 
countries, situated in most continents, but includ-
ing only nine of the fourteen NATO countries ; 
whereas normal diplomatic clearance would 
usually require advance notice of some three 
weeks, the arrangements in force permit over-
flight, and usualJly staging as well, at relatively 
short notice ranging from three days' diplo-
matic notice, often through military attache 
channels, to a simple on~hour air traffic control 
(ATC) notification. Another country reports 
rights of free overflight of certain African coun-
tries, others offer permanent authorisation. 
(a) Persian Gulf- ouerfUght 
48. The area of the Persian Gulf, not least 
because of its petroleum resources, is of great 
strategic importance to the countries of Europe, 
and merits particular attention in a report on 
strategic mobHity. The previous Rapporteur was 
authorised to visit Iran which, with a common 
frontier with Turkey, can provide the most con-
venient air route to the area ; the Iranian 
authorities kindly supplied him with information 
in response to the aviation part of the question-
naire (although that questionnaire was com-
municated only for information purposes) from 
which it emerges that overflight or staging by 
foreign military aircraft require diplomatic 
clearance with at least five days' notice. Over-
flight or staging by combat aircraft is permitted 
in the case of allied countries oney, in the frame-
work of a CENTO agreement ; overffight and 
staging of foreign military transport aircraft is 
examined on a cas~by-case basis. From other 
sources, however, it appears that Iran has more 
flexible agreements than the foregoing with the 
United Kingdom and the United States concern-
ing overflight and staging rights. From the 
questionnaire it is seen that Imnian military 
aircraft, combat or transport, can overfly or 
stage in allied countries fo:hlowing diplomatic 
clearance with seven days' notice (ten days in 
other foreign countries, transport aircraft only). 
(b) Other facilities for external powers in the 
Persian Gulf 
49. .AB far as presence in the Persian Gulf is 
concerned, the United States navy has enjoyed 
the use of certain shore facilities in Bahrein 
since the 1940s for a flagship and two destroyers. 
In 1977 these arrangements were modified to 
provide extensive visiting rights, rather than 
perma.nent deployment, for the flagship in 
Bahrein, but a United States navy presence will 
continue to be maintained in the GW.f. 
50. Following the British decision to withdraw 
from the Gulf in 1971, only two RAF staging 
posts were retained in Oman until March 1977 
when RAF personnel were withdrawn. Britain 
(and Iran) provided direct and indirect assist-
ance to Oman during the Dhofar war ; in Feb-
ruary 1977 however the withdrawal of 3,000 
Iranian troops was announced and there are now 
about 250 British servicemen on loan to Oman, 
together with other _former British officers serv-
ing in Oman under contract. 
V. Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(a) TransltJH1118t16e, etc.; atatas ofexclflllfve 
economic zone 
51. While the territorial sea was universally 
recognised to extend only to the historical three 
nautical mile.~ from the shore, not many straits 
of strategic interest to the NATO countries (or 
to the Soviet Union) were spanned by the ter-
ritorial waters of riparian powers. While the 
three passages from the Baltic to the North Sea 
are an exception, they pass through the terri-
torial waters of a NATO country - Denmark 
(or Danish and Swedish waters in the case of 
the Sound). Under generally recognised inter-
national law, in particular the 1958 Geneva 
Convention on the territorial sea and contiguous 
zone, warships have the right of "innocent pas-
sage" through the territoria.L sea, although the 
riparian State can suspend such passage in 
particular sectors if its national 13ecurity is 
affected. In the case of international straits how-
ever - straits which are used for international 
navigation between one part of the high seas 
and another part of the high seas or the ter-
ritorial sea of a foreign State - there is no 
right to suspend innocent passage. 
52. The 1958 Geneva Convention on the ter-
ritorial sea defines innocent passage only briefly 
(Article 14) : 
"4. Passage is innocent so long as it is not 
prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State. 
6. Submarines are required to navigate on 
the surface and to show their flag. 
Aircraft do not have the right of overflight of 
international straits where they are closed by 
three-mile territorial sea, without permission of 
the riparian powers. Under the Informal Com-
posite Negotiating Text (ICNT) which will now 
form the basis of negotiations when the Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea resumes on 
28th March 1978, "innocent passage" is more 
carefully defined. The definition quoted above 
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is supplemented by a list of various military 
activities which ·are excluded (Article 19) : 
"2. 
(a) any threat or use of force against ... 
the coastal State ... ; 
(b) any exercise or practice with 
weapons ... ; 
(c) any act aimed at collecting infor-
mation to the prejudice of the 
defence or security of the coastal 
State; 
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at 
affecting the defence or security of 
the coastal State ; 
(e) the launching, landing or taking on 
board of any aircraft ; 
(f) the launching, landing or taking on 
board of any military device ; 
(j) the carrying out of research or 
survey activities ; 
(k) any act aimed at interfering with 
any systems of communication or 
a.ny other ·facilities or installations 
of the coastal State ; 
(l) any other activity not having a 
direct bearing on passage." 
53. The same text prop6ses that the maximum 
permissible breadth of the territorial sea tO be 
claimed by any State shall be twel'Ve nautical 
miles. This wi:ll have the effect of placing many 
important straits at present having high seas' pas-
sage through the middle within the catego:cy of 
international straits spanned at some point by 
the territorial waters of the riparian ·powers. 
Clearly the norma.l operational activities of mili-
tary aircraft and war8hips - including the light 
of submarines, especially nuclear-propelled 
strategic missile submarines, to remain sub-
merged - cannot be reconciled with the terms 
of innocent passage and a ·twelve-mile terri~rial 
sea. For that reason the new concepts of transit 
passage aflil, arckipelagic sea lanes passage . have 
been introduced into the. negotiating text. 
54. The rig4t of transit passage will apply over 
the whole width of the teiTitorial sea through 
all straits less than twenty-four nauticaJJ miles 
wide linking one part of the high seas or exclu-
sive economic zone (EEZ, see paragraph 58) 
to another with two categories of exception.: 
- straits between an off-shore island and 
the mainland of the same State where 
an equally convenient route through the 
high seas or EEZ exists seaward Qf the 
island; 
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- straits through the waters of arehipelagie 
States (where archipelagic sea lanes pas-
sage wiN apply). 
But_ too· right of transit passage cannot affect 
the legal regime of straits in which passage is ' 
regtNated by long-standing existing specific in-
ternational conventions 1• In similar straits over 
twenty-fou~ nautical miies wide where .the high 
seas route is navigable only innocent passage will 
&pplty' in the territorial .sea, unfettered passage 
exists through only the high seas width of the 
strait. 
55: · Article 38 of the ICNT defines transit pas-
sage as "the exercise in accordance With this 
part of the freedom of navigation and overflight 
solely for the purpose - of continuous and 
expeditioUS' transit of the strait ... 11• Article 39 
defines the duties of ships and aircraft during 
transit passage. It requires them to : 
_ ... "1 .. (a) Proceed without delay through or 
. over the strait ; 
(b) refrain from any threat or u8e of 
force against... States bordering 
straits ... ; 
(c) refrain from any activities other 
than those incident to their normal 
modes of continuous and' expedi-
tious transit unless rendered neces-
sary by force majeure or. by 
distress." 
The restrictive limitations applied to- the right 
of innocent· passage do not appear, in particular 
the right of overflight for military ·aircraft is 
preserved as over the high seas, and submarines 
may pass submerged. The right of transit pas-
sage may· not be suspended. · 
~6. Articl~- 53 .of the ICNT permits ~hlpelagic 
States to designate .. sea lanes and rur routes 
th~ugh tJwir waters, and defines the. rig~t of 
archipelagic sea lanes passage in bro~ similar 
terms to that of transit passage defi.iled.· in Arti-
ele::38, and applies the·duties of Article 39 there-
to. Archipelagic sea lanes are designated- by_ axis 
lines, ships and ai.rcraft exercising their transit 
rights over a width twenty-five nauticalr 'miles 
either side, or to within 10 % of the distance 
from the axis line to the coast. If the State does 
not designa:te archipe'lagic sea lanes, the right of 
archi~lagic sea lanes passage can be exercised 
"through the routes normalllr used- for interna-
tional , na\rigation... The right may not be Sus-
,Pended. 
. 1. Such conventions are the Montreux Convention of 
1.936 on the Dardanelles and the 1867 Copenhagen Treaty 
on the Danish Straits (see paragraph 29). Passage through 
these straits is more 'restrietive .than 'tnmsit:'·pM&age. The 
Chile-Argentina Convention of 1881 on the Magellan Straits 
and the Anglo-French Convention of 1904 on the Gibraltar 
Straits concern the ·non~fol'titioation ol the strait and the 
Moroccan .ooast respeeti.Yely J .. they should n(lt affect 
transit passage. 
57. The following straits, under twenty-four 
· nautical miles wide, are among the strategically 
important straits which at present have a high 
seas passage through them\ but which will fall 
· within the territorial waters of the riparian 
powers if a twelve nautical mile territorial sea is 
accepted. Transit passage, or where so noted 
archipelagic sea lanes passage, will apply. The 
United Kingdom reports that more than 100 
straits at present having a high seas passage 
through them would become enclosed within a 
twelve nautical miles territorial sea. 
58. A subsidiary issue which has been much 
discussed at the Conference on the Law of the 
Sea is the status of a State's exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) which it is proposed should extend 
two hundred miles from its coast. Certain coun-
tries speaking at the conference have sug~ed 
that in addition to the economic rights which a 
State would enjoy within its EEZ, the zone 
should be regarded as having a status sui generis, 
not ·assimilated to that of the high seas. This 
position is not acceptable either to the allied 
countries or, indeed, to the Soviet Union 2 , all of 
whom have insisted on the high seas status of the 
EEZ permitting the free passage of warships 
and aircraft. Now however Article 55 of the 
ICNT provides that the EEZ is "subject to the 
specific legal regime established in this part" 
[V of the Convention]. However Article 58, in 
the same Part V, provides that, in the EEZ, 
States "enjoy ... the freedoms referred to in Art-
icle 87 of navigation and overflight and of the 
laYing of submarine cables and pipe1dnes and 
other internationally lawful uses of the sea 
related to these freedoms such as those associated 
with the operation of ships, aircraft, submarine 
cables and pipelines ; and compatible with the 
other provisions of this convention ... ". It is 
Article 87 that defines freedom of the high seas ; 
the remaining Articles 88 to 115 of the high 
seas section are incorporated by reference in 
Article 58 " ... insofar as they are not incompatible 
with this part" [P,art V]. These provisions 
tOgether go some way· to establishing within the 
· EEZ the rights of the high seas as far as strate-
gic mobility is concerned. 
(b) Country attitudes 
59; In conclusion, the questionnaire asked coun-
tries their attitude to the new proposals for the 
breadth of the territorial sea and for a new 
right of "transit passage" through international 
1. Except Pentland Firth and Singapore which are 
less than 6 n.m. wide. 
2. See, for example, "The Law of the World Ocean" 
by V. Yaroslavtsev in the Soviet publication "Inter-
national Affairs", Janttary 1976: " ... it follows that the 
economic zone. provided the sovereign rights of a ooastal 
State to the resources of the zone are preserved, remains 
a part .of the high seas, where all States enjoy .freedom 
of navigation and other activity not connected with the 
the zone's :resources" (page 67). 
' . ,~
International 8fraita thrOfl61l whic:h "tranait JK~aG6•" will praumaflly apply 
::(fl?Ufer 24 n.m. wide) 
'·-::-
·-
Sea areas Minimum Determining. 
linked Name of strait • 'Co&stal State(s) Location width depth 
n.m. metres 
Atlantic- North !Utlited Scotland- 11 50-180 
Irish Sea. Channel Kingdom Northern 
·-. Ireland 
_,, . 
Atlantic- Pentland . United Orkney 4: 
North Sea. Firth KiJ:lgdom Scotland 
.. ~ ' 
Central-Western Bomholmsga.t Denmark Ha.mmeren- 19 10-46 
Baltic Sweden Sa.ndha.mmeren 
Western Baltic- Ka.detrende J:>wunark Gedser-Da.rss 19 7-22 
Mecklenburger Ba.y German 
Democratic 
Republic 
Mecklenburger Fehmern Denmark Lolla.nd- 10 10-29 
Ba.y-Kiel Ba.y Belt Federal Fehmern 
Republic of 
-~ny 
--
English Channel- Dover United Dover. 17 20-37 
North Sea. Kingdom Calais 
France 
Atlantic- Gibraltar Spain entrance to 8 21-550 
Mediterranea.n Morocco Med.iterra.nea.n 
Indian Ocea.n- Ba.b-el-Mandeb Yemen entrance to 9 12-180 
Red Sea. PDR Yemen Red Sea 
Ethiopia. 
Djibouti 
Indian Ocea.n- Hormuz Ira.n entrance to 21 55-90. 
Persian Gulf Oman Persian Gulf 
Indian Ocea.n- Malacca. Indonesia. Suma.tra.- 8 20-100 
Pacific Malaysia. Malaysia. 
Singapore Singapore Singapore 6 
Indonesia. Ria.n Isles 
.. , . 
Sundra. Indonesia. Java. 12 27-180 
Sumatra. . -
Lombok Indonesia. Ba.li 11 190-1300 
Lombok 
Omba.i- Indonesia. Weta.r 12 OVal' 180. 
Weta.r Timor Timor 
Torres Australia. AustraUa 10 12 
Pa.pua. Papua. 
Nolu: 1. Presumably not suitable for the submerged passage of strategic missile submarine (SSBN). 
2. Archipelagio sea lanes passage will apply. 
No~ 
-
1 
J 
--
1 
---'---
1 
--
,} 
' 
~ 
'-1 
--
1 
-------
: 1,2"' 
~ 
I 2 
; 
~ 
--
I 
' --
Bourcu : "Strategic Attributes of International Straits", Robert W, Smith, Maritime Studies aud Management, V ol, 1!, 
No. 2, October 1974. "The Geopolitical Importance of Strategic W aterwaya in the Asian-Paoi1lc Region", Miohael MooGuiie, 
Orbis, Volume XIX, No. 3, Fall 197l.i; Commen~by Ministries of Defence. · 
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straits which, hitherto having high sea through-
out their Length, would become enclosed within 
the territorial sea of riparian States if that were 
extended to twelve miles. All countries repeying 
are prepared to support a ma.'rlmum of twelve 
miles for the territorial sea in a generally accep-
table convention. Not many of the countries who 
now claim less than twe1ve nautical lniles (see 
paragraph 19) have yet decided what breadth of 
territorial sea to c}aim for themselves, if twelve 
miles is adopted as the maximum, but Belgium 
intends to claim twelve miles. All countries reply-
ing support the provisions for transit passage 
and Denmark 1 and t;he United Kingdom will 
apply those provisions to new international 
straits created within their own territorial waters 
if enliarged. France has already legislated (Law 
of 24th December 1971) to provide for transit 
passage where applicable in its own territorial 
sea. Ital·y states that ·although the Ma:rsina 
Straits are at present straits used for interna-
tional navigation in which the right of innocent 
passage applies without other restrictions, under 
the terms of Article 38 of the ICNT they will 
become straits subject to national jurisdiction, 
with the right of innocent passage, but not of _ 
transit passage. The questionnaire does not exa-
mine attitudes to the special status proposed for 
the EEZ, as described in the l!ast paragraph, 
because it was prepared before the present pro-
visions of the ICNT were drafted ; however your 
Rapporteur understands that no status other 
than full high seas status has yet beeii accepted 
by the allied countries, a1Ithough one country in 
its comments on the first report implies t}lat the 
new text may be accepted at the conference. 
60. The Committee stresses the importance, for 
strategic mobility of allied forces, of upholding 
the right of transit passage, or where applicable 
of archipelagic sea lanes passage, if the territo-
rial sea is to be extended to twelve nautical 
miles; it stresses the importance of preserving 
the high seas status or a status no more :restric-
tive as far as the operational movements and 
activities of warships and military- aircraft are 
concerned, of all waters beyond the territorial 
sea. 
VI. Soviet strategic mobility - Angola, a case 
study 
61. The strategic movement of Cuban forces to 
Angola in 1975 and 1976 was supported by the 
Soviet Union which also supplied all military 
equipment involved. A succinct description of 
the size of the operation, and the various routes 
employed is relevant to a report which stresses 
the need for the strategic mobility of the forces 
of the Atlantic .AJJliance. 
1. See paragraphs 54 and 29. 
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62. The Soviet- Union had begun to supply 
Mr. Agostinho Neto's MPLA forces with military 
equipment, and training by Soviet military 
advisers, while they were still in exi1e based on 
Brazzaville. Once Portugal had withdrawn from 
Angola, Soviet military supplies were quickly 
routed directly to Luanda once it was in the 
hands of the MPLA. Cuban forces were later 
arrivals on the scene towards the end of 1975. 
Cuba now has a long tradition of military assis-
tance in Africa and the Middle East, albeit 
hitherto on a smaller scale than in Angola. Press 
reports have referred to the presence of Cuban 
forces at various times in Zanzibar, Equatorial 
Guinea, Somalia, the Congo (Brazzaville), Sierra 
Leone, the Cape Verde Islands, the Yemen and 
Oman. 
63. By December 1975 and early: January 1976 
Cuban forces were arriving in large numbers in 
Luanda, partly by Cuban civil air transport 
staging at Santa Maria airfield in the Azores, 
then-- in Guinea · Bissau before proceeding to 
Angola. On 19th January 1976 Portugal banned 
the use of Santa Maria airfield for the Cuban 
airlift, which was thereafter replaced by Soviet 
Tiyiishin-62 transports with a longer range 
flying directly from Cuba, staging in Conakry 
(Guinea) or the Cape Verde Islands en route to 
Luanda. There are press reports also of staging 
in Barbados and Guyana. 
64. Cuban forces also arrived directly by sea 
and by the end of January or February 1976 it 
is reported that there were 15,000 or 17,000 
Cuban forces in Angola which together with 
civilian technical advisers may have made a total 
in excess of 20,000 men. This is Cuba's largest 
military intervention abroad to date, repre-
senting at least one-tenth of its total armed 
forces (175,000). Cuban casualties, killed and 
wounded, are reported to have been between 500 
and 1,000. 
65. Soviet equipment supplied for the use of 
the Cuban forces and the MPLA is said to have 
iotalled 200 tanks of various types, some Soviet 
MiG-15 and 17 aircraft and twelve MiG-21. 
Several thousand guns, mortars and rocket laun-
chers were supplied which more than any other 
single item provided superiority for the Soviet 
proteges. Much Soviet equipment arrived by sea, 
and there are reports of some trans-shipments 
having taken place in sheltered anchorages in 
the Western Mediterranean. The Soviet airlift 
of military equipment and military advisers ori-
ginated from Odessa on the Black Sea coast, the 
customary base for Soviet strategic transport to 
Africa, used Colomb-Bechar in Algeria as a first 
staging post and subsequently either Conakry 
(Guinea) or Brazzaville en route to Luanda. 
Apal"t therefore from Algeria,. Guinea and Congo 
(Brazzavi1le) these routes must have involved 
overflying at least one, or probably several, other 
African countries. 
66. The total value of the Soviet-Cuban military 
effort in Angola has been reported as about 
$300 miLlion, while in an interview in "News 
and World Report" in March 1976, Mr. ·Rums-
feld, then United- States. Secretary of Defence, 
claimed that Cuba and the Soviet Union had 
spent $3 billion over the previous four years in 
military and economic assistance to African 
countries, thereby considerably increasing the 
number of airfields -and port facilities available 
to them in that continent. 
VU. Conclusion 
67. The Committee's principal conclusions are 
set forth in the draft recommendation. 
Preamble 
68. As far as the first paragraph of the pream-
ble is concerned, Chapter VI of this explanatory 
memorandum contains a case study of a recent 
demonstration of strategic mobility by the Soviet 
Union in Angola. As far as the penultimate 
paragraph is concerned, the Committee notes 
with satisfaction President Carter's proposal to 
stabilise the presence of military forces in the 
Indian Ocean and to avoid an arms race. The 
United States State Department spokesman on 
3rd October commenting on the second round of 
bilateral talks with the Soviet Union on the sub-
ject, held from 26th to 30th September, said 
that once the first objectives had been achieved, 
discussions could be held on a mutual reduction 
of United States and Soviet forces in the ocean ; 
other signatories would also be expected to any 
agreement. The Committee stresses however the 
need for the armed forces of the allied countries 
concerned to have ready access to parts of the 
wor1d where they exercise responsibilities, and 
has examined access to the Persian Gulf (which 
gives access to the Indian Ocean) in paragraphs 
48 to 50. 
Paragraph 1 (a) of the draft recommendation 
69. The patchwork of different arrangements 
for overflight and staging by aircraft of NATO 
countries in other NATO countries, all relying 
on bilateral agreements, is described in para-
graphs 11 to 18 above. The Committee recom-
mends that the more flexible ·arrangements gene-
rally availabLe to countries concerned in the cen-
tral area, in respect of routine NATO missions 
and N A TO-agreed exercises, should be extended 
for the same purposes by all NATO countries to 
the military aircraft of all other NATO coun-
tries through a general NATO-wide agreement 
to which NATO countries could accede progres-
siveLy. Certain Ministries of Defence have 
informed the Rapporteur that they support this 
proposal - the existence of a draft ST ANAG is 
mentioned in paragraph 18 above- one Minis-
try has reservations. 
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70. It is stressed that the recommendation is· not 
revolutionary, it 'relates solely to routine NATO 
misSions and agreed NATO exercises. The Com-
mittee recognises that in the case of certain 
NAT9 missions (the carriage of nuclear weapons 
~y air appears to be a particularly sensitive 
Issue) countries will wish to retain closer control 
of the movements of other aLlied aircraft. Move-
ments in support of missions not related to the 
agreed objectives of NATO would continue to 
be subject tcr diplomatic clearance or whatever 
arrangements are at present prescribed by the 
countries concerned. See paragraph 17 above. 
Paragraph 1 (b) of the draft recommendation 
71. Arrangements for the movement of warships 
of NATO countries in the territorial sea of other 
NATO countries is described in paragraphs 19 to 
29 above ; arrangements for port visits in para-
graphs 30 to 37. The Committee notes that move-
ments in territorial waters are not normally 
restricted, and that indeed there is little right in 
international law for imposing restrictions. As 
far as port visits are concerned the Committee 
notes the considerable disparity of treatment 
which at present exists for visits by warships of 
one NATO country to another; it recommends 
that visits by warships of one NATO country to 
another for normal NATO purposes sh~uld 
re~'?ire not more than two weeks' notice through 
military channels and should be automatically 
authorised as routine visits, provided only that 
the necessary space and facilities are available in 
the port concerned. One Ministry of Defence in 
its comments on the first draft particularly wel-
comes the proposed maximum notice of two 
weeks considering the 28-40 days of NATO STA-
NAG 1100 to be too long, another says two weeks 
would be too short. To facilitate visits and NATO 
exercises and movements in general it further 
recommends that an agreed uniform basis should 
be found for all NATO countries to waive char-
ges for port dues and certain services, as would 
be done for example in the case of "informal" 
visits to certain NATO countries (paragraph 36 
above). The Committee particularly commends 
the waiver of charges that applies to visits by the 
various permanent NATO naval forces described 
in paragraph 35 above. Alternatively, if a uni-
form waiver of charges were to penalise certain 
countries with most frequently visited ports the 
Committee recommends that a system of Joint 
funding on an agreed cost-sharing basis, possibly 
through the NATO military budget, should be 
studied. 
Paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation 
72. The impact on strategic mobility of deci-
sions to be taken at the Conference on the Law of 
the Sea is described in paragraphs 51 to 60 above. 
The new right of transit passage, or in some 
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cases of archipelagic sea lanes passage, will be 
vitall~- important if a territorial sea of twelve 
miles is to be universally recognised. The high 
seas status, or a no less convenient status for the 
exclusive economic zone must be maintained. The 
attitude of member countries is summarised in 
paragraph 59 ; the position of the Committee in 
paragraph 60. 
vm. Opinion of the minority 
73. In paragraph 1 of the operative text of the 
draft .recommendation, second line, after the 
words"": .. of the Atlantic Alliance" one member 
would ·fiave added the words : 
r ·.::_-
"Uddng due account of the special situation 
cmted by the decision taken on 21st Febru-
art 1966 by the President of the French 
~public concerning the modification of the 
relktions between France and the integrated 
military organisation of the North Atlantic 
Tteaty:" 
't 
In. -sub-paragraph 1 (a), second line, after 
the words " ... combat aircraft", a minority of 
the committee would have added the words 
"engaged exclusively". 
·' •' 
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APPENDIX I _.;::. 
Paris, lfitk Se~ember· '19:M 
Questionnaire on procedures and facilttia affecting 
the international movement of warships and · 
military aircraft 
prepared by Mr. Davieaaart, Rap'porteur 
The Rapporteur has been asked to report on the material and political difficulties of securing strate-
gic mobility, including refuelling facilities and overflying rights for fUr forces, a~ ·bunkering :l'acllities and 
rights of paBB&ge for warships, both within the NATO area a.nd world-wide. 
With a view to securing basic information for the preparation of his report,· the Rapporteur is ·addres-
sing this questionnaire to the . Ministries of Defence of allied countries. Their co-opelation in· cdinpleting 
it would be much appreciated. 
Notetl on completion of the qae8tionnaire 
(i) It is &BBumed that most of the information requested in this questionnaire will be "uncl&BBified"; 
the Rapporteur will feel free to use in a. published report all information not specifically cl&BBified. 
(ii) It is appreciated that many of the specific questions and sub-questions may not be applicable to 
certain countries. Please insert "n.a.." in places concerned. It is also appreciated that some specific questions 
may require a detailed reply ; please attach separate sheets for detailed replies as necessary with the num-
ber of the question concerned, all of which are unambiguously numbered (e.g. II.A.l.lj) (i) refers to "are 
foreign submarines required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag in the territorial sea 1"). 
(iii) Please note special cases where facilities or rights are relevant to, or could be relevant to, NATO 
commitments, e.g. movements of ACE mobile force, land or air component: STANAVFORLANT, STANAV-
FORCHAN, naval on-call force Mediterranean, movements of reinforcements to training areas, etc. 
NAME OF COUNTRY REPLYING TO QUESTIONNAIRE 
I. Military aircraft 
I.A. Procedures and facilities applying to overfllght of the country replying by 
foreign military aircraft 
I.A.l. Clearance for overflight& 
I (i) (ii) (m) (itl) 
In respect of NATO countries Other allied Warsaw Pact Other countries aircraft of (specify if countries countries (specify as 
What different (specify) (specify as necessary) 
clearance arrangements e.g. : CENTO, necessary) 
is required ! apply to different bilateral 
countries) 
(a) Diplomatic clearance; state number of 
days' notice required 
(b) Air traffic control notification only; 
state length of notice required 
(c) Other clearance, annual quota agree-
menta, etc. (specify) ; state length of 
notice required 
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I.A.2. Oaiegorie& of overfligkt by foreign military aircraft permiUed by country replying 
(State whether ca.tegory is generally permitted, generally forbidden or considered on a ca.se-by-
ca.se basis) 
In respect of (i) (ii) (in) NATO countries Other allied Warsaw Pact aircraft of (specify if countries countries 
different (specify) (specify as 
Category arrangements e.g. : CENTO, necessary) 
apply to different bilateral 
countries) 
(a) Combat aircraft 
(b) Transport aircraft 
I.A.3. Information concerning overfligkts required by country replying 
In respect of 
(i) (ii) (iii) 
NATO countries Other allied Warsaw Pact aircraft of (specify if countries countries 
different (specify) (specify as 
Information 
arrangements e.g. : CENTO, necessary) 
apply to different bilateral 
countries) 
(a) Aircraft type 
(b) Aircraft load 
(c) Purpose of flight 
(d) Airport of origin 
(e) Airport of next destination 
(f) Airport of final destination 
I.B. Procedara and faeUitla applying to .taging by 
foreign military aircraft in the coantry replying 
I.B.l. Clearance for staging 
(i) (ii) (m) 
In respect of NATO countries Other allied Warsaw Pact 
aircraft of (specify if countries countries 
What different (specify) (specify as 
clearance arrangements e.g. : CENTO, necessary) 
is required ? apply to different bilateral 
countries) 
(a) Diplomatic clearance; state number of 
days' notice required 
(b) Air traffic control notifica.tion only ; 
state length of notice required 
(c) Other clearance, annual quota agree-
ments, etc. (specify) ; state length of 
notice required 
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Other countries 
(specify as 
necessary) 
(w) 
Other countries 
(specify as 
necessary) 
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I.B.2. Oategorie8 of staging by foreip milita'71 a~rcraft ~rmitted. by wu;ntry replying 
(Sta.te whether category is generally pemlitted; generally forbidden: or considered on a case-by-
M basis) · 
'- lii~of (i) (U) (m) NA'tO countries Other allied Warsaw Pact 
aircraft of 
'(speCify if countries countries 
different (spetlify) (specify as 
-
-arrangements- e.g. : CENTO, JlSileBI.ry) -Category apply to different bilateral 
countries) 
-
(a) Combat aircraft 
•.. 
--
(b) Transport aircraft 
--' '' --
..... 
" . .. : _~. 
--
- ' 
1.1).3. Information eot_UJerning Btaging . requiret!- by . CO'!IIIIJf't/ repl~ng 
-" 
In respect of 
'{i) (ii) (m) 
,-. 
" NATO countries · Other allied War118w Pact &ho'raft of (apeoify if: countries. countries .. 
different· (speoify) (specify as 
· Information arrangements _ e.g. : CENTO, necessary) apply to different bilateral 
countries) 
(a) Aircraft type . 
(b) Aircraft load 
(c) .Purpose .of flight 
t 
_(d) ~rt of ~rig~ 
--
-- -
(e) Airport of next destination . ' 
(f) Airport of final destination 
' 
·-
.. 
I.C. ProceduN8 flftfl f~ ·applYfrW to owr(lfgltt· -of foreign 
COIIJitn. ~7 mllf,., .atreratt of . .co•tr.Y ... ,.,.. 
(w) 
Other ~'!IDtries 
(specify as 
necessary) 
.. 
' 
<w> 
Other countries 
(ilpecif'y as 
neceaaary) 
. ' 
.. 
'' 
.. 
-- -. 
.. 
1.0.1. Clearance for overflig11Js ~ . . . . . ' 
(i) (ii) (m) (w> .~ 
•, c- :aequu,d ~y.: - :NATO ·couiltiieil Other allied · ' < War118w Pact Other countries 
...... (specify• if countries countries .. · · (specify as 
What .- ' ,. .. , . dift'erent·, (speoify) (speoify aB n~) 
clearanoe ,, • ammgements-~ . e.g. : CENTO, necessary) '., : 
is required ! applyto~t bilateral .. 
countries) ~ 
(a) Diplomatic clearance ; state number of I '. '.' : . . .. .. 
days' notice required . ' 
(b) Air traffic control notification only; .. . - : : 
state length of notice required ...... -
(c) Other clearance, annual quota. agree- .-. ' " J 
-
menta, etc. (specify); state length of : 
notice required .. -
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1.0.2. Oategoriu of overfUgkt by military aircraft of wu:titry replying tOOt are permitted by fMeign countriu 
(i) (U) (ui) 
Permitted by : NATO countries Other allied Warsaw Pact 
(specify if countries countries 
dift'erent (specify) (specify 88 
-. " :~oey 8o1Tallg8Dlents e.g. : CENTO, neoeesary) apply to dift'erent bilateral 
countries) 
·-
(a) Combat aircraft 
(b) Transport aircraft 
-· --
1.0.3. ln.formalion concerning ouerfUgkts required by foreign countriu 
(i) (U) (m) 
Required by : NATO countries Other allied Warsaw Pact 
(ipeolfy if countries countries 
different (specify) (specify 88 
lD{QJmation arrangements e.g. : CENTO, neoeesary) apply to dift'erent bilateral 
-
- - countriee) 
•, '. --
." 
-
(a) Airoraft type 
(&) Airci'aft load 
(c) Purpose of flight 
(d) Airport of origin 
(e) .Airport of next destination 
· (/) Airport of final destination 
I.D. Preeedu,... flflfl fadlltl- applylnt/ to aCaglnt/ in foNfgn 
COIIIdrNe •J' mmtary a#.rcrafl of country NpiJ'Intt 
I.D.l. Olearan.ce for Blagin.g 
(i) (U) (m) 
Required by : NATO countriea Other allied Warsaw Pact 
(llpeoify if countries countries 
What dift'erent (specify) - (specify 1111 
clearance airangements e.g. : CENTO, neoeesary) 
ia required ' 
apply to dift'erent bilateral 
countries) 
(a) Diplomatic clearance; state number of 
days' notice required 
(b) Air traffic control notification only ; 
. 15t;ate, leng,th of notice required 
--, . -
(c) Other clearance, annual quota agree-
ments, etc. (specify) ; state length of 
-
.. notice required 
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I.D.2. Categorie8 of Blaging by military aircraft of counlry replying wktek are .pertnilted by foreip eou~ 
(State whether category is generally permitted, generally forbidden or considered on a case-by-case 
basis) · 
(i) (U) (m) (iv) 
Permitted by-l' NATO countries Other allied Warsaw Pact ~.-901,1Q.tries (specify· as . (specify if countries countries 
different (specify) (specify as neceaary) 
Category arrangements e.g. : CENTO, ~) apply to different bilateral 
countries) "' 
(a) Combat aircraft ,. 
(b) Transport aircraft 
-
. '' 
' 
" 
I.D.3. · Information concerning ataging required-by foreip countriea 
-
(i) (ii) (Ui) > ·{ivY 
Required by : NATO- countries Other allied Warsaw Pact Other countries 
(specify if countries countries (specify as -
different (specify) (specify as necessary) 
Information arrangements e.g. : CENTO, necessary) .... apply to different bilateral . 
countries) 
~ T " .. 
-
(a) Aircraft type 
-., . - -· 
(b) Aircraft load -- -. - ~-
'. 
(c) Purpose of flight 
(a) Airport of origin 
'' 
(e) Airport of next destination 
. . . .. .. .. 
U> Airport of final destination 
,- .. 
-
-
.. 
D. Wal'81a.,. · 
D.A. Procedarea Gild fadlifiea appJ.ylng to the JH1118116• Gild · ., :.. 'i 
navigation of foreign IDCirships In the terrftorldl ••a and •tralfe of country replying - -- · ' ·. · -. 
II.A.l. Territorial, aea 
II.A.l.(a) What is the limit of the territorial sea claimed by the country replying! 
II.A.l.(b) (i) Is the right of innocent passage of foreign warships recognised through the territorial 
sea 1 What definition of innocent passage is applied (ii) to surface ships ; (Ui). to sub~ 1 
II.A.l.(c) (i) Have regulations been made concerning passage through the territOrial * which'would 
apply to innocent passage by foreign warships! (specify) [Article 17 of the Geneva Convel'ition 
on the territorial sea (1958)]. · · · · · · 
~ - ' ''( .-. -
II.A.l.(c) (ii) Have foreign warships been required to leave the territorial sea for disregardi:gg. C()&Stal 
State regulations Y (specify) [Articl~ 23 of Geneva Convention]. 
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II.A.l.(d) Before the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea by a. foreign warship is exercised 
does the country replying require: (i) its prior authorisation to be obtained 1 (ii) a.dva.nce notice 
to be given t (specify number of days).· 
II.A.l.(e) Ha.s. the right of "innocent pa.ssage" through the territoria.l sea. been temporarily suspended 
for the protection of the security of the country replying t [Article 16 (3) of the Geneva. Oonven-
~]. . 
II.A.l.(/) (i) Are foreign submarines required to navigate on the surface a.nd to show their flag in the 
territorial $ea. t {specify exemptions if a.ny); (ii) is the rule enforced effectively 1 
[Article 14 (6) of the Geneva. ·Convention]. 
II.A.2. Straits 
li.A.2.(a) Do a.ny straits used for international navigation between one part of the high seas a.nd another 
pa.ss through the territoria.l sea of the country replying ! 
II.A.2.(b) Does the country replying cla.im the right to limit in any wa.y the right of innocent :R&SB&ge oi 
foreign warships through such straits ! 
ll.A.2.(c) Are a.ny such straits covefe4 by a. .SJI6C?ia.l ~gime arising fron:t a specific inte~tional oonvention 1 
(specify, with title, date a.nd list of parties thereto).· 
D.B. Proadam and fflcil#tia qplylng to port CfiUa 
fly fotelgn IDCinthi_.. In the coantry replying 
tt.B.l. Authorisation and 'IUJC#icolion required by cauntrg replying 
In respect of 
(l) (U) (Ut) 
NATO countries Other allied Warsaw Pact 
warships of (specify if countries countries 
What authoriSation different (specify) (specify 88 
or notification arrangements e.g. : CENTO, neceesary) 
is required by apply to different bilateral 
country replying t . countries) . .. 
(a) Prior authorisation through diplomatic 
channels ; . (specify usual time required 
for authorisation) 
(b) N otifica.tion through military channels; 
(specify notice ·required) 
(e) Other procedure under · specia.l agree--
menta, etc. (specify) 
.. 
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II.B.2. Porl jacilitie8 pravided by t'..O'Umrg· retJ,ying 
. . . 
What For warships of (i) . (ii) (iU) (w) 
facilities N.A,TO co~tries Other allied Warsaw Paet O~er countries 
are normally (specify if countries countries (specify as 
difrerent (specify) (specify 88 necessary) provided by the 
arrangements e.g. : CENTO, necessary) country replying t 
apply to different bilateral (specify if standard 
·QOuntrlE!II) charges are made or 
waived in each case) 
(a) Tugs 
' (b) Berths, moorings 
·. 
(c) Food, fresh water 
· (d) Fuel 
(e) Emergency repairs 
(/) Other repairs 
(g) Shore leave for crews . .. 
D.C. Patlfl6e ofUJGrahl_.- of eoantl'.)' replying in terrltorlcrl 
sea of foreign eoantrlea 
.. 
II.C.l. Territorial sea 
II.C.l.(a) What is the limit of the territorial sea of foreign countries that is recognised by the coun~ry 
replying: (i) are all claims of foreign countries recognised 1 (ii) are such claims recognised up 
to a limit 1 . (specify). 
II.C.l.(b) 
II.C.l.(c) 
II.C.l.(d) 
II.C.l.(e) 
II.C.l.(/) 
( i) Does the cotintry replying claim the right of innocent passage for it& warships through 
the territorial sea of foreign countries t What definition of innocent passage does it ~pt 
for (ii) its surface ships; (iii) its submarines -i (iv) Does the country--exercise its right .of. inno-
cent passage or has it been unable to do so 1 (specify countries, ·occasions). 
(i) Do warships of the country replying recognise and.comply ~ih coastB,i _State·regru,.tions 
governing passage through the territorial sea 1 (specify as necessary) ; (ii) Have warships of the 
country replymg'lleen required to leave territorial waters of foreign States. for disregarding 
coastal State regulations 1 (specify). [Articles 17 and 23 of the Geneva. Convention]. 
Before exercising t)le right of innocent ·passage for its warships through the territorial sea of 
foreign countries, does the country replying (i) obtain the prior authorisation of thE? coastal 
State where required to do so 1 (specify); (ii) provide advance notification where required 1 
(specify countries so requiring and number of days' notice). 
Have warships of the country replying had their right of innocent passage through the territorial 
sea temporarily s~pended by foreign coastal S~tes 1 (specify) [Articl~ 16 (3) of the Geneva 
Convention on the Territorial Sea (1958)]. · 
Do $Ubmarines of the country replying navigate on the surface and show- their flag when exer~ 
cisiDg the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea of foreign coun~es ! (specify 
exceptions) [Article 14 (6) of the Geneva Convention]. · 
II.C.2. Straits 
II.C.2.(a) ·Do the warships ·of the country replying exercise the right of innocent passage through straits, 
in the territorial sea of foreign countries, used for international navigation between· one part 
. of the high seas and another 1 (specify straits chiefly involved). 
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II.C.2.(b) Have the warships of the country replying had their right _of innocent passage through such 
straits liiriit.M m any way ! · · · · 
p;.,C.2.(c) Is the country replying a party to.any international agreements providing a special regime for 
passage through international straits of which its own territorial sea is not a part 1 (specify, 
.·with tables, dates-~ list of parties thereto). · 
D.D; Pro.:edu,.. Gild (fliciUU. apply"" to port calla by auarships 
of COIIIItr'.)' replying in forsljn COIIIItrt.8 
(i) (w") (Ui) 
' 
.. '' Is required by : NATO oountrii!s Other allied Warsaw Pact 
(specify if countries ooun~es 
What different (specify) (specify as 
authorisation arrangements e.g. :_ CENTO, necessary) 
or notification 1 apply to dift"erent bilateral 
countries) 
~,.,... 'i~ .... , , • " 
' (a) Prior authorisation through diplomatic 
cha.J,mels; (specify usual time required 
.. 
. -
·, .for- authorisation) 
. ;..~~~ '. -\ 
(b) Notification through military channels; 
(specify notice required) 
(c) Other procedure under special agree-
ments, etc. (specify) 
.. -. I 
II.D.2-. Potl Jacilitiu prot1ided by foreip ·cov:nkiea 
- ., '; . - -, '. 
Provided by 
- (i) (U} <*1 
NATO countries Other allied Warsaw Paot 
Facilities (specify if countries countries 
provided for .. -_. ..•.. -different . '- (specify) (specify as 
warships of country arrangements e.g. : CENTO, necessary) 
repl~ 1 apply to different bilateral 
' · ·<&il~tty -if standard charge~ countries) 
· · ite triilide 'or waiVl!d in each case) t 
~ ... 
(a) Tugs -- -. 
(b) Berths, moorings 
(c) Food, fresh water 
(tl) Fuel 
(e) Emergency repairs 
(/) Other repairs ' 
(g) Shore leave for crews 
--
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(w) 
Other countries 
(specify as 
necessary) 
(w) 
Other countries 
(specify as 
necessary) 
A..PPBN'DIX I DOOUMDT- '168 
D.E. Fleet auxiliary ., .... ,. (e.g. fiHt ofleN, •apply cmcf repair .....r.) 
II.E.l.(a) Does the country replying consider its own fleet auxiliary vessels to be "government ships 
other than warships", "government ships operated for non-commercial purposea" to which 
Article 22 of the Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone of 29th April 1958 1 
applies, or are they deemed to be "warships" ! 
II.E.l.(b) Are the fleet auxiliary vessels of the .country replying armed, or does .the country reserve the 
right to arm them without affecting their designation under II.E.1.(a) 1 
II.E.l.(c) Do the fleet auxiliary vessels of the country replying in fact receive from other countri!3s .th~ 
treatment appropriate to their designation under E.l.(a) 1 (Describe discrepancies under the 
same heads and sub-heads as for questions II.D.1. and II.D.2. above.) 
II.E.2.(a) What designation does the country replying apply to fleet auxiliary vessels of other colm.tries: 
(i) the same as it applies to its own (~:E.l.(a)) ; or 
(ii) the designation applied by the flag country; or 
(iii) other designation (e.g. "warships") irresJ?ective of other consideration 1 
II.E.2.(b) If fleet auxiliary vessels of other countries are armed, does that fact modify the designation 
under II.E.2.(a) and, if so, in what way 1 
II.E.2.(c) :Poes the country replying extend to fleet auxiliary vessels of other countries the, .. tl'(l&tment 
appropriate to their designation under E.2.(a) 1 (Describe discrepancies under the· same heads 
and sub-heads as for questions II.B.l. and 2. above.) 
m. Conference on the lAW of the Sea 
m.A. Territorial NG 
III.A.l. What breadth of territorial sea would the country replying wish to aee adopted as the maximum 
permissible 1 (cf. Article 2 of Part II of the. revised single negotiating .text (6th May 1976) of 
UNCLOS ID). 
ID.A.2. What breadth of territorial sea will the country replying claim if the maximum of twelve nautical 
miles specified in Article 2 cited above is adopted in a final convention 1 
m.B. Trcuurft ,..... 
III.B.l. Does the country replying support the provisions for transit passage for all ships _a:ijd ~lr~f 
embodied in the UNCLOS Ill revised single negotiating text, .·};'art ;11,. Cliapter 2,. ~tiM 2t 
(a) in respect of its own territorial sea in any straits used for international navigation; 
(b) in respect of other straits used for international navigation 1 
1. Or the corresponding articles of the revised single negotiating text (6th May 1976) of UNCLOS m. 
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._ APPE~IX JI, .... 
T~ promulgated by Belgiurn-Q~Jd Denmark_1 . 
. . 
(a) Belgian royal decree of 30th December 
1923 on the admission of foreign &Darship8 to 
Belgifm wafenl· and po,., 
WE, .ALBERT, King of the Belgians, to all 
}1resent an~f to come; -greetingS : . . . . . 
Considering that the provisions -of the royal 
decree of 18th February 1901 on the admission 
of foreign warships to Belgian waters and· ports 
no longer corresponds to present circumstances ; 
On the proposal of our Ministers for Foreign 
Affairs, Railways, the Navy, PQsts and Tele-
graphs and Defenee; · · · · 
HAVE DECREED AND DECREE : 
., ' . 
General provisions relating to peaeetbne 
Article 1. The word "warship" shalt be con8i-
dered as applying not only to all warships so 
named in the normal meaning of the word but 
also to auxiliary vessels of all kinds~· · · · · 
Article 2. In peacetime, warships belonging to 
foreign powers recognised by Belgium shall be 
f~··to enter Belgian N()rth ·.Sea· PQ~ .and 
anchor in that pait . of-:~ · temtorill) • w.ate;rs · 
situated less than three nautical miles from the 
coast provided there are no more than three such 
warships flying the same. :flag~: inCluding those 
already in the area or.in- a port. ~-·· · 
Except in the cases provided for in Article 
5, visits shall always be subject to advane~:noti~ 
fication. Such notification shall be made through 
:q.ormal diplomatic .. channel.s so 8!J· w .be rec~.ived; .. 
circ,umstances ,permi.tting1 ·JI.t least seven days · 
before. the date of the planned visit. 
- •• j ' ~ • • 
Article 3. Foreign warships shaJU nqt enter JWI- , 
gian waters in the Scheldt, anchor off Antwerp 
or penetrate Belgian inland waterways without 
the authorisation of the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 
If such authorisation has not been obtained 
in advance through diplomatic channels, it shall 
be requested through the Belgian pilots' depart-
ment for the Scheldt estuary which sha1i trans-
mit the decision to the captain of the warship. 
Article 4. Unless they have special authorisation 
from the government, foreign warships may not 
stay more than fifteen days in Belgian territorial 
waters and ports. 
I. See paragraph !! of the ~ry memorandUm.. 
Th,ey shall. sail within six hours if so re-
quested by the naval authorities on instructions 
from the territorial military authorities, even if 
the Length fixed for the stay has not yet expired . 
. ,• . . 
(The third p.aragraph of this decree was 
rescinded by a royal decree of 28th October 
'1936.) 
Article 5. The ban on allowing more than three 
warships flying the same flag to enter or anchor 
freely in the area l$id -dowu in Article 2 and the 
provisions of Article 3 and. the first paragraph 
of Article 4 sha1l not apply to: 
. ' 
r. warships whose entry ha.S been autho-
rised. tlu:oug\1. _diplomatic channels; 
2. ships carrying a head of State, a prince 
of a reigning, dynasty or .a diplomatic 
official accredited to the King or the 
goveri:u:D.ent; 
3. warships forced to put into port because 
of damage, heavy weather or other rea-
sons of .force majeure; 
4. ships responsible for supervising the 
North Sea fisheries in accordance with 
the North Sea fisheries convention. 
·These fishery protection vessels shall, 
when approaching territorial waters, 
display the distinctive signa1 assigned 
to them b~ the international. convention: 
Article fJ •. Foreign warships sh4ll.n9t be subject 
to the obligation to take a pilot to navigate in 
Belgian waters but must conform to all other 
· · · regulations on anchoring and navigating in Bel-
gian waters. 
It shall be fol"bidderi. for foreign warships in 
· Belgi.an waters to conduct surveys of terrain, 
. soundings, landing or firing exereises, nor, with-
out ~uth~tio~ any und,erwater work with or 
without a diver. In no case shall foreign sub-
marines submerge in territorial waters or enter 
such waters submerged. Members of the crew 
shall be unarmed when they disembark. Officers 
and petty officers may carry knives which form 
part of their uniforms. Small vessels circulating 
in ports and territorial waters shalil not be armed. 
If funeral ceremonies have to be held on land, an 
exception to paragraph 4 of this article may be 
authorised by the Ministry of Defence at the 
request of the territorial military authorities. 
No foreign warship may execute a death 
sentence in territorial waters. 
Article 7. Captains of foreign warships shall 
observe the laws and regulations concerning 
. po,lice, health and taxation unless exceptions are 
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establtihed b.y . ~iiW· conventions. o~ · b~ inter-
n&tiona1 praetroe. 
Article 8. (Rescinded by a royal decree of 2S'th 
Octtlber· 1936,) 
Article 9: Sllould a foreiiDl warship_ not conform 
to the rules set · out in the present . decree, . the 
naval authorities or the lOcal military authorities 
shall first draw the attention of the commandmg 
officer to the infringement committed and invite 
him formally to respect· th~ reg"lfmtioos.-
If this approach fail'S th~'territoriltl military 
authOrities may ask the· iorei~ wltl'Ship to- leave 
the port or'territorial waters immemately. 
Miscellaneous provisions 
Article 10. Provisions contrary to the present 
decree. are repealed. 
~le• 11·. Tlie aiove provisions:sh.B.D not·a.ppl!Y 
in timet of way: or. mobilisatiool.or.'When· a tha!eat 
of war, reswct·for:neutraiityol'lucy ·othB:Jr consi;. 
d:emion of which 1the Belgian: Gcwernment• sha;J:l 
be th~ sore jtrdge·' C0m:pels. i1i. to 'stmpend: thei~ 
appl'icati.on. 
Article 12 . . Our Ministers for. Foreign Affairs, 
Railways, the Navy, Posts and Telegraphs and 
Defence are each responsible for implementing 
that part of th:e preselllt, decree- which: concerns 
him .. 
Done in Brussels on 30th December 1923. 
.ALBERT' 
IiaUrjtretatiue proviato...- · 
L Concef'ni1YJ .Article 2 
Although warships belonging to foreign 
powers recognised by Belgium are free to enter 
the Belgian North Sea ports and ·anehorirrterri:. 
terial wa.ters·(less th1m three nautical miles-from 
the coast) provided there are- not mol'e than 
three of. them at B1 time; such visits mnst never-
theless be preceded (SEWen days beforehand if 
possible) by notification through normal diplo-
matic chan~rels. 
2. Concerning Article 3 
It is for the Miuister for Foreign Affairs to 
grant authorisation. Foreign diplomatic missions 
do not therefore have to contact the Minister of 
Defence. 
However, for practical reasons, the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs shall not grant such authori-
sation without previously submitting each case 
to the defence authorities (naval headquarters) 
for an opinion. 
Before granting such authorisation, it is in 
fact wise to ascertain the material possibilities of 
tying up (space at the quay, draught, etc.), such 
verifications being the responsibility of the navy. 
7 
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In-t:he.ev-ent (}f..a.n..oificial ~.the.·Mi:nistry 
for- Fl<meigJI Affaim: shall. be. responsible .. for 
in.fol'Dling. :fue.. Belgian. ,a;athorities eoucerned .(t9r. 
ritorial military authorities,: p.rovin.aiall arul.com;. 
munal authorities). 
In the event of an unofficial or op~rational 
viSit, the naval headq~arters shall be responsiT>l~ 
for info~ing the Ioc~ authorities. concerned.' 
For such communications emevgency ·pmoe~ 
dure. shaH be adop~ed involving the use of the 
tel~phone followed; by · corrfi:Mnation in writing 
if· necessary. 
("'liJ 1 OHirlfmee gevernif~~K· file: CHMaissierr of 
(tlretgrr · wtrrslrips artrl · milifery aircralf r to 
DtmiSit -territory· iA time of"pet~a · 
W-E, . MARGBETHE THE. SECOND, bY. the Grace of 
GOd Queen of Denmark, Hereby: make known : 
Prm ·1 - Ge'lt6t'rll Pro.visiOft& 
1. (1) This Ordinance shall appiyto"th~ admis-
sion of·· foreign warships and· milita-ry aircraft 
to Danish territory when Denmark' as welf 'as· th-e 
State by which the vesseL or aircraft .is owned ·are 
in a state of peace. 
(2) ·Other· vessels and'' aircraft· wh1ch are 
owned.or-UBecr by a forei~ Sfate ami·wmch are 
not employed exclusively·foP--commerciaf'pll'l'pP• 
ses shall be equated with foreign· warships·· and 
military; aireraft in the application of. the provi-
sions oi"this Ordinance. 
(3) For· tire purpoees·-Gf'this- Ordirumce·the 
term ·'"passage" meiU'ls · i~n.t p8MH.gE7 within 
the· ·meaning 'M. international 'law .. 
( 4) Where advance pernUssiGn.. is· requi.J:ed 
pursuant to this Ordinance, the appLication for 
suah perm.issionJ·sfudl btnmbmitted::nnt less than 
eight ·days inD ad.Tanae:. Where' aci'vaace- notifica;. 
tioo of: passage' is reqni:Jred, such· notifitia.tion 
shall be givennmt less than three da.~ in a,dV8.11(te 
of 'the: proposed~~· · 
( 5) Tli.e Mfuister of Defence may make 
reroeptions- te- · ~ · prov-isiQna. Gf tms. ·Ordinance\ 
2. (1) For the purpose. of:this- Ordinance:tll'e 
term "Danish territory"· mea.II!f ·Danish land ter-
ritory and Danish territorial waters and the air 
space over these territories. 
( 2) Danish territorial waters embrace the 
territorial sea and internal waters as defined in 
the reLevant provisions in force at any given 
time. 
Part 2- Warships 
3. (1) Foreign warships shall enjoy the right 
of passage through the territoriaJI sea subject to 
advance notification being given through diplo-
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matic channels, cf., however, sub-section (4) 
below. For the vessels referred to in section 1, 
sub-section (2), notification of passage shall not, 
however, be required. 
(2) Where navigation within the territorial 
sea takes place in connection with passage of the 
Great Be~t, Samsoe Belt or the Sound, notifica-
tion shall not be required, cf., however, sub-sec-
tion (4) below. 
. ( 3) Foreign warships shall not be allowed 
during passage to stop or anchor in the territo-
rial sea except where advance permission to do 
so has been obtained through diplomatic chan-
nels or where stopping or anchoring are inci-
dental to ordinary navigation or are rendered 
necessary by force majeure or by distress. 
( 4) For simultaneous passage of the terri-
torial sea of more than three warships of the 
same nationality advance permission, obtained 
through diplomatic channels, is required. Pas-
sage of the Great Belt, Samsoe Belt or the Sound 
shall be allowed, however, subject to advance 
notification through diplomatic channels. Per-
mission or notification, as the case may be, shall 
not be required for the vessels referred to in 
section 1, sub-section (2). 
4. (1) Warships may pass through or stay in 
internal waters where advance permission for 
such passage or stay has been obtained through 
diplomatic channels. 
( 2) Passage of Hollaenderdybet;Drogden 
and passage of the Little Belt and, in connection 
therewith, the necessary navigation by the 
shortest route through internal waters between 
Funen, Endelave and Samsoe shall be allowed, 
however, subject to advance notification through 
diplomatic channels. 
5. The permissions and notifications referred 
to in sections 3 and 4 shall not be required for 
vessels in distress. In the event of distress the 
vessel shall give international distress signal and 
notify Danish naval authority - possibly 
through a Danish coastal radio station. 
6.- (1) Warships may not without special per-
mission conduct scientific or military activity 
within Danish territorial waters. 
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(2) Submarines are required to navigate on 
the surface while within Danish territorial 
waters. 
(3) Warships shall show their naval or 
national flag while within Danish territorial 
waters. In port flags may, however, be used 
under traditional regulations governing the dis-
play of flags. 
Part 3- Military aircraft 
7. (1) For flights over or landing in Danish 
territory of military aircraft advance permission, 
obtained through diplomatic channels, is 
required. This provision shall not apply to aircraft 
which, with the approval of Danish authorities, 
are conducting flights for humanitarian pur-
poses. 
(2) Permission to overfly or land in Danish 
territory will be granted onLy if an ordinary 
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisa-
tion) flight schedule is submitted prior to the 
flight to the competent Danish air traffic service 
organ and if the flight is otherwise carried out 
in accordance with the guidelines set out by 
ICAO and the provisions relative to these guide-
lines laid down by Danish aeronautical autho-
rities. 
8. (1) Military aircraft may not without spe-
cial permission conduct scientific or military 
activity within Danish territory. 
( 2) Military aircraft may carry permanent 
installation of weapons without ammunition and 
cameras without films or plates. Electronic 
equipment other than such as is required for 
navigation of the aircraft may not be used by 
military aircraft over Danish territory. 
Part 4 - Repeal 
9. Royal Ordinance No. 356 of 25th July 1951 
governing the admittance of foreign men-of-war 
and service aircraft to Danish territory in time 
of peace is hereby repealed. 
Done at Amalienborg Palace on 27th February 
1976 
Under Our Royal Hand and Seal 
MARGRETHE R. 
Doeument 758 
Amendment No. 1 
Strategic mobility 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Dejardin 
29th November 1977 
1. Leave out the third paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation. 
2. In paragraph l(a) of the draft recommendation proper, after "combat aircraft on" insert "exclusively". 
,. 
1. See 12th Sitting, 30th November 1977 (Amendment agreed to). 
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Signed : Dejardin 
Doeument7S8 
Amendment No. 2 
AMENDMENT No. Z 1 
tabled by Mr. Valleix 
30th Nonmhr 1977 
In paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper, after "Atlantic Alliance" insert ",with due res-
pect for the different positions of the member States towards the integrated military organisation". 
Signed : V alleiz 
I. See 12th Sitting, 30th November 1977 (Amendment negatived). 
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Document 759 25th Nove~ 1977 
RepUes of the Cowacll to Recommendations B9'l to 306 
RECOMMENDATION 297 1 
on a European armaments policy 8 
The Assembly, 
(i) While wishing for a mutual and balanced reduction of armaments in Europe, believing that the 
increasing cost of future generations of weapons systems makes it urgent and imperative for the European 
countries of the Alliance to secure the economic and military advantages of standardisation through joint 
production ; 
( ii) Noting : 
(a) that the proliferation of equipment types reduces the operational capacity and the cost effective-
ness of the defence of Westem Europe; 
(b) that the growing complexity of modem weapons systems causes a large increase in equipment 
costs; 
(iii) Considering the inherent political dangers of any armaments industry which relies on exports to 
third world countries or areas of conflict ; 
(iv) Welcoming recent indications that the United States will increasingly seek standardisation of 
equipment in the Alliance ; 
(v) Stressing the need for satisfactory parliamentary control both at European as well as a.t a national 
level of the defence procurement process, and resolving itself to play a r6le until the European Parliament 
is invested by statute with defence functions, 
REOOMMBNDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
Urge member governments, aeverally and jointly in all appropriate bodies, to pursue the following 
objectives : 
I. Ensure the maintenance of a viable defence production industry in Europe taking account of the 
needs of national defence plans and of the Alliance : 
(a) by giving first priority to the joint production of standardised equipment in Europe while ensuring 
the interoperability of existing equipment throughout the Alliance ; 
(b) by pursuing secondly further standardisation in the Alliance as a whole ; 
2. Streamline the institutional basis of joint production : 
(a) by concentrating on the independent European programme group; 
(b) by ensuring that military characteristics of equipment are determined within NATO; 
3. Inform the Assembly accurately and fully of the nature and extent of the terms of reference given 
to the Standing Armaments Committee on 26th April 1977. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1977 during the First Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session (2nd Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Dankert on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and .Armaments (Document 738). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 291 
I. The Council take full account of the economic and military reasons for greater co-operation in the 
production and procurement of armaments, as argued in the preamble to the Assembly's recommendation. 
They appreciate the need to offset the consequences of the rising cost of the advanced defence systems 
now being developed, and of the proliferation of equipment types. They have missed no opportunity of 
urging the governments of member States to pursue, in all appropriate bodies, the objective of maintaining 
a viable European armaments industry. This objective should be achieved by ensuring the interoperability 
of existing equipment between all the member States of WEU and by standardisation between them as 
far as possible. The Council also recognise that the process of procuring and manufacturing defence 
equipment should, inter alia, ensure the maintenance of a viable European armaments industry, possessing 
a research and development capacity in the most advanced sectors. 
The maintenance of such an industry is essential for the common defence of the countries of 
Western Europe and plays a vital part in their economy by providing many jobs. 
The way to safeguard this industrial and technological potential lies through the organisation of 
co-operation between the countries of Europe. 
In this connection, it should be borne in mind that the western armaments industries in fact differ 
widely in level and cannot engage in open competition, which might be damaging to them. 
This is why the European members of the Atlantic Alliance have started to co-operate on the 
implementation of specific projects within the independent European programme group. 
2. In the Council's view, recent major developments, which have strengthened the links between the 
WEU countries in this respect, should be seen in this light. 
The Council refer to the mandate given to the Standing Armaments Committee to produce a 
descriptive analysis of the situation of the European industry in the armaments sector. 
The Council also welcome the formation of the independent European programme group (IEPG) 
whose first resolution listed the following essential aims as a means of increasing the cohesion of the 
Atlantic Alliance in the armaments sector : 
(a) the more effective use of funds for research and development; 
(b) increased efforts to promote interoperability and standardisation by the most appropriate means 
(c) maintenance of a valid industrial and technological basis for the European defence industry; 
(d) strengthening the European factor in relation to the United States and Canada.. 
The Council fully acknowledge the importance of the independent European programme group no 
least as a forum for defining national requirements with a view to joint production of armaments, and 
recognise the advantage of using the results of the group's studies. To this end, they agreed at their meeting 
in Strasbourg on 26th Aprill977, that, while preparing its descriptive analysis, the Standing Armaments 
Committee should receive and use certain data which the IEPG had already produced and was willing 
to supply. In the Council's view, this arrangement also meets the point several times raised by the Assembly 
concerning the risk of duplicated studies of the same subjects by the IEPG and the SAC. 
3. The Council have at all times given their support to decisions taken by the North Atlantic Council 
and its dependent bodies concerning co-operation between the member countries of the Alliance on 
armaments and standardisation and interoperability of equipment. In this connection, they refer to their 
reply to Recommendation 281. 
4. The Council note with satisfaction the Assembly's interest in the descriptive analysis of the 
armaments industry in member countries now being carried out by the Standing Armaments Committee. 
The Council can give an assurance that the Assembly will be given full information on this analysis 
immediately the work of the Standing Armaments Committee has made sufficient progress. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd November 1977. 
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RECOMMENDATION 298 1 
on the political acttoities of the Council - reply to the twenty-second annual 
report of the Council 2 
The Assembly, 
Welcoming the positive statements on the present and future prospects of WEU made by 
several ministers at the Assembly's twenty-second session; 
Thanking Mr. von Plehwe for so ably leading the WEU secretariat during a. particularly 
difficult period ; 
Noting that the Council ha.s appointed a titular Secretary-General in the person of Mr. 
Longersta.ey ; 
Regretting that the Council is a.llowing certain procedure essential to its relations with the 
Assembly to lapse ; 
Recalling tha.t the Council has frequently undertaken to report to the Assembly on the appli-
cation of the Brussels Treaty, even if it is exercised by bodies other than WEU, 
REcoMMENDs THAT THE CoUNCIL 
l. Ensure that a joint meeting is held with the General Affairs Committee in the nea.r future 
allowing a. true dialogue to be held on essential matters concerning the future of WEU and the 
development of international relations, particularly between Eastern and Western Europe; 
2. Ensure tha.t, in accordance with customary procedure in national parliaments, governments 
provide substantial information on the aspects of their foreign policy raised in recommendations of 
the Assembly ; 
3. Continue to include in the annual report a. detailed account of its work a.s wa.s its practice 
until the twenty-second annual report; 
4. Report more fully to the Assembly on the application of the modified Brussels Treaty in 
other bodies ; 
5. Maintain its activities in accordance with the assurances given to the Assembly. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1977 during the First Part of the Twenty.Third Ordinary Session (2nd Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Treu on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 
(Document 733). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Reeommendation 898 
I. The Council wish to reaffirm the great importance they continue to attach to the development 
of close and constructive relations with the members of the Assembly of Western European Union; 
they have therefore invited the General Affairs Committee to meet them on 3rd November. 
The Council have taken note of the Assembly's concern regarding joint meetings, expressed in 
particuJar in the Assembly's reply to the twenty-second annual report of the Council. In this reply, 
the General Affairs Committee states that, in the past, it has always made clear its desire to have 
a true dialogue with the Council without giving more weight to one procedure than another. The 
Council, for their part, share this desire and will do their utmost to respond a.s satisfactorily as pos-
sible to the wish for information expressed by members of the Committee. 
2. It is always open to members of the WEU Assembly either to ask questions or to intervene 
in debates within their respective parliaments on matters of foreign policy dealt with in Assembly 
recommendations. As in the past and in accordance with customary procedure, the governments of 
WEU member countries will continue to provide substantial information to their parliaments on the 
international problems being examined by the Council or the Assembly. 
However, it can happen that parliamentarians ask questions in their national parliaments 
which are identical or very similar to those put to the Council by the WEU Assembly. Members of 
the Assembly will appreciate that the governments of the member countries must retain the option 
of either keeping to the reply prepared unanimously by the Council or postponing their reply in 
order to avoid prejudging that of the Council, if it is still being prepared. 
3. In their annual reports, the Council provide the Assembly with the appropriate information 
on their work, together with any information which can be included on matters relating to the appli-
cation of the modified Brussels Treaty by its signatories in bodies other than WEU. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st October 1977. 
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RECOMMENDATION 299 1 
on the appUcaUon of the Brussels Treaty - reply to the twenty-second cmnual 
report of the Council 2 
The .Assembly, 
Congra.tulating the Council on the content of its replies to Assembly recommenda.tions when these 
ema.na.te from the Council itself or from delega.tions ; 
Tha.nking the Council for the welcome it ga.ve the Committee on Defence Questions a.nd Arma.ments 
a.t the conversations on 31st Ma.y 1976 ; 
Noting certa.in shortcomings in the a.pplica.tion of the provisions of the Brussels Trea.ty concerning 
the control of a.rma.ments ; 
Gra.tified tha.t the Council ha.s given the Sta.nding Arma.ments Committee a. ma.nda.te whose scope 
extends well beyond the field of a.ctivities hitherto conferred on that body, 
REco:m.mNns THAT THE CoUNcn.. 
1. Ensure that replies to Assembly recommenda.tions furnished by other interna.tiona.l orga.nisa.tions 
a.re no less precise tha.n those prepa.red by the Council ; 
2. Continue to indicate in future a.nnua.l reports the tota.l number of British la.nd forces sta.tioned. on 
the mainland of Europe a.nd consider whether in the light of the security requirement of the governments 
concerned it ca.n indicate the number of such forces a.ssigned to SACEUR in a.ccorda.nce with the 
commitment conta.ined in Article VI of Protocol No. II to the modified Brussels Trea.ty; 
·3. Ensure a. fuller a.pplica.tion of the provisions of the trea.ty concerning the control of a.rma.ments, 
with pa.rticular rega.rd to biologica.l a.nd chemica.l wea.pons ; 
4. (a) Ensure a. continuing excha.nge of informa.tion between the independent Europea.n progra.mme 
group a.nd the Sta.nding Arma.ments Committee ; 
(b) Ensure tha.t the number, sta.tus, qualifications a.nd level of the representatives of the member 
countries on the Sta.nding Armaments Committee a.re high enough to gua.ra.ntee the effectiveness of the 
work underta.ken ; 
(c) Encoura.ge na.tiona.l authorities to provide the Sta.nding Arma.ments Committee with all the 
informa.tion it requires ; 
(d) Ensure tha.t the study underta.ken by the Sta.nding Arma.ments Committee is extended to the 
field of research in order to ensure European co-opera.tion in this sector ; 
(e) Keep the Assembly regula.rly informed about the tasks entrusted to the Sta.nding Arma.ments 
ColDmittee, the time-ta.ble a.nd successive stages a.nd the results obta.ined. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1977 during the First Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session (2nd Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments (Document 745). 
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1. In reply to Assembly recommendations the Council will continue to take account of the work in 
hand in other international organisations to which the member States of WEU belong, endeavouring to 
ensure that whatever information is provided to the Assembly is as precise as possible. 
2. The Council will also continue to indicate in future annual reports the total number of United 
Kingdom forces stationed on the mainland of Europe. With regard to the provisions of Article VI of Protocol 
No. II to the modified Brussels Treaty, the Council will continue to receive from the British Government 
additional information from which it will satisfy itself that the approved number of British forces assigned 
to SACEUR on the mainland of Europe is maintained. In view of the security requirements of the 
governments concerned, however, the Council consider that such additional information would not be 
suitable for inclusion in future annual reports to the Assembly. 
3. The Council have at all times been attentive in ensuring that the mission of the Armaments Control 
Agency is duly carried out, in the circumstances which are well-known to the Assembly and have regularly 
been described in annual reports and in replies to Assembly recommendations on this subject. 
In the case of biological weapons, the Assembly is invited to refer to the Council's reply to Written 
Question 157. 
4. The Council observe that the governments represented on the Standing Armaments Committee all 
participate in the IEPG and are therefore particularly well-placed to further a. continuing exchange of 
information between the two bodies. The Council consider that the number and qualifications of the 
national representatives who compose the SAC are satisfactory. They also recognise that each member 
government must have sole responsibility for determining the type, extent and classification of the 
information it wish~ to supply to the SAC but it is clear that the Committee will only be able to carry 
out its task if member governments co-operate satisfactorily with the Committee. Having regard to the 
wide scope of the study undertaken, the Council believe that it would be premature to extend it to cover 
the field of research. 
5. The Council are aware of the interest taken by the Assembly in the work of the SAC and will continue 
to provide the Assembly with all the information needed for its work in this field. In this regard, the 
Council have informed the Assembly of the terms of the mandate given to the SAC on 31st May 1976 
and have also undertaken, in replying to Recommendation 293, duly to inform the Assembly of the results 
of the SAC's study. The Council trust that their decision to permit a meeting of the Liaison Sub-Committee 
on joint production of armaments will also help to keep the Assembly informed of the SAC's latest 
terms of reference. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd November 1977. 
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The Assembly, 
Gratified to note that the Council agrees on the need to seek an overall policy in the field 
of advanced technology designed to guarantee Western Europe's place in the world and to foster 
fruitful co-operation with the United States on a.n equal footing and that the Council favours the 
harmonisation of national aeronautical policies ; 
Considering that in the military field the Council recognises the need for a. joint approach 
by member countries in studying and determining their aircraft requirements ; 
Regretting the Council's decision not to draw up guidelines for a. long-term European policy 
in sectors of advanced technology, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Invite member governments : 
1. Further to their consideration of the construction of civil aircraft, to consider making a. com-
bined study of their civil and military requirements and programmes with particular regard to the 
possibility of developing a transport aircraft, different versions of which could be used for civil or 
military purposes; 
2. To continue to give a. high priority to the operational utilisation and commercialisation of 
application satellites developed in Western Europe ; 
3. In the field of a. common European energy policy, which remains of the highest priority, to 
seek the closest possible co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy ; 
4. To advance the interests of fusion research in Europe by taking an early decillion on the 
siting of the Joint European Torus. 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1977 during the First Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session (2nd Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Lenzer on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 736). 
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The Council share the Assembly's view that Europe needs to develop and apply overall aero-
nautical, space and energy policies. 
Believing that the countries of Western Europe, acting both through bilateral agreements and 
within the Community, should concert their efforts and co-operate to maintain the European indus-
try's capacity and technical level, the Council note with satisfaction the progress achieved by the 
European partners in working out a concerted approach. 
For example, in the case of both civil and military aircraft, a substantial degree of co-opera-
tion has been established between European manufacturers. Moreover repeated appeals have been 
made for closer co-operation with regard to the construction of a civil transport aircraft. The Council 
shal-e the Assembly's wish for the development of a European civilian and military aeronautical 
industry capable of co-operating, on an equal footing, with the United States. 
The Council propose to deal a.t greater length with space questions in their reply to Written 
Question 178 which is now being studied. 
The Council also share the Assembly's views regarding the urgent need for a. common energy 
policy. Various international expertises as well a.s the estimates of the EEC Commission have shown 
the serious risk that as early a.s in the 1980s, world-wide demand for oil will no longer be met by 
sufficient supplies. The Council of the European Community, therefore, agree on the need to co-ordi-
nate national policies and develop common instruments as regards energy conservation, better use 
of more plentiful and, in particular, indigenous fuels and development of new technologies and sour-
ces of energy. As regards the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Assembly will certainly be a.wa.re 
of the co-operative action envisaged by Euratom and of the projects jointly developed by a num-
ber of Community countries in the field of European fast-breeder reactors (in particular, the Super-
pMnix fast breeder jointly developed by France, Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany), and 
in the field of uranium enrichment (Eurodif or Urenco) .. 
Furthermore, the Council of the Communities have recently authorised the Commission to float 
a number of Euratom loans. European standards have been laid down, particularly on protection 
against radioactivity. Nevertheless, the Council consider that much still remains to be done both in 
defining a common European supplies policy and in developing a nuclear industry with mastery of 
the fusion cycle. Finally, in the longer term, Europe's nuclear fusion potential must be developed, 
so that a prototype controlled fusion plant will be available by the end of the twentieth century. 
The Joint European Torus is directed to this end, as are a number of national projects. The Council 
therefore welcome the decision taken on 25th October, agreeing a site for the JET and consider that 
European nuclear fusion research must be pursued so that Europe can achieve a technological level 
comparable with that of the United States and the Soviet Union. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 25th November 1977. 
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The Assembly, 
(i) Aware that the military capability of the Soviet Union is continually increasing, as defence 
expenditure in real terms steadily rises, as considerable improvements in Soviet technology enhance the 
effectiveness of its unquestioned numerical superiority in manpower and equipment, and as new strategic 
nuclear missiles are prepared which could threaten Western Europe; 
(ii) Believing that a policy of detente can be actively and safely pursued only on the basis of close 
consultation and cohesion in the Atlantic Alliance, backed by public support for a fully adequate defence 
effort ; and w~lcoming therefore the new resolve of all the Atlantic allies "to strengthen their mutual 
support efforts and co-operation" ; 
(iii) Welcoming the intention of the new United States Administration to secure significant reductions 
in the numbers of Soviet and American strategic nuclear weapons, provided always that the essential 
basis of mutual deterrence and the security of the Alliance is not jeopardised ; 
(iv) Considering that there are both positive and negative features in the application by the Warsa'W 
Pact countries of existing East-West agreements affecting detente, and in the progress of other ongoing 
negotiations ; 
(v) Calling for all such agreements to be continuously and closely monitored in the Alliance, as well 
as in WEU, with a view to ensuring their strict observance by both sides, and to assessing the spirit in 
which the voluntary provisions of the final act of the conference on security and co-operation in Europe 
are being interpreted by the Warsaw Pact countries; 
(vi) Believing however that, properly conducted, the process of detente can bring advantages to both 
East and West in increasing stability and security at lower economic cost to both sides, 
RECOMMENDS TO THE CoUNCIL 
That it urge member governments: 
1. To seek to ensure that the North Atlantic Council continues its careful preparation for the meeting 
of representatives of Ministers to be held in Belgrade in 1977 in pursuance of the CSCE final act: 
(a) by continuing to compile, on the basis of reports from member States, the record of the 
implementation by the Warsaw Pact countries of the CSCE final act, with particular attention 
to all items in the documents on "confidence-building measures and certain aspects of security 
and disarmament", on "co-operation in humanitarian and other fields" as well as to co-opera-
tion in other fields ; 
(b) by agreeing that the policy of all members of the Alliance with respect to the Belgrade meeting 
shall be: 
(i) to ensure at the preparatory meeting now being held that the meeting at the level of 
representatives appointed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs is not delayed ; 
( ii) to exclude from the agenda any proposed new items which seek to undermine Alliance 
policy; 
(iii) to present the full record of the implementation of the final act so far; 
(iv) to seek to strengthen and extend the voluntary provisions for confidence-building measures, 
and to report on the progress or lack of progress of the negotiations on mutual and balanced 
force reductions ; 
2. To ensure that the MBFR negotiations are pursued with determination on the present lines until 
the gap is bridged between Warsaw Pact and NATO positions; 
3. To seek to secure a moratorium on the further development by all countries of cruise missiles and 
strategic bombers, pending the outcome of the bilateral SALT negotiations ; 
4. To propose that Soviet nuclear missiles based outside the MBFR guidelines area, but targeted on 
Western Europe, and other comparable forward-based nuclear weapons, be discussed in an appropriate 
East-West arms control forum. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 21st June 1977 during the First Part of the Twenty.Third Ordinary Session 
(3rd. Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. de Koster on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments (Document 744). 
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I. (a) The North Atlantic Council have carefully prepared the meeting of representatives of Ministers 
which is being held in Belgrade. The Nine have likewise closely co-ordinated their position to that end. 
An extensive record of implementation has been compiled concerning all the elements of the :final 
act, especially "co-operation in humanitarian a.nd other fields" a.nd "confidence-building measures a.nd 
certain aspects of security and disarmament". 
(b) With respect to the preparatory meeting of the Belgrade meeting, which was concluded on 
5th August, there is reason for general satisfaction a.s far a.s the results of this meeting are concerned : 
(i) the meeting on the level of representatives appointed by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs has 
meanwhile started on 4th October; 
(ii) the western allies have been on their guard against a.ny attempts to introduce into the debate 
proposals which might weaken the position of the Alliance. As a result no new proposal of this 
kind has been put on the agenda. ; 
(iii) a. satisfactory result has been gained in particular as regards item 4 of the agenda. of the 
Belgrade meeting. Under this item a.n exchange of views has begun on the implementation 
both of the provisions of the final act a.nd of the tasks defined by the conference, as well as 
in the context of the questions dealt with by the latter, on the deepening of mutual relations, 
the improvement of security a.nd the development of co-operation in Europe, a.nd the 
developments of the process of detente in the future ; 
(iv) some member countries of the Atlantic Allia.nce have tabled a. new proposal a.t the Belgrade 
meeting to strengthen a.nd extend the provisions for confidence-building measures. 
2. There is a. firm determination on the part of the western powers involved to pursue the MBFR 
negotiations along the present lines. 
3. Cruise missiles a.nd intercontinental bombers are included in the bilateral strategic negotiations 
between the United States and the USSR which could soon lead to a. SALT II agreement. 
4. In the present set-up of arms control negotiations like MBFR a.nd SALT neither the United States 
non-central weapon systems nor the Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles, targeted on Western Europe 
are the subject of discussion. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd November 1977. 
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Welcoming the decision by the councils of the co-ordinated organisations to introduce a pension 
scheme; 
Deploring nevertheless that the governments did not take an immediate decision to set up a 
joint body to manage the pension scheme for all the co-ordinated organisations; 
Regretting that the pension scheme regulations do not provide for a. reversionary pension to be 
granted to the widowers of female staff in the same conditions as for the widows of male staff ; 
Noting the slowness in reforming the procedure for co-ordination and the unacceptable delay in 
applying the adjustments proposed by the Co-ordinating Committee in May 1977, 
REcoMMENDS THAT THE CoUNOIL 
I. Promote in the framework of the co-ordinated organisations : 
1. The early establishment of a joint body to manage the pension scheme ; 
2. The granting of a reversionary pension to widowers of female staff in the same conditions as 
for widows of male staff ; 
3. The creation of a. voluntary savings system for granting loans for the purchase of accommo-
dation; 
4. The establishment as soon as possible of a committee of senior experts to plan and promote 
a personnel policy ; 
II. Avoid excessive delays in adjusting salaries in accordance with increases in the cost of living 
which lead to a progressive decline in the purchasing power of staff ; 
Ill. Invite the Public Administration Committee to transmit to the Assembly its study on condi-
tions for seconding national officials. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd June 1977 during the First Part of the Twenty·Third Ordinary Session 
(4th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Lord Selsdon on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration (Document 742). 
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I. 1. The Council consider that the pension scheme of the five co-ordinated orga.nisations could 
with advantage be managed by a joint unit. The Co-ordinating Committee of Government Budget 
Experts has instituted a working party to study this question. On this subject, the Secretaries-
General have called on the assistance of an internationally reputed expert to advise on the practical 
problems associated with the creation of such a unit. The expert recommends the setting-up of the 
administrative unit to operate as from January 1978. 
The Council however have not yet taken a position on this question. 
2. As requested by one of the councils of the co-ordinated organisations in June 1977, the 
Co-ordinating Committee is now studying the question of reversionary pensions. Consideration has 
been given to the possibility of a.llowing female staff who have opted to stay in the provident fund 
to reopen this option in the event of the pension scheme rules being amended to include uncondi-
tional reversion on a widower of a survivor's pension upon the death of his spouse. 
3. Staff members who opt for the provident fund will continue to have the poBBibility of obtain-
ing loans as in the past. For those staff members who opt for the pension scheme, the Council note 
that the Secretary-General of WEU is already studying various suggestions. 
4. The functioning of the machinery for co-ordination is currently under review by various 
authorities. 
II. In December 1976 and January 1977, the councils of the five co-ordinated organisations 
approved the 133rd Report of the Co-ordinating Committee which amended the procedure for 
adjusting the remuneration of staff of those organisations. 
This more elaborate procedure, applied this year for the first time, for the annual salary 
adjustments due on 1st July, allowing for changes in cost-of-living and in standard-of-living, has 
caused delays in preparing intermediate but related advances limited to cost-of-living increases. 
Advances based on these increases for the first half of 1976 were granted in December 1976 and 
for the second half of 1976 in June 1977. 
The Council are following closely the development of this problem. 
III. As recommended by the ABBembly, the Secretariat-General has transmitted to the Clerk of the 
ABBembly the information collected by the Public Administration Committee during its enquiry into 
conditions for the secondment of national officials to international organisations. 
It is recalled that this study, carried out at the request of the Council, was concerned with 
the implementation in member countries of the principles recommended by the Council in this matter. 
These principles, which were transmitted to the ABBembly with the Council's twentieth annual report, 
were the outcome of the studies of the special working group set up in October 1971 following 
Recommendation 200. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd November 1977. 
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Aware that the large numbers of modem attack submarines in service with the Soviet navy pose 
a serious threat to allied communications, both acr088 the Atlantic and between the different parts of 
Western Europe ; 
Aware that a significant part of the Soviet nuclear threat arises from the Soviet strategic submarines ; 
Believing that the European NATO countries must be able to provide an effective ASW capability 
from their limited resources, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE 0oUNon. 
Urge member governments : 
1. To ensure that their anti-submarine warfare forces are fully interoperable, with particular reference 
to communications, and in appropriate cases to increase the standardisation of these forces ; 
2. To call on the independent European programme group or on Eurogroup to undertake an evalu-
ation of European ASW requirements and capabilities with particular reference to shallow waters and 
the use of maritime patrol aircraft ; 
3. To increase their support for the SACLANT anti-subma.rine warfare research centre at La Spezia 
through closer liaison with national centres and improved facilities for national research staff to spend 
time in the international allied environment of the SACLANT centre. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd June 1977 during the First Part of the Twenty·Third Ordinary Session 
(5th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the supplementary Report tabled by Mr. Raper on behalf of the Committee 
on Defence Questions and Armaments (Document 743). 
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I. The Council have considered carefully the points raised in Recommendation 303 on anti-submarine 
warfare, which they have noted with interest. 
2. The Council are agreed that the interoperability of ASW forces is a worthy aim. 
For over twenty years, the navies of the member States of the integrated military organisation of the 
Atlantic Alliance have shared common tactical doctrines and procedures ; proposals for co-operative research 
and development of future ASW sensors and associated equipment is now under consideration and encou-
ragement is being given to joint consideration of the wider aspects of acoustic warfare. In the ASW weapon 
field, the longer-term aim of member countries of the integrated military organisation of the Atlantic 
Alliance is to achieve at least interchangeability (as opposed to simple compatibility) to ensure economical 
and flexible logistic support. However, these States also recognise that the effective control and co-ordination 
of total ASW resources is dependent upon interoperability in communications between shore Commanders, 
ships, submarines and aircraft. 
3. The Council are aware that the independent European programme group is already examining the 
harmonisation of plans for the replacement of equipment and this could certainly cover ASW requirements 
in coastal waters and the use of maritime patrol aircraft if the independent European programme group so 
decided. Since the independent European programme group is now recognised as the main forum for European 
collaboration in the defence equipment field, Eurogroup would not be appropriate for such an evaluation. 
4. The member countries of the Council belonging to the integrated military organisation of the Atlantic 
Alliance fully endorse the call for increased support of the ASW Research Centre at La Spezia.. Closer liaison 
between the research programmes of the SACLANT Centre and related national research programmes is 
being encouraged and should lead to greater participation by national research staffs in the Centre's inter-
national allied environment. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st November 1977. 
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Gratified that the elections on 15th June 1977 testified to the Spanish people's free choice in 
favour of a. democratic parliamentary regime ; 
Recognising the important constitutional and political changes which have occurred in Spain 
during the last sixteen months ; 
Welcoming the moves towards a more liberal system of government which have taken place 
since 1975, in particular the legalisation of political parties and of free and independent trade unions; 
Recognising the important advances made in the new preliminary constitution of Spain, and 
expressing the hope that Spain will proceed on its way towards a full system of parliamentary demo-
cracy; 
Expressing the wish that Spain will soon be able to take its place in the process of building 
Europe; 
Noting that Spain is in fact already associated with western defence policy in Europe, 
RECOMMENDs THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Examine closely the evolution of the Spanish political regime, the application of universal suffrage 
and guarantees of public freedom ; 
2. Insofar a.s there are valid guarantees regarding the establishment of democracy, promote the early 
participation of Spain in Western Europe's economic and political activities; 
3. Study the possibility of close co-operation between Spain and the WEU member countries. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 22nd June 1977 during the First Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session 
(5th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the supplementary Report tabled by 1\lr. Urwin on behalf or the General 
Affairs Committee (Document 746). 
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The Council share the Assembly's satisfaction at the rapid advance towards a liberal regime 
in Spain and, in particular, welcome the massive endorsement by the Spanish poopm;. on 15bh June 
1977, of the moves towards democracy in their country. 
The Council are following closely the further progress of the reforms introduced in Spain and 
are·· gratified that umvet:BILI! sufFrage• has been: appJied and publie· fireedom guarnteed. 
They note further that, having returned to the concert of democratic European nations, Spain 
cur now pla.y ·her faU part ow th-e intenm.tiona.l seene and.; ca.n. move close~t to her~ Ewr~n. partners, 
in accordance with both her traditions and her interests. 
In line· with thl:Y ·wish expressed by· the. AMembly, the ·Council view with·· favour· t~ develop-
ment of close · co~ooper&tioru between Spain and the· member· countrielt' of. W estem Europeam · Union. 
They will give every consideration to ways and means of bringing this about. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st October 1977. 
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Concerned that, a]though Western Europe's energy supplies are far from being adequate1y 
guaranteed, only 12% of the European Communities' energy research budget is allocated to new sour-
ces of energy and on1y very small percentages of the member countries' research and development 
budgets are earmarked for this purpose ; 
Deploring the continued absence of consensus on a common energy policy and, therefore, the 
fact that no concrete measures can be agreed upon in the Community and OECD frameworks ; 
Convinced that a common Western European policy should advocate long-term measures to 
reduce dependence on imported energy and therefore promote research and development on maritime 
sources of energy, inexhaustible supplies of which are available to the Western European countries; 
Aware of the United Kingdom's research and development in the field of wave power, and of 
France's tidal power plant and its further research and deve1opment on tidal energy, 
RECOMMENDs THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Request member governments to seek political agreement on a European energy policy in the 
Community framework and on the assignment of a higher percentage of its research and develop-
ment budget to new sources of energy, in particular to maritime sources of energy; 
2. Promote a joint working group on tidal and wave-power energy of French and British scien-
tists and engineers, together with experts from other interested countries, to study - in the light 
of experience already acquired in setting up oil rigs in the North Sea and elsewhere - the future 
possibilities of this kind of energy and problems of corrosion and ocean behaviour; 
3. Foster the harmonisation of policies to achieve practical resu1ts through joint action in devel-
oping maritime sources of energy in view of their future importance ; 
4. Review the possibilities of exploiting the resources of the ocean for energy supplies. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 23rd June 1977 during the First Part of the Twenty-Third Ordinary Session 
(7th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Jessel on behalf of the Committee on Scientific• 
Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 737). 
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Desiring to keep Western Europe's dependence on imported energy, especially petroleum, to the 
minimum, the European Community and its member States attach great importance to research and 
development on alternative sources of energy. Within the framework of the European Community 
preference is given to such projects as are of relevance to the largest possible number of member 
States. 
The use of tidal power necessitates special geophysical conditions. In Europe it is only some 
coastal regions in France and the United Kingdom which meet minimum requirements for the con-
struction of tidal power stations. The technology required to operate a tidal power station is known 
and has been applied. It therefore needs no subsidised further development. The type of work invol-
ved in the construction of a tidal power station is largely determined by local circumstances such as 
the nature and configuration of the terrain and the tide rise, and is therefore of no general signifi-
cance. The contribution which tidal power stations can make to energy supplies is small, and their 
economic efficiency is questionable. 
It is much the same with wave power. The United Kingdom, with its island position, has a. 
national programme for the utilisation of wave energy, but in other countries wave power cannot be 
expected to contribute substantially to energy supplies. 
A working group of the International Energy Agency, chaired by Great Britain, is currently 
discussing research and development on wave-power energy. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 21st October 1977. 
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The Assembly, 
Considering Israel's wish to establish closer links with Western European countries in the 
research and development of advanced technology ; 
Aware that in various fields such as the desa.lination of water, Israeli research and develop-
ment might be of great benefit to several Western European countries; 
Convinced that collaboration between Israel and Western European countries would be mutually 
advantageous, especially in: 
(a) new sources of energy such as solar energy; 
(b) oceanography, desalination engineering and pisciculture; 
(c) aircraft construction and space programmes; 
Considering that Israel, although not geographically part of Europe, is already co-operating 
with such European organisations as CERN and Euratom ; 
Conscious of the need for Europe to play a more important geo-political rOle and to act as a 
balancing factor for the world superpowers ; 
Aware of the necessity to have good relations with all Middle Eastern countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNciL 
Invite member countries : 
I. To intensify co-operation between Western European and Israeli scientific and technological 
communities ; 
2. To promote greater co-operation with Israel in aircraft construction, oceanography and the 
development of new sources of energy ; 
3. To instruct the European Space Agency to seek co-operation with Israel in its work on scien-
tific and application satellites ; 
4. To promote a permanent discussion with all Middle Eastern countries in the field of science 
and technology. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 23rd June 1977 during the First Part of the Twenty.Third Ordinary Session 
(7th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum : see the Report tabled by Mr. van Ooijen on behalf of the Committee on Scien-
tific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 735). 
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The Council consider it desirable that the member countries of WEU should co-operate with 
all Middle Eastern countries in the field of scientific research and technological development for peace-
ful purposes and welcome the recommendation of the WEU Assembly that member countries inten-
sify their co-operation with Israel in this sector. 
Thanks to its high level of scientific and technical development, member countries have long 
been co-operating fruitfully with Israel in this field. 
Article 18 of the EEC agreement with Israel and the exchange of letters thereto reaffirm the 
intention to promote scientific and technological collaboration. The competent EEC bodies are at 
present examining suitable projects and ways and means for Israel to participate in European co-
operation on scientific and technical research in widely varied fields of activity. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 23rd November 1977. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on the spread of nuclear energy and defence problems 
The Assembly, 
Considering that nuclear energy is a. fact of international life which will provide a. high percentage 
of the world's electricity by the end of the century, that several other energy options might eventually 
be a.va.ila.ble a.nd that decisions regarding nuclear energy should take account of the major concern to 
avoid further proliferation of nuclear weapons; 
Aware that a.t present the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. exercises safeguard a.nd 
control measures only with regard to specific export equipment a.nd material a.nd not a.ll the nuclear 
activities of a. recipient nation ; 
Welcoming the agreement reached by the fifteen nuclear exporting countries in London in September 
1977 to prevent further sales of advanced nuclear technology without adequate safeguards a.nd controls; 
Stressing the need to avoid any form of safeguard a.nd control measures which would undermine 
the existing non-proliferation treaty, which guarantees countries non-discriminatory access to nuclear 
technology for peaceful purposes, 
REOOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNOIL 
Urge member governments : 
1. To promote world-wide co-operation in monitoring a.ll the various activities in the field of nuclear 
energy; 
2. To make full use of diplomatic channels in order to strengthen world-wide international safeguards 
and controls, increase the responsibilities of the !AEA a.nd establish multinational regional nuclear fuel 
centres; 
3. To give impetus to the development a.nd international application of procedures a.nd stringent 
measures to protect nuclear facilities a.nd nuclear materials, in storage or in transit, from terrorist seizure 
or diversion. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Jessel, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. This report should be considered as a follow-
up to the reports submitted by Mr. 0Rborn, 
Mr. Small, Mr. Lenzer, Mr. Cornelissen and, at 
the last session, by your Rapporteur 1, The 
Committee's and the Assembly's preoccupation 
with energy problelll8 is fully justified since 
energy may be considered as the nerve system 
which controls the economy of the Western 
European countries. At the same time, a Euro-
pean Community approach to this problem 
cannot be achieved since national governments 
wish to retain their authority in this essential 
matter. 
2. The first draft report on this subject was 
submitted by the former Rapporteur, Mr. van 
Kleef, who left the Netherlands Delegation 
before the Committee met in Bonn on 3rd 
November 1977. Although the Rapporteur was 
therefore unable to introduce and defend his 
text, on the proposal of the Chairman the Com-
mittee discUBSed the draft report and its 
preliminary draft recommendation. The pol-
itical and industrial consequences of some of 
the recommendations submitted by Mr. van 
Kleef were considered inappropriate in view of 
Europe's present energy situation. The Com-
mittee did not agree to the postponement of 
decisions on (i) a European or national pro-
gramme for setting up fast-breeder production 
lines, (ii) the export or sales of fast-breeder 
reactor demonstration plants, and (iii) the 
establishment of enrichment or reprocessing 
facilities ; neither did it agree to the indefinite 
deferment of decisions on commercial reproces-
sing and recycling of uranium or plutonium. 
3. Your present Rapporteur was then appointed 
and agreed to try to produce a report in line 
with the general views expressed by the Com-
mittee. 
4. He is convinced that since 1945 the NATO 
nuclear umbrella has been beneficial and has 
helped to maintain peace both in Europe and 
throughout the world. He is strongly in favour 
of the application of all measures necessary to 
arrest the proliferation of nuclear facilities or 
weapons as promoted by the non-proliferation 
treaty. 
5. Although the governments of member coun-
tries, in the framework of the EEC, OECD 
and its International Energy Agency, and 
NATO, have been trying to find solutions to the 
problems of energy supplies, little progress has 
been made since the summit conference in 
I. Documents 640, 655, 686, 721 and 737 respectively. 
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Copenhagen in December 1973 when the heads 
of State and government agreed to develop 
a common policy towards existing energy 
resources, research into new energy sources, and 
the diversification of sources of supply. Current 
projects in each country were to be developed 
in harmony with other member countries. Since 
then, however, the Council of the Communities 
in Brussels has produced a paper on energy 
targets to be reached by 1985 and, on 29th 
March 1977, it drew up rules for crisis man-
agement in the event of an oil shortage. The 
lack of progress is mainly due to the larger 
countries of the Communities being extremely 
reluctant to commit themselves. 
6. A second matter of concern is that no plan 
for sharing scarce energy supplies between the 
EEC countries has been found acceptable by 
any of the governments, although they acknow-
ledge that in the long term supplies cannot be 
guaranteed. The absence of guarantees might 
have direct repercussions on the security of the 
Western European countries. In Europe, only 
the Soviet Union has adequate supplies 1 and 
the political implications of turning to that 
country for energy supplies would be most 
serious. 
7. Third, there is no obvious solution for 
meeting the needs of developing countries which 
are poor in primary sources. 
8. As often in the past, Europe is obliged to 
find answers to these questions because the 
United States, having taken the lead, forces 
them to take decisions in its wake. 
9. On 24th June 1977, President Carter 
declared in New York: 
"We are trying to stop nuclear proliferation 
around the world. I think eight months ago 
there was a general feeling among the 
leaders of nations on this earth that it was 
too late, that the genie that could kill all 
mankind had escaped, that there was no 
way to put it back in the bottle. 
But we have worked very closely with our 
friends and allies in Canada, Australia, 
Britain, and other countries to make sure 
the the peaceful use of atomic power can 
continue to generate electricity and give us 
power, but that the waste products that can 
be changed into explosives would be care-
fully controlled. 
And I believe we now have a good prospect 
for success." 
1. See Appendix I. 
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10. Considering this statement your Rapporteur 
realises that President Carter is not against 
nuclear energy and the United States pro-
gramme of light-water reactors will continue ; 
sixty new reactors are to be built, making a 
total of 140 nuclear power plants in the United 
States by 1985. 
11. Major third world countries such as Brazil, 
Pakistan, Iran and many others, are firmly 
convinced that they need nuclear energy to con-
tinue their development. This means that they 
want national authority over the whole cycle of 
nuclear energy. The United States is very 
reluctant to allow these countries to have the 
dangerous elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, i.e. 
uranium enrichment and plutonium reproces-
sing, under national control. 
12. The problem of nuclear proliferation came 
to the fore with the recent decisions by West 
Germany and France to sell nuclear fuel 
facilities to Brazil and Pakistan respectively. 
However, countries such as Iran which, unlike 
Brazil and Pakistan, have signed the treaty on 
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, will 
concur in not building or importing enrichment 
or reprocessing plants only if they are assured 
of a continuous supply of enriched uranium. In 
order to avert the need for individual repro-
cessing facilities, a multinational facility for 
servicing spent fuel should be established under 
the authority of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in Vienna. Several European 
countries such as Belgium, France and Germany, 
and outside Europe, Japan, are not inclined to 
accept the American policy unconditionally. The 
Netherlands Government backs the American 
policy and the United Kingdom has an inter-
mediate point of view. Your Rapporteur wishes 
to underline the fact that even without repro-
cessing plants it is possible to develop nuclear 
weaponry. 
I. International agreements 
13. Since 1960 nuclear co-operation and nuclear 
power facilities have grown enormously. The 
non-proliferation treaty 1 was negotiated in the 
1960s with provisions for voluntary renunciation 
of nuclear weapons and IAEA verification on 
the one hand and for peaceful nuclear trade, 
co-operation, and assistance on the other. There 
are now some one hundred United N&tions mem-
ber nations non-nuclear parties to the treaty, 
plus an additional nine signatories (awaiting 
ratification). The review conference in 1975 
reinforced the international non-proliferation 
sentiment. Of crucial importance of course are 
1. See Documents 454 and 672 and Appendix II. 
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countries which are not parties to the treaty 
such as India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, 
Chile, Israel, South Africa and Spain, plus two 
nuclear powers, China and France. Egypt, 
Indonesia and Turkey have not ratified the 
treaty. 
14. The treaty may be considered as an agree-
ment between non-nuclear weapon States to 
forego nuclear weapons and accept the safe-
guards, but in turn they are promised full co-
operation and assistance with nuclear power 
facilities. If the nuclear powers place too many 
restraints on nuclear trade or even introduce a 
general embargo on sensitive fuel cycle tech-
nology, they might imperil the treaty itself. 
Nevertheless, restraint in nuclear exports is 
being considered. 
15. In January 1976, seven countries-Canada, 
the United States, France, West Germany, the 
United Kingdom, Japan and the USSR -
signed an agreement to restrict the future sale 
of nuclear reactors and other nuclear installa-
tions to prevent the purchasers using them for 
making atomic weapons. They were later joined 
by Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and East 
Germany. Representatives of these fifteen coun-
tries met in London on 20th and 21st September 
1977. At an earlier meeting there in April1977 
they agreed to ensure that nuclear exports 
would not contribute to the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons or explosives. 
16. The United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan 
participated in the economic summit meeting in 
London on 9th May 1977 and agreed to prepare 
a report evaluating the impact of trade in 
nuclear power plants and fuel cycle facilities on 
the proliferation of nuclear explosives. The 
evaluation report dealt with the whole cycle 
from uranium reserves, the reprocessing of 
radioactive wastes, etc., up to the possible pro-
duction of plutonium. All aspects of the fuel 
cycle were therefore scrutinised. This report was 
submitted to all fifteen participants at the 
conference held in London on 20th and 21st 
September. 
17. The London agreement seeks to prevent 
future sales of advanced nuclear technology 
without adequate safeguards and controls. 
Future contracts for selling sensitive nuclear 
technology will be subject to controls accepted 
by the fifteen participating countries, all of 
which are able to export this technology. Loop-
holes by which an exporter might skimp on 
safeguards to gain a competitive edge are to be 
closed. The West German-Brazilian and Franco-
Pakistani contracts are not concerned since the 
London a~ement is not retroactive. 
18. Although the fifteen countries at the con-
ference aim to harmonise their nuclear export 
policies this does not constitute a cartel, nor do 
they wish to deny developing countries the 
benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. Many 
developing countries are somewhat suspicious of 
the group of fifteen as they consider steps are 
being taken to prevent them developing their 
own nuclear energy sources. This is not the 
intention of the fifteen - rather they wish to 
forestall the provision of dangerous material as 
an incentive to buy benign materiaL. The fifteen 
envisage a further meeting in the course of 1978. 
19. The documents on which the fifteen govern-
ments have each decided to base their national 
nuclear export policies will be sent to the 
Director-General of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. 
20. Addressing the United Nations General 
Assembly in New York on 4th October, Pre-
sident Carter referred to the London conference 
and its aims. He said : 
"It is a truism that nuclear weapons are a 
powerful deterrent. They are a deterrent 
because they threaten. They could be used 
for terrorism or blackmail as well as war. 
But they threaten not just the intended 
enemy, they threaten every nation - com-
batant and non-combatant alike. This is 
why all of us must be concerned. 
Let me be frank. The existence of nuclear 
weapons in the United States and the USSR, 
and in Great Britain, France and China, 
is something we ~ot undo except by the 
painstaking process of negotiation. But the 
existence of these weapons does not mean 
that other nations need to develop their 
own weapons, any more than it provides a 
reason for those of us who have them to 
share them with others. 
Rather it imposes two solemn obligations on 
the nations which have the capacity to 
export nuclear fuels and technologies - the 
obligations to meet legitimate energy needs 
and, in doing so, to ensure that nothing we 
export contributes - directly or indirectly 
- to the production of nuclear explosives. 
That is why the supplier nations are seeking 
a common policy, and that is why the 
United States and the Soviet Union, even as 
we struggle to find common ground in the 
SALT talks, have already moved closer 
toward agreement and co-operation in our 
efforts to limit nuclear proliferation." 
U. Energy development and nuclear weapons 
21. Since France and China achieved nuclear 
status in the early 1960s, all five permanent 
members of the Security Council have been 
nuclear powers. The United States, the Soviet 
Union and the United Kingdom promoted and 
a• 
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signed the 1970 non-proliferation treaty but 
France and China refused to sign it. This 
situation remained unchanged until 1974 when 
India carried out a "peaceful" nuclear test. 
22. The fact that the situation remained stable 
may have induced certain countries, and 
especially the United States, to engage in 
nuclear trade with nations that had refused to 
sign the treaty on the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. Of the twenty-nine United 
States agreements for nuclear co-operation with 
other countries, no less than thirteen are with 
nations which refused to adhere to the treaty. 
Admittedly safeguard agreements have been con-
cluded for application through the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna -
established by the United Nations - but they 
refer only to specific exported equipment and 
material and not all the nuclear activities of a 
recipient nation. A case in point is South Africa 
where, as a result of information from recon-
naissance satellites, the USSR and the United 
States thought a nuclear explosion was being 
prepared. The United States is heavily involved 
in the South African nuclear programme, having 
exported even the computers for its enrichment 
plants and having committed itself to provide 
enrichment services for the South African power 
reactors. Germany and France are competing 
strongly for reactor sales there. 
23. In August 1977 the French Foreign Min-
ister warned the South Afrieans not to develop 
nuclear explosive devices as this would seriously 
strain their relations. The German Government 
has requested the South African Government to 
sign the non-proliferation treaty and the United 
States Government also has brought strong pres-
sure to bear on the South African Government 
in this respect. Thus, nations which otherwise 
compete in nuclear matters have been able to 
align their approach and act forcefully. This 
situation also shows that national nuclear 
activities such as building a uranium enrich-
ment plant do not come under the control of the 
IAEA in Vienna ; a country like South Africa 
with large supplies of uranium could easily 
acquire nuclear independence and, in time, 
develop the necessary technology to do as it 
pleased. At present, it still depends on countries 
such as the United States and France for its 
supplies of enriched uranium and this provides 
them with a means of exerting pressure on 
South Africa. 
24. South Africa could, however, proceed in the 
same manner as France and conduct plutonium 
tests until it has sufficient enriched uranium 
from its own enrichment facilities. The Vienna 
agency is unable to apply safeguards capable of 
detecting a diversion of weapons-grade material 
in time to prevent fabrication of nuclear 
weapons if reprocessing and enrichment plants 
proliferate on a national basis. 
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25. The matter requiring the most urgent atten-
tion in respect of non-proliferation is the 
question of plutonium reprocessing. This prob-
lem is complicated by the fact that no steps have 
been taken to implement the article authorising 
the agency to regulate reprocessing and to 
require deposit with the agency of any plutonium 
in excess of that needed for recycling as reactor 
fuel. The agency is not prepared to implement 
this regulation without the firm backing of the 
major supplier agents. 
26. Proposals have been made for setting up 
multinational reprocessing plants and for the 
disposal of highly radioactive waste by-products. 
The United Kingdom, Germany and France 
have already concluded such a multinational 
arrangement and the resulting joint company, 
United Reprocessors, will be used for allocating 
reprocessing contracts on a rotating basis among 
the three plants in those countries : 
"The fuel cycle - the supply of fuel for 
nuclear power reactors - which includes 
mining, refining, fabrication of fuel ele-
ments and their use in a nuclear reactor, 
also includes chemical processing to recover 
remaining fissionable material, re-enrich-
ment of the fuel and refabrication into new 
fuel elements. In these fields a very promis-
ing industrial development is the British-
French-German joint company, United 
Reprocessors, which is an effective Euro-
pean marketing organisation. In the United 
Kingdom reprocessing takes place at the 
Windscale plant, and in France at La 
Hague. If a new facility has to be built 
this will be done in Germany. Such a plant 
might be commissioned in the second half of 
the 1970s. Because of the difficulty in 
obtaining authorisations, due to the risk of 
radioactivity being released, enthusiasm for 
building such a plant is not very great. 
The transportation of irradiated fuel is also 
done in a joint enterprise, Nuclear Tran-
sport Limited, which has its headquarters 
at Risley. This company is bringing toge-
ther the wide experience of the three 
national companies and pooling their mate-
rial and equipment in order to operate more 
economically." 1 
27. The principal obstacle to the establishment 
of a common multinational arrangement is com-
petition between the main western powers to 
sell reactors. France and Germany need export 
markets to keep their nuclear industries in 
business even more than the United States does. 
The only nuclear power plants now being sold 
on the export market are light-water reactors 
of some 1,000 MW e. The United Kingdom, 
1. See Document 640, paragraphs 104 and 105. 
222 
having chosen a different type of reactor for its 
home market, is not a competitor in the nuclear 
power plant market, but is still well advanced 
in reprocessing and enrichment technology which 
give it a share of the nuclear export market. 
28. However, British policy might change as 
the board of the National Nuclear Corporation 
has advised the government to reverse its deci-
sion to develop a British-designed steam-
generating heavy-water reactor for the next 
atomic power station programme. The board 
recommended the adoption of the American-
type light-water reactor. 
29. A second report, from the Nuclear Installa-
tions Inspectorate, stated that light-water 
reactors were suitable for commercial use in the 
United Kingdom. 
30. Both reports have been submitted to the 
Minister of Energy for action. 
31. The rapid spread of nuclear reactors, 
uranium enrichment facilities and reprocessing 
plants outside the nuclear powers, i.e. the five 
permanent members of the Security Council, has 
led to concern about proliferation problems. 
Some have suggested banning the export of con-
ventional reactor technology, advanced reactor 
technology such as that of the fast-breeder 
reactor, and fuel cycle technology until more 
acceptable safeguard institutions have been 
created. However, such a ban could wreck the 
non-proliferation treaty which guarantees coun-
tries non-discriminatory access to nuclear tech-
nology for peaceful purposes. 
32. At the end of August 1977, the South 
Mrican Prime Minister denied that his govern-
ment was preparing to carry out nuclear tests. 
He even said that South Mrica was willing to 
adhere to the non-proliferation treaty, but 
pointed out that of the thirty-four member 
countries of the directorate of the IAEA in 
Vienna, thirteen had not signed the non-
proliferation treaty and that one of the thirteen 
countries was France, which had given such a 
strong warning to South Mrica on nuclear 
tests. Whatever should be done to reinforce 
international agreements on safeguards, it would 
certainly not be wise policy to undermine the 
existing non-proliferation treaty. 
33. When a country considers whether or not 
to invest in nuclear power plants for generating 
electricity it must consider all the economics of 
a nuclear energy system of which the nuclear 
reactor itself is only a part. Since the vast 
majority of countries have opted for light-
water reactors, they are fully aware that the 
generating facility itself is useless without a sup-
ply of uranium and uranium enrichment services 
which transform the natural uranium into usable 
light-water reactor fuel. A country must be sure 
that it can either buy enriched uranium fuel 
directly or contract separately for natural 
uranium, uranium conversion services, uranium 
enrichment services and fuel fabrication services. 
The availability of enrichment services is the 
major concern since it involves advanced 
technology, which only a few countries possess at 
present, and because the present cost of enrich-
ment facilities is very high. 
34. In this connection your Rapporteur wishes 
to point out that on 25th August 1977 the 
Australian Government approved the mining 
and export of its uranium. For four years, con-
secutive Australian Governments banned uranium 
mining but this ban has now been lifted. 
Immediate development of the Ranger deposit in 
Australia's Northern Territory can now start ; 
the uranium reserves there are estimated at some 
100,000 metric tons. Three more deposits in the 
same area are to be developed, together estimated 
at some 300,000 metric tons, which means that 
in this area one-third of the world's proven 
reserves of uranium are to be found. The 
estimated cost is some $25 billion. The Austra-
lian Prime Minister told the Federal Parliament 
that uranium exports would be subject to safe-
guards and would decrease the risks of further 
proliferation of nuclear weapons 1 • The controls 
are to include a combination of international 
supervision and bilateral agreements. Potential 
customers are expected to include Japan, Western 
Europe and the United States. It is quite clear 
that the Australian attitude will influence other 
uranium-producing 'countries, which will cer-
tainly try to export not only the mineral ore 
but also the finished fuel, usable in nuclear 
reactors. 
35. Therefore, if a country decides to use 
nuclear power plants for producing electricity it 
should also consider the fuel supply system, its 
cost and the availability of fabrication services. 
As has happened in Germany, France and the 
United Kingdom, serious thought should be 
given to the consequences of the possible intro-
duction of breeder reactors in which plutonium 
produced by conventional methods can be 
effectively used if the cost of reprocessing and 
the construction of breeder reactors are econo-
mically attractive. Your Rapporteur is not con-
vinced that this course would be advisable. 
36. Any country making a major commitment to 
nuclear energy via a strategy of purchasing 
nuclear generating facilities or technology but 
not fuel cycle facilities woUJld be dependent on 
the internal political situation of the country 
from which it contracts to purchase fuel cycle 
services. For that reason it would be desirable 
for such a country either to contract for fuel 
cycle services with an international organisation 
in which domestic political factors affecting 
1. See article in The Times, 27th August 1977. 
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export agreements are of secondary importance, 
or to build the facilities itself both to serve its 
own reactors or to export such services to coun-
tries wishing to diversify their sources of supply. 
Ill. The nuclear industry in the western world 
37. In June 1955 the Foreign Ministers of the 
six members of the European Coal and Steel 
Community decided that commercial nuclear 
power could help in establishing an integrated 
European nuclear industry. This industry was 
then still in its infancy and vested interests 
were only few. Moreover, they wished to provide 
for a new source of energy, anxious to ensure 
the economic growth in what was to be the 
Common Market, which eventually came into 
being at the same time as Euratom on 25th 
March 1957. The Rome Treaty provided for 
joint enterprises to carry out projects of out-
standing importance to the development of the 
nuclear industry in the Community. However, 
Euratom had no success as the national nuclear 
industries did not wish Euratom to work on 
technology that was ripe for commercial appli-
cation. This attitude proved very advantageous 
to the United States nuclear industry which, in 
the 1970s, firmly established itself in Europe ; it 
even became the sole supplier of reactors, enrich-
ment services and reprocessing. 
38. The conventional light-water reactor became 
the predominant reactor sold by American com-
panies such as Westinghouse and General 
Electric during the 1960s and 1970s : 
"Because enriched uranium has been avail-
able in the United States from the three 
plants that were built to make materials for 
weapons and for naval propulsion, and 
because of the advantages of enriched 
uranium as fuel, it was only normal for 
American nuclear industry to apply its 
military experience with enriched uranium 
to commercial nuclear power plants. In 
building these plants Westinghouse has a 
head start as it built the light-water reactors 
now being used in some fifty American sub-
marines. The American submarine pro-
gramme was a very important stepping-stone 
and gave the American firms the chance to 
iron out many technical and management 
problems. 
The principal path of evolution for United 
States nuclear power technology has thus 
been to pursue the use of slightly-enriched 
fuels. From the early 1970s onwards this 
technology became dominant for a large 
proportion of commercial nuclear power not 
only in the United States but also in the 
Soviet bloc nations and Europe." 1 
1. See Document 640, paragraphs 93 and 94. 
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These companies sold reactor systems both 
directly and in co-operation with firms within 
particular countries. They concluded licensing 
and technical agreements with companies in 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and also 
Japan. 
39. Light-water reactors were generally adopted 
on the world market because the European 
industries, operating individually, had not been 
able to produce reactors which were as economic 
as those developed in America. In the main 
European countries the idea was to use American 
manufacturers as primary suppliers for initial 
reactors but, over the long term, to acquire the 
technology needed to produce the same type of 
reactor themselves. Each industrialised country 
felt that it was in its national interest to have 
its own independent industry for manufacturing 
the major components of the system and making 
the system operational. 
40. In Germany, Kraftwerk Union (KWU) began 
by building light-water reactors under lieence 
from Westinghouse but it renounced this licence 
in 1969 and is now completely independent from 
W estinghouse. In France there was a similar 
situation with Framatome. This is a fully-
integrated company which can produce all major 
light-water reactor components. It used to be 
partly owned by W estinghouse, but the French 
Government recently bought up most of the 
Westinghouse share in the company. The French 
and German companies are very active in the 
export market and therefore in strong competi-
tion with W estinghouse and General Electric. 
Together they could export four or five reactors 
per year, a capacity which could easily be 
expanded if warranted by demand. Both com-
panies can also provide a variety of fuel fabri-
cation services, once having obtained enriched 
uranium. 
41. Several other companies such as the Swedish 
company ASEA-Atom produce light-water 
reactors of their own design. The Swedish firm 
has sold two reactors to Finland. Brown Boveri 
and Company, a Swiss-German firm, is colla-
borating with the United States company General 
Atomic and is specialising in high-temperature 
reactors. 
42. Three major Japanese eompanies might enter 
the reactor market since they have the necessary 
experience and production capacities. 
43. Finally, the Canadians are selling their 
CANDU reactor which uses natural uranium as a 
fuel. This reactor is particularly advantageous 
for countries which possess their own supplies of 
natural uranium and do not wish to be dependent 
on foreign enrichment technology. The disadvan-
tage of this type of reactor is that it requires 
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expensive heavy water as a coolant and 
moderator 1 • 
44. The present international nuclear energy 
industry is in no way comparable to that 
which existed five or six years ago. In terms of 
operating reactors and enrichment facilities the 
United States has a commanding lead, but any 
country now wishing to purchase nuclear reactors 
can turn to France, Germany or Sweden and 
obtain nuclear power plants and systems identical 
to those which could formerly be obtained only 
in the United States. Enrichment technology or 
services are also available in France, Germany, 
the United Kingdom or even Japan. The domestic 
markets of those countries are not large enough 
to allow the reactor manufacturers to achieve 
economic production ; therefore an export 
market is needed to allow the manufacturers to 
operate their plants efficiently and to help 
spread some of the research and development 
costs. France's decision to abandon its own gas 
graphite technology in favour of United States 
light-water reactors was partly due to export 
market considerations. 
45. For politieal reasons many countries have 
slowed down their construction of nuclear power 
plants and thus there is substantial excess 
capacity in the world for producing conven-
tional reactor systems. Competition in reactor 
sales is growing and many firms are competing 
for orders in Belgium, Brazil, Egypt, Iran, 
Spain, South Africa and South Korea. 
IV. The uranium enrichment industry 
46. When the European countries decided to 
use light-water reactors they at the same time 
opted for enrichment facilities 2• At the begin-
ning of the 1970s the Commission of the 
European Communities argued that the setting 
up of a European uranium enrichment capacity 
had to form part of the overall scheme grouping 
Community and European efforts towards 
industry-oriented scientific and technological 
development. Community experts believed it was 
impossible to obtain a firm long-term under-
taking from the United States to supply the 
necessary materials and therefore they urged 
the Community to build its own enrichment 
plants. However, as no truly European nuclear 
1. See Document 649 : Advanced technology in Canada 
- the consequences for Europe, report by Mr. van Ooijen. 
2. ura:mum enrichment : The development, design, 
constructiOn and operation of systems, proceBBes and 
components to permit isotopic separation and enrichment 
of the isotope U-235 in uranium for use as nuclear fuel. 
The ~chno!ogy includes such prooeBBes as gaseous diffusion, 
centrifugat1on, and advanced systems involving lasers and 
aeronozzles. 
energy industry had been shaped the experts' 
proposals were not taken up and two groups 
were formed independently of the Community 
to establish the enrichment plants. 
47. At Tricastin in Southern France, Eurodif, 
an international consortium composed of France 
(52 %) , Belgium, Spain, Italy and Iran, is 
building a large gaseous diffusion plant using 
French technology which will eventually have 
a capacity of 10.7 million separative work units 
per year t. It will become operational in 1978 
and reach full capacity in 1982. The same con-
sortium is considering building another enrich-
ment plant. 
48. France's acceptance of Iran as a participant 
in Eurodif and the agreements concluded with 
Iran for the sharing of nuclear research and 
development, illustrate France's intention to 
promote its nuclear industry's products in this 
export market. 
49. A second international consortium, Urenco, 
composed of Germany, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, is building enrichment facil-
ities based on gas centrifuge technology. Pilot 
plants are currently operating at Capenhurst 
in England and Almelo in the Netherlands ; the 
Committee visited the latter on 27th October 
1975. 
50. The French system has a great advantage in 
that it is already operational and using proven 
technology whereas the centrifuge system is new 
although far more economical. The gaseous 
diffusion system requires more than 2,000 kW 
per separative work unit as compared to 250 kW 
for the centrifuge system. 
51. South Africa has built a pilot enrichment 
plant using the jet nozzle process which requires 
3,000 kW per separative work unit. 
52. The plant which Germany is to deliver to 
Brazil will use the centrifuge system if 
Germany's Urenco partners - the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom- agree to the transfer 
of this know-how. " 
53. Japan too is considering building an enrich-
ment plant. 
54. Today the United States is still by far the 
most important producer of enriched uranium. 
It has three gaseous diffusion plants, owned by 
the United States Energy Research and Develop-
ment Administration (ERDA) and operated by 
private American corporations. Its capacity to 
serve both domestic and foreign needs is a little 
over 17 million separative work units per year · 
this will be increased to 27.7 million separativ~ 
1. Separative work units are a measure of the work 
required to separate uranium isotopes and thus enrich the 
uranium fed to the enrichment plant. 
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work units by 1985. Seventeen million separative 
work units are sufficient for about 170 nuclear 
power plants of 1,000 MWe each. 
55. The Soviet Union has also become a sup-
plier of enriched uranium in the world market ; 
the French, followed by the Germans, Belgians, 
Italians and Swedes, have bought enrichment 
services from the Soviet Union. Soviet deliveries 
are expected to amount to 3 million separative 
work units per year by 1985. 
56. Thus, in the next decade, countries operat-
ing light-water reactors will be able to choose 
from a wide range of suppliers when contracting 
for enrichment services. 
V. Reprocessing 
57. The technology for reprocessing spent 
uranium fuel, the part of the fuel cycle that 
has caused the most concern because it involves 
the separation of fissionable plutonium from 
spent uranium fuel, is one of the most expensive 
elements in the fuel cycle. 
58. Fuel elements discharged from light-water 
reactors contain about half the fissile material 
present in new fuel elements. From economic 
and conservation points of view, recovery and 
re-use of the materials appear desirable. The first 
United States commercial plant experienced 
some operational and maintenance difficulties 
and was shut down for modification and expan-
sion. A second plant has not reached - and may 
never reach - the operational stage. A third 
commercial reprocessing plant was expected to 
commence operation in 1976, but will be delayed 
pending construction of facilities to satisfy new 
criteria for waste treatment and plutonium 
shipment 1 • 
59. From a resource standpoint the develop-
ment of a commercial reprocessing and recycling 
capacity is highly desirable for the continued 
growth of nuclear power. The continued absence 
of a reprocessing and recycling capability will 
materially increase the demands for uranium, 
increase enrichment capacity requirements, and 
necessitate interim storage of large volumes of 
spent fuel elements. 
60. The world's largest commercial plants for 
reprocessing uranium fuel are at La Hague and 
Marcoule in France and Windscale in the 
United Kingdom. A consortium of German com-
panies is participating in the construction of 
uranium oxide reprocessing plants at La Hague 
1. See ERDA publication : A national plan for energy 
research, development and demonstration : creating energy 
choices for the future, 1976, Volume 1: The plan. 
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and Windscale through the multinational 
reprocessing company, United Reprocessors \ 
which was formed in 1971. In addition, an 
experimental reprocessing plant is operating in 
Karlsruhe, Germany, and a much larger repro-
cessing plant is to be established by a German 
public utility group in co-operation with United 
Reprocessors for the early 1980s. 
61. Several small reprocessing plants are oper-
ating in Japan, Belgium and Italy. 
62. Although the world's operating commercial 
reprocessing capacity is well below current 
requirements, the technological capability to 
reprocess spent uranium fuel is known, or being 
developed, in at least ten countries and in the 
1980s they will be in a position either to build 
plants or to transfer technological capabilities to 
other countries. 
63. France recently sold a reprocessing plant to 
Pakistan with safeguards approval from the 
IAEA. A similar sale was also concluded with 
South Korea but the South Koreans later can-
celled it under pressure from the United States. 
64. In his address to the United Nations 
General Assembly on 22nd September 1975, Dr. 
Henry Kissinger, then United States Secretary 
of State, outlined the need to collaborate in 
nuclear energy matters and in reprocessing in 
particular. He stated : 
"The greatest single danger of unrestrained 
nuclear proliferation resides in the spread 
under national control of reprocessing 
facilities for the atomic materials in nuclear 
power plants. The United States therefore 
proposes - as a major step to reinforce all 
other measures - the establishment of 
multinational regional nuclear fuel cycle 
centres. These centres would serve energy 
needs on a commercially sound basis and 
encourage regional energy co-operation. 
Their existence would reduce the incentive 
for small and inefficient reprocessing 
facilities, limit the possibility of diverting 
peaceful nuclear materials to national 
military use, and create a better framework 
for applying effective international safe-
guards." 
65. In his report on second-generation nuclear 
reactors 2, :M:r. Lenzer made several recommen-
dations, one of which was directly related to the 
abovementioned address : 
"1. To formulate a long-term common 
nuclear energy policy, act immediately on 
decisions already taken in the Community 
I. See paragraph 26. 
2. Document 686. 
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and the OECD, and define the extent of 
co-operation with the United States ; 
2. To promote the further development of 
the European nuclear power industry to 
meet the increased requirements for nuclear 
power plants on the world market ; 
3. To make known in national parliaments 
and European assemblies their opinions on 
the United States proposal for multinational 
regional nuclear fuel centres." 
The Assembly adopted these recommendations 
and, on 17th May 1976, the Council replied as 
follows: 
"1. As regards the use of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes, the member countries 
of the European Community are pursuing 
a common policy based on the treaty estab-
lishing the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity. Decisions taken by the OECD 
Council or the Steering Committee of the 
Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD are 
carried out by member countries with due 
regard to their obligations under the 
Euratom treaty. Co-operation between the 
member countries and the United States of 
America and between the Community and 
the United States has been resting for years 
now on the basis of co-operation treaties. 
Under the present circumstances and in the 
light of experience, the member govern-
ments deem the extent of that co-operation 
to be adequately defined. 
2. The member governments have for many 
years been promoting the further develop-
ment of the nuclear power industry so as 
to meet the growing requirements of the 
rest of the world as well. Firms in the 
individual countries are perfectly capable 
of meeting the requirements for nuclear 
power plants on the world market. 
3. The United States proposal to operate 
fuel centres under multinational direction 
and at regional level must be welcomed as 
a possible further step towards diminishing 
the dangers of nuclear proliferation. But 
it also raises a number of political, ecolo-
gical, legal and management problems 
which need to be closely examined. The 
IAEA has begun a study on the question 
of fuel centres. As soon as its findings are 
available, and as soon as the debate that has 
arisen in the United States on this set of 
problems has produced some clarification, 
the member governments will be able to 
express well-grounded views on the United 
States proposal both to the national parlia-
ments and the Assembly." 
66. Following the address by Dr. Kissinger, in 
October 1976 President Ford announced his 
government's new policy concerning plutonium : 
until the world-wide problem of nuclear proli-
feration had been adequately dealt with it would 
be United States policy to regard the repro-
cessing of nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as 
"not a necessary and inevitable step in the 
nuclear fuel cycle". This raised the possibility of 
a complete ban on the reprocessing of spent fuel 
in the future. 
67. On 7th April 1977, President Carter 
declared: 
" ... The benefits of nuclear power are thus 
very real and practical. But a serious risk 
accompanies world-wide use of nuclear 
power - the risk that components of the 
nuclear power process will be turned to 
providing atomic weapons. 
... We believe that these risks would be 
vastly increased by the further spread of 
sensitive technologies which entail direct 
access to plutonium, highly-enriched ura-
nium or other weapons-usable material. ... 
We are now completing an extremely 
thorough review of all the issues that bear 
on the use of nuclear power. We have 
concluded that the serious consequences of 
proliferation and direct implications for 
peace and security - as well as strong 
scientific and economic evidence - require: 
- a major change in United States 
domestic nuclear energy policies and 
programmes ; and 
- a concerted effort among all nations to 
find better answers to the problems and 
risks accompanying the increased use of 
nuclear power. 
First, we will defer indefinitely the com-
mercial reprocessing and recycling of the 
plutonium produced in the United States 
nuclear power programmes. From our own 
experience we have concluded that a viable 
and economic nuclear power programme can 
be sustained without such reprocessing and 
recycling. The plant at Barnwell, South 
Carolina, will receive neither federal 
encouragement nor funding for its com-
pletion as a reprocessing facility. 
Second, we will restructure the United 
States breeder reactor programme to give 
greater priority to alternative designs of 
the breeder, and to defer the date when 
breeder reactors would be put into com-
mercial use." 
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VI. Fast-breeder reactors 
68. Referring to fast-breeder reactors in his 
report t, Mr. Lenzer wrote: 
"The fast-breeder reactor is fuelled with a 
mixture of plutonium and uranium oxides, 
clad in stainless steel and made up into very 
compact fuel element assemblies. It relies 
on the nuclear fission of plutonium and 
uranium 238 atoms in an intense flux of 
high-energy - or fast - neutrons produced 
in a highly-compact core without any 
moderator. 
All countries actively engaged in the 
development of nuclear power programmes 
consider that the fast-breeder reactor offers 
the best prospects for electricity generation 
in the 1990s. It has the great advantage of 
producing more plutonium than it consumes 
- this process being known as breeding. 
Prototype plants at an advanced stage of 
construction are being built in France and 
England, i.e. the Phoenix and Dounreay 
reactors. 
The French project is somewhat more 
advanced than the British project and has 
experienced less difficulties, but both 
promise a far more economic type of 
reactor. The type of fast-breeder reactor at 
the most advanced stage of development is 
the liquid metal cooled fast-breeder reactor. 
The liquid metal used to provide very effi-
cient heat transfer from a compact high-
power reactor core is sodium." 
69. In September 1976 a United Kingdom 
Royal Commission published a 200-page report 
setting out reasons for delaying the decision to 
move on to the industrial stage of the Dounreay 
prototype fast breeder. The question was 
whether a breeder with a 1,300 MW e capacity 
should be built. The United Kingdom Atomic 
Energy Authority stated the Royal Commis-
sion's report greatly exaggerated the dangers 
involved. 
70. In 1976, the French Government decided to 
continue with its fast-breeder reactor and 
produce the Super-Phoenix. The building of the 
1,300 MW e Super-Phoenix fast-breeder is a joint 
venture between French, German and Italian 
utilities. The French even have a 450 MW e 
export version of the Phoenix which they have 
offered for sale. 
71. Germany and Japan are ea0h building 
300 MWe prototype plants which are scheduled 
to be in operation by 1980. In Germany this is 
the Kalkar plant (SNR-300). 
1. Document 686, paragraphs 32-34. 
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72. A 350 MW e fast-breeder reootor has been 
operating in the Soviet Union since 1972. 
73. If the decision taken by President Carter 
not to continue work at the Clinch River (Ten-
nessee) fast-breeder plant is upheld, the United 
States will be the only major industrial country 
with no operational fast-breeder reactor in the 
near future. 
74. On 7th November 1977 President Carter 
vetoed a law authorising expenditure of some 
$80 million to continue construction of the 
Clinch River demonstration plant. In explaining 
his veto - the first since taking office - the 
President expressed fear lest the plutonium in 
such a plant fell into the hands of terrorist 
groUipS or irresponsible nations sustaining dan-
germlB ambitions. 
VU. High-temperature gas-cooled reactors 
75. A considerable development effort has been 
made on this type of reactor in Europe and the 
United States. However, its commercial future 
in the United States has been seriously handi-
capped since late 1975 when Gulf-General 
Atomic cancelled all orders and suspended sales 
of this type of reactor. Prior to this the French 
Atomic Energy Commissariat had drawn up 
contracts with Gulf-General Atomic to be the 
French liceiUiee for this type of reactor. 
76. In Germany the German affiliate of Brown 
Boveri and Company and General Atomic were 
joint owners of the Hochtemperatur-Reaktorbau 
(HRB). This type of reactor is still being 
developed in the framework of a German 
Government research and development pro-
gramme. 
77. •rogether with the fast breeder, it was 
allocated the largest sum of money in the 
Federal Government's budget for reootor 
development. The government hopes that such 
a reactor will help to achieve gasification of 
coal at acceptable prices. The relatively high 
steam temperature of the power systems of the 
reactor allows efficient conversion of the nuclear 
fission heat into the energy needed for gasi-
fication. 
Vm. Conclusions 
78. The energy crisis arising from the oil 
embargo in 1973 and the subsequent increase in 
oil prices applied by the OPEC countries intro-
duced a new and confusing element into the 
ongoing nuclear energy debate. To put nuclear 
power into some perspective it must be recog-
nised that the world is not running out of 
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energy. Although the relative contribution that 
oil and gas make to the world's energy supplies 
will diminish before the end of the century, 
substantial amounts of those fossil fuels remain. 
Coal resources are vast and uranium resources 
are probably much larger than currently 
estimated. Looking further ahead, solar, tidal 
and wave, geothermal and, probably, fusion 
energy can provide enormous power resources. 
If these options are successfully pursued the 
world will have plenty of energy in the future, 
although probably at costs significantly higher 
than those of today. 
79. Thirty countries, in addition to the five 
nuclear weapon States, have nuclear power 
plants in operation, under construction or on 
order. Nuclear energy has therefore become a 
fact of international life. There is now a highly 
competitive international commerce in reactors, 
uranium and supporting equipment. The prin-
cipal motive for this interest is the desire for a 
cheap source of energy. Although the original 
promise of abundant nuclear electric power at 
a fraction of the cost of other resources has 
faded, the opinion persists that economic bene-
fits will accrue over the lifetime of current 
plants. In Western Europe and Japan there is 
moreover a preference for nuclear power in 
order to develop a diversified energy base to 
increase the security of supply. Much of the 
present world economy relies on oil and gas but 
nuclear power cannot be a substitute for oil in 
such areas as transportation and petrochemicals. 
80. The growth and diffusion of nuclear power 
inevitably enhances the potential for the proli-
feration of nuclear weapons. Widespread proli-
feration would constitute an extremely serious 
danger to European security and to world peace 
and stability in general. The perils of proli-
feration are recognised by many countries, for 
example West Germany, Japan and Sweden, 
which have the ability to produce nuclear 
weapons but have renounced their production. 
There are, however, other countries which do not 
support the treaty on the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons and the whole system might 
quickly fall apart if plutonium and highly-
enriched uranium materials suitable for nuclear 
weapons, and the facilities to produce them, 
became increasingly widespread 1 . 
81. A particularly disturbing aspect of nuclear 
proliferation is that nuclear means might come 
within the reach of national or international 
terrorist groups. A highly-organised terrorist 
group might have the ability to fabricate a 
nuclear weapon from stolen plutonium or highly-
enriched uranium. This threat will emerge if 
plutonium is reprocessed and recycled or if 
1. See Appendix m. 
reactors requiring highly~enriched uranium are 
introduced. 
82. The link between nuclear power and weapon 
capability has been recognised since the end of 
World War II, as have the potential for nuclear 
proliferation and its attendant political and 
security risks. If uranium is available, trained 
personnel are the key requirement for weapon 
manufacture and detonation. Most of the tech-
nology for a weapons programme is readily 
available to scientists and engineers. Military or 
civilian defence personnel have been trained in 
nuclear science and engineering for a long time 
now and reactor and chemical separation tech-
nology has been widely diffused since 1954. 
83. The past few years have seen a rise in the 
size, sophistication and capabilities of terrorist 
groups around the world. Their activities are 
strongly motivated and modern communications 
allow terrorists to obtain a wide audience for 
their messages. For some years now there has 
been a possibility that terrorists might attempt 
to steal nuclear weapons. The proliferation of 
civilian nuclear power and its sensitive tech-
nology provide additional opportunities for 
terrorists to employ nuclear energy as a weapon. 
Through this spread new problems have come to 
the fore, qualitatively and quantitatively. Tech-
nologies which introduce weapons-grade mate-
rials into civilian activities are, of course, 
undesirable from a security point of view. If 
there were no reprocessing or recycling of 
plutonium or production of high-grade uranium 
in the high-temperature gas-cooled reactors the 
possibility of nuclear terrorism would be very 
slight since there would be fewer opportunities 
for theft. 
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84. The likelihood of nuclear terrorism is impos-
sible to assess but the possibility must be taken 
seriousLy. Security measures must be improved 
in both national and international frameworks 
where key nuclear facilities and transportation 
are concerned with a view to forestalling 
terrorist activities. It -is for that reason that 
your Rapporteur has recommended effective 
international standards and measures in nuclear 
security policies. 
85. To strengthen the controls and safeguards 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency all 
exporting countries should in future seek agree-
ments to have all nuclear facilities placed under 
the agency's safeguards when exporting to coun-
tries which have not signed the non-proliferation 
treaty. An effort should be made to renegotiate 
existing agreements to include this provision and 
to persuade other suppliers to adopt a similar 
policy. 
86. Finally, your Rapporteur is of the opinion 
that serious consideration should be given to the 
establishment of multinational regional nuclear 
fuel centres. From the European point of view 
this is a political necessity if the European 
countries do not wish to find themselves in a 
situation where the United States polices the 
western world and the Soviet Union the eastern 
world. Your Rapporteur has the impression that 
although the major industrialised nations in 
Western Europe have shown a real desire to 
develop a concerted strategy to prevent prolife-
ration, in the long term they do not believe in 
their own efforts. For that reason they are 
afraid to leave their national decision-making 
power in the hands of an international European 
authority. 
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APPENDIX I 
The Warsaw Pact 1 
Warsaw Pact countries depend on- the 
USSR to meet their energy needs, which vary in 
accordance with each country's resources. The 
USSR's oil reserves were estimated to be 83.4 
billion barrels as of 1st January 1975,- -although 
many specialists doubt this high figure. It 
became the world's largest producer of oil in 
1974 with over 9 million barrels a day, surpas-
sing the United States and Saudi Arabia. In 
1973 the Soviet Union was exporting 1.3 million 
barrels a day to communist countries, including 
those of East Europe, Cuba, Mongolia, North 
Korea and North Vietnam, and 1 million barrels 
daily to West Europe and other areas of the 
world. 
Soviet exports of oil to East European and 
other communist countries are politically as well 
as economically motivated. Although the USSR 
advised these governments as early as 1969 to 
find additional sources of oil, such as the 
Mideast, it would still like to maintain its role 
as their main supplier. The Soviet Union sells 
oil and gas to its COMECON partners under 
special trading arrangements in which it takes 
soft currencies and manufactured products. 
Although it did not increase the price of its oil 
to its East European allies in 1973 and 1974, 
the Soviet Union doubled the price in January 
1975, going from about $3.20 a barrel to about 
$7.50 a barrel, an amount which still remains 
substantially lower than the price charged West 
European buyers. 
The USSR has recently been emphasising 
long-term economic co-operation in COMECON, 
especially in energy matters ; because the other 
COMECON countries are dependent on the 
USSR for their oil and gas needs, they are 
obliged to co-operate. This co-operation includes 
joint planning in geological prospecting and 
developing enterprises for coal, oil, and gas 
extraction and processing. As production in 
extractive industries is highly capital-intensive, 
the East European countries are expected to 
share the costs by granting extensive credits to 
the USSR. From 1976 through 1980, the 
duration of their next national year-plans, all 
East European countries are expected to co-
operate in energy programmes and preferential 
development of oil and other fuel resources, as 
well as in the construction of installations and 
pipelines. 
The USSR exports oil and gas to West 
Europe as a principal means of obtaining large-
1. See "World power assessment" by Ray S. Cline, 
Georgetown University Centre for Strategic and Inter. 
national Studies, Washington, D. C., 1975. 
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diameter pipe and the hard currencies which are 
important to the USSR in the purchase of 
western technology. In 1973 the price of Soviet 
oil to West Europe was increased between 3.5 
to 4 times the old rate, to nearly $11 per barrel. 
Soviet oil earnings increased by around 50 %, 
to about $3 billion, up from about $1.2 billion 
in 1972. Total Soviet exports increased in value 
from almost $5 billion in 1973 to an estimated 
$7.5 billion in 197 4. 
Although the USSR wants convertible cur-
rencies and claims to have vast oil and gas 
reserves, it has not been able to keep up either 
with its own target figures set for production or 
with its domestic consumption and export com-
mitments. For example, it promised to supply 
West Germany with 68,000 barrels per day of 
oil in 1973, but actually delivered only 57,200 
barrels. There also have been shortages in the 
deliveries of its crude oil, high-octane gasoline, 
and light and heavy industrial fuels to France. 
It seems clear that the availability of the 
USSR's oil for export to the West will be 
declining because of Soviet and East European 
needs. What the USSR obviously wants is to 
increase its capacity over a long term through 
United States or Japanese investment in Siberian 
development projects. It also hopes gradually 
to insert itself through special arrangements 
with Mideast States into a future trade pattern 
which lets the USSR import oil and gas from 
Iran, Iraq, and other nearby producers and pass 
along to West European countries some of the 
surplus thus acquired. 
Consumption of energy, especially of oil, is 
one of the key yardsticks of economic develop-
ment. The USSR's current per capita con-
sumption of oil is less than that of the United 
Kingdom and the Democratic Republic of 
Germany and only about 40 % of that in the 
United States, but Soviet domestic consumption 
is increasing rapidly and the Soviet Union is 
developing a vast petrochemical industry. Since 
the more accessible sources of oil in the western 
part of the USSR are being depleted, more 
remote sources must be tapped to meet needs 
even though they involve high development and 
transportation costs and require advanced 
technology for exploitation. This is the main 
reason that, since 1965, the USSR has increas-
ingly turned to the United States and Japan in 
attempts to get technical help and investment 
capital. 
To make up the difference between lagging 
production, increasing domestic consumption, 
and commitments to its allies and other associ-
Al'PlDNDIX I 
ates, the USSR will have to increase its imports 
of oil from the Mideast. In 1973 the USSR 
imported 294,000 barrels of oil a day from the 
Mideast, and 402 billion cubic feet of gas from 
Iran and Afghanistan. These imports allowed 
the USSR to sell 240 billion cubic feet of gas to 
West Europe. The USSR has been buying 
Mideast oil and gas in return for military hard-
ware, industrial products, and technical assist-
ance. 
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Soviet imports of oil have been steadily 
increasing and are projected to be much larger 
in the next decade. The USSR did not suffer 
directly from either oil cutbacks or the 1973 oil 
embargo, which Soviet broadcasts encouraged. 
Currently the oil it buys from Libya and Iraq 
comes from nationalised fields. Because Soviet 
policy has been consistently pro-Arab, the USSR 
and East Europe stand to gain, not lose, from 
any future oil embargo. 
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** Afghanistan 
-Albania 
-Algeria 
-Argentine 
** Australia 
** Austria 
** Bahamas 
-Bahrain 
- Bangladesh 
*Barbados 
**Belgium 
-Bhutan 
** Bolivia 
**Botswana 
-Brazil 
** Bulgaria 
-Burma 
** Burundi 
** Ca.meroon 
** Canada 
** Cent. Afr. Rep. 
** Chad 
-Chile 
-China 
* Colombia 
- Congo, P.R. of 
** Costa Rica 
-Cuba 
** Cyprus 
** Czechoslovakia 
**Dahomey 
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Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons 1968 
Lillt of signatures, ratiflcationa and acceaaiona 
08 at 31st July 1917 
-Guinea. -Oman 
-Guyana -Pakistan 
** Haiti ** Panama 
**Holy See ** Pa.ra.gua.y 
** Honduras ** Peru 
**Hungary ** Philippines 
** Iceland ** Poland 
-India -Portugal 
* Indonesia - Qa.tar 
** Iran ** Romania 
** Iraq - Rwanda 
** Ireland - Salvador 
-Israel ** San Marino 
** Italy - Saudi Arabia 
** Ivory Coast **Senegal 
** Jamaica ** Sierra Leone 
** Japan ** Singapore 
** Jordan ** Somali, D.R. of 
** Kenya - South Africa 
** Khmer Republic -Spain 
** Korea (South) * Sri Lanka 
- Korea (North) ** Sudan 
*Kuwait ** Swazila.nd 
** Laos ** Sweden 
** Lebanon ** Switzerland 
** Lesotho ** Syria 
** Liberia **Taiwan 
** Libya -Tanzania 
- Liechtenstein ** Thailand 
** Luxembourg ** Togo 
** Madagascar ** Tongs. 
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** Denmark -Malawi * Trinidad and Tobago 
** Dom. Republic ** Malaysia ** Tunisia 
**Ecuador ** Ma.ldives * Turkey 
* Egypt, A.R. of ** Mali -Uganda 
** El Salvador ** Malta -UAE 
- Equatorial Guinea. - Mauritania ** Upper Volt& 
** Ethiopia ** Mauritius ** Uruguay 
** Fiji **Mexico ** Venezuela 
** Finland -Monaco -Vietnam 
-France **Mongolia ** Western Samoa 
** Gabon **Morocco * Yemen Arab Republic 
** The Gambia **Nepal *Yemen (PDRY) 
** Germany (Fed. Rep.) ** Netherlands ** Yugoslavia 
** Germany (Dem. Rep.) ** New Zealand ** Zaire 
** Ghana ** Nicaragua -Zambia 
** Greece - Niger ** UK 
**Grenada ** Nigeria **USA 
** Guatemala **Norway **USSR 
At 31st July 1977: Parties 99 (including Taiwan) ; Signatories 10; Non-parties 38. 
N. B.: •• States that have signed a.nd ratified or acceded; 
• States that have signed but not ratified ; 
- States non-parties. 
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APPENDIX -III 
(a) Nuclear power and nuclear proliferation capabilities 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
-- -
Nuclear power reactors (MWe) 
Country Under Forecast Annual 
NPT status Operational construction capacity bomb 
or on order mid-19808 equivalent 
Nuclear weapon State8 
United States Party 37,600 170,800 208,400 4,168 
USSR Party 4,600 9,800 14,400 288 
United Kingdom Party 5,300 6,500 11,800 236 
China Non-party 1 1 1 1 
France Non-party 2,800 18,500 21,300 426 
Insecure State8 
Israel Non-party 0 (a) 1 1 
South Africa Non-party 0 (a) 1 1 
South Korea. Party 0 1,800 1,800 36 
Taiwan Party 0 4,900 4,900 98 
Yugoslavia Party 0 600 600 12 
Status-aeelcing StateJJ 
Brazil Non-party 0 3,200 3,200 64 
India Non-party 600 1,100 1,700 34 
Iran Party 0 4,200 4,200 84 
Spain Non-party 1,100 7,200 8,300 166 
Riw.la to State8 in preceding categorieJJ 
Argentina Non-party 300 600 900 18 
Egypt Signatory 0 (a) 1 1 
North Korea Non-party 0 1 1 1 
Pakistan Non-party 100 1 100 2 
PoliticaUy-constrained major State8 
Czechoslovakia Party 100 1,800 1,900 38 
East Germany Party 900 1,800 2,700 54 
Italy Party 500 4,700 5,200 104 
Japan Party 5,100 10,400 15,500 310 
Poland Party 0 400 400 8 
West Germany Party 3,300 20,000 23,300 466 
Other developed counme8 
Australia Party 0 1 1 1 
Austria Party 0 700 700 14 
Belgium Party 1,600 3,800 5,400 108 
Bulgaria Party 900 900 1,800 36 
Canada Party 2,500 9,300 11,800 236 
Finland Party 0 2,200 2,200 44 
Hungary Party 0 1,800 1,800 36 
Luxembourg Party 0 1,300 1,300 26 
Netherlands Party 500 0 500 10 
Romania Party 0 400 400 8 
Sweden Party 3,200 5,200 8,400 168 
Switzerland Party 1,000 4,800 5,800 116 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Nuclear power reactors (MWe) 
Country Under Forecast Annual 
NPT status Operational construction capacity bomb 
or on order mid-1980s equivalent 
Other developing countries 
Chile Non-party 0 0 0 0 
Greece Party 0 0 0 0 
Indonesia Signatory 0 0 0 0 
Mexico Party 0 1,300 1,300 26 
Philippines Party 0 1,400 1,400 28 
Thailand Party 0 1 1 1 
Turkey Signatory 0 0 0 0 
Notes: Columns (3), (4), (5) derived from "World list of nuclear power plants, 31st December 1975", Nuclear 
News, February 1976. Many countries' programmes have undergone change in the past year, but the overall picture 
is reflected here. 
Column (6), "Annual bomb equivalent", is a rough approximation which assumes each 1,000 MWe in Column 
(5) is operated in such a way as to produce 200 kgfplutonium annually as a by-product, and 10 kg{plutonium 
are required for one bomb. 
(a) indicates that a country has formally announced that it has one or more nuclear plants on order or under 
construction since the data for this table were compiled. 
Srnirce: Nuclear Power Issues and Choices, page 284, Ballinger Publishing Company (Cambridge, Massachusetts). 
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(b) Research reactors U. non-nuclear countries · 
I 
Foreign Rating Uranium In Possible Country Name patron (th~rmal MW) enrichment operation bombs per year 
Australia. HIFAR UK 10 80% 1958 ** 
Austria. ASTRA us 12 90% 1960 ** 
Belgium BR-2 none 50 90% 1960 ** 
BR-3 us 40 4.4% 1962 ** 
Brazil IEAR-1 us 5 20% 1957 ** 
Canada. NRX none 40 natural 1947 2 
NRU none 200 natural 1957 10 
NPD none 80 natural 1962 4 
Denmark DR-2 UK 5 90% 1958 ** 
India CIR Canada. 40 natural 1960 2 
Israel Dimona. France 24 natural 1964 I 
Italy PRO none 30 90% 1964 ** 
ESSOR France 38 natural 1967 2 
Japan JRR-2 us 10 90% 1960 ** 
JRR-3 none 10 natural 1962 ! 
JPDR us 45 2.6% 1963 2 
Norway HBWR* none 20 natural 1959 I 
Pakistan PARR us 5 90% 1965 ** 
South Africa Safari-! us 20 93% 1965 ** 
Sweden R-2 us 30 90% 1960 ** 
R-3/Ada.m none 65 natural 1963 3 (6) 
(later 130) 
Switzerland Diorit none 20 natural 1960 I 
Lucens none 30 0.95% 1965 2 
West Germany FRG us 5 90% 1958 ** 
VAK us 60 2.6% 1961 3 
FR-2 none 12 natural 1961 ! 
FRJ-1 UK 5 80% 1962 ** 
FRJ-2 UK 10 80% 1962 ** 
AVR none 49 20% 1965 ** 
MZFR none 200 natural 1965 10 
Yugoslavia R-A USSR 10 2% 1959 l 
• This is a joint undertaking of the European Nuclear Energy Agency and as such is subject to safeguards 
to see that it "shall not further any military purpose". 
** Plutonium from these reactors would be negligible. 
Source : "Must the bomb spread" by Leonard Beaton, Penguin Books. 
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Amenclment No. 1 
The spread of nuclear energy and tbJfence problems 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Roper 
29th Nove~ 1977 
on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 
I. In the second paragraph of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out all the words after 
"with regard to" and insert "certain specific nuclear equipment and material imported under bilateral 
agreements, and nuclear material in or under the control of non-nuclear weapon parties to the non-proli-
feration treaty". 
2. After paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, insert the following new paragraph: 
"To concert their policies with other supplying countries to make the supply of civil nuclear assis-
tance of any sort to third countries dependent on the latter's acceptance of full !AEA safeguards 
on all nuclear installations and materials on their territory or under their control;". 
Signed: Roper 
I. See 11th Sitting, 30th November 1977 (Amendment agreed to). 
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The spread of nuclear energy and defence problema 
OPINION 1 
on the report. of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Qaatlons 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 1 
by Mr. Roper, Chairman 
The Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, 
29th NoveudMr 1977 
Having considered the report on the spread of nuclear energy and defence problems submitted by 
the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions (Document 760) ; 
Recalling its own report on the proliferation of nuclear weapons (Document 672) and Recommenda-
tion 264 of the Assembly, 
1. CoMMENDS to the Assembly the report of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace 
Questions (Document 760), to the extent that it would strengthen existing provisions for the non-prolife-
ration of nuclear weapons ; 
2. PRoPOSES the following amendments to the draft recommendation therein : 
(a) in the second paragraph of the preamble, delete all after "with regard to" and inaerl in its place: 
"certain specific nuclear equipment and material imported under bilateral agreements, and 
nuclear material in or under the control of non-nuclear weapon parties to the non-proliferation 
treaty" ; 
(b) insert a new operative paragraph after operative paragaraph 2: 
"To concert their policies with other supplying countries to make the supply of civil nuclear 
assistance of any sort to third countries dependent on the latter's acceptance of full IAEA safe-
guards on all nuclear installations and materials on their territory or under their control". 
1. Adopted unanimously in Committee. 
2. Member8 of the Committee : Mr. Roper (Chairman) ; 
MM. de Koster, Pawelczylc (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Ahrens, 
Beauguitte, ter Beek, Boldrini, Bonnel, Boucheny, 
Critchley (Alternate : Lord Duncan-SamlyB), Dejardin, 
F0880n, Grant, Handlos, Hardy (Alternate: WatkinBon), 
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Konen (Alternate : Spamz), Lemmrioh, Maggioni, Menard. 
Nessler, Pecckioli, Riviere, Roberti, Sckmidt, Soholten, 
Tanghe, Whitehead (Alternate : Banlc8). 
N. B. The namu of tko8e taking part in the oote an 
printed in italicB. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Roper, Chairman) 
Introduction 
1. At its meeting on 4th October the Presidential 
Committee decided to refer to the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments for an 
opinion, the report on the spread of nuclear 
enengy and defence problems to be prepared by 
the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions 1 • 
Preuious position of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments 
2. The most recent report by the Defence Com-
mittee on the specific problem of the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons and its relationship to civilian 
nuclear technology was that on the proliferation 
of nuclear weapons 2 • On the basis of this report 
the Assembly adopted Recommendation 264 on 
27th May 1975, the text of which is at Appendix. 
Paragraphs 6 to 8 of the operative text of that 
recommendation were added by amendment in 
the Assembly, and were not to be found in the 
draft recommendation contahied in the Commit-
tee's report. 
3. The attitude of the Committee expressed in 
that report can be summarised under four heads : 
(i) to urge all member countries to accede 
to the treaty on the non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons, and in their 
foreign relations to encourage other 
countries to accede to it ; 
(ii) otherwise to be prepared to supply 
civilian nuclear technology to third 
countries under conditions compatible 
with the non-proLiferation treaty -
i.e. there should be no possibility of 
materials or technology being devoted 
to the production of n-oolear explosive 
devices, because such devices could 
always be used as nuclear weapons 
whatever their avowed purpose ; 
( iii) countries supplying civilian nuclear 
technology or materials should insist 
on the safeguard controls of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency being 
extended to all n-oolear i.nsta1J.ations 
and materials in the receiving country, 
not merely to the materials or installa-
tions being supplied ; 
I. Reference Document 760. 
2. Document 672, Rapporteur Mr. Delorme, adopted 
in Committee by 15 votes to 0 with 1 abstention on 29th 
April 1975. 
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( iv) under operative paragraph 8 (b) added 
to the recommendation by amendment 
in the Assembly, IAEA safeguards 
were to be extended to the physical 
protection of nuclear material through-
out the whole nuclear fuel cycle. 
4. The Committee recalls the present status of 
the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons to which 100 countries have adhered, 
and which has been signed by a further nine 
countries who have not yet ratified the treaty. All 
members of WEU e~ept France are parties to 
the treaty, as are all other members of NATO 
except Portugal and Turkey 1• Other significant 
countries which are not parties to the treaty are, 
in Europe, Spain ; elsewhere : Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, China, Egypt t, India, Indonesia t, Israel, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka 1• 
Present proposals of the Committee 
on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions 
5. In paragraph 3 of the draft recommendation 
attached ·to its present report, the Science Com-
mittee proposes a vaguer stance on non-prolifera-
tion and safeguards than the Defence Committee 
and, on its recommendation, the Assembly have 
done hitherto. 
6. The nature of IAEA safeguards is not 
perhaps clearly brought out in the Scienee Com-
mittee's ·report, and the wording of the second 
paragraph of the preamble to the dra::flt recom-
mendation does not appear to be entirely accurate. 
Unlike Euratom safeguards, which are applied 
automatically to all nuclear material on the 
territory of the member States 2 , IAEA safe-
guards are applied only where a State concludes 
a specific agreement to accept them. Usually 
such agreements cover only specified installations 
or material on the territory of the State, but 
under the non-proliferation treaty non-nuclear 
weapon States are required to conclude agree-
ments for the application of IAEA safeguards to 
all source or fissionable material in all peaceful 
nuclear activities in the State or under its control. 
Thus, although the non-parties to the non-pro-
liferation treaty cited in paragraph 4 above are 
I. Country· having signed the treaty but not yet 
ratified it. 
2. Except for any material which a member State 
declares to be prepared for military purposes. 
all members of the IAEA, nuclear installations 
and materials on their territory are not under 
IAEA safeguards except where specifically 
covered in individual agreements. 
Conclusions - Opinion of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments 
7. The Committee agrees with, and commends 
to the Assembly, the Science Committee's pro-
posals to the extent that they strengthen existing 
provisions for the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, provided that in keeping with earlier 
reports of the Committee 1 the right is maintained 
for an existing nuclear weapon power (defined in 
the non-proliferation treaty as a country having 
exploded a nucl.ear weapon or explosive device 
prior to 1st January 1967) to assist another 
existing nuclear weapon power in the production 
of nuclear weapons, including the exchange of 
military grade nuclear materials and design 
information. Under present arrangements there 
is an exchange of military grade fissile material 
and design information between the United States 
and the United Kingdom. This right is tacitly 
recognised in the treaty on the non-proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. 
8. The Committee recommends that the draft 
recommendation of the Science Committee be 
I. Document 454, 19th September 1968; Document 
499, 4th December 1969. 
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reworded in the second paragraph of the 
preamble, and that it be fU!'ther strengthened by 
embodying the principle previously adopted by 
the Assembly in paragraph 3 of Recommendation 
264 whereby the supply of civil nuclear assistance 
to third countries should be made dependent on 
those countries accepting full IAEA controls on 
all. nuclear installations and material on their 
territory or under their control. 
9. Moreover, in view of the progressive erosion 
of the principle of non-proliferation in the last 
ten years, leading to the nuclear e~plosion con-
ducted by India in 1974 and the reported 
preparation for such an explosion by South 
Africa in 1977, the Committee would have 
preferred that a further measure be incorporated 
in the draft recommendation to ban the supply 
to individual non-nuclear weapon countries of 
p·a.rticularly sensitive plant or materials. These 
can now be considered to be fast-breeder reactors 
and fuel for them ; reprocessing plants and 
enrichment planrts. Fuel for breeder reactors may 
be readily adaptable for use in nU/Clear weapons ; 
reprocessing and enrichment plants can be 
operated to provide fissile material for nuclear 
weapons. Encouragement should instead be given 
to the establishment of regional nuclear centres 
to be owned and operated by and under the full 
control of the IAEA or Euratom. Sensitive plant 
and materials for non-nuclear weapons countries 
should then be supplied only to such regions! 
centres. 
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APPENDIX 
RECOMMENDAnON 264 1 
on the proliferation of nuclear weapons 1 
The Assembly, 
Regretting that despite a certain progress in arms control negotiations, and the acceptance of "essen-
tial equivalence" in strategic armaments by the superpowers, the numbers of nuclear weapons have con-
tinued to grow ; 
Considering that the nuclear explosion conducted by India threatens the stability of relations in 
the area, undermines the basis on which nuclear technology can be made available by one country to 
another, while doubtless adding nothing to the security or economic resources of India ; 
Aware of the vital importance, in view of the energy crisis, of nuclear power being available to all 
countries for civil applications ; 
Believing that the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons still offers the best basis on 
which the peaceful applications of nuclear energy can be made available in full to all countries, while avoiding 
total nuclear anarchy ; 
Noting with keen satisfaction that, after the United Kingdom, five other member States of WEU 
have adhered to the treaty and deposited on the same day their instruments of ratification ; 
Aware that the adoption of parallel if not identical attitudes on the part of the member States of 
WEU would be fruitful for Western Europe, 
RECOMMENDS TO THE CoUNOIL 
That it urge member countries : 
I. To adhere to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and, where possible, to deposit 
their instruments of ratification before the end of the review conference ; 
2. In all their foreign relations to encourage universal accession to that treaty ; 
3. To accept the full application of controls provided for under that treaty, and to concert their policies 
with other supplying powers to make the supply of civil nuclear assistance of any sort to third countries 
dependent on their acceptance of full IAEA controls on all nuclear installations and material on their ter-
ritory or under their control ; 
4. Subject to the foregoing overriding consideration, to provide the maximum possible assistance to 
third countries in all civil applications of nuclear energy ; 
5. To consult with their allies in the North Atlantic Council with a view to achieving, through the 
various arms control negotiations, a genuine reduction in the numbers of nuclear weapons without diminishing 
the essential basis of their security ; 
6. To speak with one voice now in the Geneva conference responsible for considering the application 
of the treaty and subsequently adopt joint attitudes towards the depository countries of the treaty and 
of the IAEA; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 27th May 1975 during the First Part of the Twenty-First Ordinary Session 
(4th Sitting). 
2. Explanatory Memorandum: see the Report tabled by Mr. Delorme on behalf of the Committee on Defenoe Questions 
and Armaments (Document 672). 
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7. With this in view, to convey strongly to the USSR and the United States the urgency of meaningful 
progress towards vertical non-proliferation in accordance with the commitments entered into lest the treaty 
lose its credibility and become merely an instrument of discrimination ; 
8. To increase IAEA guarantees and safeguards and in particular : 
(a) invite the nuclear States to follow the example of the United Kingdom and of the United Statee 
by making their civil installations subject to !AEA safeguards ; 
(b) extend IAEA safeguards to the physical protection of nuclear material throughout the whole 
nuclear fuel cycle. 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 264 
l. All member countries ofWEU, whether or not parties to the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear 
weapons, hold equally firmly to the principle of non-proliferation, which in their view should lead to an 
improvement in international relations. 
2. They are also fully aware of the importance of peaceful uses of nuclear energy for the economic deve-
lopment of many countries, and continue to encourage exchanges of equipment, materials and scientific and 
technical information in this field, while taking appropriate steps to ensure that exports of such nuclear 
equipment and material are not diverted from their peaceful purposes. 
3. Arms control and disarmament are matters of concern to the member countries of WEU and to the 
Atlantic Alliance ; all member countries will therefore give particular attention to any measures designed 
to discourage proliferation. The balance of forces is, moreover, a. vital factor in maintaining_ peace and all 
action of the kind mentioned above must take account of the need to safeguard member countries' security 
and stability. 
4. The Council are also convinced of the need to harmonise member countries' positions in the appro-
priate international fora. 
5. The Council stress that the problem of physical protection of nuclear material, particularly against 
loss, theft and sabotage, has until now been essentially the concern of the military nuclear States, but that 
it is in fact also the concern of other States, whether or not they have acceded to the treaty, particularly 
as such protection involves heavy expenditure which affects the economic balance and the conditions of 
production and trade of nuclear material. 
A fuller examination of this problem has been undertaken by the EEC and by a group of experts 
meeting under the auspices of the !AEA, which has submitted its conclusions to the countries concerned. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 27th November 1976. 
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The Assembly, 
International terrorism 
MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION 
tabled by Mr. Miiller and others 
with a request for urgent procedure 
28th Novemher 1977 
Considering that terrorism allows minorities to threaten the operation of democracy ; 
Recalling that terrorist action is e. threat to Europe's security because of the material and moral 
disturbances it can cause, particularly in time of crisis; 
Noting that only firm and concerted action by governments can deter terrorism; 
Welcoming the results achieved by such action in recent months; 
Welcoming also the progress made towards peace in the Middle East thanks to Egyptian and Israeli 
initiatives ; 
Considering that a. return to peace in that area. can but weaken terrorist undertakings; 
Regretting the delay by the Western European countries in expressing what is only in part a. joint 
opinion on these events, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNCIL 
I. Ensure that member countries pursue and strengthen their consultations for effective joint action 
both to fight international terrorism and to help establish e. fair and lasting peace in the Middle East ; 
2. Examine, in the light of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treaty, the implications of the present 
situation for the application of Article V of Protocol No. II on internal defence and police forces, particularly 
in view of the need to protect mobilisation centres and military or civil nuclear installations. 
Signed,: MUller, Roilgers, Me'TUle, Okannon, Grieve, Bennett, Beaumont, .A bens, M argue, Radius 
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Intemational terrorism 
DRAFT RECOMMENDATION 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. Miiller, Rapporteur 
The Assembly, 
Considering that terrorism allows minorities to threaten the operation of democracy ; 
Recalling that terrorist action is a threat to Europe's security because of the material and moral 
disturbances it can cause ; 
Noting that only firm and concerted action by governments can deter terrorism; 
Welcoming the results achieved by such action in recent months, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CoUNcn.. 
Ensure that member countries pursue and strengthen their consultations for effective joint action 
to fight international terrorism, particularly in view of the need to protect mobilisation centres and military 
or civil nuclear installations. 
1. Adopted in Committee by 12 votes to 4 with 0 
abstentions. 
2. Members of the Committee : Mrs. von Bothmer 
(Chairman); Sir John Rodgera, Mr. Sarti (Vice-Chairmen); 
MM. Abens, Ariosto, Beith, Sir Frederic Bennett, MM. 
Bizet, Brugnon (Alternate : Forni), Cermolaoce, Fa'Uld8, 
Geaener, Gonella, Grangier, Hanin (Alternate: Van Aal), 
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Mrs. van den Heuvel-de Blank, MM. Mangelschots 
(Alternate: Van Waterachoot), Mende, Minnocci (Alter-
nate: Oalamandrei), Muller, Peijnenburg, P6ridier~P.erin, 
Portheine, Reddemann, Segre (Alternate : !Treu), Urwin. 
N. B. The namu of thoae taking part in the oote are 
printed in italicB. 
Doeumeat 762 
Amendment No. 1 
International terroriam 
AMENDMENT No. 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Dejardln 
30th November 1977 
I. Insert the following new paragraph at the end of the preamble to the draft recommendation : 
"Disturbed at the spiral of violence that can be caused by acts of terrorism in a society marked by 
individualism, the lure of gain and the disintegration of social conditions favouring human relations,". 
2. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, insert: 
", whilst guaranteeing respect for private life and the free exercise of the political, economic and 
social rights of citizens which is characteristic of any democratic system.". 
Si(/'IWJ : De;ardin 
1. See 12th Sitting, 30th November 1977 (Amendment referred back to Committee). 
MINTED IN FRANCe 


